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Chapter  1 –  Introduction  
What is the potential of ethical investment to contribute to sustainable development? This 
question is the starting point of this dissertation.  
Ethical investment is changing. In the Netherlands, it started at the beginning of the 
1990s. At that time it was a marginal activity offered by very few social or ethical 
financial institutions under the impulse of specific groups of investors such as churches 
and environmentalists. A decade later, every major Dutch bank offered an ethical 
investment fund. However they did not call it ‘ethical’ but ‘sustainable’. They did not 
carry the social and environmental screening themselves but subcontracted it to rating 
organisations. A number of other changes had occurred; these are related to the criteria, 
the structure, and the actors involved.  
One major change has been the transformation of ethical investment from an activist 
movement into a commercial project in which mainstream financial institutions have 
become a dominant actor. By becoming a mainstream product the ethical investment 
community has lost some of its capacity to be critical as well as its ideological strength. 
But on the other hand investments under ethical screens have increased and may very 
soon reach the necessary critical mass to affect corporations. Criteria have become 
understandable and applicable for companies rather than idealistic and disconnected from 
business reality. The transformation of ethical investment has softened the rebellious and 
activist side of the activity but it has also created a new potential to influence 
corporations’ behaviours and practices.  
From this observation emerged the two-fold desire to understand the change that has been 
taking place within the field of ethical investment and to investigate more specifically one 
group of actors of this field, namely corporations. 
1.1 Ethical investment: construction of an institutional field 
Ethical investment is becoming an institutional field, that is a set of organisations “that, in 
the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) and which “attempt to carry on a common enterprise” (Scott, 2001). Institutional 
fields do not emerge fully formed; they evolve over time through a process of 
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institutionalisation “by which social process, obligations, or actualities come to take on a 
rule like status in social thought and action” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977b). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) institutional fields are characterised by a higher level of 
interaction among organisations of the field, the development of clear field boundaries, 
an increase in the amount of information that organisations within the field must process, 
and development of a mutual awareness and a common meaning system by members of 
the field. 
The origins of ethical investing go back to the 18th century in the US. For hundreds of 
years, many religious investors whose traditions embrace peace and non-violence have 
actively avoided investing in certain kinds of enterprises, the so called "sin" stocks - 
alcohol, tobacco, weapons and gambling. In the 1970s a series of social and 
environmental movements started to show interest in this type of investment. In the late 
1970s, the concept of social investing began to attract a considerably larger group of 
American investors, mainly owing to concerns about South African racial policy. Ethical 
investment took on a new form: it became a social movement through which citizen 
groups expressed their disagreement about companies’ misbehaviour. As a social 
movement, ethical investment was not only a reaction, but also an attempt to change 
social order or social structures (Tarrow, 1998).  
In the 1980s ethical investment arrived in Europe and once again changed form. It 
developed into a commercial product involving new types of actors, new organisations, 
new criteria and new values. Ethical investment funds suddenly became very popular 
among financial institutions. In 1984 the first ethical investment fund was launched in the 
UK, Friends Provident Stewardship. Statistics from August 2001 estimate the total for 
retail funds screened using ethical criteria at 4 billion pounds sterling (EIRIS, 2001) – 
nearly 2,000 times the original estimate made by City Observers when the first ethical 
fund was launched. In August 2001, there were 60 ethical funds in the UK (EIRIS, 2001). 
In the Netherlands the first ethical fund, ‘Het Aandere Beleggingsfonds’, was set up in 
1991. In 2001, the Netherlands counted twelve ethical funds representing around 1,684 
million Euro (SIRI Group, 2002), meaning that most of the major Dutch banks offered an 
ethical investment fund. Pension funds – who own a significant percentage of shares on 
the stock market funds – are also showing a growing interest. A UK Social Investment 
Forum survey published in October 2000 found that 59% of the largest pension funds, 
representing over £230 billion of assets, had incorporated social responsibility issues into 
their investment strategies (Eurosif, 2003).  
With the increasing demand for ethical investment funds emerged a new type of 
organisation, namely the rating organisations. In 1983, the Ethical Investment Research 
Service (UK based) was the first rating organisation set up in Europe. The Dutch rating 
organisation, Triodos Research, started its activity in 1997. In November 2001, Europe 
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counted more than 19 organisations providing social and environmental screening of 
companies. Some are new organisations while others are established providers of 
corporate governance services who have expanded their range.  
Two other major events marked the development of ethical investment. In 1999, the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index was launched, soon followed by the FTSE4Good index in 
2001. Both are market indices integrating social and environmental dimensions. They are 
managed by well known indices providers. Although they are not the first market indices 
including such aspects, e.g. Domini 4000 Social Index in 1990, they have had a 
significant impact on the business community. The second event is the enforcement of 
the UK SRI Pension Disclosure Regulation in 2000 under which pension funds are 
required to disclose whether or not they use social and environmental criteria in the 
management of their fund.  
Ethical investment is no longer a social movement led by marginal groups but it has 
become a mainstream activity dominated by financial institutions. The changes that are 
taking place within the field of ethical investment present some characteristics of 
institutionalisation. Not only structural change has taken place but also cultural change. 
In its early age, ethical investment referred to ethics and religion, but in the 1990s, it 
shifted to sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. These two 
concepts have become part of the common language of the ethical investment 
community. How did this happen? How did financial institutions and global social 
structures provide conditions for the emergence of ethical investment? What kind of 
actors crafted ethical investment standards, with what motives and purposes, and through 
what modes of activity? What implication did this have on the activity of ethical 
investment? And what does it add to the potential of ethical investment to influence 
corporations to change towards sustainable development? 
1.2 A quest for legitimacy  
Ethical investment defines or delimits the range of behaviour and activities considered 
ethically correct. Ethical investment screening assesses a company’s congruence with a 
set of values and norms that have been socially constructed through a process of 
interaction between actors. Its institutional mechanisms range from formal arrangements 
to informal conventions and customs regarding the ethical screening and 
selection/exclusion of companies. Such arrangements are meant to distinguish between 
companies but can also affect corporate legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is a process that confers organisations a certain recognition from social 
actors. Through the legitimation process social actors accept or endorse the organisation’s 
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means and ends as valid, reasonable and rational (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Scott, 
1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that legitimacy is necessary to ensure the survival 
of organisations. It is a way to demonstrate that they act according to a collectively 
valued purpose in a proper and adequate manner (Meyer & Rowan, 1977a). Legitimacy 
provides a justification for the organisations’ behaviour and practices. Thereby it protects 
the organisations from having their conduct questioned. A legitimate organisation is one 
that is perceived to be pursuing socially acceptable goals in a socially acceptable manner; 
normative quality, efficiency and performance alone are not sufficient (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990).  
Legitimacy and efficiency do not necessarily conflict. They may sometimes pull the 
company in two opposite directions, but they are both essential for the survival of an 
organisation. The challenge is to find an acceptable balance between the two. Moreover 
not all organisations seek the same degree of legitimacy. Institutional theorists have been 
criticised for their deterministic approach, viewing legitimacy as a source of constraint 
for organisations. Other authors offered a more strategic approach to legitimacy 
(Ashforth et al., 1990; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). They suggest that organisations 
adopt specific strategies according to their internal objectives. Organisations keep a 
certain degree of strategic freedom.  
Corporate social responsibility has been a growing issue for corporations. There are 
increasing pressures from governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations on corporations to show a commitment towards social and environmental 
matters. Ethical investment, by assessing corporate social and environmental 
performance, contributes to these pressures. Excluding a company from an ethical 
investment portfolio implies that the company’s behaviour or/and activity is not 
sustainable and incongruent with social expectations. It may therefore affect its 
legitimacy. In such a case, a corporation is likely to take action to ensure its continued 
legitimacy and thereby change its practices and behaviour to fit the requirements.  
1.3 Research questions 
This dissertation addresses two research questions: 
1) What are the nature and characteristics of the institutionalisation process of 
the field of ethical investment? 
2) How do corporations respond to the pressures exerted by ethical investment? 
As was shown in Section 1.1, ethical investment started as a social movement. Groups of 
people with definite interests wished to fight for specific interests. Today the nature of the 
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battle seems to have changed. From an alternative social movement, ethical investment 
has acquired a social recognition, that is a public awareness of its legitimate place and 
purpose in society. The ethical investment movement has managed not only to maintain 
itself over time, but also to grow. Ethical investment has become an organisational field, 
that is a set of organisations that constitute a recognised area of institutional life 
(DiMaggio et al., 1983). The objective of the first research question – investigating the 
institutionalisation of the ethical investment field – is to study the institutionalisation of 
the ethical investment field in the Netherlands. Fields are not only organisations that 
produce ‘outputs’ but also organisations that supply resources, effect constraints, or pose 
contingencies (DiMaggio, 1983). Together these organisations define the broader field 
logics, governance institutions, and activity (Fligstein, 1996; Hoffman & Ventresca, 
2002; Scott, 1991). The formation of the ethical investment field creates specific 
dynamics and mechanisms that need to be explored to understand the pressures it can 
exert on corporations.  
The second objective – exploring corporations’ responses to the pressures exerted by 
ethical investment – focuses on one specific actor of the ethical investment field. 
Corporations are at the very centre of ethical investment. They are screened and 
benchmarked by rating organisations and are potential investment opportunity for 
investors. Previously shareholders paid very little attention to environmental and social 
matters and have always been considered as primarily interested in, and focused on, 
financial performance. With the emergence of ethical investment, corporations have been 
facing a new type of shareholders who are asking increasingly more questions unrelated 
to financial performance. They are also screened by a new type of rating organisations 
that write company sustainability profiles. The institutionalisation of ethical investment 
has created pressures on companies. Oliver (1991) argues that organisations respond 
strategically. The range of strategic responses varies from conformity to resistance, from 
passive to active, from impotent to influential, and from habitual to opportunistic 
depending on the institutional pressures exerted (Oliver, 1991). The second research 
question explores how corporations perceive and deal with ethical investment.  
1.4 Research approach 
Ethical investment has been the subject of attention by many scholars. Most of the studies 
have investigated the financial consequences of investing ethically, most of them 
showing a positive impact. This has been by far the major area of research related to 
ethical investment (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Bauer, Koedijk, & Otten, 2002; 
Gottsman & Kessler, 1998; Luther & Matako, 1993; Meulen & Soppe, 1997; Moskowitz, 
1972; Mueller, 1991, 1994; Perks, Rwalinson, & Ingam, 1992; Snyder & Collins, 1993). 
Ethical Investment 
 6 
The dominant claim is that ethical investment provides higher financial returns than 
regular funds (Luther, Matako, & Corner, 1992; Mallin, Saadouni, & Briston, 1995; 
Snyder et al., 1993; Social Investment Forum, 1998). A number of studies show 
inconclusive results either because of a lack of significant statistical difference between 
the returns of ethically screened and unscreened universes (Diltz, 1995; Sauer, 1997) or 
because of sector and style biases (Louche, 1998; Pava & Krausz, 1996). Very few 
studies conclude that ethical funds under-perform (Mueller, 1991).  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on ethical investment by proposing a new 
approach and new research areas. In the thesis ethical investment is looked at as an 
organisational field. A ‘field’ is “an analytical construct” (DiMaggio, 1983) which 
definition and specification depend on the phenomena studied. It is a way to construct a 
social universe (in reference to (Bourdieu, 1993)). A field has “its own norms governing 
conduct, values inducing behaviour, and the rewards determining production” (Ferguson, 
1998). It translates external phenomena into its own terms for the use of its constituents. 
The concept of field offers a way to analyse the complex and dynamic configuration of 
ethical investment.  
The dissertation investigates field-level dynamics, collective rationality and the behaviour 
of individual organisations. It is an attempt to link the micro and macro levels of analysis. 
It focuses on processes and mechanisms that contain opportunities for change. 
Mechanism is a key aspect of the research as it makes it possible to explain and 
understand what is observed (Elster, 1989; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). Moreover it 
provides an account of how complex social processes occur, with a focus on specifying 
micro-translations that make actors and activity more visible (Olson, Ventresca, & 
Stevenson, 2003).  
The research focused on the development of ethical investment in the Netherlands. 
Empirical data were gathered by several means. The research is based on a five-year 
participation-observation in a Dutch rating organisation, Triodos Research. The 
observation-participation provided a very rich insight into the activity and practices of the 
field. It gave access to internal meetings and documents, discussions with practitioners, 
clients and other actors involved in the field, participation to various conferences, and the 
database of the rating organisation. Another important source of data is a series of 
interviews with key players of the field: fund managers, managers from stock-quoted 
corporations, sustainability analysts from rating organisations, and the director of VBDO 
(Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development). The third source of 
empirical data consists of publications related to the field of ethical investment (articles, 
brochures, reports, etc), the various ethical funds investigated in the Netherlands and the 
companies studied (annual reports, websites, newspaper cuttings, etc). 
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The empirical data focus on several aspects. Firstly, how actors of the field perceive and 
describe ethical investment, both the broader historical context and the more immediate 
personal one. Secondly, what stimulated their involvement in the field. Thirdly, how do 
actors see their role within the field. Fourthly, how do they talk about the activity of 
ethical investment. Fifthly what do they do and with whom do they have contacts. And 
finally, what do they say others do.  
The data collected was organised in one in-depth case study, the Triodos case, and six 
smaller case studies, six Dutch corporations. The data was analysed in a first stage by 
being classified into categories and themes, and in a second stage by employing data 
displays such as thematic lists, designed to help organise and interpret data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1984). A theoretical framework guided the process of data reduction.  
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The personal experience in the field led to certain observations that raised numerous 
questions, which needed to be organised and structured in order to become 
understandable. The theoretical perspective provides a specific lens for addressing the 
research questions. Combining the observation participation with the theory raised a 
whole series of new questions. It was decided that the structure would follow the 
chronological development of the research project. 
Chapter 2 presents the Triodos Case. This case study was the inspiration behind the 
research and has been a major source of data and knowledge about ethical investment. It 
describes the organisation and the reasons why Triodos Bank decided to launch an ethical 
investment fund. It chronicles the development of the fund over a period of five years as 
well as the emergence of the rating organisation called Triodos Research. The chapter 
introduces the research topic – ethical investment – but also identifies and defines the 
issues addressed in the research. It also points out that it is necessary, first of all, to 
approach the subject with a theory that allows one to study processes and mechanisms 
and, secondly to consider the activity in a broader context, both in time and space.  
Chapter 3 develops the general theoretical framework based on institutional theory. 
Chapter 4 introduces the approach and methods for the collection and analysis of the 
empirical data.  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present and explore empirical data that improve our understanding of 
the institutionalisation of the ethical investment field. Chapter 5 provides descriptive and 
analytical information about the international and institutional contexts in which ethical 
investment developed. Chapter 6 investigates the institutionalisation of ethical investment 
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in the Netherlands. Chapter 7 explores corporation’s responses to ethical investment. It 
presents six Dutch corporations from three different sectors of activity. 
Building on the data and analysis of previous chapters (2, 5, 6, and 7), Chapter 8 draws 
the conclusions of the dissertation and proposes some arguments about the potential of 
ethical investment to change corporate practices and behaviour. It discusses the 
implications and limitations of the findings and suggests direction for future research.  
The structure of the dissertation can be described as a continuous switch between the 
micro and macro view of the ethical investment field. It starts at the micro level by 
presenting one specific case, Triodos. It moves to the macro level by describing the 
international and institutional contexts in which ethical investment developed. It then 
goes to the meso level by focusing on the development and evolution of ethical 
investment in the Netherlands. It moves back to the micro level by exploring 
corporations’ responses to ethical investment. Finally, in the concluding chapter the 
dissertation attempts to link the macro, meso and micro levels by adopting a more holistic 
approach. The structure of the dissertation is represented in Table 1.  
 
Level of analysis Micro Meso Macro
Chapter I Introduction    
Chapter II Triodos Case    
Chapter III Theoretical framework    
Chapter IV Methodological considerations    
Chapter V Institutional and international contexts    
Chapter VI The Dutch case    
Chapter VII Corporations’ responses    
Chapter VIII Conclusion    
Table 1 – Dissertation overview 
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Chapter  2 -  Triodos  Case  
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 presents the case of a Dutch bank, the Triodos Bank, that in 1997 decided to 
launch an ethical investment fund called MeerWaarde Fund. For this purpose, it also set 
up a research department to screen stock quoted companies according to social and 
environmental criteria. A few years later, in 2002, Triodos Research split up into two 
independent organisations, Dutch Sustainability Research (DSR) and Triodos Advisory 
Services (TAS). DSR is a fact-finding organisation – its activity focuses on conducting 
company screenings, while TAS is a consulting organisation supplying sustainable 
investment research and advice to a wide range of stakeholders. For practical reasons, it 
is always referred to as Triodos Research in the dissertation except in specific cases 
where the distinction between DSR and TAS is relevant. In such cases it will be 
specified.  
Triodos constitutes an interesting case to study the development of ethical investment in 
the Netherlands. It does not only provide an example of ethical investment activity but 
also of the networks that have been built around it and the way it has developed over 
time. It leads to a better understanding of the process and the arena of ethical investment.  
The content of this chapter is based on a five-year involvement in the bank as observer-
participant (see Chapter 4 for more details on participation-observation). The objectives 
of the chapter are firstly to introduce the activity of ethical investment: what is it, how 
does it work and which actors are involved and, secondly, to further develop the two 
research questions presented in Chapter 1.  
This chapter chronicles the emergence and development of the MeerWaarde Fund and 
Triodos Research from the mid-1990s until the end of 2002. It reports inside views and 
details on three sub-cases: a bank, an ethical investment fund, and a rating organisation. 
The three sub-cases are presented independently in three distinctive sections although 
they are interwoven. For each of the sub-cases the centre of attention differs. The Triodos 
Bank sub-case focuses on the identity of the organisation. The Triodos MeerWaarde Fund 
sub-case focuses on the management of the fund, that is the objectives, policy, and actors. 
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And the Triodos Research sub-case focuses on the development of the activity of the 
rating organisation. The three sub-cases together provide a good picture of the 
development of ethical investment activity, the actors involved, and the translation of an 
idea into practice. Triodos is an omni-present element in the whole thesis. 
2.2 Triodos Bank 
Founded in 1980 in the Netherlands, Triodos Bank finances companies that create social 
added value and care for the environment. It engages in very specific areas where 
financial institutions are not active. The philosophy of the bank is to use money in an 
ethically aware manner and its identity and strategy are reflected in the key words of 
transparency, socially responsible businesses and sustainable banking. It promotes a 
different type of relationship with customers in which they have a much clearer idea of 
what their money is used for. Triodos is an international bank with offices in Belgium, 
UK and The Netherlands. They belong to national and international networks of social 
and environmentally oriented financial institutions. The bank has had an impressive 
growth especially since the mid-1990s. From 1995 to 2001 the total balance sheet and the 
number of employees have been multiplied, respectively by 5.6 and 3.6. Throughout the 
period, Triodos Bank has managed to keep a very strong and specific identity.  
This section presents Triodos Bank: its structure, activities and especially its identity. The 
engagement and commitment of the bank make it a very characteristic organisation that 
has an important effect on the way activities are conducted.  
2.2.1 A brief history 
It all started in 1968 when Adriaan Deking Dura, a personnel manager, Dr Dieter Brüll, a 
professor in tax law, Lex Bos, a senior organisational consultant, and Rudolf Mees, a 
banker formed a study group to see how money could be handled consciously (Triodos 
Bank, 2000b). They were, as Peter Blom, current managing director of Triodos Bank, 
described them “practical idealists” (Blom P., Managing Director (MD), 2001). Three 
years later, in 1971, Triodos Foundation was set up to finance social and environmental 
renewal and innovation through loans and gifts (see Table 2 for an overview of the key 
dates of the development of Triodos Bank). In 1973 the Triodos Guarantee Fund started 
to mobilise gifts and loans for promising new social initiatives and enterprises. Investing 
and life insurance were not considered because there was very little interest at that time 
for these activities among the public. According to the managing director, “at that time 
people didn’t invest on the stock market, at least in the Netherlands, and I think in all 
Europe... Even life insurance was not really a banking activity”. Investing started to be an 
Triodos Case 
 11
issue only later in the seventies. The aim of Triodos was transparency: “We wanted more 
transparency in the banking system, more transparency for depositors. We wanted to let 
the depositors know where their money was going to, for what it was used.” (Blom P. 
(MD), 2001) 
In 1980 Triodos Bank was able to raise enough capital to start as a fully licensed, 
independent bank in the Netherlands. It was allowed to carry out all banking activities. 
Triodos Assurantiën, an insurance brokerage service was launched in 1986.  
The 1990s were a decade of important developments and growth for the bank. First of all 
the expansion of the bank: in 1993, Triodos Bank opened a branch office in Belgium, and 
in 1995 Triodos and Mercury Provident merged their activities, forming the UK branch 
of Triodos. And secondly numerous funds were created. In 1990 two products were 
launched: the first green investment fund, Biogrond Beleggingsfonds, listed on the 
Amsterdam stock exchange, and the MeerWaarde Polis (Added-Value policy), a life 
insurance product launched in partnership with Delta Lloyd, an insurance company. The 
investments of the MeerWaarde Polis, mainly listed companies, were screened according 
to social and environmental criteria. Then other funds were launched: in 1993 Het 
Windfonds (a Dutch Wind Fund), in 1994 the first North-South Funds that focused on 
microcredit1 and fair-trade finance2, in 1997 the MeerWaarde Fund (an ethical investment 
fund listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange), and in 1998 the Solar Investment Fund.  
1971 Triodos Foundation was set up  
1980 Triodos Bank NV was founded 
1990 Biogrond, the first green investment fund  
Meerwaarde Polis, life pension insurance product 
1993 Opening of Triodos Bank Belgium  
Dutch Wind Fund 
1994 First North-South Funds 
1995 Opening of Triodos Bank in the UK and launch of UK Wind Fund 
1996 Het groene Beleggen Fund 
1997 Triodos MeerWaarde Fund  
1998 Solar Investment Fund  
2000 Triodos MeerWaarde Aandelen Fund 
Triodos MeerWaarde Obligatie Fund 
2001 Triodos Venture Capital Fund. 
Triodos Values Fund, an ethical investment fund in Belgium.  
Table 2 - Triodos Bank, Key dates 
                                                 
1 Micro-credit refers to small loans made to low-income individuals to sustain self-employment or to start 
up very small businesses Canada, D. o. F. 1999. Reforming Canada's Financial Service Sector. 
2 Fair Trade is an alternative approach to conventional international trade. It is a trading partnership which 
aims at sustainable development for excluded and disadvantaged producers. It seeks to do this by providing 
better trading conditions, by awareness raising and by campaigning. 
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The growth of Triodos Bank has been extremely fast and impressive. Two elements show 
this very clearly. In 20 years the net profit of the bank has been multiplied by 18026.3 
with two important peaks, in 1996 and 1999 (see Figure 1). In 2001 net profit, for the first 
time in the Bank’s history, decreased (by 15% compared to 2000). It is interesting to note 
that the decrease was less strong than the average decrease in the financial sector. 
However the total balance sheet kept growing with an increase of 23% compared to 2000. 
In 2002 net profit grew again. In numbers of employees the growth has also been 
impressive (see Figure 2). In 21 years the total number of employees has been multiplied 
by 23, from 9 in 1981 to 206 in 2002. There are two important growth peaks, one in 1994 
and one in 1999. 
 
Figure 1- Triodos Bank, Net Profit 1981 
2002(thousands of euros) 
Figure 2 - Triodos Bank, Number of 
Employees 1981-2002 
 
The ongoing growth of Triodos Bank demonstrates the continuing popularity of 
sustainable savings and green investment and the increasing demand for lending in very 
specific sectors such as nature & the environment, the social economy and culture.  
2.2.2 Identity and mission 
From the start Triodos Bank took a distinctive route: “the anthroposophic movement and 
the movement for religious renewal, The Christian Community, were the sources for the 
people who founded Triodos bank” according to the preamble of the Articles of 
Association of Triodos Bank. Anthroposophy has been an important basis for the work of 
Triodos bank and is now presented as a “free source of inspiration” (Triodos Bank, 
2003).  
What makes Triodos Bank distinctive is its identity and its commitment to social, 
environmental and cultural goals. The Bank strongly believes that social and 
environmental interests should be taken into account in economics decisions. Finance and 
economics cannot be viewed in isolation from society as a whole. Triodos Bank wants to 
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be more than a mere financial instrument, ‘more than just money’ (Triodos Bank, 1999). 
Triodos Bank seeks to contribute to the social economy by investing in sustainable 
economic development, both socially and for the environment. It wants to “reconnect 
money with the real economy”, as the managing director says, by seeking a new balance 
between human and natural values on the one hand and money and material goods on the 
other (Triodos Bank, 1999). The bank wants to “contribute in a sustainable way to a 
better life for all” through its investments” (Triodos Bank, 1999). Through its 
commitment, Triodos Bank is engaged in financing activities that regular financial 
institutions scarcely consider.  
The bank’s name stems from the Greek ‘Trihodos’, which stands for tripartite or 
threefold path. In its brochure of 1992, it was translated as: people freely develop and 
exercise their individual abilities; every human being as an autonomous co-worker can be 
part of an organisation; a sustainable economy is developed through suitable associations, 
that take into account the interests of mankind and the earth. It is interesting to note that 
the translation of the threefold approach changed over time. In 1997 it referred to “a view 
of society which distinguishes three areas: education and culture, human rights, and 
economics” (Triodos Bank, 1997a). In 2003, it changed again and referred to the social, 
environmental and cultural spheres (Triodos Bank, 2003, January). The 2003 version 
refers clearly to the concept of sustainability with one additional dimension, culture. 
Over time the ethical dimension appeared in Triodos Bank documents. In 1992 ethics was 
not to be found in the Triodos Bank Brochure. In 1997, they presented themselves as a 
‘social bank’ and in 2003 as a ‘social and ethical bank’. In the Annual Review of 2000, 
the managing director talked about “good” and “bad” businesses which, although not 
directly mentioned, makes one immediately think of ethics (Triodos Bank, 2000b). It 
seems that in 2003 the ethical dimension has become a central aspect: “Social and ethical 
– as well as financial – perspectives are at the heart of Triodos’ business practices” 
(Triodos Bank, 2003, January). 
Triodos’ mission is the following: “Triodos Bank seeks to contribute to a more humanly-
oriented society - one which respects people, the environment and culture” (Triodos 
Bank, 2000b). In practice it is translated as supporting only businesses and projects that 
are socially, ecologically and financially sustainable: “…projects which benefit the 
community, enhance the environment and respect human freedom” (Triodos Bank, 
1997b). Social and environmental responsibilities are key dimensions for Triodos Bank 
as much internally as externally. According to the managing director, “socially 
responsible action means making choices. For Triodos Bank, such choices are as much to 
do with the initiatives financed by the bank as the way the bank runs its business” 
(Triodos Bank, 2000b). The managing director notes that socially responsible depends on 
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the context, “it changes over time and varies from country to country. …Standards also 
change with social attitudes”. In his talk on social responsibility, the managing director 
refers to good business and bad business. “Good business not only means making a profit, 
but also realising that you are dependent on people and the environment. …You will not 
be interested only in your own short-term profit, but you will also be able to justify your 
actions in the long term”.  
2.2.3 Organisational structure  
Triodos Bank is a public company not listed on the stock market. The shares are wholly 
owned by a Trust (the Foundation for the Administration of Triodos Bank Shares) which 
is funded by depository receipts (non-voting shares). The Board of this Trust can vote on 
key issues but has to take into account the interests of the non-voting shareholders, the 
bank as an institution and the special mission of the bank. Triodos has offices in The 
Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Triodos Bank Dutch office and Triodos 
Belgian office both manage an ethical investment fund, the MeerWaarde Fund in the 
Netherlands and Triodos Values Fund in Belgium. 
Triodos Holding NV and Triodos Bank NV are two legally separate organisations. They 
are closely linked through personal contacts and friendships. Triodos Advisory Services 
(TAS) is a subsidiary of Triodos Holding NV and Dutch Sustainability Research is a 
Triodos Venture for 80% (10% being hold by Mees Pierson and 10% by PGGM). See 
Annex 1 for a graphical representation of the structure of Triodos Bank and Triodos 
Holding.  
2.2.4 Strategy and activities 
Triodos Bank is a retail bank focusing on private clients and providing loans to small and 
medium size businesses, projects and institutions with social, environmental and cultural 
added value. It exclusively finances the development of renewable energy sources (solar, 
wind), organic agriculture, art and culture, education, health care, protection of the 
environment and nature conservation. Triodos Bank also plays an active role in financing 
projects in the developing world (micro-credit). Triodos Bank is active in the following 
sectors (see Figure 3 for an overview of Triodos Bank activities from 1996 to 2002):  
- Social business: employment projects, care for immigrants, start-ups, small craft 
companies and companies for which employee participation is an important objective.  
- Housing and Other: new types of dwelling and social housing have always been an 
important sector for Triodos Bank. A new addition is ecological buildings.  
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- Nature and the Environment: this sector includes organic farming, renewable energy 
projects (such as wind turbines), recycling activities and ecological buildings.  
- Culture and Society: including health care, education, artists and related cultural 
projects such as youth theatres and special film productions.  
- North-South (Development co-operation): Triodos is increasingly active in financing 
projects in developing countries, including small, local financial institutions (serving 
micro and small businesses), solar energy projects and fair trade.  
Triodos Bank has developed specific financial instruments over the years, among which 
various investment funds. Triodos Groen Beleggen Fund invests in wind energy and 
agricultural land for organic farming respectively. Both funds attract their capital from 
the general public (Biogronds Beleggingsfonds is quoted on the Dutch stock exchange). 
The Hivos-Triodos Fund was founded with Hivos (a Dutch NGO supporting projects in 
developing countries). It provides loans and guarantees to organisations, enterprises and 
small financial institutions in developing countries. The Triodos-Doen Fund, founded 
with the Doen Foundation (which receives its funding from the National Postcode 
Lottery), makes loans and guarantees to projects in the fields of nature and the 
environment, third world co-operation and promotion of economic independence for 
refugees.  
Figure 3 – Triodos Bank, Areas of activity 
Triodos bank has been actively involved in the setting up of the Green System in 
Holland. It was introduced in 1992, and launched in1995, as a joint operation between the 
Dutch government and the financial sector. Dutch Green Funds have the characteristic of 
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offering a unique tax incentive scheme. Private investors are not taxed on their interest 
and dividend income, provided that this derives from investment in certain green 
investment funds. These green investment funds, in turn, have to invest in certain green 
projects. Table 3 shows the distribution per activity of the green projects as well as the 
volume of the green funds from 1995 to 2001. The objectives and activities of green 
investment funds must primarily be the provision of funds to green projects, that is 
projects that are important for the environment; this includes forestry and nature projects 
(Bouma, Jeucken, & Klinkers, 2001; Scholtens, 2001). At least 70% of the total assets of 
green investment funds must be invested in green projects. The tax authority can assess, 
on request, whether a credit or investment institution meets the criteria that have been set 
and whether the fund can be designated as a green investment fund. To be eligible 
projects have to be new, though a fundamental improvement to an existing project can 
also be regarded as a new project. The main categories of green projects are projects in 
the fields of nature, forestry, landscape and organic farming, sustainable energy, housing, 
farming, ‘green label’ animal housing and greenhouses, and others related to recycling, 
water purification, CO2 recirculation and energy and nature. The designated categories 
are updated periodically. Initially projects had to be in the Netherlands. But the 1998 tax 
plan announced an extension to projects in a limited number of less developed or Eastern 
European countries. For each project an individual request has to be submitted to the 
investment institution. The request is then issued by the Ministry of Housing, Physical 
Planning and the Environment and is valid for a maximum of 10 years (30 years for an 
investment in forestry and nature). It can be renewed. 
Triodos was one of the pioneers in green investment. It launched its first green fund in 
1990, the Biogrond Belegging Fund (organic and biodynamic agriculture), which was 
listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Then in 1993 the bank launched the Wind 
Fund and in 1996 the Groen Beleggen fund. All three were recognised by the Dutch 
government as a Green Fund under the Green Fiscal Regime. In 1998 the three green 
funds merge into a single, listed Triodos Green Fund. Lately, end 2002, Triodos Bank has 
played an important role in defending and supporting the Dutch Green fund system when 
the new Dutch government was planning to limit tax incentives.  
Green project facility (1995-1999) (Scholtens, 
2001) 
 Green funds: Volume (VBDO, 2002) 
                        million Euro 
 %  1995 4.260 
Nature and forest 11.8  1996 248.200 
Organic farming 15.2  1997 325.816 
Energy 36.1  1998 410.063 
Housing 8.8  1999 601.286 
Other 28.1  2000 675.637 
Total 100  2001 759667 
Table 3 - Green Investment funds in The Netherlands: Volume and distribution per activity 
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Another activity where Triodos Bank has been a pioneer is ethical investment. An ethical 
investment fund is different from a green fund. A green fund is defined by the Dutch 
parliament, its focus is on environmental aspects, and it aims at financing small projects. 
In comparison an ethical investment fund focuses on environmental and social aspects, 
and concerns the buying (selling) of common stocks from corporations quoted on the 
stock market. Although they have for common aim stimulating socially responsible 
businesses, green funds and ethical funds are two distinguished types of investments 
addressing different markets and targets.  
In the late 1980s, Triodos Bank started to think about developing a new product: private 
life insurance. At the time, it was a growing activity in the Netherlands that was provided 
exclusively by the government (Oosenbrug, 1999). The bank’s first idea was to develop a 
health care product, that is an insurance policy where anthroposophic medicine was 
covered. Then it was decided to develop a life insurance policy, the MeerWaarde Polis. 
Because of its limited experience in investing on the stock market, Triodos Bank asked 
Delta Lloyd, an insurance Group, to do the asset management. Delta Lloyd was chosen as 
partner because Triodos already had much contact with this organisation and above all 
because they were receptive and enthusiastic about the idea. (Blom P. (MD), 2001). As a 
result the MeerWaarde Polis (Added Value Policy), a life pension insurance based on the 
philosophy of responsible entrepreneurship, was launched in 1990. Although it was a new 
activity, it was essential for Triodos that it should respect and reflect the organisation’s 
values, that is transparency, social responsibility and sustainable banking. Therefore 
companies that would be part of the investment portfolio had to be carefully selected. At 
the beginning of the 1990s there was no experience with this type of investment in the 
Netherlands, and very little in Europe. According to the managing director at the 
beginning “the selection of companies was based on feelings, common sense, and 
common knowledge” (Blom P. (MD), 2001). The managing director in collaboration with 
an employee of the Bank did the selection of corporations. It was done in a very informal 
way based on their knowledge about for-profit organisations (Blom P. (MD), 2001; 
Jansen K. (ETB), 2000) Jansen K., Employee Triodos Bank (ETB), 2000). No 
corporation screenings were available at that time. This was the first experience in the 
Netherlands with what would later on be called ethical investment.  
During the same period (beginning of the 1990s), the managing director of Triodos Bank, 
Peter Blom, was part of a group of people among whom were the association MEMO and 
some church groups. MEMO (1976-early 1990) was an association for socially and 
environmentally responsible businesses. This group of people wanted to invest on the 
stock market but were concerned about the way it was done. They came together with the 
project of creating an ethical trust fund, that is raising capital for investing in financial 
instruments (usually bonds and shares). This led in 1991 to the creation of the ABF fund. 
Ethical Investment 
 18 
At the very beginning Peter Blom was a member, together with other people, especially 
church groups and ASN. The development of the fund was rather difficult because at that 
time there was neither any experience nor a structure. As said Peter Blom, “it was a kind 
of trial and error system”. Very soon after the setting up of the fund Triodos Bank’s 
managing director realised that the values of the fund were not “close enough to the 
values of Triodos” although they were looking at environmental and social issues. He 
withdrew from the working groups and worked on a new project for an ethical investment 
fund within Triodos Bank. After a few years of research, in1997, the MeerWaarde Fund 
was created.  
2.2.5 Conclusion 
Triodos Bank chose an approach to banking that was different from that taken by 
mainstream financial institutions. Its commitment to social, environmental and cultural 
goals constitutes its identity and makes it a distinctive organisation. It strongly believes 
that finance can provide tools to achieve sustainable and equitable development but that 
this requires a re-construction of the Global Finance System where Solidarity can have a 
central place.  
The bank started as a very small organisation. Nevertheless the values held by the bank 
seem to attract an increasing number of people. Since its launch, the bank has kept 
growing. The activities of Triodos are very specific. The focus is on private clients or 
small and medium size businesses, projects and institutions. It also provides financial 
products to people, organisations or causes that are most of the time excluded from the 
regular banking system. In the late 1980s, Triodos Bank started to develop a completely 
new activity. Instead of focusing on small and medium firms, it started dealing with big 
stock quoted corporations. This began with a life insurance product called Triodos 
MeerWaarde Polis, and then in 1997 an ethical investment fund was launched, the 
MeerWaarde Fund. This has brought a new dimension to the bank’s activity. In this 
development Triodos saw an opportunity to spread its message to another sphere/level of 
the market. Triodos had two priorities: firstly to develop a product that would not deflect 
from its values, and secondly to encourage stock quoted corporation to move towards 
sustainable development. It was a big challenge for Triodos Bank. The next section is 
devoted to the MeerWaarde fund. It shows how the fund has developed and how the 
values of Triodos Bank are integrated and operationalised in the management of the fund.  
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2.3 Ethical investment: the MeerWaarde Fund 
In the 1990s, influenced by a general trend in the financial sector, Triodos Bank started to 
consider investing on the stock market. Indeed, the stock market had become more 
popular at the beginning of the 1990s in the Netherlands. This constituted a completely 
new domain for Triodos Bank. At that time the primary focus of Triodos Bank was 
financing small projects or businesses, which involved very close contacts with its 
customers and an in-depth knowledge of all the projects financed. On the contrary, 
investment on the stock market focuses on listed, large companies such as Unilever and 
Shell, in which Triodos Bank would have a limited amount of shares. This meant quite 
important changes for Triodos Bank: a move away from local organisations to 
multinational corporations; from a total control over the projects involved to a very 
limited or non-existent control over large corporations; from a total to a partial 
assessment of the organisation; from the local to the international market; from concrete 
and visible results to a less perceptible and more abstract impact. As the managing 
director of Triodos Bank said, “…it is not going in depth but rather broad…we have to 
realise that a small change in a big company is maybe the equivalent to developing a 
small project here in the Netherlands” (Blom P. (MD), 2001). Managers of the bank saw 
in the fund the opportunity to influence big business and a way to spread the bank’s 
message, that is respect for people, the environment and culture. The crucial issue was to 
let corporations know that investors do not only care about financial performance but also 
about social and environmental performance. An important question that was then raised 
was: ‘How to do it’? 
The first move of Triodos Bank towards the stock market started in 1990 with the 
MeerWaarde Polis insurance policy. However the real take-off took place with the 
MeerWaarde trust fund called, launched in May 1997. It took seven years before Triodos 
Bank really got involved in ethical investment which, recognised the managing Director, 
is quite a long time. An important reason for the delay was that Triodos Bank wanted to 
be careful and find the appropriate way of getting involved in this activity: “The main 
point was that we couldn’t improvise” (Blom P. (MD), 2001). It is only after a long 
period of investigation that the Bank decided to launch an ethical investment fund. The 
Bank faced the considerable challenge of engaging in this new activity without losing its 
strong identity. The development of this new activity was an important step for the Bank. 
Although it has never been its main activity, it has contributed to its expansion and 
offered new opportunities.  
This section recounts the development of ethical investing within Triodos Bank, the 
questions and problems that it has raised, and the structure that has emerged to enable it 
to carry the activity. 
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2.3.1 Overview of the MeerWaarde Fund 
The MeerWaarde Fund (Added Value Fund) is a mutual fund or unit trust. “A mutual 
fund is a company that brings together money from many people and invests it in stocks, 
bonds or other assets. The combined holdings of stocks, bonds or other assets the fund 
owns are known as its portfolio. Each investor in the fund owns shares, which represent a 
part of these holdings” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003). The fund was 
launched in May 1997. Until May 2000 the MeerWaarde Fund was a mixed fund. It was 
composed of shares (between 30 and 60%), bonds (between 40 and 70%), and liquid 
assets (maximum of 10%) (Triodos MWF, 1997). The 29th of May 2000, the structure 
was changed. In order to better satisfy its clients, Triodos Bank decided to offer a more 
flexible product. This entailed a reorganisation of the Triodos MeerWaarde Fund. It is 
now a combination of three types of investment products, from which clients can chose 
one of the sub-products or a combination of them, according to their risk aversion and 
investment strategy. The MeerWaarde Fund is the umbrella structure and consists of: 
- Triodos MeerWaarde Aandelenfonds (fund B), composed entirely of shares; 
- Triodos MeerWaarde Obligatiefonds (fund C), composed of bonds, 
- Triodos MeerWaarde Mixfonds (fund A), a mix of shares (between 30 and 60%) and 
bonds (between 40 and 70%) 
The specificity of the MeerWaarde Fund is the use of social and environmental screening 
in addition to financial screening for the selection of companies. Triodos Bank applies 
three types of screening related to social and environmental aspects:  
- Exclusionary or absolute criteria: companies involved in at least one of the 
exclusionary criteria are excluded from the investment universe. These criteria may 
be turnover related, meaning that if a company derives more than a certain percentage 
(usually 5%) of its turnover from one of the activities which is classified as 
unsustainable, the company is excluded. The list of activities can vary from fund to 
fund. It often includes, for example, alcohol, nuclear energy, weapon industry, and 
animal testing. Criteria may be process related. Those criteria lead to the exclusion of 
the company if it is involved, without any regard to the percentage of turnover. It may 
include, for example, corruption, dictatorial regimes, and child labour. 
- Comparative criteria: companies are screened according to series of criteria related to 
environmental and social aspects such as management, policy in place, and 
performance. Most of the time benchmarking is carried out during the comparative 
screening. Companies are compared and the best are included in the investment 
universe.  
- Inclusionary criteria or sustainable activities: these refer to certain activities that are 
considered to have a special added value to society or/and a special contribution to 
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sustainable development such as environmental technology, bicycles, etc. 
Corporations that derive a significant percentage of their turnover from one of these 
activities are screened according to absolute criteria. If they pass the exclusionary 
screens, they are integrated in the investment universe. 
The MeerWaarde Fund is an international and diversified fund (see Table 4). The fund 
does not focus on specific sectors. However the fund does not invest in corporations that 
are active in sectors that have a negative impact on society, or whose behaviour has a 
negative impact on society (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 2000). Over the years it has 
become more international: in 1997, the launch year, there were a majority of companies 
from the Netherlands and a minority form the US. Four years later there were 
corporations from seven different countries with a majority in the US (Dutch companies 
being the second most represented). Concerning the sectors of activities represented in 
the fund, their number went from four in 1997 to 13 in 2001, with the sectors Capital 
Goods, Information Technology and Telecommunication the more prominent ones. 
During the first years of the fund, diversification (both geographical and sectoral) was 
limited because the number of companies screened on social and environmental criteria 
was very limited. The fund developed in parallel with the universe of corporations being 
screened. As of April 2003, out of 465 companies screened for the MeerWaarde Fund, 
only 179 (that is 38%) were selected while 69% were excluded, either because of a low 
performance on social and environmental criteria or an involvement in unsustainable 
activity or behaviour.  
Table 4- Portfolio of the MeerWaarde Fund 1997-1999-2001 
The MeerWaarde Fund had a Total Intrinsic Value of 17,820 thousands Euro in 1997. It 
has been multiplied by 5.47 within 5 years to reach 97, 563 thousands Euro in 2002. 
Concerning the performance of the fund, in the period of May to the end of 1997, the 
Portfolio composition Distribution per sector of activity 
1997 1999 2001** 1997 1999 2001*
Bonds 75% 34% - Capital Goods 38% 7% 17%
Stocks 21% 61% - Chemistry 7% 2%
Liquid assets 4% 5% - Consomer goods 3% 11%
Construction 13%
Diverse 6%
Distribution per country Electronics 7%
1997 1999 2001* Energy supply 2%
Denmark 1% Financial 9% 9%
France 5% Food 11% 4%
Germany 3% IT 15%
Mexico 3% Media 31% 13% 11%
Netherlands 61.41% 69% 38% Paper/Publishing 1%
Norway 0% Pharmaceutical/HC 13% 7%
UK 3% Retail trade 2%
US 39% 29% 51% Services 3% 2%
Technology 13%
Telecommunication 6% 3% 15%
*Triodos Meerwarde aandelenfonds Transport 5% 2%
**From 2000 the fund has changed of structure Nb sectors 4 14 13
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Added Value Investment Fund achieved a return of 2.80% compared to a return of 9.8% 
for the benchmark3. The main reason for this result was the predominance of fixed-
interest securities over stocks during the first months of the fund's existence. This 
predominance was reduced considerably during the first quarter of 1998, resulting in a 
performance which is practically equal to that of the benchmark (7.6% compared to 7.7% 
for the benchmark). In 1998, the return on investments increased a great deal (10.9%) but 
in 1999 it decreased. During the year 2000, the structure of the fund changed. It was split 
up into three funds (bonds, share and mix). In order to make comparison with the former 
MeerWaarde Fund possible, only the mix fund is looked at in the table below. Although 
the performance of the MeerWaarde Mixfonds has not been very good over the past two 
years, it outperformed the benchmark which was negative in the past three years (see 
Table 5).  
 Intrinsic 
value 
Exchange 
value 
Dividend Returns  Benchmark
* 
1997 23.32 23.32 - -  
1998 25.87 25.87 0.55 10.93%  
1999 25.32 25.8 0.3 -0.27%  
2000 25.48 26 0.6 0.78%  
2001 26.44 26.22 0.5 0.85% -1.85% 
2002 24.22 24.5 0.3 -6.56% -11.5% 
Table 5 - Triodos MeerWaarde Fund (1997:2000), and Triodos MeerWaarde Mixfonds (2001:2002) 
Returns Per share 
2.3.2 Objectives and investment policy of the MeerWaarde Fund 
2.3.2.1 Objectives 
The sustainable investment fund of Triodos Bank NV, the MeerWaarde Fund, strives for 
capital growth in the long term. The investment policy is based on the ‘three Ps’ 
approach, meaning that the selection of corporations to be invested in is established 
according to criteria related to People, Planet and Profit: Profit refers to a sound return 
and risk level; People refers to human dignity, i.e. treating employees, clients, suppliers 
and the community in which the corporation operates in a responsible way; and Planet 
gives considerations to sustainability, i.e. treating natural resources, waste and the 
environment in a responsible way (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 2000). The People and 
                                                 
3 The benchmark consists of 50% bond funds and 50% share funds and the customised benchmark is 
composed of 60% S&P 500 index and 40% FTSE 300 index. 
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Planet factors define the basic investment universe within which the Profit factor is used 
to select the final investment universe.  
Through its ethical investment Triodos Bank wants to “encourage companies to behave in 
a more sustainable way”(Triodos Bank, 2001). The fund is a kind of commitment to 
promote and stimulate change towards sustainable development. In an interview the 
Managing Director said that “Triodos MeerWaarde Fond gives the bank a way to 
encourage social responsibility in larger companies. The standards are clear – a 
company must be within the top 50% of best performing companies, socially and 
environmentally, to be included in the portfolio. This creates a mechanism to encourage 
companies to improve their performance. In this way, you let capitalism work for you” 
(Triodos Bank, 2000b)  
2.3.2.2 Investment policy 
The investment policy aims at selecting companies that are leading the sector in which 
they are active regarding social and environmental matters. The fund distinguishes two 
categories of investments. On the one hand investments are made in corporations which, 
on the basis of their products and/or services, deliver a positive contribution to human 
beings and/or the environment (this refers to corporations that are active in the 
sustainable sectors). 
Triodos considers that these companies have valuable social and/or added value. The 
screening is carried out only on exclusionary criteria. Companies that pass the 
exclusionary criteria are selected in the investment universe. And on the other hand 
investments are made in corporations in regular sectors such as media, capital goods, 
construction, etc. Companies of those sectors are first screened on the exclusionary 
criteria. Companies that do not pass the screening are excluded. Those that pass the 
screening are then screened on comparative criteria. Out of this screening corporations 
are given a score on their sustainable performance (their performance on social and 
environmental issues) and are ranked. The benchmark is done sector by sector. The top 
50% of the companies are selected in the investment universe. The policy of MeerWaarde 
is to invest only in corporations that are leading in their sector with regard to social and 
environmental management. The screening process is represented in Figure 4 and further 
explained in section 2.4. 
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Figure 4- MeerWaarde Fund- Selection method 
2.3.2.3 Screening process 
The screening processes can be divided into three major elements: 
1. Collection of information on companies 
Information from publicly available sources is collected, such as company’s reports, 
websites information (this is a crucial source of information), reports from NGOs, trade 
organisations, governments, sector organisations, etc. All available information is 
gathered together and analysed by sustainability analysts.  
Sustainability analysts contact companies in order to conduct either a face-to-face 
interview or a telephone interview. The relationships between companies and rating 
organisations may differ. Company profiles are send to each company screened and 
feedback is asked.  
Additionally, third parties (NGOs, trade unions and all relevant organisations) are 
contacted according to the sector of activities and the need for complementary 
information.  
2. Organisation of the information into a company profile 
The information gathered is transformed into a company profile containing the following 
categories: 
Phase 1
Exclusionary criteria
Phase 3
Relative criteria
Involvement
Best in class
YesNo
Yes
No
Phase 4
Financial criteria
Investment decision
Sector analysis
In Out
No
In sustainable
sector?
Phase 2
Inclusionary criteria
Yes
No
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- Information organised thematically (description of the company’s activities and 
social and environmental practices) 
- Information on the involvement of the company in specific activities or practices, 
such as weaponry, child labour.  
3. Selection of companies  
On the basis of the results of the screening and rating, companies are selected (or 
excluded) according to standards and processes set up beforehand by the fund manager. 
For the selection two methodologies are used: ‘best in class’ and ‘sector study’. Both can 
be used either independently or jointly, depending on the fund manager’s request. The 
second methodology consists of comparing companies within the same sector. Best in 
class methodology means selecting a certain percentage of the best companies. For 
example if 100 companies are screened and ranked, only the 50% best will be selected, 
that is only 50 companies. With both methodologies, companies are given scores and 
ranking on three aspects: people, planet and transparency, which altogether form the 
overall sustainability score. 
2.3.3 Development of the fund 
1995-1997: Development of the MeerWaarde Fund project 
The MeerWaarde Polis was the first step into the world of stock market investment. The 
insurance policy was rather successful. A few clients of the Bank wanted more than 
deposit, they wanted to get involved in the stock market. Some of them were already 
doing this with other banks, but were concerned about the way their money was being 
invested; they wanted to invest their money in a “better” way (Blom P. (MD), 2001). 
Triodos heard the message and already fortified with the experience of the green funds 
and life insurance, the Bank’s board of management accepted the challenge of launching 
a trust fund. They saw new market opportunities and new products for their clients in this 
activity. Moreover, Triodos’ competitors, especially ASN, had already developed such a 
trust fund. Three main reasons motivated Triodos’ decision: its competitors, its clients 
demands, and the “opportunity to change big firms’ behaviour” (Rüter B., Head Triodos 
Research (HTR), 2001). This last point was decisive. It opened the opportunity for 
Triodos to reach a new ‘target’ (the large for-profit companies) in order to spread their 
message. In this new activity they saw a way to influence for-profit organisations towards 
sustainable development. “Of course, we, I mean Triodos, knew that we were not going to 
change radically the policies of companies. Our investments would be too small for that. 
But we wanted to influence the companies by opening a dialogue with them. We believed, 
and we still believe, that by discussing with companies we can change them a little bit. 
We can make them aware of certain problems.” (Jansen K. (ETB), 2000). Up to that time, 
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the bank had never thought about having any influence on the biggest companies. But the 
idea seemed consistent with its approach to ‘money’ and its philosophy: “It is also in the 
‘mission’ of Triodos to try to promote the sustainable development within the big 
companies” (Jansen K. (ETB), 2000) 
In 1995 Triodos started some investigations on ethical investment. At that time two 
ethical funds were already set up in The Netherlands (ASN Aandelen fund, 1993 and 
ABF Het Andere Beleggings Fund, 1991). According to employees of Triodos Bank 
(Jansen K. (ETB), 2000; Miedema M. (SA), 2000, 2001 and 2003) Miedema M., 
Sustainability Analyst (SA), 2000, 2001, and 2003) the existing Dutch ethical funds were 
not entirely satisfactory: they were not based on sector studies, activities were mixed up, 
and companies from different sectors were compared. In order to get a better insight and 
some ideas on how to screen companies, Triodos set up a small team consisting of three 
employees, among whom Bas Rüter (presently head of Triodos research and deputy 
managing director of Triodos Bank), to investigate the then current practices – 
methodologies and criteria. They looked at what was happening abroad, and how 
screenings were carried out. In particular, they went to England to explore existing funds 
such as Merlin Research Unit (Merlin Ecology Fund), Commercial Union, Abbey Life 
Ethical Trust, Scottish Equitable Ethical Unit Trust, Hypobank. They visited some 
research units as well, such as EIRIS, NPI, and PIRC (Jansen K. (ETB), 2000; Miedema 
M. (SA), 2000, 2001 and 2003). The outcomes of the investigation were the following: 
- It is better to compare companies from the same sector. It seemed more relevant and 
accurate: “Comparing companies from different sectors does not make sense” 
(Miedema M. (SA), 2000, 2001 and 2003).  
- Criteria used at that time by other ethical investment funds were not satisfactory. 
Triodos wanted strict criteria.  
- The quality of the research was of primary importance to reflect as good as possible 
Triodos Bank’s principles. Therefore in-depth research was necessary. “We had to 
have good research, something more structured, systematic, and thorough” (Blom P. 
(MD), 2001). 
As a result, a research department devoted to the screening of corporations was set up. 
“Triodos wanted to have the guaranty of the quality of the research and of the respect of 
its values” (Rüter B. (HTR), 2001), they wanted the screening done in ”very serious 
manners” (Jansen K. (ETB), 2000). Late 1996 saw the conceptual start of what became 
later the research department. It developed its own criteria with the collaboration of Tessa 
Tenant (formerly Henderson Fund Manager (UK) and presently Executive Director of the 
Association for Sustainable & Responsible Investment in Asia). The fund had some 
unique criteria such as cars, farming, fur, drugs, tourism, fishing, agriculture, 
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hydroelectric power, endangered species, airlines, hazardous substances, mining, oil and 
gas that were exclusionary criteria, but it also had the so-called sustainable activities such 
as health care, public transportation, education. The logic of selecting pioneers in 
sustainable sectors came from the influence of the loan department where initiatives in 
sustainable activities were favoured. The rest of the criteria were rather common in the 
ethical investment field. It also set up its own methodology based on a sector approach, 
which was rather innovative at that time. The fund had exclusionary criteria that were 
used a lot in the UK and used what is today called the best in class approach. The best in 
class approach has been intensively discussed within Triodos. Triodos wanted to have a 
positive approach. At that time nobody was applying this approach. According to Bas 
Rüter Triodos was the first to apply such a method of selection: “We wanted to show to 
the companies that they could be part of the universe if they are better than the average. 
It was a way to stimulate companies and to reward the best.” (Rüter B. (HTR), 2001). 
Ethical investment lies very close to regular investment. It was quite a risk for the Bank 
because it was far from its core activity, that focused on small projects and community 
involvement. The challenge was also to hold on the organisation’s values, values for 
which its clients chose Triodos as their bank. The Bank has a very close relationship with 
its clients. “Clients of Triodos have chosen this bank for ideological reasons” (Miedema 
M. (SA), 2000, 2001 and 2003). It was therefore very important not to deceive them. 
Internally the creation of the MeerWaarde Fund met resistance from some employees 
within the bank (Blom P. (MD), 2001; Miedema M. (SA), 2000, 2001 and 2003). The 
fund was perceived as not as ‘green’ as the rest of Triodos bank activities. Therefore it 
was called ‘light green’ while the rest of the activities were called ‘dark green’. There 
was no real disagreement but rather questions from the employees. According to the 
managing director, in 2001 there were still some questions about the MeerWaarde Fund, 
“…it is not yet fully accepted” (Blom P. (MD), 2001).  
May 1997: Launch of the fund 
In March 1997, Triodos Bank recruited the first full-time employee to work at the newly 
formed Research Department. Two months later, in May 1997, the MeerWaarde fund was 
launched. At the beginning there were around 30 to 40 companies, mainly Dutch ones, 
plus some American ones very well known for their good environmental and social 
behaviour such as Ben & Jerry or part of a sustainable sector. 
For the same reasons as for the insurance policy, that is the non-expertise of Triodos 
Bank in managing a mutual fund/unit trust, Triodos decided to ask Delta Lloyd to co-
operate with them in order to manage an ethical fund. Triodos Bank was responsible for 
the social and environmental screening while Delta Lloyd was responsible for the 
financial screening and the buying and selling of shares. The selling of the fund was 
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exclusively carried by Triodos Bank and Delta Lloyd at the beginning, but a few years 
later agreement was reached with Friesland Bank and Mees Pierson, and lately (in 2002) 
with ABN AMRO, Kempen Capital management and various otheres for them to sell the 
fund.  
1995 The board of management of Triodos Bank decides to set up a mutual fund 
including social and environmental criteria.  
1997 May: Launch of the MeerWaarde Fund 
1998 Internationalisation of the investment portfolio 
2000 Creation of three different funds: Triodos MeerWaarde Aandelenfonds 
(shares); Triodos MeerWaarde Obligatiefonds (bonds); Triodos MeerWaarde 
Mixfonds (stocks and bonds) 
Table 6 – Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, Some key dates 
It took Triodos Bank a long time before launching the MeerWaarde Fund (see Table 6 for 
the key dates). Two reasons amongst others played an important role: firstly the field was 
very new and therefore very few people had any experience with ethical screening, and 
secondly Triodos Bank wanted to make sure this new activity could fit in with its 
principles. Investigation constituted a significant phase in the development of the fund. In 
1996-97 Triodos Bank started to design a working methodology in order to screen 
companies. It was influenced by developments in the UK because there was more 
experience in that country. The Bank was also confronted with the 
application/operationalisation of theoretical principles such as sustainable development. 
Very quickly Triodos Bank came up with the conclusion that a professional body should 
be in charge of the screening. Therefore the bank set up a department devoted to it. One 
of the strong motivations for engaging in ethical investment, beside the market 
opportunity, was the potential impact it could have on stock quoted corporations. It was 
for a small bank like Triodos Bank the only way to “open a dialogue with them” (Blom P. 
(MD), 2001). This has had a significant influence on the methodology adopted, putting 
forward contacts with corporations.  
2.3.4 Development of the criteria 
From the beginning the intention was that the criteria adopted would have to be very 
strict. It was felt that the fund should have more restrictive rules than those imposed by 
existing funds in the Netherlands. Triodos Bank had a very strong position on this issue, 
even though it ruled out investment into a significant amount of listed companies.  
The MeerWaarde Polis mainly emphasised avoiding the ‘bad’ and including the ‘good’: 
no armament or alcohol industries for example, while sectors such as healthcare and the 
environment were highly represented. With the launch of the MeerWaarde fund, Triodos 
shifted towards a more positive approach. The task of the Triodos research team was to 
translate the policy of the fund into criteria. It took over two years to develop the first set 
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of criteria. Although they keep on evolving, this first year was important for setting the 
basis of the criteria. The criteria did not undergo any major changes the following years --
they have been better defined, some have been added and other deleted or rather 
reorganised-- until 2002 when the sustainable sectors were revised.  
In 1997 there were 33 exclusionary criteria in total; 21 of them were related to what was 
called ‘activity to be avoided’ (now called ‘Serious negative social effects of products 
and services’) – the exclusion is related to the percentage of turnover related to the 
activity (if more than 5% of the turnover is generated by one of these activities the 
company is excluded). In 2002 the number was reduced to 17. Five were deleted or, for 
most of them integrated in other criteria (drugs, excessive non-sustainable forms of 
tourism, excessive non-sustainable forms of agriculture, excessive non-sustainable forms 
of fishing activities, large scale hydroelectric power stations, trade in animals or 
endangered species). One new criterion was integrated in the list in 2002: pornography. 
Criteria called ‘Process-related’ (and now called ‘Not sustainable management’) – this 
leads to the exclusion of the company without any regard to the percentage of turnover 
involved – numbered 12 in 1997. In 2002 the criteria were reorganised and grouped 
together bringing their number to 3. In 2002 the total number of exclusionary criteria was 
22.  
Comparative criteria have also changed over time. They have been completely 
reorganised. In 1997 there were seven categories: Strategic objectives, Employees, Place 
in society regarding social criteria, and Strategic objectives, Impact on the environment 
and measures, Place in society regarding environmental criteria. In 2002 it was 
reorganised into three main categories: People, Planet, Transparency and external 
relations. In general criteria have been redefined and regrouped, which explains the 
decrease in number. But two aspects have also been added to the comparative screening, 
namely corporate governance and quality. It was not a decision of Triodos MeerWaarde 
fund to add those two dimensions but of Triodos Research. Triodos MeerWaarde Fund 
saw their relevance and accepted them. Criteria are discussed/considered thrice a year by 
the advisory board. As of 2002, the comparative screening covered 126 criteria.  
A recent and significant change has been the review of the ‘sustainable sectors’ 
(inclusionary criteria). In 2001 discussions started about the sustainable sectors. 
Questions concerning the extent to which a sector can be sustainable were raised. The 
review of sustainable sectors was been discussed with the advisory board of Triodos 
Research in 2002. Three of the sustainable activities were left out. The list of sustainable 
sectors was changed, and the definition of the sectors considered sustainable redefined. 
For example in the description of ‘organic farming’ in the 2002 version, an eco-label is 
required, which was not the case in 1997. In the description of ‘sustainable energy’, the 
following has been added: ‘Companies generating large scale hydroelectric power are 
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excluded’. The activity ‘sustainable transport’ has been narrowed to bicycles, and ‘health 
care’ to homeopathy and medical devices. Environmental technology has also been 
redefined. Table 7 lists the sustainable activities considered by Triodos in 1997 and 2002. 
1997 2002 
Organic farming 
Renewable energy 
Sustainable transport 
Health care 
Financial services fore sustainable activities 
Environmental technology and consultancy 
Education 
Telecommunication 
Organic farming 
Renewable energy 
Bicycle 
Homeopathic treatment 
Medical devices 
Environmental technology 
Table 7 - Triodos MeerWaarde Fund Sustainable activities (MWF, 2000; Triodos MWF, 2002b) 
It is interesting to note that criteria used by the MeerWaarde Fund are intimately linked to 
Triodos Research. Therefore when Triodos Research changes the criteria – adding, 
deleting or redefining – this has implication for the MeerWaarde Fund. Changes are 
always discussed between Triodos MeerWaarde Fund and Triodos Research.  
2.3.5 Actors in the MeerWaarde Fund 
The management of the MeerWaarde Fund involves several actors that are more or less 
active and hold specific roles and responsibilities. Actors are grouped into categories such 
as advisory board members, investors, screening providers, etc. The following paragraphs 
present each of the categories, with a special focus on the relationship between them and 
the MeerWaarde Fund.  
2.3.5.1 Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board of the MeerWaarde Fund consists of six independent members 
nominated during the general assembly. It was set up from the beginning of the fund, in 
1997. They are responsible for ensuring that investments are made in accordance with 
fund policy and provide advice to the management of the fund. As of December 2002, the 
board was composed of six members with diverse backgrounds and involved in various 
organisations such as environmental groups, consumers’ organisations, universities, 
financial sector, and corporations (Triodos MWF, 2002a).  
2.3.5.2 Research 
Ethical research is provided by Triodos Research. Triodos MeerWaarde Fund is a client 
of Triodos Research. The fund buys a service from Triodos Research in order to be able 
to conduct the management of the fund. There is a relationship of client/supplier. 
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However for several reasons the relationship between these two organisations goes far 
beyond the mere ‘client/supplier’ relationship.  
Triodos Research was first founded as a department of Triodos Bank in 1997 and became 
independent in 2000. It then registered under the name of Triodos Research BV, which 
later on became Triodos Advisory Services BV, a branch of Triodos Holding. Until the 
separation, Triodos Research was only conducting company screenings for the fund of 
Triodos Bank, that is the MeerWaarde Fund. Triodos Research was founded within 
Triodos Bank and for the fund of Triodos Bank. Since its independence, it provides 
services to many other clients. A description of Triodos Research and its development is 
provided later on in this chapter (see section 2.4). Many of the values and norms of 
Triodos Research have been inherited from Triodos bank which, as described earlier, is 
very strong. Although today Triodos Research is independent, the imprint left by Triodos 
Bank is still very deep. The MeerWaarde Fund is an important client of Triodos Research 
independently of the capital it represents. Historical reasons bind the two organisations.  
The two organisations are also linked to each other through their structures. The head of 
Triodos Research, Bas Rüter, is also responsible for the MeerWaarde Fund and is Deputy 
Managing Director of Triodos Bank. Peter Blom, managing director of Triodos Bank, has 
responsibilities in both Triodos Research and the MeerWaarde Fund.  
Triodos MeerWaarde Fund and Triodos Research have very frequent and close contacts. 
Besides providing company screening, Triodos Research takes part in discussions related 
to the criteria and methodology. Meetings are held once a month, gathering sustainability 
analysts from Triodos Research, and asset managers from the MeerWaarde Fund and 
Delta Lloyd (responsible for the financial screening). During these meetings they discuss 
mainly financial issues.  
Asset managers of the MeerWaarde Fund regularly make contact with Triodos Research 
for explanation/discussion concerning a specific issue related to a company, a sector 
study or criteria. They also contact Triodos Research when they have questions from 
clients that they cannot directly answer. They forward the question to Triodos Research 
who is then in charge of the answer. They also forward information provided by clients of 
Triodos Bank investing in the MeerWaarde Fund. Sometimes clients send articles or 
website addresses related to the involvement of a company. The information is forwarded 
to Triodos Research in order to be processed if necessary. This usually happens when 
Triodos Research has finished a new sector study which entails some changes in the 
companies selected, or when Triodos Bank publishes an article in its newsletter. It was 
for example the case after the update of the food industry sector because Unilever was 
selected. This raised much criticism from the clients (Hansen S. (SA), 2003).  
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Although Triodos Research has become an independent entity, Triodos MeerWaarde 
Fund and Triodos Research are still very close. Triodos Research is very influential on 
the MeerWaarde Fund. Beyond the commercial relation, the MeerWaarde Fund and 
Triodos Research share a number of values and beliefs due to historical reasons. 
2.3.5.3 Fund management 
Two different entities manage the MeerWaarde Fund together: Triodos Bank and Delta 
Lloyd. The two organisations have been working together since 1990 with the 
MeerWaarde Polis. The management benefits from the expertise of the two organisations, 
Delta Lloyd in portfolio management and Triodos Bank for social and environmental 
matters (see Figure 5). Triodos Bank deals with social and environmental screening while 
Delta Lloyd is in charge of the financial screening. In other words, Triodos Bank defines 
the investment universe and Delta Lloyd takes investment decisions within the defined 
universe. At any moment, Triodos Bank can require Delta Lloyd to take companies off 
the portfolio because of social and/or environmental problems. Upstream the 
management system, Delta Lloyd may suggest some companies to Triodos Bank for the 
investment universe, because of financial opportunities. Delta Lloyd's fund managers do 
not invest in companies without the agreement of Triodos Bank. The two organisations 
meet every two months and communicate results to each other regularly.  
Due to the fund management system, financial and social-environmental matters are 
processed independently from each other. Social and environmental criteria make it 
possible to defined the investment universe on which the usual financial criteria are 
applied, such as earnings per share, operating incomes, growth rate, market position. For 
Delta Lloyd, the management of the Added Value Investment Fund does not differ from 
other funds except that the fund universe is smaller and the investment strategy is more 
oriented towards the long term (Weiss M. (Delta Lloyd), 1998). It is also worth noting 
that Triodos Bank can ask shares to be sold within three months on ethical reasons, 
without taking into consideration the financial performance of the shares.  
It is interesting to note that the three dimensions, social, environmental and economic, are 
kept separated. Two different units manage the three dimensions. On one side there is a 
unit with knowledge on social and environmental matters, and on the other side there is 
another unit with knowledge on the economic performance of the company. It is 
important to point out this separation because brochures from ethical investment funds 
claim that fund management integrates the three dimensions but it suggests that they are 
juxtaposed rather than integrated.  
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Figure 5 - Fund management system 
Concerning the marketing of the MeerWaarde Fund, Triodos Bank is in charge of it. The 
marketing department publishes a number of documents concerning the Fund: annual and 
semi-annual reports, a prospectus, a brochure concerning all investment funds proposed 
by Triodos Bank, among which the MeerWaarde Fund. Triodos Bank also has a website 
where all the above information can be found. The bank publishes twelve newsletters per 
year in which articles related to the fund (performance, company screening, specific 
issues) are sometimes published. These may be written by people from the bank or from 
Triodos Research.  
The management of the MeerWaarde Fund involves several organisations: Delta Lloyd 
for the financial screening, the selling/buying of shares, and the selling of the fund and 
Triodos Bank for the marketing and selling of the fund.  
2.3.5.4 Investors 
Investors are individuals who wish to invest money through the buying of shares. Triodos 
MeerWaarde Fund is, in this case, the financial intermediary (see Figure 6). The 
corporation gives a security to the intermediary, Triodos, in return for funds. The 
intermediary, in turn, acquires funds from the general public, and offers accounts to the 
general public (Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 1995).  
According to the managing director of Triodos, the MeerWaarde Fund has attracted a 
new clients although until 2002 the investors were mainly Triodos clients, “It is mainly a 
new opportunity for clients of Triodos rather than a way to attract new clients” (Blom P. 
Triodos Bank Delta Lloyd
Financial screening
Financial monitoring
Eligible companies
Social and Environmental
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(MD), 2001). Recently the MeerWaarde Fund counts new clients especially clients from 
other banks such as ABN AMRO who can buy it from their own bank on a share account.  
Figure 6 – Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, a financial intermediary 
According to a survey carried by Motivaction in 2002 (Triodos, 2002) clients of Triodos 
Bank are for 60.3% ‘postmaterialists’ that is people that seek solidarity, social harmony 
and a natural environment (Motivaction, 2002). This category of people is usually highly 
educated, with various income rates and from various age groups. This group is dominant 
while in the Netherlands it only represents 9.7% of the population. The two other 
important groups represented in the fund are the self-actualizers – seeking autonomy, 
intrinsically motivated and ambitious – and cosmopolitans – people seeking new 
experiences in order to enrich their self-development.  
According to the MeerWaarde management team investors can be divided into two 
categories, a main one that wants to invest in an ethical fund for the good feeling it 
provides, and a minor one that wishes, through the fund, to stimulate sustainable 
development: “Only a very little percentage are more involved in the choice of 
companies. ... Let’s say 1% of the clients. These people are aware that the way they invest 
might influence companies. The rest do not really think about that. Their main concern is 
‘feeling good” (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 21-05-2001). A majority of the investors 
have chosen an ethical investment fund in order to have a ‘good feeling’. In general 
clients are concerned with the activities they do not want to be involved in. “They want to 
be sure that their money don’t go into nuclear energy, weapons, forced labour.” (Triodos 
MeerWaarde Fund, 21-05-2001). 
Some of the investors of the MeerWaarde Fund are active investors. They watch carefully 
the companies that are included in the portfolio. However a majority of them is less 
involved. A certain number of investors are members of, or working in, organisations 
related to social, environmental or/and cultural aspects. They are therefore directly 
concerned by corporations’ social and environmental behaviour and they also have some 
knowledge on these issues. This makes them more critical than other investors. It 
frequently happens that investors contact the MeerWaarde Fund to ask questions about 
companies, about the selection or about criteria: “…the Aids debate, clients came up with 
the question about big pharmaceutical companies that have lots of power (concentrate 
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power). They have sent articles about that and clearly stipulated that they didn’t want to 
invest in these big companies (such as Glaxo Welcome). They don’t like certain 
companies.” (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 21-05-2001) Investors do not hesitate to ask 
questions when they disagree with the selection of a company (most of the time sending 
articles or references to websites to back up their concern). According to the MeerWaarde 
management team this happens two to three times a year. Numerous investors attend the 
shareholder annual meetings. Their questions concern performance as well as their 
worries about specific issues related to the social and environmental aspects of the fund.  
Investors look at the activity of a company as a whole. They consider companies to be all 
the same unless they see in the media that a company is doing something special – either 
good or bad. Then they either want to exclude the bad company, and might ask some 
complementary information on the rest of the sector, or they might ask to include the 
company even if it is in an excluded sector such as the car industry (Triodos MeerWaarde 
Fund, 21-05-2001). Most of the investors base their opinion on media reports. According 
to the MeerWaarde management team, the media has an important impact on investors, 
who then come to Triodos Bank with specific requests and questions. It is interesting to 
note that “people remember good or/and bad stories. But most of the time people see the 
bad stories rather than the good ones.” (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 21-05-2001). 
Investors are very explicit about what they do not want but not always about what they do 
want.  
In general the MeerWaarde Fund has a good relationship with its clients, the investors. 
As the management team said, “Clients trust Triodos to do the job (the screening) 
properly” (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 21-05-2001). A majority of the investors are not 
actively involved in the management of the fund while a minority is. This minority 
regularly contacts the MeerWaarde Fund to ask questions or send information. This does 
not happen more than four times a year. Triodos MeerWaarde Fund investors however 
are more involved than investors in regular funds, because of their special interests and 
concerns related to social and environmental issues.  
2.3.5.5 Others 
A number of other actors of different type have played a role in relation to the 
MeerWaarde Fund: the VBDO, Dutch Analysts Association (VBA), Eurosif, Global 
Reporting Initiative, and Inaise. They are mainly networks, associations and organisations 
dealing with ethical investment, in which Triodos is involved. This section also covers 
some partners of Triodos Bank that are of relevance for the MeerWaarde Fund. Partners 
or Triodos Bank and have not been considered in the previous section in order to 
concentrate on partners that are more especially involved in the ethical investment 
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movement – and therefore more relevant to the present research. The MeerWaarde Fund 
is in contact with diverse organisations that contribute to the process of ethical 
investment. Triodos is member of all the organisations mentioned in this ‘others’ 
category. This means that Triodos financially supports each of these organisations by 
paying an annual subscription fee. And it also means that Triodos participates to meetings 
organised by these organisations on a regular basis. The frequency of the meetings differs 
for each organisation.  
 VBDO (Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development) 
VBDO was officially established in 1996. Its creation was supported by Triodos bank, 
along with other Dutch banks – ASN Bank, Rabobank, SNS, ABF – and the Dutch 
Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment (VROM). The aim of VBDO 
is “to promote the interests of its members, investors both private and institutional, within 
the overarching context of sustainable development”(VBDO, 2001). VBDO’s members 
are essentially financial institutions but also individual investors. As of December 2002, 
there were 23 member organisations, among which 16 financial institutions, 5 NGOs, 1 
rating organisation and 1 consulting organisation. VBDO’s main activity is to enter into 
dialogue YKVJ VJGOCPCIGOGPVQH KPFKXKFWCN EQORCPKGUCTQWPFSWGUVKQPU TGNCVGF VQ VJG
VQRKEQHUWUVCKPCDNGFGXGNQROGPV
8$&18$&1TGRTGUGPVU KVUOGODGTUVQXKUKV
EQTRQTCVKQPUCPFCUMUSWGUVKQPUQPDGJCNHQHVJGOCUUJCTGJQNFGTFWTKPIVJGUJCTGJQNFGT
OGGVKPIU The topic is invariably sustainable development. It started first with Shell in 
1996. VBDO went to Shell’s annual shareholder meeting and raised questions about 
corporate responsibility on behalf of its members. In the years to follow, the VBDO 
visited numerous companies. In 2001 VBDO talked to 27 companies individually 
(VBDO, 2001). Engagement ranges from informal meetings with management to tabling 
critical resolutions at company general meetings. VBDO is not an activist group but acts 
within the bounds of what some may call ‘shareholder activism’ or ‘shareholder 
engagement’. Shareholder engagement is a technique – the use of voting rights attached 
to ordinary shares to assert and achieve political, financial, or other objectives. It can be 
used as a tool to influence corporate behaviour on a broad range of issues. This is usually 
done by using the rights of share ownership to gain entry to a company’s annual meeting 
where critical questions can be asked of senior executives. 
VBDO, in collaboration with its members, has also developed several activities or 
products related to ethical investment such as the standardisation of environmental 
information for investors, guidelines for Transparency by Sustainable Investment Funds, 
market development, engagement strategies, and codes of conduct for SRI funds 
'WTQUKH
D. Every year since 1998, VBDO organises a symposium on investment and 
sustainable development attended by financial institutions, private investors and 
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companies: the National Socially Responsible Investment Forum. VBDO plays an 
important role in the diffusion of information about ethical investment. It is a central 
organisation in the Netherlands concerning ethical investment. It participated to the 
development of the Social and Economic Council on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Report from the ministry (SER, 2001), they regularly write reports and article, go to 
conferences, develop research project with universities, and are regularly the object of 
newspaper or TV reports. They are a member of GRI and were one of the initiators of 
Eurosif (see presentation of Eurosif in Annex 8).  
 VBA (Vereniging van Beleggingsanalisten) 
VBA is the Dutch Analysts Association. It was founded in 1961 and is part of the EFFAS 
(European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies). The VBA has approximately 
1,200 active members (analysts and fund managers), employed by banks, brokers and 
institutional investors in the Netherlands and abroad. As a representative of its members 
the VBA takes part in various financial committees and is in frequent contact with 
political parties, government bodies and regulatory agencies in the Netherlands. Within 
the VBA, various committees are actively researching various issues related to the 
financial sector and in an international context. Recently, in 2002, the association 
integrated a working group on socially responsible investment. This group works on the 
connection between sustainability and investment and looks at the various options likely 
to contribute to, and promote, sustainable development through investment. Members of 
the group are: Marcel de Berg, (Your Good Choice), Bas Rüter (Triodos Bank), Wouter 
Peters (PGGM), Age van Heemstra, Peter Pauw (ING Bank),·Pim van Santen (Mn-
Services), Wout van Heerdt (Interpolis).  
 Eurosif (European 5QEKCN+PXGUVOGPV(QTWO 
Eurosif is the pan-European stakeholder network for promoting and developing 
sustainable and responsible investment founded in 2001. The Eurosif board is made up of 
the Five Founding Social Investment Forums among which VBDO. 'WTQUKH CKOU VQ
RTQXKFGKPHQTOCVKQPCPFGFWECVKQPQPUWUVCKPCDNGCPFTGURQPUKDNGKPXGUVOGPV
54+CVC
RCP'WTQRGCPNGXGN VQRTQOQVG VJGFGXGNQROGPVCPFEQPXGTIGPEGQHEQOOWPKECVKQPQP
54+
'WTQUKHC6TKQFQU$CPMKUCHQWPFKPIOGODGTQH'WTQUKHCNQPIYKVJQVJGT
OGODGTU /GODGTU EQPUKUV QH HKPCPEKCN KPUVKVWVKQPU 
 TCVKPI QTICPKUCVKQPU 
 CPF
0)1U
 
 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
“The Global Reporting Initiative is a multi-stakeholder process and independent 
institution whose mission is to develop and disseminate globally applicable Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines. These Guidelines are for voluntary use by organisations for 
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reporting on the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of their activities, 
products, and services.” (GRI, 2003) GRI incorporates participation of representatives 
from business, accountancy, investment, environmental, human rights, research and 
labour organisations from around the world. The initiative was launched in 1997 by the 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). It became independent 
in 2002. GRI is an official collaborating centre of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and works in cooperation with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 
Global Compact. It also has close ties with the following initiatives: AA 1000, ISO 
14000, ISO 14063, OECD Guidelines for MNEs, SA8000 and Global Sullivan Principles 
(GRI, 2003). Triodos Bank supports GRI in two ways. Firstly through VBDO: VBDO is 
one of the organisational stakeholders of GRI (what GRI defines as a critical element in 
GRI’s governance structure as they elect the Stakeholder Council which, in turn, appoints 
the GRI Board of Directors); and secondly by following the GRI guidelines for its annual 
report.  
 5QEKCN8GPVWTG0GVYQTM'WTQRG
508
508 C PQVHQTRTQHKV CUUQEKCVKQP KU CP őKPVGTPCVKQPCN PGVYQTM QH UQEKCNN[ CPF
GPXKTQPOGPVCNN[GPICIGFGPVTGRTGPGWTU CPFDWUKPGUU NGCFGTUFGFKECVGF VQEJCPIKPI VJG
YC[YGCPF VJGYQTNFFQDWUKPGUU +VU IQCN KU VQ KPVGITCVG VJG XCNWGUQH C UQEKCNN[CPF
GPXKTQPOGPVCNN[ UWUVCKPCDNG UQEKGV[ KPVQ FC[VQFC[ DWUKPGUU RTCEVKEGUŒ 
508 
6JGPGVYQTMYCUHQWPFGFKPVJG75KPCPFECOGVQ'WTQRGKP508JCUCNUQ
DGGP RTGUGPV KP #UKC UKPEG  CPF KU EWTTGPVN[ YQTMKPI QP GUVCDNKUJKPI C DTCPEJ KP
5QWVJ#HTKEC/GODGTU QH VJG PGVYQTM CTG DWUKPGUU NGCFGTU GPVTGRTGPGWTU CPF0)1U
&KTGEV QHHURTKPI QTICPKUCVKQPU CTG $WUKPGUU HQT 5QEKCN 4GURQPUKDKNKV[ 
$54 VJG
+PXGUVQTŏU%KTENGCPF5VWFGPVUHQT4GURQPUKDNG$WUKPGUU
54$
 +0#+5'
VJG+PVGTPCVKQPCN#UUQEKCVKQPQH+PXGUVQTUKPVJG5QEKCN'EQPQO[
+PCKUGKUCINQDCNPGVYQTMQHUQEKCNN[CPFGPXKTQPOGPVCNN[QTKGPVGFHKPCPEKCNKPUVKVWVKQPU
+V YCU ETGCVGF KP  /GODGTU CTG HTQO 'WTQRGCP CPF PQP'WTQRGCP EQWPVTKGU
+0#+5'OGODGTUVJTQWIJVJGKTKPXGUVOGPVRQNKE[HQUVGTCPFRTQOQVGVJGFGXGNQROGPV
QH QTICPKUCVKQPU CPF GPVGTRTKUGU KPXQNXGF KP VJG GPXKTQPOGPV CPF UWUVCKPCDNG
FGXGNQROGPV VJG UQEKCN GEQPQO[ JGCNVJECTG UQEKCN FGXGNQROGPV GFWECVKQP CPF
VTCKPKPI PQTVJ5QWVJ GZEJCPIG CPF CTVU CPF EWNVWTG +0#+5' OGODGTUŏ CRRTQCEJ VQ
KPXGUVKPI CPF FGRQUKVKPI KU FKHHGTGPV HTQO VJCV QH VTCFKVKQPCN HKPCPEKCN KPUVKVWVKQPU ő#U
EQNNGEVQTUQHFGRQUKVUVJG[VT[VQDGVTCPURCTGPVKPUVKVWVKQPUYJGTGRGQRNGECPCEVWCNN[UGG
YJCVJCRRGPUYKVJVJGKTOQPG[ETGCVKPICYCTGPGUUCPFKPXQNXGOGPV#UKPXGUVQTUVJG[
VT[VQDGOQTGVJCPLWUVRTQXKFGTUQHOQPG[Œ
+PCKUG+PVJG0GVJGTNCPFU6TKQFQU
$CPMCPF#50CTGOGODGTUQH+PCKUG+VKUYQTVJPQVKPIVJCV(TCPUFG%NGTEM&KTGEVQTQH
6TKQFQU$CPM0GVJGTNCPFUJCUDGGP2TGUKFGPVQH+PCKUGUKPEG/C[
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With all these partners (VBDO, VBA, Eurosif, GRI, Inaise and SNV) Triodos has close 
and regular contacts. They essentially exchange information and knowledge. They may 
also develop some projects together. Other organisations that are not mentioned are the 
NGOs. Triodos has regular contacts with NGOs in its regular activity. These contacts are 
not mentioned but they do exist. Triodos Bank has signed the UNEP Financial Institution 
Initiative Statement on the Environment and Sustainable Development. 
2.3.5.6 Relationship between the MeerWaarde Fund and its actors 
The MeerWaarde Fund involves several actors drawn from fund managers, advisory 
committees, research and diverse organisations related to the activity or the movement. 
The types and frequency of contacts vary for each actor and have evolved over time.  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 graphically represent (1) actors involved and (2) the intensity of the 
contacts. Intensity of contact has been divided into three levels: regular and frequent 
contacts, regular or frequent contacts, and neither regular nor frequent contacts. Those 
categories have been chosen because it is not possible to exactly quantify the number of 
contacts. However it is possible to identify whether the contacts are intense (regular and 
frequent), semi-intense (regular or frequent), occasional (neither regular nor frequent), or 
non-existent. For both figures the central actor is MeerWaarde Fund. The internal 
contacts are not represented (fund management).  
Figure 7 represents the actors in the MeerWaarde Fund in 1997, that is at the very 
beginning of the fund while Figure 8 represents the actors in 2002. In 1997 the total 
number of groups of actors was 9. In 2002 this number increased by three (12 groups). 
The circle of occasional contacts has especially increased: 7 in 2002 against 3 in 1997. 
Groups in the circle of intense contacts have, on the contrary, decreased, from 4 groups in 
1997 to 2.5 in 2002 (one being in between the circle of intense and semi-intense 
contacts). The semi-intense circle contains more or less the same number of groups, 2 in 
1997 and 2.5 in 2002. Two main reasons explain those changes. First of all Triodos 
Research became independent in 2000. This means that in 1997 the MeerWaarde Fund 
had direct contacts with corporations and NGOs in relation to screenings while in 2002 
those contacts were made by Triodos Research under the name of a rating organisation 
and no longer of a financial institution. Note that the situation partly changed in 2002 
when Triodos Research was split up in two organisations, DSR and TAS, because TAS 
became part of Triodos Bank again. Therefore those two groups of actors have been 
pushed into the circle of occasional contacts. The same applies to VBDO. Triodos 
Research is maintaining most of the contacts with VBDO. However the bank itself is still 
connected to VBDO as a member. Rating organisations have disappeared. The 
MeerWaarde Fund has contact only with Triodos Research (Triodos Research is 
maintaining contacts with other rating organisations). Investors have moved from the 
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intense circle half way to the semi-intense. It seems that over time investors are asking 
fewer questions. This may be due to the fact that since 2002 procedures, criteria and 
methodologies have been written down and publicly available – therefore answering a 
certain number of questions from investors. Inaise has moved from semi-intense to 
intense. This move is mainly due to the direct involvement of the Director of Triodos 
Netherlands as President of the organisation. Two groups, university and financial 
institutions, are mainly connected to the MeerWaarde Fund through the advisory board, 
members of which are part of those groups. The contact intensity has not changed over 
the last five years. Four groups have been added in 2002: VBA, SVN Europe, Eurosif and 
GRI. Those are organisations that have developed between 1997 and 2002 due to the 
growth of the ethical investment movement. Triodos has supported their creation. In a 
number of cases the relation of Triodos Bank with the organisations is of a membership 
type. 
Triodos MeerWaarde Fund has increased the number of organisations with which it has 
contacts but the intensity of contacts has decreased. This is mainly due to the 
independence of Triodos Research, that maintains intense contact with some of the 
groups while the MeerWaarde Fund leaves the responsibility to Triodos Research. The 
MeerWaarde Fund has very intense contacts with Triodos Research, which plays a central 
role in the fund: defining the investment universe and reviewing the criteria and 
methodology of the selection procedure.  
2.3.6 Conclusion 
The development of the MeerWaarde Fund has been a long process of trial and error. 
Triodos had to build up a completely new knowledge base, know how and new contacts 
indispensable for managing the fund. One of the priorities of the bank was to develop a 
product that would reflect and respect its values. This entailed a fund with numerous and 
strict criteria that have not significantly changed over the last 6 years. An important 
outcome of the development of the MeerWaarde Fund has been the creation of a new 
department, which then became an independent organisation, entirely devoted to the 
activity of screening: Triodos Research. 
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2.4  Triodos Research 
Triodos Research is a rating organisation. It provides the screening and rating tools 
necessary in the investment decision process. This section describes how Triodos 
Research has developed over time (from 1997 till end 2002), and the services and 
products it offers.  
2.4.1 Brief history 
Triodos Research started in 1997 as a small department of Triodos Bank. In March 1997 
it was composed of three people (representing 1.8 equivalent full time). The department 
was set up in order to carry out screenings for the new ethical fund of Triodos Bank, the 
MeerWaarde Fund, launched in May 1997. In 2000 Triodos Research became a branch of 
Triodos Holding NV, and in January 2002, Triodos Research was split up into two 
independent organisations: Triodos Advisory Services (TAS), 100% owned by Triodos 
Holding NV, and Dutch Sustainability Research (DSR), an independent organisation 
owned by Triodos Bank, Mees Pierson and PGGM. TAS and DSR are two separate 
organisations with distinctive structures and roles. TAS “supplies investment research 
and consulting services to pension funds, companies and stakeholder groups who are 
interested in corporate sustainability and socially responsible investing” (Triodos 
Research, 2003b) while DSR “provides access to detailed company profiles on major 
public companies worldwide” (Triodos Research, 2003a). DSR is a fact-finding 
organisation whereas TAS carries out analysis and consulting activities. As of December 
2002, DSR consisted of five employees and TAS of 9. Together they counted eleven full 
time employees. Although DSR and TAS are two independent and separate entities, in 
the present thesis they are regrouped in one unit named Triodos Research. The reasons 
for keeping the old name and structure are twofold. Firstly, the writing of the thesis 
started when there was only one organisation. The change in name and structure occurred 
while the thesis was already well advanced. For practical reasons it is easier to keep 
Triodos Research as unit of analysis. Secondly, the split up has not led to drastic changes 
in the working procedures. TAS and DSR work together and are based in the same office. 
Up to 2003 the split was primarily administrative in nature. For these two reasons the 
thesis does not distinguish between TAS and DSR in the analysis of the data. However 
because the split is of interest to understand the development of Triodos Research it 
needed to be mentioned.  
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2.4.2 Overview of Triodos Research 
2.4.2.1 Mission statement 
Although Triodos Research has gone through structural and organisational changes, its 
mission has remained the same. It complies with Triodos Bank’s mission but touching a 
new area, the stock quoted companies. Its purpose is to make stock-quoted corporations 
aware of their social and environmental responsibilities. Its objective is to influence 
corporations to move towards sustainability: “Triodos Research aims to influence 
companies toward a more sustainable society and to promote corporate accountability 
and responsibility toward stakeholders.” (Triodos Research, 2000) 
The tools Triodos Research possesses to reach its mission are information and 
engagement with companies. Its objectives are the following (Triodos Research, 2000): 
- “Provide high quality research and services to financial institutions and institutional 
investors to develop sustainable investment products. 
- Promote a dialogue with and advise companies on corporate sustainability and 
accountability. 
- Advise and support various stakeholders in promoting more sustainable behaviour of 
companies worldwide.” 
2.4.2.2 Strategy and activities 
The basic activity of Triodos Research is to “conduct systematic research into companies 
listed on the stock exchange on the basis of social and environmental criteria.” (Triodos 
Research, 1999). However the activities of Triodos Research have developed over time. 
They first focused on company profiles and sector studies. Then later on other activities 
were developed due to market demand or partnerships: sustainability scans, advisory 
services, corporate governance, and issue reports. The activity of information provider 
has been complemented by the activity of consulting services. Table 8 lists the activities 
of Triodos Research in 2002. 
The two core activities of Triodos Research have evolved over time. They concern the 
way the activity is carried out, what is looked at, and what is reported and how. The 
foundation of the SiRi Group in 2000 has led to what has been called a harmonisation 
process. The first year SiRi’s main activity was to find a standardised way of producing 
company profiles: standard criteria, standard definitions, standard methodology and 
standard reporting. That has been a very long process which is still going on. The SiRi 
partners had to face cultural differences, multiple priorities, and various client demands. 
For Triodos Research the process has entailed some changes. First of all, some criteria 
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have changed. Two groups of comparative criteria have been added: corporate 
governance and quality. Other comparative criteria have changed such as: the number of 
women represented on the management board. However those changes are minor. 
Exclusionary criteria have evolved rather than changed. That is the case for example with 
‘Environmentally dangerous substances’. Triodos Research used to refer to a Dutch 
document from the ministry listing dangerous substances. The reference consists now of 
two international lists, Ospar (Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic) and POPs (Persistent Organic Pollutants). Triodos Research 
has been a dominant partner in the definition of exclusionary criteria because of its 
stringent requirements. Secondly the process has entailed a complete reorganisation of 
the profiles. Profiles used to be organised around three main groups of questions: 
exclusionary screens, and comparative social and environmental screens. With SiRi, they 
have been reorganised into seven groups of screens organised around stakeholders: 
community, corporate governance, customers, employees, the environment, human rights 
and supply chain, and controversial business activities. And thirdly the process has forced 
Triodos Research to write clear and standard procedures regarding company screenings, 
contacts with companies and stakeholders, exchange of information, etc. Triodos 
Research has developed several guidelines related to screening.  
The new company profile has led to some changes for sector studies. The most important 
source of information for conducting a sector study is company profiles. It is on the basis 
of the profiles that the comparative screening is carried out. The most significant change 
has been the corporation rating and the organisation of the study. Until 2000, companies 
from a same sector were given a mark on each aspect – social and environmental. Each 
aspect had a weight according to the sector characteristics. The two marks were added 
and companies of the sector were ranked according to their total results. The marking 
system was not very clear and relied on the analyst’s interpretation. This system has 
completely changed. Sector studies have been reorganised around People, Planet, and 
Transparency & external relations. Triodos Research has placed an emphasis on the 
willingness of the company to communicate and on its openness. Therefore the last 
category has been added. Terms have changed to refer directly to the three Ps concept. 
For each category, a series of very precise questions is asked to which the analyst may 
answer only ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. If the answer is yes, the company gets 1 point, if it is no, it 
gets a zero. The system of rating is more systematic and tries to base the answer on 
objective facts rather than feelings. There is also a weighting system according to the 
sector characteristics.  
Clients of Triodos Research have also changed over time. At the beginning, Triodos 
Research had one single client: Triodos MeerWaarde Fund. It was exclusively working 
for the fund. But little by little the activity grew and Triodos Research started to offer its 
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research and consulting services to other financial institutions such as pension funds and 
banks. They used the services for managing ethical funds. But another type of client 
showed interest in some of the services of Triodos Research (especially consulting, sector 
study and issue reports): companies and stakeholder organisations such as NGOs and 
trade unions. Up to the end of 2002, those clients have mainly been Dutch organisations. 
Company profile Screening of companies on detailed information covering a 
breadth of social, environmental, and corporate governance 
issues.  
Sector study In-depth assessment of companies sustainability 
performance within an industry 
Consulting services Consulting services related to sustainable investing and 
corporate responsibility. Advice can be provided on 
developing sustainable investment strategies taking into 
account a wide range of social, environmental, and 
corporate governance criteria. 
Sustainability Scans Sustainability Scans, providing a “snap shot” of a client’s 
portfolio relative to mainstream investment benchmarks 
Corporate governance 
services 
Corporate governance services through which detailed 
corporate governance information can be obtained from 
European companies, including voting advice 
Issue report In-depth report on specific issues reflecting the state of the 
art, future developments, and a position statement on what 
can be expected from companies.  
Table 8 – Activities of Triodos Research in 2002 
2.4.2.3 Criteria management 
Criteria used by Triodos Research are regularly discussed and definitions constantly 
refined or updated according to new developments in society. Analyst of Triodos 
Research meet every two weeks to discuss issues related to criteria and/or methodology. 
Table 9 is an inventory of all issues discussed within Triodos Research from 1999 to 
2002. It only includes issues for which a memorandum has been written. Discussions on 
issues do not always result in memoranda, either because an issue may require several 
discussions but only an end-memorandum is written with the final decision, or because it 
was a minor discussion that did not entail any changes in the issue. During the four years, 
53 memos resulted from discussions on various issues. Most of the discussions were 
about updating or refining the criteria. Few of the discussions were about adding or 
withdrawing criteria. ‘Refining’ means considering new developments regarding the 
specific issue, the practice of the criteria, and changes in society. For example the criteria 
related to hazardous substances has been updated, meaning that the list of hazardous 
products has changed. It used to be the list from the Dutch ministry, it is now the POPs 
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list (internationally recognised) and the OSPAR list. Dictatorial regimes and Human 
rights are the most discussed issues. Discussions were often about the application of the 
criteria and updates of the information.  
Type of 
Discussion 
Issues discussed resulting in a memorandum Number of 
times 
Refining 
criteria 
Dictatorial regimes & Human rights 
Hazardous substances 
Working conditions & labour rights 
Unsustainable mining 
Nuclear weapons 
Factory farming 
Environmental legislation & serious environment damages 
Forestry 
Fishing 
Animal testing 
GMO & genetic engineering 
Violation of legislation 
10 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
1 
New criteria Pornography 
Corporate governance 
Quality 
1 
3 
1 
Sectors Financial sector 
Airlines 
Pharmaceutical industry 
Sustainable sectors 
1 
2 
3 
3 
Other General revision of exclusionary criteria (alignment with SiRi 
standards) 
Companies using non sustainable wood 
Alliances 
Protected areas 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table 9 – Triodos Research: discussion on issues (1999-2002) [source Memo Triodos Research] 
It is interesting to note that increasingly Triodos Research is adopting international 
conventions, guidelines or agreements as reference for defining the criteria, such as the 
World Wild Fund list of 2000 on protected areas, OSPAR and POPs lists. At the 
beginning (1998/1999) Triodos Research tried to rework those conventions, or adapt 
them to its specific needs. 
Three new criteria have been added to the list of issues covered by Triodos Research 
namely pornography, corporate governance, and quality. These additions were mainly 
due to two reasons: demands from new clients (concerning pornography), and alignment 
with the SiRi partners (harmonisation of the company profiles).  
Sustainable sectors have encountered major changes in 2001/2002. Numerous questions 
were raised from sustainability analysts and investors (from the MeerWaarde Fund) about 
the so-called sustainable sectors: can those sectors really be considered sustainable? This 
was discussed several times with the stakeholder panel of Triodos Research in 2002. The 
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list of sustainable sectors has changed, and the definition of the sector considered 
sustainable has been redefined (see section 2.3.4).  
2.4.3 Development of Triodos Research 
Triodos Research encountered some significant changes between 1997 and 2002. This 
section presents some key moments that have been important in the development of the 
organisation. Figure 9 gives an overview of the key dates.  
1996-1997: Search for criteria and a methodology 
From 1996 to the launch of the fund Triodos Bank worked on developing a methodology 
and criteria for the MeerWaarde Fund. They first conducted a kind of state of the art 
review. Because in the Netherlands very little was in place, they looked abroad especially 
at the UK. They contacted EIRIS, Merlin Research Unit, PIRC, Ethical Services Ltd and 
Commercial Union. They had special contact with Tessa Tenant, at that time working at 
National Provident Institution (NPI) in the UK. They did a comparative study including 
funds from the UK, US, Australia, Germany, and Scotland.  
In 1997 the list of criteria was composed of 12 ‘negative’ and 26 ‘positive’ criteria and 
indicators. The negative criteria were exclusionary ones. The definitions were very 
vague. For example, there was a category called ‘Society’ in which one of the criteria 
was: “ No serious damages affecting the welfare and the health of the local community 
where the company is operating”. In the category ‘working conditions’, one of the criteria 
was: “No strikes or other serious conflicts in the last three years”. The positive criteria 
were also very vague. One of them was “Good relations between the board of directors 
and the trade unions”.  
1996 and 1997 were years of exploration. Triodos Research needed to build a 
methodology and to acquire some experience. The bank had a general idea of what they 
wanted but the operationalisation was still at an experimental stage.  
1997, March: First employee 
Triodos Research officially started. The first employee was hired to conduct the screening 
of corporations. She had a background in environmental science. Two other employees of 
Triodos Bank were also recruited to the research department but both were working part 
time. One of them was, and still is, the head of the department, and the other was 
specialised in all issues related to human rights (ILO conventions, dictatorial regimes). 
The second employee was hired in September 1998. His background was related to social 
issues, more especially with reference to employees, such as working conditions, trade 
unions and social policy. The third employee started in November 1998. She is the 
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researcher conducting the present study. Each of the employees focused on a specific 
domain: environment, social, or human rights. They were responsible for keeping the 
department updated concerning their domain and also to check the company screening on 
these issues.  
The department met every week to discuss company screenings, issue development and 
working organisation. Each company screened was presented to the department and 
results were discussed with the whole group.  
1997-1998: First screenings 
The focus was on Dutch companies, and this for several reasons. First the bank wanted to 
launch the fund with a number of Dutch companies because the fund was Dutch and 
targeting Dutch citizens, and secondly they were easier to screen (information more 
easily available and companies were better known).  
Analysts disposed of a list of exclusionary criteria (negative criteria) and a list of 
comparative criteria (positive criteria). However neither were workable criteria. Analysts 
had to develop them while doing the screening. Therefore each company assessment led 
to numerous discussions about the company itself but also the criteria. The first three 
Dutch sectors were screened between 1997 and 1998: Construction, Food, IT. For each 
sector study a ‘background document’ was produced. In a background document, 
information about specificities and characteristics of the sector are gathered and analysed. 
The writing of a background document takes between one and two weeks. It consists of 
several steps:  
- Identification of the problems occurring in the sector. Once identified, these are 
discussed with experts (professionals from the sector, NGOs, and other relevant 
actors).  
- Literature review 
- Interviews with stakeholders related to the sector (trade unions, associations, NGOs). 
External specialists provide the necessary and basic knowledge to be able to make a 
sector analysis. To each of the stakeholders identified, the analyst sends a 
questionnaire in which he/she asks what the relevant issues for this sector are. They 
are also asked to weigh each issue (criteria). The analyst collects all the responses and 
works out an average of the answers received. This analysis is used as the basis for 
the screening of the companies in the sector.  
- After having gathered the opinions of several stakeholders, the whole department 
meet and discuss the weights. The analyst pursues the sector study only if the group 
reaches agreement. 
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- After approval of the department, the analyst starts screening companies of the sector.  
The second stage is carrying out the company screening. It starts with the gathering of 
information about each company, followed by analysis. After a first draft, two or three 
persons (often one analyst together with the head of the department) go and visit the 
company. Each company screened is presented and discussed with the whole department. 
The screening of one company takes 35 hours on average. Time allocated for screening 
companies from the sustainable sector is 13.35 hours.  
July 1998: First official document on the methodology and criteria 
The first official document related to the methodology and criteria of the MeerWaarde 
Fund was published in July 1998. A distinction was made between two categories of 
criteria: ‘Activities to be avoided: Significant negative social impacts of products and 
services (21 criteria) and Significant process-related negative social effects (8 criteria)’; 
‘Aspects of the relative criteria’ (9 aspects related to the environment and 18 aspects 
related to social issues). At the end of the list of criteria it was stipulated that “In addition 
to these aspects, other complementary aspects may be investigated and evaluated per 
sector”. The list of criteria had expanded a lot since 1997. Exclusionary criteria had 
increased from 12 to 29, and the comparative ones from 26 to 27. 
October 1998: First ‘quick’ sector study 
Because sector studies took too much time it was decided to develop a working method to 
speed up studies: the ‘quick sector study’. The first sector screened with the ‘quick sector 
study’ method was the Employment Placement Agencies. It was decided to reduce the 
time spent per company from 35 to 23 hours. Quick sector studies mean: fewer 
indicators, telephone interviews instead of a visit, limited consultations with experts 
(within the sector or related to a specific environmental problem), less group discussion 
within the department; and the sector weights do not have to be approved by experts. One 
important change compared to the ‘normal’ sector study methodology is the time spent on 
pre-sector analysis. The background document is reduced to a minimum. Criteria used for 
screening are very carefully chosen, therefore the number is reduced according to the 
sector relevance. The time spent for screening is distributed as follows (average per 
company): 
a) Gathering of information from companies, internet, and third partiesÎ8 hours 
b) Contact company: telephone interview Î 2.5 hours 
c) Assessment of company Î 7.5 hours 
d) Second contact with companyÎ4 hours 
e) Write advice to company Î 1 hour 
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1999: Research of partners abroad 
1999 was the year of international strategy development. Triodos Research already had 
some contacts abroad, among which EIRIS (UK), PIRC (UK), KLD (US), Centre Info 
(Switzerland) Caring Company (Scandinavia) and Arese (France), but no concrete 
partnership yet. Triodos saw internationalisation as necessary for two main reasons: the 
MeerWaarde Fund needed to be more diversified and include companies from several 
countries (it was too much focused on Dutch companies), and the screening of 
international groups like Shell or Unilever requires an international perspective. The 
policy of Triodos Research has always been to be as close as possible to companies, i.e. 
to have contacts and stakeholders related to the company. Therefore the screening of 
foreign companies needs to be carried out as much as possible by organisations that have 
knowledge about the context and culture in which the company operates.  
In January 1999 KLD (US), Arese (France), Imug (Germany), Centre Info (Switzerland) 
and Triodos Research started the process of setting an international cooperation. In April 
1999 the Belgian rating organisation expressed an interest in joining the partnership 
project. In April 1999, Arese and Centre Info agreed to cooperate with Triodos Research. 
Contacts with other interested parties went on during the whole year: MJRA in Canada 
(August) and Avanzi in Italy (November). The idea of an international rating group 
started to flourish (what would later become the SiRi Group). All the rating organisations 
were confronted to a similar problem: the need to have international companies in their 
portfolios and the difficulty of screening companies from other countries.  
June 1999: First Triodos Research brochure 
For the first time Triodos published a brochure devoted to Triodos Research called: 
‘Triodos Research, A choice for sustainable investment’. It presented the approach of 
Triodos Research as well as the services it offers: sustainable capital management, 
investment advice, and research services. It is interesting to note that during the first half 
of 1999, Triodos Research was contacted by other banks that were interested in 
developing an ethical investment fund.  
2000: Independence 
In 2000, Triodos Research became a branch of Triodos Holding (100% owned by Triodos 
Holding). 
January 2000: First contract with external client 
Triodos Research had its first external client in January 2000. The first contact between 
Triodos Research and the client, another financial institution, had been made in 
September 1998. In March 1999, the financial institution began to develop jointly with 
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Triodos its ethical investment fund project. It took almost one year to develop the fund. 
The bank had much trouble in defining the fund’s policy and criteria. Contacts with 
Triodos were rather intensive. Triodos Research gave advice concerning both criteria and 
methodology.  
June 2000: Launch of SiRi Group 
SiRi Group (Sustainable Investment Research International) was officially launched in 
February 2000. Triodos Research, KLD (US), Arese (France), Caring Company 
(Scandinavian countries) and Centre info (Switzerland) initiated SiRi. Very soon it was 
joined by other rating organisations. In February 2000 it counted nine members (those 
already mentioned, plus Michael Jantzi Research Associates (Canada), Avanzi (Italy), 
Fundación Ecología y Desarrollo (Spain), Pensions & Investment Research Consultants 
(UK and Ireland)). In May 2003 it counted 11 members. Scoris (Germany), Stock at 
Stake (Belgium), and the Sustainable Investment Research Institute SIRIS (Australia) had 
joined, whilst Arese left in 2002.  
SiRi describes itself as “an unrivalled resource of knowledge and expertise on 
corporations, local markets and SRI investment strategies” (SIRI Group, 2003). Its 
mission is to provide and promote high quality social investment research products and 
services throughout the world. The SiRi Group's goals include global coverage of all 
major financial markets, publication of harmonised profiles in comparable formats of the 
largest publicly traded companies throughout the world, publication of social profiles of 
companies making up the major stock indices throughout the world, promotion and the 
development of socially screened national and transnational financial indices, and 
maintenance of the highest possible standards for social investment research and products 
(SIRI Group, 2003).  
SiRi Group has put much effort and energy into developing what is called ‘harmonised 
profiles’ that is reports of company screening using consistent criteria and in a 
standardised format. It has been a very long process requiring the agreement of all 
members regarding the issues that are of importance for assessing corporation 
sustainability. In mid-2000 SiRi Group managed to establish its first draft harmonised 
profile. The draft was joined with a handbook called “Data Entry Guide” that explains 
how to fill in the profile (explanation of the issues covered, the conditions companies 
should fulfil in order to get a ‘yes’, etc). Of course the harmonised profile is an evolving 
document. Each Profile contains over 350 data points and associated analysis. All major 
stakeholder issues are covered including community involvement, environmental impact, 
employment relations, customer policies, human rights issues and corporate governance. 
For each issue, SiRi describes and analyses the company's policies, management systems, 
reporting standards and impacts together with particular strengths and weaknesses. In 
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addition, SiRi Global Profiles contain information on controversial business practices 
such as armaments, tobacco, animal testing or GMOs. There are regular updates and 
changes. The SiRi Group publishes harmonised profiles of the leading international 
corporations (by end 2002 it had covered the 1,000 largest international companies).  
At the beginning of 2002, SiRi developed a Quality Management System which all 
members are required to follow. This system covers data gathering, knowledge 
management, contacts with stakeholders, relationships with corporations and 
incorporation of feedback. For the harmonised profiles, the SiRi Group applies quality 
standards to ensure a consistent approach to information gathering and analysis. The SiRi 
Group applies proprietary criteria, definitions and explanations relating to all issues 
covered in Profiles. All companies analysed are contacted at an early stage for their input 
and all see a draft copy of their profile for comment and feedback. Company visits are 
undertaken in many cases. Stakeholder groups are contacted for their views. Each profile 
is reviewed by a separate SiRi Group member, after internal checking, and each group 
member organisation is subject to an audit of their research processes. These quality 
standards ensure that each Profile contains comparable data and analysis.  
Besides the harmonised profiles, SiRi offers the following services: local profiles, 
exclusionary screens, SRI Ratings, SRI indices, SRI fund analysis, strategic SRI advice, 
shareholder engagement, and sector profiles (SIRI Group, 2003). Since October 2002, 
SiRi issues a newsletter, The Global SRI Reporter. It is published 9 times a year..  
2000: Expansion and new directions for Triodos Research 
2000 marked an important turn in the history of Triodos Research. The department took 
some new strategic directions. The main two developments were: internationalisation and 
development of a service organisation. The priority shifted from Dutch companies to 
foreign companies. That means that international contacts needed to be developed, 
organised and defined. At the same time Triodos Research started offering services to 
external clients and strove to be “the reference for the Dutch market”. However clients 
may have different requirements from Triodos Bank and therefore Triodos Research must 
adapt its services in order to satisfy its clients. But Triodos Research also needs to know 
about the needs and expectations of potential clients. These two strategic changes have 
been crucial in the development of Triodos Research. They have led to numerous 
structural and organisational changes: 
- Increase of the number of analysts: from 5 to 10 (full time equivalent). 
- Strategic meeting of Triodos Research held twice a year with the whole department in 
order to discuss past and future development (first meeting in May 2000)  
- Time efficiency to become the highest priority 
- Working procedures to be written down and planning sheets established 
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- Need to know who the potential clients are, as well as their needs and expectations 
- New tasks within the department allocated to an Account manager: he or she is 
responsible for relations with clients. 
- Specialisation per issue: each analyst is responsible for one or more issues (mining, 
forestry). She/he must keep informed of new developments and write update 
documents when necessary.  
- Company responsibility: each analyst is responsible for a certain number of 
companies (he/she must keep informed of any changes or developments concerning 
the companies he/she is responsible for). 
The new strategic directions brought numerous methodological questions related to 
different requirements of clients, meeting deadline for clients, documents to be 
communicated to clients and documents that cannot be communicated, consistency 
problems between the different rating organisations, cultural differences, explanation of 
criteria, etc. These led also led to some changes related to methods and criteria: 
- New criteria, among which pornography, monopolistic behaviour, corporate 
governance and quality 
- Revision of the criteria: redefinition and better operationalisation in order to avoid 
differences of interpretation as much as possible.  
- New activity: writing issue reports (first one in November 2000 about mining 
activity) 
- Only one co-reader instead of two for checking the screening results of companies 
- Group approval for company screening is not required any more. Only the co-reader 
has to give his/her agreement.  
- Screening of all companies even if they are excluded from MeerWaarde Fund 
because clients have different requirements.  
- Reliance on other rating organisations for the screening of foreign companies.  
- Time spent on company screening: more efficient. 
- Development of standard form for sector studies and company profiles. 
The expansion of Triodos Research brought numerous questions related to the quality of 
the screening. Within the department there was a fear of gaining quantity at the expense 
of quality. It was often referred to as the ‘quick and dirty’ screening. Numerous meetings 
took place in order to discuss the changes and slowly reach agreement. This caused some 
tension within Triodos Research. For the first time, analysts were confronted with time 
pressures. The efficiency issue was dominant in the meetings: ‘How can we speed up 
company screenings?’, ‘Where can we gain some hours?’. Triodos Research had to cope 
with strict deadlines.  
The strategic meetings are also a sign of the new dimension of the department. Triodos 
Research is starting to develop a strategic position. During the first strategic meeting 
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(July 2000), a SWOT analysis was carried out in order to find out where Triodos 
Research stands, where it is going, who its competitors and potential clients are, what 
clients want, and what the market opportunities are. This shows a clear change: Triodos 
Research is adopting a strategic approach of its activity. 
January 2001: First pension funds 
At the beginning of 2001, for the first time, Triodos Research started to work with a 
pension fund that was interested in integrating sustainability aspects in its investment 
policy. The pension fund’s objective is to have the highest possible returns. Managers of 
the pension fund believe that sustainable investment leads to higher returns in the long 
run, therefore they developed this new policy on sustainable investment in 2001. The 
implementation of the policy took quite a long time. In the fall 2001 a one-year pilot 
project was launched in order to test the impact on the investment return. 
February 2001: Rating tool 
In 2001 a new client came with a new request. He did not want profiles or sector studies, 
but needed a specific product consisting only of company ratings. Triodos Research was 
already carrying some kind of ratings within the framework of sector studies. But the 
criteria were not identical for each sector study and there was some room for 
interpretation. The client wanted something standardised, quantitative, and with as little 
room as possible for interpretation. Triodos Research developed a new product called 
‘rating tool’. It was one of the major projects of the year 2001 and required intensive 
work.  
The rating tool is a methodology in which 235 multiple-choice questions are answered for 
every company covered. For each answer a figure is attributed. If the question is ‘Does 
the company monitor its environmental impacts?’: ‘Yes’=1 , ‘No or no information’=0, 
‘Not investigated’=0.5 or ‘Not disclosed’=0. As input for these questions, the SiRi 
company profiles are used. The questions are grouped into chapters that are issues or 
concerns such as Tobacco, Animal testing, General environmental principles & policies. 
In total there are 50 chapters. Each chapter has a weight, with all chapters adding up to 
100%. A sector and/or country risk classification may be applied to each chapter (e.g. for 
the chemicals sector, most environmental chapters are given a high risk classification).  
The strength of the methodology is that all companies, irrespective of the countries or the 
sector in which they operate, can be compared to each other. The overall score provides 
an indication of how sustainable the company is. The rating tool is a new methodology 
focusing on quantitative results.  
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August 2001: Stakeholder panel 
The stakeholder panel consists of 10 experts from trade unions, employers’ organisations, 
environmental pressure groups, human rights organisations, development organisations, 
consumer organisations and academia. All members act in their personal capacity and do 
not represent their own organisations. They meet 3 to 4 times a year. The stakeholder 
panel has no decision-making power. Its purpose is to provide feedback and advice on the 
following issues: 
- Criteria to be used to assess a company’s sustainability. 
- Relative weights to be assigned to criteria depending upon the industry under review. 
- General methodology for conducting sustainability ratings of companies. 
- Other issues that contribute to ensuring high quality, reliable research.  
The stakeholder panel is a way to officialise the involvement of independent experts. 
Triodos Research has always contacted stakeholders for advice. At the very beginning, 
stakeholders were consulted whilst writing the ‘background’ document concerning the 
sector, and later on whilst carrying the company screening. Then analysts stopped writing 
background documents in order to speed up sector studies. Instead the activity of issue 
management was introduced, for which stakeholders are contacted. The activity has been 
split off into two activities. However contacts concerning issue management are informal 
and irregular. Stakeholders are sometimes not directly involved. The panel allows a 
regular and long term implication of the stakeholders. 
The stakeholder panel has been a stimulus to revise some criteria and write down 
documents on specific issues. One important review concerned the sustainable sectors. 
The document about these sectors was entirely reviewed, updated and changed. The 
unsustainable sectors, such as automobile, are now under discussion. Triodos Research 
has been forced to provide a document stating its position regarding, for example, the 
Ahold affair in 2003. Documents produced for the stakeholder panel also concern some 
procedures that needed to be clearly explained to the stakeholder panel for discussion 
such as the relationship with NGOs and the use of information.  
2001-2002: Slow down in the reorganisation 
After the turmoil of 2000, Triodos Research seems to be settling down. The number of 
full time employees has remained more or less unchanged (an average of 10 full time 
equivalents). However this number hides a rather high employee turnover. Until end 2002 
there was an important rate of people leaving. From the 9.5 full time equivalents on 1st 
January 2001, only 4.1 were still working at Triodos Research in January 2003. 
Employees of Triodos Research have now an official work title: sustainability analysts.  
During the last years Triodos Research has been completely reorganised. In 2001/02 there 
have been some changes but these are less far-reaching than in 2000:  
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- Distinction between two types of meetings: content meetings, the discussion of 
criteria or specific forthcoming issues related to sustainability; and process meetings, 
discussion of the day-to-day work (planning, organisation, clients, etc).  
- Set up of working group within the department to develop specific projects. 
- Development of marketing activity. 
- Working procedures are written down: Handbook for screening companies (2002), 
guidelines for sector studies, list of compulsory sources for screening companies, etc. 
- Development of a new research tool: ‘wiseguys’. This internet research tool searches 
information on more than 400 websites selected by Triodos Research. Wiseguys is 
also used by SiRi partners.  
- Official agreement with NGOs: Triodos Research has an official contact person in 
several NGOs such as trade unions, and environmental and human rights 
organisations.  
2001/2002: New partnerships 
In 2001 Triodos Research became a partner in the European Corporate Governance 
Service (ECGS). ECGS is an alliance of eight independent research organisations, which 
have come together to provide investing institutions with expert corporate governance 
assessments of, and informed proxy voting advice about, Europe's largest quoted 
companies (www.ecgs.org). Through the ECGS network, high–quality, consistent 
analysis and informed proxy voting advice on corporate governance is provided about 
companies in the FTSE Eurotop 300 Index as well as leading local indices. Governance 
assessments are made against local best practice as well as global standards such as the 
OECD Guidelines of Corporate Governance and the ICGN Principles. 
In 2002 a new initiative was initiated by Your Good Choice and Triodos Bank: SODP 
(Stichting Ondersteuning Duurzaam Pension, Foundation for Supporting Sustainable 
Pension Funds). This project was developed in collaboration with ABF Capital 
Management and in close dialogue with Triodos Research and some pension funds. The 
aim is to help pension funds that want to take a further step in implementing sustainable 
criteria in the core asset process. SODP wishes to offer alternatives for implementing the 
desired sustainability profile in the real portfolio through what is called ‘controlled 
sustainability’. This is a quantitative approach for pension funds that optimises the 
sustainability score of the portfolio within a strict risk return profile compared to a 
normal index.  
The objectives of SODP include: exploring how to implement sustainability within 
pension schemes, understand sustainability and explore which criteria have to be set and 
how to implement them in the investment process, provide a network to its members, and 
promote sustainability (through proxy voting for example). SODP was set up and is 
controlled by pension funds. 
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Triodos Research plays an important role in this project. It has participated in its 
development and is the research partner. It is in charge of providing company screenings 
and rates the companies according to SODP requirements. Triodos Research also sits on 
the advisory board of SODP.  
January 2002: Launch of DSR and TAS 
In January 2002 Triodos Research split up into two organisations: Dutch Sustainability 
Research (DSR) and Triodos Advisory Services (TAS). The idea of founding an 
independent company devoted to fact-finding and company profiles had already been 
suggested in July 2000. Triodos Research and SNS, whose both have a research branch 
for ethical investment, thought of joining forces and set up an organisation together. For a 
number of reasons the project never succeeded. However Triodos Research did not give 
up the idea and looked for other partners.  
Two main reasons motivated the split up. First of all, there is a financial aspect. Company 
screenings are very expensive, especially if one wants to have a diversified portfolio, i.e. 
a significant number of companies screened internationally, and a performing monitoring 
system. And secondly there is a strategic aspect. The Bank wanted to detach part of the 
activity from the name of Triodos, which represents first and foremost a bank, and a bank 
with strong social, environmental and cultural commitments. The fact-finding activity 
deviated from Triodos’ core business and could, in certain cases, have been a handicap 
for expanding the activity.  
DSR is an independent organisation set up jointly by Triodos Bank, the Dutch pension 
fund PGGM and Mees Pierson (Fortis Group). It is a member of the SiRi Group. DSR is 
a fact-finding organisation. It does not promote specific criteria for analysing companies. 
DSR provides access to the SiRi Global Profiles database. The database consists of 
detailed and standardised sustainability information of up to 1000 global companies 
covering environmental, social and corporate governance issues. The company profiles 
follow the SiRi requirements and standards. They consist of eight distinct chapters 
including: general corporate information, community, corporate governance, customers, 
employees, the environment, human rights and contractors, and controversial activities. 
DSR also offers a standard company ranking based on more than 200 criteria and detailed 
research reports on specific sustainability themes or sectors.  
TAS is the new name of Triodos Research, an independent legal entity owned by Triodos 
Holding and with a new focus on research and consulting activities. It supplies 
investment research and consulting services to pension funds, banks, companies and 
stakeholder groups who are interested in corporate sustainability and socially responsible 
investing. Research and advisor services are customised to meet clients’ specific needs. It 
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provides products such as sector studies, sustainability scans, company information, 
corporate governance services.  
April 2002: Quality Management System 
The SiRi Group has developed a Quality Management System which all members are 
required to follow. This ensures a consistent approach to information gathering and 
analysis. The system covers data gathering, knowledge management, contacts with 
stakeholders, relationships with corporations and incorporation of feedback.  
A system has been developed to file and archive the collected information as well as to 
track the screening process. Wide-ranging data and news searches are undertaken. 
Triodos Research has established a list of data sources that are compulsory to consult 
when working on a profile, consisting of: newspapers, the wise guys search tool 
(covering more than 400 websites), plus some additional websites that cannot be 
integrated in the search tool because a password is needed to access them. This is the 
case, for example, with ChinaOnline. All companies analysed are contacted at an early 
stage for their input and all see a draft copy of their profile for comment and feedback. 
Company visits are undertaken. Stakeholder groups have to be contacted for their views 
(at least two trade unions and one other NGO). Each profile is reviewed by a separate 
SiRi Group member. Each SiRi group member organisation is subjected to an audit of 
their research processes. 
Moreover in 2003, Triodos MeerWaardeFund signed the Transparency Guidelines for 
SRI funds initiated by VBDO in the Netherlands and internationally promoted by Eurosif. 
The aim is to ensure that retail SRI funds are accountable to all stakeholders, in particular 
their customers, and to preserve the reputation of the European SRI sector. Signatories 
make the pledge to be “open and honest and disclose accurate, adequate and timely 
information to enable stakeholders, in particular consumers, to understand the SRI 
policies and practices relating to the fund” (Eurosif, 2003b). 
2002: Consulting work 
Since the change in the structure of Triodos Research (the split up into TAS and DSR), a 
new activity has been growing: consulting. TAS advises institutional investors on 
possible approaches towards incorporating social, environmental and/or ethical 
considerations in investment decision making. Based on clients’ needs and objectives, 
TAS assists in defining criteria and developing formal investment strategies. At the same 
time, TAS collaborates with consultancy organisations such as Good Company and Your 
Good Choice to give workshops on corporate social responsibility and sustainable 
development to financial institutions and corporations.  
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(nb)=represents the number of full time equivalent employees 
Figure 9 – Development of Triodos Research between 1997-2002: some key dates 
2.4.4 Triodos Research Supply Chain and Network 
The screening of companies involved contacts with numerous actors. Annex 2 shows the 
interactions between three types of actors during the screening of a company ‘A’: 
corporation ‘A’, rating organisation (Triodos Research) and third parties. Third parties 
consist of all other organisations that might be contacted during the screening process. 
Most of the time, these are NGOs, Trade Unions, professional organisations, and other 
experts. The figure on Annex 2 does not take into account possible contacts between third 
parties and the company. In order to write a company profile, Triodos Research is in 
constant communication with companies and third parties. They provide Triodos 
Research with the raw information which is going to be processed and analysed at a later 
phase.  
The Supply Chain 
The process of ethical investment can been regarded as continuous flow of money and 
information (see Figure 10). The focus is on the supply chain of ethical investment.  
Five main groups of actors are involved: companies, stakeholders, rating organisations, 
financial institutions, and investors. Companies have a double role: upstream the supply 
chain they provide information necessary for the screening, and downs stream they may 
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become investment opportunities. They are thereby taking part in both the information 
and money flow. Other information providers are the stakeholders. Stakeholder is 
understood as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984). It includes non-governmental organisations 
such as human rights, environmental organisations, trade unions, consumer groups, 
(inter) governmental organisations, shareholders, professional organisations, the media 
and others. Companies and stakeholders may be regarded as raw information suppliers. 
Rating organisations are in charge of collecting the information and process it. The group 
of rating organisations may be split in two. On one hand there are rating organisations 
conducting social, environmental and ethical screening such as Triodos Research or 
KLD, and on the other hand there are rating organisations conducting the financial 
screening. The first group of rating organisations are sometimes part of the financial 
institutions or independent. That is the case for example at Triodos. Delta Lloyd conducts 
the financial screening for Triodos. Ethical rating organisations are most of the time 
independent organisation, not part of the financial institution. However, it is interesting to 
note that in a number of cases, such as Triodos Research, the rating organisation has 
some links with one or more financial institutions (see section 2.4.4). The rating 
organisations collect information from multiple sources and process it. They write 
company profiles reporting what is called the ‘raw’ information (that is facts). Based on 
the profiles, sector studies are carried out in which companies from the same sector are 
benchmarked and ranked. Company profiles, sector studies and ratings are products that 
are offered by rating organisations to financial institutions in order to manage their 
sustainable investment fund. Provided with this information fund managers make 
investment decision that is buying (selling) corporations’ shares on the stock market. 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 represent the network of Triodos Research, in which Triodos 
Research is the central actor. The two figures represent the network at a different period 
of time: Figure 11 shows the network as it was in 1997, and Figure 12 as it was at the end 
of 2002, that is 6 years later. There might be relationships between other actors but these 
are not represented on the figures. Each of the actors represented has had contact with 
Triodos Research, however the type, quality and quantity of contacts vary among the 
actors. In the same way as in figures 6 and 7 (representing the actors of the MeerWaarde 
Fund), a distinction has been made between three categories according to the intensity of 
contacts: regular and frequent in the inner circle, regular or frequent in the second circle, 
and neither regular nor frequent.  
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Figure 10 - Flow of money and information within the process of ethical investment 
In 1997 Triodos Research had intense contacts mainly with two types of actors: 
corporations and NGOs. Those two actors were still in the inner circle in 2002. Triodos 
Research has frequent and regular interaction with companies and NGOs during the 
screening process. NGOs consist of all the organisations necessary for the screening, that 
is environmental and social organisations, trade unions, human rights groups, 
professional experts, consumer organisations, and others according to the sector or the 
issue at stake. NGOs are also contacted when writing an issue report, and when 
conducting a sector study (to get insights into the sector characteristics). In 1997 Triodos 
Research had irregular but rather frequent contact with investors. This was mainly due to 
the fact that Triodos Research was part of Triodos Bank and therefore was working 
exclusively for the MeerWaarde Fund. The fund and the research were very close to each 
other. By 2002, investors had moved to the outside circle. Indeed contacts are becoming 
rare. Most of the time they are handled by the management team of the MeerWaarde 
Fund. However, other banks with less experience in ethical investing like to involve 
Triodos Research when they have difficulties with investors. But Triodos Research does 
not see it as its role to have direct contact with investors. It is the financial institution’s 
role to do this.  
Triodos Research, as well as Triodos Bank, have regular contact with VBDO. They work 
or collaborate together on a regular basis. In 1997 Triodos Research had a few contacts 
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with other rating organisations. It was only in 1999 that they had more regular contacts, 
and in 2000 those contacts were formalised through the creation of the SiRi Group. In 
2002 contacts with the SiRi partners were very intense. They are about practical issues 
but also content issues. Financial institutions other than Triodos Bank were also in the 
outside circle in 1997. At that time, Triodos Research had only one client: Triodos Bank. 
In 2000, Triodos Research had its first external clients. Today they are in constant 
communication with all kinds of financial institutions because they are their clients.  
Now and then Triodos Research has contacts with universities. Academic researchers 
contact them in order to use the database for some studies. But Triodos Research is also 
asked to give lectures during university courses, usually Master’s or MBA. They also 
have regular traineeships. However this is a loose link.  
In 2002 three new important actors came into the network of Triodos Research: ECGS 
and SODP, with whom they have (or are going to have) numerous contacts, and 
consulting organisations. The arrival of this last actor is interesting because it opens up a 
new range of activities for Triodos Research and also a new position on the market.  
A certain number of other actors can be grouped together. They are quite different type of 
actor, in their activity and nature. However the type of contact they have with Triodos 
Research is similar: it is an information based contact, they principally exchange 
information linked to ethical investment concerning the activity or issue related. These 
are: Eurosif, VBA, UKSIF and GRI. UK Social Investment Forum is a network for 
socially responsible investment. Its primary purpose is to promote and encourage the 
development and positive impact of Socially Responsible Investment. Its members 
consist of financial institutions, financial advisers, advisory firms and research providers. 
The contacts are neither regular nor frequent, however they are strategically important as 
they provide information on the development of the activity as well as contacts with other 
actors.  
Intergovernmental organisations, governments and the European Union have also come 
into play. They are showing a growing interest for ethical investment and therefore invite 
Triodos Research to meetings or projects. The contacts are very irregular and not 
frequent. For example Triodos Research was invited several times to take part in 
discussions that led to the European Commission’s Green Paper Promoting a European 
framework for Corporate Social Responsibility in 2001. 
The number of actors involved in the network has been multiplied by 1.8 from 1997 to 
2002. It consisted of 9 actors in 1997 and 16 in 2002. The number of frequent and regular 
contacts has increased the most (from 2 to 6). Actors in the not regular and not frequent 
category have also become more important. Triodos Research has expanded its network, 
which has also become better organised. 
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Figure 11 – Triodos Research network: 1997 
Figure 12 - Triodos Research network: 2002 
Figure 13 provides an overview of the types of contact between Triodos Research and the 
main actors. The contacts have been divided into two categories: ‘money’ and 
‘information’. They could have been divided into more categories but this would have 
made things much too complicated. The ‘money‘ category means that Triodos Research 
sells its products or services to the actor. The ‘information’ category means that Triodos 
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Research either exchanges information with the actor (that can be of different types) or 
develops new products or services.  
Figure 13 - Information and money flows between Triodos Research and actors in its network 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
Over the past six years Triodos Research has encountered a number of changes in terms 
of structure, organisation, standardisation of the criteria and working procedures and 
development of a certain expertise. At first, it was a department of Triodos Bank, then 
became independent but 100% owned by Triodos Holding NV, and lately transferred part 
of its activity to a new organisation jointly founded with other financial organisations. 
The screening activity has become self-sufficient. Triodos Research has grown 
significantly: from 2 to 10 full-time equivalent employees, which has entailed a total 
reorganisation of the work and a better definition of the tasks.  
One of the key factors of the transformation process has been the launch of the SiRi 
Group in 2000. Since then Triodos Research has been through a series of standardisation 
exercises – concerning criteria, working procedures, and methodologies. Triodos 
Research has also expanded its network. It has developed numerous contacts with actors 
involved in ethical investing. An interesting development has been the consulting 
activity. Triodos Research, a rating organisation, is asked to provide advice to financial 
institutions setting up an ethical investment fund, but also to companies to explain the 
screening process.  
The screening process has evolved over time. It has become better organised and there 
are clear rules about how to do it. Guidelines and handbooks have been written for new 
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employees but also to ensure stability in the working procedures. Little by little meetings 
within Triodos have changed, not in terms of frequency but rather in terms of content. In 
1998/99 discussions revolved mainly around company profiles, the ethical justification 
for companies being included or excluded, and the way criteria were applied. Little by 
little discussions changed. Today, meetings are organised around two different types of 
subject: process meetings, that are about practical issues such as planning, clients, 
contacts; and content meetings, that are about criteria. There is little discussion about 
whether or not criteria are being followed and about the ethical justification for including 
a company or not. Responsibility for implementing the criteria is left to each 
sustainability analyst. Rules have been established about the ‘how’ to apply criteria 
leaving no space to the ‘why’ of the rules. Within Triodos Research there has been much 
concern about individual judgement. One of the responses has been the development of 
guidelines, that have made the approach more structured and bureaucratic. Rules are not 
unimportant, but on their own they do not address the full range of ethical problems 
likely to be confronted (Nash, 1990). However the established rules do not aim to 
constrain the analysts but rather to provide a minimum level of consistency. Moreover, in 
2001 Triodos Research set up a Stakeholder Panel that provides an enforcement 
mechanism as it keeps an eye on criteria implementation.  
2.5 Signs of change 
Following the wishes of their clients Triodos Bank engaged in a new activity: investing. 
However the bank did not develop a regular fund but an ‘ethical’ investment fund. The 
ethical requirements made the activity of investing compatible with the bank’s overall 
mission which is “to contribute to humanly-oriented society—one which respects people, 
the environment and culture” (Triodos Bank, 2000b). The purpose of the ethical fund is 
to “encourage companies to behave in a more sustainable way” (Triodos Bank, 2001). 
This chapter described the Triodos case. It included three sub-cases: a bank, Triodos 
Bank, an ethical investment fund, MeerWaarde Fund, and a rating organisation, Triodos 
Research. It provided insights into and details about (1) the activity of ethical investment 
and (2) the developments and events from the mid-1990s until 2002 that shaped the 
activity within Triodos.  
Ethical investment involves a series of actions such as screening, rating, or ranking, 
interactions with various actors such as corporations, rating organisations, financial 
institutions, but also NGOs, trade unions, and others, and decisions among which 
selecting or excluding companies.  
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The development of ethical investment activity has been a long process. It has gone 
through a number of changes. A significant change is related to structure. From a 
department within Triodos Bank, in 2002 Triodos Research developed into two 
organisations: DSR an independent, commercial organisation that is a partner of the SiRi 
Group and is owned by three financial institutions – Triodos Bank, PPGM and ING 
Bank, and TAS a branch of Triodos Holding. These structural changes have had an 
important impact on the networks of both Triodos Bank and Triodos Research. Between 
1997 and 2002, the number of close contacts between Triodos Bank and other actors 
diminished. The only close relationship of Triodos Bank was with the rating organisation. 
However the number of loose contacts increased, especially with national or international 
networks related to ethical investment and sustainability reporting. On the contrary 
Triodos Research increased significantly its close contacts with other actors but lost 
contact with shareholders. The structural change shows that screening shifted from an 
internal activity within the bank to a subcontracted service.  
Other changes are related to the screening process. The screening of companies went 
from an ad hoc and subjective selection to a standardised and more objective process. 
Company profiles became standardised. Criteria became better defined, the number of 
exclusionary criteria decreased and that of comparative criteria increased. Around 2002 
comparative criteria were reorganised into People, Planet, Profit categories, referring 
directly to the 3Ps which is a CSR model. A quality management system was developed 
in 2002.  
The creation of the international SiRi Group in 2000 had an important impact on the 
activity of Triodos Research. Another factor that influenced Triodos Research’s activity 
was the selling of its services to new clients in 2000. Until the end of 1999 Triodos 
Research’s only client was Triodos Bank. But in 2000, when it became independent, it 
started to provide its services to external clients. Triodos Research adapted its services to 
new requirements but also expanded its range of activities, for example to advising 
services.  
Other aspects changed within Triodos Research. For example discussions about criteria 
were delegated to the members of the stakeholder panel in 2001. But also the wording 
used within Triodos Research changed; for example the word ‘avoidance’ became 
‘serious negative social effects’ and ‘ethical’ was replaced by ‘sustainable’.  
The signs of change described in this chapter suggest a number of elements: 
- An expanding field: over the year Triodos Research has been providing its services to 
an increasing number of clients. This suggests that there is a growing number of 
financial institutions that offer ethical investment funds.  
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- Development of a specific knowledge and know-how related to ethical screening: 
along with the development of Triodos Research, a new function (sustainability 
analyst), specific tools and techniques for screening companies (such as the rating 
tool) and a specialised terminology have been established.  
- An increasing formalisation and standardisation regarding working procedures and 
criteria: working procedures and criteria have been written down; a quality 
management system has been set up; SiRi partners have developed harmonised 
company profiles. 
- A structural reorganisation: Triodos Research became an independent organisation, 
separate from Triodos Bank. The social and environmental screening is now carried 
out externally.  
- Expansion of the network: Triodos Research has established a number of new 
partnerships nationally but also internationally with, for example, the SiRi Group, 
Eurosif, or ECGS.  
The Triodos case describes the field of ethical investment from the inside of one 
organisation and over a specific period of time. It points at a number of changes but it 
only provides a limited view on the process of ethical investment and it does not help to 
understand why and how changes happened. It is therefore necessary to consider the case 
in a larger historical and institutional context.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will investigate the whole field, both in an international and national 
context. Chapter 7 will particularly focus on one group of actors, the corporations, which 
are of special interest for addressing the second research question of this dissertation. But 
first, Chapter 3 will present the theoretical perspective on which the analysis will be built 
and Chapter 4 will present the methodology and methods used for the research.
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Chapter  3 –  Institutional  theory  
perspective    
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 described the activity of ethical investment, from screening to investing. It 
chronicled the emergence and the development of the MeerWaarde Fund, an ethical fund, 
and of Triodos Research, a rating organisation – both initiated by Triodos Bank. The 
development of the activity went through a process which is characterised by a number of 
specific aspects: complexity and dynamic, formalisation, standardisation, and 
structuration. There are also some elements that suggest a certain professionalisation, for 
example the emergence of a new function and the creation of new tools and techniques, 
as well as the building of an identity through the development of specific vocabulary and 
a network. These elements are characteristic of institutional fields.  
Chapter 2 indirectly also raised the legitimacy issue. The activity, from screening to 
investing, involves a series of actions, interactions and decisions. Corporations are 
assessed and benchmarked according to social, environmental and financial criteria. 
According to their performance and their ranking within the sector, a company may either 
be included or excluded from a fund. Inclusion depends on two conditions: firstly the 
corporation must fulfil a certain number of criteria (the absolute criteria), and the 
corporation must be amongst the top ranking firms of its sector (best in class 
methodology). If the corporation fails to fulfil either of these conditions, it will be 
excluded. This type of screening is used by Triodos Bank to define the investment 
portfolio of the MeerWaarde Fund but also by other organisations that run ethical 
investment funds. Beyond the activity of investing, the screening of companies according 
to economic, social and environmental criteria is also a way of assessing the degree of 
congruence between the company’s activities and performance, and ethical investment 
norms, or in other words legitimacy. This immediately raises the questions: what are 
those norms, and whose norms are they? To answer these questions it is necessary to 
broaden our focus, from the activity to the system of ethical investment, which is a way of 
including the context in which ethical investment has developed and is taking place. 
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This chapter proposes a theoretical perspective in order to analyse both the changes that 
took place within the field of ethical investment and the issue of legitimacy. The first 
section is devoted to the issue of legitimacy. The second section presents the general 
theoretical approach. The third section focuses on the theoretical perspective embraced in 
the research, that is: institutional theory. It is followed by two sections developing 
specific aspects of institutional theory: institutional mechanisms and organisational 
responses to institutional pressures. In the concluding section a theoretical framework is 
proposed, that is based on specific aspects of institutional theory, and will be used 
throughout the rest of the thesis.  
3.2 The legitimacy issue 
3.2.1 Organisational legitimation 
Legitimation relates to a process through which shared beliefs and values that have been 
socially constructed through human interaction are reflected. It is a process that confers to 
an organisation a certain recognition by social actors. Through the legitimation process 
the social actor accepts or endorses the organisation’s means and ends as valid, 
reasonable, and rational (Baum et al., 1991; Meyer et al., 1983b). Legitimation connects 
the micro –the organisations – to the macro – the norms – levels of the system. “The 
concept of legitimacy is important in analysing the relationship between organisations 
and their environments. Legitimacy provides a linkage between the organisational and 
societal level of analysis” (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) and, at the same time, actions taken 
by organisations for the purpose of legitimation alter the values and norms (Clark, 1956). 
Note that two terms are used: ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legitimation’. In this dissertation, the first 
term mainly refers to the state while the other refers to the process.  
Parsons viewed legitimacy as the ”appraisal of action in terms of shared or common 
values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system4”. He wrote 
that “since organisations exist in a superordinate social system and utilise resources 
which might be otherwise allocated, the utilisation of these resources must be accepted as 
legitimate by the larger social system” (Parsons, 1960). Thus, according to Parsons 
organisations are legitimate to the extent that their activities are congruent with the goals 
of the superordinate system. The functionalist approach of Parsons offers a simplistic 
view of legitimacy. According to him, particular ways of doing things come about 
                                                 
4 Parsons (1951) defines a social system as a system of interaction of a plurality of individual actors 
oriented to a situation and where the system includes a commonly understood system of cultural symbols 
Parsons, T. 1951. Toward a general theory of action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press..  
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because they serve the ‘wider needs’ of society. He clearly distinguishes between 
individual well-being and “the common good”. Legitimacy is merely viewed as an output 
for subordinates to get resources. The objective is to serve the goal of the superordinate 
system. Parsons does not consider the social processes by which legitimacy is met and 
does not consider individual choice.  
Dowling (1975) argues that organisations, and companies in particular, seek to establish 
congruence between the social values attached to their activity with the norms of 
acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they are part (Dowling et al., 
1975). If these two systems match, then there is organisational legitimacy, but if they 
don’t, there is a threat to organisational legitimacy. Threats can take the form of 
economic, legal and other social sanctions. Meyer and Scott also depict legitimacy as 
stemming from congruence between the organisation and its cultural environment: 
“Organisational legitimacy refers to … the extent to which the array of established 
cultural accounts provide explanations for [an organisation’s] existence” (Meyer & Scott, 
1983a). Maurer (1971) views legitimation as “the process whereby an organisation 
justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist, that is to continue to import, 
transform, and export energy, material, or information (Maurer, 1971). And Suchman 
(1995) gives a definition incorporating the evaluative and cognitive dimensions of the 
above definitions. “Legitimation is a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995). He defines 
legitimation as a perception or assumption, and justifies it by the fact that it represents a 
reaction and judgement of observers to the organisation as they see it. Legitimacy is 
conferred upon or attributed to the organisation by its constituents. He also says that it is 
a socially constructed system because it reflects congruence between the behaviours of 
the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social groups.  
Institutional theorists argue that conforming to a set of institutionalised beliefs increases 
legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities (Meyer et al., 1977a). Meyer and Rowan 
(Meyer et al., 1977a) say that by ensuring legitimacy, organisations demonstrate that they 
are acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner. It also 
provides a certain rationalisation and justification of the organisation’s behaviour and 
practices. Thereby legitimation protects the organisation from having its conduct 
questioned. Legitimation is a way of strengthening its support and securing its survival. 
Organisations that overlook legitimacy are more vulnerable and may be proclaimed 
negligent, irrational or unnecessary (Meyer & Rowan). Organisations are sensitive to the 
cultural environment and therefore look for justifications. Legitimation refers to the 
desire to improve the appropriateness of actions within an established set of regulations, 
norms, values, or beliefs (Suchman, 1995). It is worth noting that this ‘desire’ can be of 
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different kinds. It may be motivated by the necessity to reduce uncertainty or to be part of 
the general tendency.  
One of the outcomes of the legitimation process for organisations is reputation. Although 
connected, legitimation and reputation are different. Reputation is an intangible resource 
that contributes to performance differences between organisations. Rao (1994) argues that 
reputation and legitimation are not competing specifications of organisational identity but 
are rather complementary aspects of creating an organisational identity. Reputation is 
based on signals and legitimation flows from symbols. Both of them, signals and symbols 
are needed to create impressions on audiences. In his study, Rao (1994) shows that like 
legitimation, reputation influences the survival of organisations. He also shows that rating 
organisations (financial rating organisations) legitimate organisations. He argues that 
certification contests organised by independent intermediaries are social tests that invest 
organisations with credibility. “Victories in certification contests legitimate organisations 
and validate their reputation because of the taken for granted axiom that winners are 
‘better’ than losers and the belief that contests embody the idea of rational and impartial 
testing” (Rao, 1994). Do ethical investment and in particular rating organisations 
contribute to the building of the reputation of organisations? Can we expect that 
legitimation generates a favourable reputation? There are very few studies on this matter 
(Aldrich, 1994; Rao, 1994). 
Parsons’ view of legitimacy does not address the process related to legitimacy but only 
the output. The research question of the present research is especially concerned with 
how a an activity, ethical investment, influences corporations that are at the micro level 
and how in return the micro level forms and shape the values at the macro level. In order 
to address this issue, legitimation should be viewed as a mechanism that is a social 
process that provides justification and rationalisation for particular actions. It is a link 
between the micro level, organisations, and the macro level. The macro level can be of 
different types, for example the superordinate system of Parsons, or a community, a 
government, a social movement with different values and its own beliefs’ system. This 
process is a sort of continuous appraisal of the congruence between the behaviour of an 
entity with the shared beliefs and values of social groups. The motives for seeking 
legitimacy may be of different nature depending also on the organisation’s own goal.  
3.2.2 Legitimacy and efficiency 
Institutional theorists argue that legitimacy is a necessary variable for an organisation to 
survive. “Organisations require more than material resources and technical information if 
they are to survive in their social environments. They also need social acceptability and 
credibility” (Scott, 2001). However an organisation cannot survive only through 
legitimacy. It also needs to fulfil efficiency requirements. The previous section discussed 
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the concept of legitimation. Efficiency, just like legitimacy, can be subject to many 
interpretations. In engineering terms, the concept of efficiency refers to maximising the 
output while minimising the input, for example the efficiency of an engine can be 
measured in miles per gallon of gas (Richardson & Joshi, 1997). In economics, the unit 
used in order to measure inputs and outputs is monetary. Efficiency is usually seen as an 
optimal use of resources, that is a use of resources which extracts the maximum output 
from any trade or productive activity (Campbell, 1970).  
Legitimacy and efficiency may be seen as two forces that work in opposition or as 
complementary. While efficiency connotes with the individual search for gain and the 
desire to dominate, legitimacy connotes with the need for social ties which bind 
individuals together into organisations, families and states (Richardson et al., 1997). 
Views on the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency have changed over time. 
Friedman, by reducing corporations’ responsibility to making profit (Friedman, 1970), 
narrowed corporations’ legitimacy to economic performance. In Friedman’s view, 
corporations’ legitimacy is entirely dependent on one stakeholder, namely stockholders, 
meaning that a corporation must be profitable in order to be legitimate. Legitimacy and 
efficiency work hand in hand. This view has been criticised. Donaldson (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995) argues that corporations need to consider the interests of all parties 
affected by the actions of the business. Companies are not only required to act 
instrumentally in order to ensure long term shareholder value, but they are dependent on 
specific external and internal spheres of legitimacy, defining the acceptance and stability 
of the corporation as a social actor. Corporations are not autonomous entities acting 
independently but they are embedded in a social context that determines their actions 
(Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). Legitimacy is then provided by interactions with and among 
a spectrum of stakeholders, which makes the relationship between efficiency and 
legitimacy more complex.  
Institutional theorists relate legitimacy and efficiency to two different environments, the 
technical and institutional environments (Meyer et al., 1977a). The two environments 
impose very different demands on organisations. “A technical environment demands 
physical output in the form of products, services, and profit, while the institutional 
environment demands structures, ideologies, and processes in order for the organisation 
to become legitimate” (Boons & Strannegard, 2000). Organisations need to manage both 
environments, but the two environments do not necessarily enhance each other. It makes 
it difficult for companies to deal with the two environments. If micro-economic models 
emphasise the rational utility maximisation function, institutional studies bring attention 
to the need to conform to social values, that is seeking legitimacy. According to Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) organisations solve conflicts between institutional rules and efficiency 
by ‘decoupling’ actions towards both environments. Organisations decouple structure 
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from activity and structures from each other. Different structures manage the different 
types of demands. This avoids conflicts between the two and ensures, through the formal 
structure, legitimacy. According to Meyer and Rowan, “the more highly institutionalised 
the environment, the more time and energy organisational elites devote to managing their 
organisation’s public image and status and the less they devote to coordination and to 
managing particular boundary-spanning relationships”. Corporations use decoupling to 
protect their formal structures from evaluation. 
Scott and Meyer (1983) separate the two environments as two dimensions of the 
organisational environment (Scott & Meyer, 1983). The two dimensions and their 
combinations depend of the type of sector, that is the degree of institutionalisation, and 
the level of technical development. Organisations that are in predominantly technical 
sectors will attempt to control and coordinate their technical activities and protect this 
technical core from the external environment (Scott et al., 1983). They decouple the 
technical activities from potential fluctuations in the institutional environment. They 
closely control the technical activities and strive to achieve maximum efficiency. 
Organisations operating in predominantly institutional sectors do not try to control or 
coordinate their technical activities closely. Instead, they attempt to buffer or decouple 
these activities from the formal organisational structure. They use the formal 
organisational structure to integrate the specifications established by the larger 
institutional structures. Administrators in institutionalised organisations buffer their 
organisations’ technical activities from close surveillance and regulations (Scott et al., 
1983). When the organisation is in a technical sector, then efficiency will be prioritised 
and perceived as the sign of success, while in an institutional sector, it will be the 
opposite: organisations will first try to conform to the institutional pressures. In the case 
where both environments, institutional and technical, are highly developed, such as in 
hospitals, organisations face internal conflicts. In the case where neither of the 
environments is highly developed, organisations have only a limited chance to survive. 
So from Scott and Meyer’s perspective, legitimacy and efficiency are two distinct 
dimensions whose relationship depends on the type of sector.  
Others, like Offe (Offe, 1984) and Joerges and Czarniawska (Joerges & Czarniawska, 
1998) see the two environments as intertwined. Miles (1982) supports this view in the 
analysis of the tobacco industry. He refers to the relationship as one of “mutual 
interdependence’ (Richardson et al., 1997). The tobacco industry is subject to the 
demands for efficiency from the market but has simultaneously found that its major 
products were being de-legitimated in western societies. The strategic challenge facing 
the industry was to re-establish legitimacy while seeking to achieve efficiency. Both were 
necessary simultaneously, as the organisation’s survival could not be ensured simply by 
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establishing its legitimacy, nor could it survive by only continuing to produce cigarettes 
as efficiently as possible.  
Legitimacy and efficiency are often perceived as two conflicting forces because they 
follow different rationalities as well as provide different rationalities to organisations. 
The issue of legitimacy versus efficiency has often been discussed (Meyer et al., 1977a; 
North, 1990; Scott, 1983). It is interesting to note that the concept of sustainable 
development brings up issues related to legitimacy/efficiency. The concept originates 
from a resource dependency perspective in which natural resources are scarce and may in 
the future not be sufficient to fulfil human beings’ needs (Meadows, 1972). The discourse 
related to sustainable development has evolved over time and has entered the sphere of 
corporate social responsibility. In Western Europe, for instance in the Netherlands, being 
sustainable is part of the responsibilities of corporations. Three aspects of sustainability 
are distinguished: economic, environmental and social. Companies are increasingly being 
judged on criteria related to social and environmental matters. Ethical investment is a 
good illustration of this phenomenon integrating social and environmental performance in 
the investment decision process. This development has opened an intense debate on the 
link and the relationship between social and environmental performance and financial 
performance: are they positively or negatively correlated. One of the most often used 
arguments is that a good social and environmental performance benefits financial 
performance. If social and environmental aspects are considered as part of the legitimacy 
of the company and the financial one as the efficiency aspect, then the argument says that 
a company cannot only act according to an efficiency goal because this is linked to 
legitimacy. If it does this, it might negatively affect its legitimacy, which will have a 
negative repercussion on its efficiency. It is also true the other way around: a company 
acting only in relation to its legitimacy will damage its efficiency, which in return will 
harm its legitimacy. This refers back to Friedman’s perspective of profitability as the 
ultimate responsibility of companies because everything is brought down to the economic 
performance of the company. It is also interesting to note that environmental/social 
aspects are managed separately from financial performance. As will be discussed later on, 
ethical investment clearly distinguishes between the three aspects of sustainability.  
Legitimacy and efficiency do not necessarily conflict. Although they may pull the 
company in two opposite directions, they are both essential for the survival of an 
organisation. The challenge for companies is to find an acceptable balance between the 
two of them. The combination between legitimacy and efficiency may differ depending 
on the sector and its characteristics. This is an important element that will reappear when 
considering the sample of corporations to be studied for this research. Because technical 
and institutional environments are different per sector, institutional pressures will be 
different as well. In an institutional sector, institutional pressures may have a greater 
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effect than in a technical sector. Another important element coming out of the issue of 
decoupling relates to the research question. If ethical investment by developing standards 
invites corporations to engage in decoupling, it may affect (negatively) the potentiality of 
ethical investment to change organisational behaviour. The risk is that corporations will 
hide behind standards. By conforming to those norms they will avoid inspection, 
evaluation and control of their activities.  
3.2.3 Degrees of legitimacy 
Not all organisations seek the same degree of legitimacy. Organisational legitimacy is 
determined by the method of operation and output as well as by the goals or domain of 
activity of the organisation (Dowling et al., 1975). Dowling and Pfeffer, defining 
legitimacy as a constraint, argue that its impact on an organisation depends on (1) how 
visible the organisation is and (2) the degree of dependence of the organisation on social 
and political support. They hypothesise (without providing any research evidence), that 
organisations that are larger and organisations that receive more political and social 
benefits would tend to engage more heavily in legitimating behaviour. Suchman 
describes two particular important dimensions in this regard: the distinction between 
pursuing continuity and pursuing credibility and, the distinction between seeking passive 
support and seeking active support (Suchman, 1995).  
The first aspect depicted by Suchman (1995) deals with both stability and credibility. 
Stability is improved because people are more likely to supply resources to organisations 
that appear desirable, proper, or appropriate (Parsons, 1960). And then credibility is 
enhanced because people perceive legitimated organisations not only as more worthy but 
also as more meaningful, more predictable, and more trustworthy (Suchman, 1995). Part 
of the cultural congruence captured by the term legitimacy involves the existence of a 
credible collective account or rationale explaining what the organisation is doing and why 
(Jepperson, 1991). Suchman (1995) notes that “actions that enhance persistence are not 
always identical to those that enhance meaning”; it is therefore important to keep these 
two dimensions distinct from each other although they are mutually reinforcing.  
The second distinction drawn by Suchman (1995) concerns active or passive 
acquiescence of legitimacy. If an organisation wants to be left alone, its legitimacy level 
will be low. But if on the contrary it seeks extended audience intervention, then the 
legitimacy demands may be stringent. Passive support involves legitimacy as cognitive 
taken for granted, while active support involves legitimacy as evaluative approval: to 
avoid questioning, an organisation only needs to “make sense”, to mobilise affirmative 
commitments, it must also “have value” (Suchman, 1995). Here it is interesting to bring 
in Katz and Kahn’s (1978) levels of legitimacy. They distinguish three levels of 
legitimacy: (1) the formal law enacted by legislative bodies, (2) legal norms or 
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generalised codes that transcend specific statutes, and (3) societal or moral justification, 
as embodied in social norms. This threefold basis confers great power to produce 
compliance (Katz & Kahn, 1978). In order to have active support an organisation must go 
to the third level of legitimacy (and beyond) while passive support can be achieved at the 
second level.  
Suchman offers a strategic approach to legitimacy, which differs from the deterministic 
approach of institutional theory. Suchman’s dimensions suggest that organisations adopt 
specific strategies according to their internal objective. This objective, as discussed 
previously, may be influenced by the organisation’s environment (technical or 
institutional). Suchman follows Pfeffer’s proposition that “one of the elements of 
competition and conflict among social organisations involves the conflict between… 
systems of belief or points of view” (Pfeffer, 1981, in (Suchman, 1995)). In 1975, 
Dowling & Pfeffer proposed three types of responses to become legitimate: (1) the 
organisation adapts its output, goals, and method of operation to conform to prevailing 
definitions of legitimacy; (2) the organisation attempts to alter the definition of social 
legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s present practices, output, and values; 
(3) the organisation attempts to become identified with symbols, values, or institutions 
that have a strong base of social legitimacy. Suchman as well as Ashforth & Gibbs 
(1990), (Ashforth et al., 1990), “depict legitimacy as an operational resource that 
organisations extract from their cultural environments and that they employ in pursuit of 
their goal” (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is a process that needs to be kept under 
managerial control because it is a source of conflict between the corporations’ managers 
and social actors. Oliver (1991) adopts a similar approach in her organisation’s response 
to institutional pressure framework (the framework is introduced later on in section 3.6). 
According to this view, legitimation is purposive, calculated and frequently oppositional 
(Suchman, 1995).  
This approach contrasts with institutional theorists (DiMaggio, 1991; DiMaggio et al., 
1983; Meyer et al., 1977a; Meyer et al., 1983b; Zucker, 1987), whose assumption is that 
legitimacy is not an operational resource but a set of constitutive beliefs (Suchman, 
1995). One of the basic arguments of institutional theory is that legitimacy is a source of 
formal structures for organisations that constrain organisational behaviour. It is a 
sustained and driving force among organisational actors. Institutionalists emphasise the 
collective structuration (DiMaggio et al., 1983).  
Both approaches, strategic and institutional, consider that all organisations seek and need 
a certain degree of legitimacy in order to function. It is considered a card for survival and 
long-term sustainability, and gives them the necessary license to operate (Bansal & Roth, 
2000). It would be interesting to examine this assumption more closely. One may 
question whether organisations always want legitimacy. In some cases, it may well be 
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possible that an organisation either cannot live up to a certain degree of legitimacy or/and 
strategically refuses to do so. Moreover the approaches to legitimacy do not consider that 
an organisation may face several processes of legitimacy with different and conflicting 
norms and values. This may be due to a multiplicity of social actors. For example 
consumers and shareholders of a corporation may not follow the same legitimacy 
processes. In this case the organisation has to choose to which norms it wants to conform 
and to which it does not want to conform.  
It can be expected that corporations will not perceive, and respond to, pressures exerted 
by ethical investment in the same way. This may vary according to the activity and 
objective of the company. Therefore companies may adopt different responses to ethical 
investment entailing a certain degree of resistance and compliance (Oliver, 1991). In the 
case of ethical investment, size is an issue to be considered because corporations screened 
for ethical investment only include the largest stock-quoted companies. In order to 
investigate the research question related to corporations’ responses to ethical investment, 
it is important to consider a strategic approach to legitimacy. The strategic and the 
institutional approaches are not two completely different approaches, but they do address 
two different levels of analysis: the strategic approach focuses on the micro level, that is 
the organisational level, while the institutional approach focuses on the macro level, that 
is the field level. Elsbach (Elsbach, 1994) argues that the distinction between the two 
approaches is a matter of perspective, “with strategic theorists adopting the viewpoint of 
organisational managers looking ‘out’, whereas institutional theorists adopt the viewpoint 
of society looking ‘in’”. 
3.2.4 Legitimacy and organisational change 
The research questions of the thesis deal with social change. Therefore it is appropriate 
firstly to ask whether or not legitimacy may stimulate change and secondly to explore 
ways of approaching the issue of change. 
Organisations are sensitive to reputational effects because these affect their efficiency as 
well as their legitimacy. If ethical investment affects companies’ reputation through the 
rating, it is most likely that they will consider it carefully. Ethical investment may also 
affect the legitimacy process by changing/creating standards and norms. Legitimacy acts 
as a constraint on organisational behaviour, but it is a dynamic constraint which changes 
as organisations adapt, and as the social values which define legitimacy change and are 
changed (Dowling et al., 1975). Social norms and values are not permanent. Changing 
social norms and values constitute one motivation for organisational change and one 
source of pressure for organisational legitimation. If ethical investment changes the 
norms and values, corporations will have to change if they want to conserve a certain 
degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy is problematic for organisations, and it is likely that 
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organisations take actions to ensure their continued legitimacy. Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) 
provide a series of examples in which legitimacy has been a source of change for 
organisations among which the case of the American Institute for Foreign Study (AIFS). 
Faced with a problem of legitimacy following criticism of its methods of operations, 
AIFS engaged in a variety of legitimating behaviours such as co-optation of prominent 
educational and political leaders, the use of legitimate organisations as sites for its 
operations, and the identification of its output with other legitimate organisations 
(Dowling et al., 1975).  
In societies where corporations have a significant power, it is important to consider a 
point that was only alluded earlier: organisations may have a crucial role to play in the 
definition of the values and norms. Unfortunately, institutional theorists have often 
omitted this possibility. It was only in 1991 with the article of Oliver that this was fully 
considered. She argues that organisations adopt different strategies in response to 
institutional pressures. Strategies range from conformity to manipulation. When 
conforming, they simply and purely adopt the existing norms and values. When 
manipulating, they openly disagree with the norms and values and try to change them. 
Oliver considers organisational strategic choice. It is crucial to envisage alternatives 
because existing norms and values may not be the best for promoting sustainable 
development. Following the functionalist view of Parsons (1960) organisations do not 
have any choice, they are subordinated to the central actor (see section 3.2.1). This view 
of legitimacy may not stimulate change but rather hinder it. It is therefore important to 
consider organisational strategic choices where organisations are free to enter into 
conflict with the system and try to change the social norms.  
Another important element to consider is the issue of decoupling (see in section 3.2.2). 
Meyer and Rowan suggested that to achieve legitimacy within their environment, 
organisations must construct stories about their actions that correspond to socially agreed 
rules about what such organisation should do. These stories are not necessarily connected 
to what the organisation actually does, but rather they are used as ‘forms of symbolic 
reassurance to mollify potentially influential publics’ (Meyer et al., 1977a). If legitimacy 
drives corporations to separate their technological and institutional environments this 
may not stimulate corporations to change, but rather reinforce their current practices.  
3.3 Theoretical orientation: Mechanism approach 
Although ethical investment is a rather new phenomenon, numerous studies have already 
been carried out. Most of them focus on clarifying the link between financial and 
sustainable performances (for a review see (Kurtz, 2000)). They can be criticised for 
being theoretically poor and provide limited understanding of the phenomenon. They do 
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refer to some theories, mainly related to financial assumptions (especially portfolio 
theories) and stock prices (for example in (Hickman, Teets, & Kohls, 1999; Meulen et al., 
1997; Wall, 1995)). However a large number of the studies on ethical investment are 
merely performing statistical analysis. They do not develop causal arguments to explain 
why findings have been observed. They do not refer to a theoretical framework. Statistics 
provide a tool for estimating mathematical models representing a conception of social 
processes (Sørensen, 1998). Statistics is often used as an end result, providing the model 
itself to be estimated. As said Sutton and Staw (1995) “data are not theory…empirical 
evidence play an important role in confirming, revising, or discrediting existing 
theory…but [they] rarely constitute causal explanations” (Sutton & Staw, 1995). 
According to Boudon, “understanding is achieved not by means of descriptive statistical 
models but through theoretical models that show the abstract logic of the process being 
analysed” (Boudon, 1976; Hedström et al., 1998). Boudon (1976) argued, “we must go 
beyond the statistical relationship to explore the generative mechanism responsible for 
them [the causal relationships]” (in (Hedström et al., 1998)). Studies exploring other 
dimensions of ethical investment are rare. There are some studies questioning the ethical 
dimension of ethical investment (Anderson et al., 1996; Irvine, 1987; Mackenzie, 1997). 
They have based their theoretical perspective on business ethics and philosophy. Severyn 
Bruyn, whose work relates to social economy and cultural studies, has done some studies 
on ethical investment based on the social and political economy field. He addresses 
ethical investment as a political movement (Bruyn, 1987, 1999). 
The thesis deals with social change, and more exactly with change within and from an 
organisational field. ‘Change’ may be approached from different angles involving 
different bodies of literature. In order to go further in the development of the research it is 
important to state clearly in what way ‘change’ is addressed. Boudon (1986) distinguishes 
four main types of theories of social change. The first two types are rather linear 
(Boudon, 1986). The first type of theory points out the existence of more or less general 
and irreversible trends. This type of theory includes statements affirming the existence of 
stages destined to appear in a certain order. It is for example the law of the three stages in 
product development: launch, maturity and decline. Theories of the second type take 
form of what are generally known as conditional laws, or propositions of the type ‘if A, 
then B’ or ‘if A, then (usually) B’. It is formulated either in a form of conditional law or a 
structural law. For the last one the element A describes not one single condition or 
variable but a system of variables. Type 1 and 2 are not always independent of each 
other, or more precisely, statements about trends are often based on more or less explicit 
conditional laws. They are both characterised by conclusions or diagnoses that could be 
described as empirical in so far as they refer to certain states or stages of society. In 
contrast type 3 of theory deals with the form of change and not the content of change. It 
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does not tell us what has changed, but how, in what form and in what way the change 
occurred. For example Crozier puts forwards theories dealing with the form of certain 
processes. He does not tell us what will change (which is what type 1 and 2 would do), 
but how, in what way it will occur. He applies such a theory of change when looking at 
French cultural habits (Crozier, 1970). The fourth type of theory deals with the causes or 
factors of change. Because of causal feedback, the notion of cause can be very ambiguous 
when it is used in the analysis of social change. For example a new policy is in fact the 
result of a process characterised by a linked series of actions, reactions or retroactions 
rather than of a cause or even of a group of causes. It is the end point of the whole 
process, and one cannot impute causality to one or more of the elements of that process.  
Boudon’s classification is useful to help situate the type of theories necessary for the 
research. The thesis focuses on the mechanisms that lead or may lead to change, hence 
not what has changed but how it changed. It also investigates how the organisation’s 
responses to these changes may, in return, impact the whole field of ethical investment 
itself; or in other words it considers the feedback loop. In order to carry the research, 
theories of the types 3 and 4 are necessary. Institutional theory is a theory of these types. 
It is concerned about “the way in which organisations function and change” (Boons et al., 
2000). It does not explain what has changed but how it has changed. It concentrates on 
processes rather than results. Type 3 and 4 explore mechanisms of social change.  
Sutton and Staw (1995) wrote that there is little agreement about what constitutes strong 
versus weak theory in the social sciences (Sutton et al., 1995) (see the Academy of 
Management Review, October 1989, volume 14, which provides a special forum on 
theory building). In order to understand complex social phenomena, the relevant question 
to ask is “why did it happen?”. Elster (1989) argues that such an investigation involves 
examining mechanisms: “mechanism is what matters. It provides understanding, whereas 
prediction at most offers control” (Elster, 1989). So rather than focusing on statistical 
associations or other forms of relationships, it is important to investigate the mechanisms 
that drive the social phenomenon studied. Following Schelling (1998) scheme’s, 
mechanisms provide a plausible account of how entities I and O are linked to one another 
(Schelling, 1998). In the case of the thesis, “I” would be ethical investment and “O” 
companies. The thesis explores the type of relationship between these two. Merton (1967) 
argues, in his concept of middle range theorising, that sociological theory should deal 
with “social mechanisms”. Mechanisms constitute the middle ground between social laws 
and description. A law asserts that given certain initial conditions, an event of a given 
type (the cause) will always produce an event of some other type (the effect) (Elster, 
1989). Mechanisms are elementary ‘building blocks’ of middle-range theories. “It helps 
to distinguish between genuine causality and coincidental association, and it increases the 
understanding of why we observe what we observe” (Hedström et al., 1998).  
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Hernes (1998) defines a mechanism as “an intellectual construct that is part of a phantom 
world which may mimic real life with abstract actors that impersonate human and cast 
them in conceptual conditions that emulate actual circumstances”. A mechanism is a set 
of interacting parts, it is “an abstract dynamic logic by which scientist render 
understandable the reality they depict” (Hernes, 1998). It enables us to model reality and 
to achieve a certain understanding of it. It is of course, as any model, a simplification of 
reality. Mechanisms make it possible to explain but not to predict (Elster, 1989). 
According to Herdström and Swedberg (1998) the mechanism approach can be 
characterised by four core principles: 
- Explanation based on actions, meaning that it is actors and not variables who do the 
acting. A mechanism-based explanation refers directly to causes and consequences of 
individual actions oriented to the behaviour of others.  
- Explanatory precision, referring to the middle range theory of Merton. It is not a law, 
but aims at explaining a limited range of phenomena. 
- Abstraction, expressing the idea that effective theorising is not possible without a 
prompt elimination of irrelevant factors and a sharp focus on the central issue. It is 
through abstraction and analytical accentuation that general mechanisms are made 
visible.  
- Reduction, meaning opening the black box, that is, thriving for narrowing the gap 
between input and output, cause and effect.  
“Mechanism approach is a special style of theorising. This style can be roughly 
characterised by a focus on middle-range puzzles or paradoxes for which precise, action-
based, abstract, and fine-grained explanations are sought” (Hedström et al., 1998).  
In order to investigate the phenomena of interest in this research, it is necessary to have a 
theory that can provide a research design to explain both the development of ethical 
investment and its effect on corporations. The theory should should be broad enough to 
incorporate the influence of significant actors, and it is necessary to have a theory that 
integrates system dynamics. Influences exerted by a phenomena on organisations cannot 
be studied in a static way because it is the dynamics, mechanisms, flows, interactions, 
and feedback loops that bring the phenomena into life, involving change, influence, and 
evolution. Those are the cores of this research. One may find it contradictory to talk about 
system perspective and holism when one of the four principles of the mechanism 
approach is about reduction. However ‘reduction’ should not be taken as defined by 
Descartes in the 17th century but it should be understand as simplification with the 
explicit purpose of understanding (Le Moigne, 1990).  
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Whatever the theoretical approach is, one must be aware that any theory instructs us to 
look at phenomena in particular ways. Theory provides a framework for considering the 
social phenomena in questions. But theories are recreated by the authors who employ it 
(DiMaggio, 1995).  
3.4 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory offers a basis to investigate the research question of the thesis. 
Although some of the concepts of institutional theory were developed at the turn of the 
century, institutional theory is a relatively new theory. Its applicability and relevance to 
many disciplines has been studied in numerous researches over the last two decades. 
Institutional theory recognises ‘the importance of the wider social and cultural 
environment as the ground in which organisations are rooted’ (Scott & Christensen, 
1995). According to Scott and Christensen (1995) institutional theory is best described as 
‘theoretical orientation –as a family of concepts and arguments- than as a tightly 
integrated, parsimonious theory’. However its explanatory power is pertinent to socially 
derived phenomena (Koziol, 2000). It provides theoretical ground for exploring social 
mechanisms; it addresses the organisational level and it looks at the way in which 
organisations function and change. Institutional theory constitutes the dominant 
theoretical perspective of this research. This section is a short introduction to the theory 
presenting the main developments and streams; for a more extensive and complete review 
see Scott (2001). The next section focuses on specific aspects that are relevant to the 
thesis.  
Institutional theory represents a distinctive approach to the study of social, economic and 
political phenomena (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). It traces the emergence of distinctive 
forms, processes, strategies, outlooks, and competencies as they emerge from patterns of 
organisational interaction and adaptation. Such pattern must be understood as responses 
to both internal and external environments (Selznick, 1996). The roots of institutional 
theory go back to the end of the 19th century, and are associated with Veblen, Commons, 
Marx, and Durkheim. The theory has been marked by a succession of developments 
within different disciplines, and approaches to institutions are very diverse (for a more 
complete review see (Hodgson, 2002; Nielsen, 2002; Scott, 2001). Although approaches 
differ, they have in common a “scepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes 
and a common conviction that institutional arrangements and social processes matter” 
(DiMaggio et al., 1991). Analysing organisations’ behaviour cannot be done in an 
atomised way because an organisation’s behaviour cannot be analysed as atoms outside 
the social context; it is embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. Two 
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important periods mark the development of institutional theory. They are referred to 
respectively as the old and new institutionalism.  
The link between organisations and institutional argument is more recent. This 
perspective emphasises the ways in which action is structured and how order is made 
possible by shared systems of rules. Structure and system of rules constrain the 
inclination and capacity of actors to optimise as well as privilege some groups whose 
interests are secured by prevailing rewards and sanctions (DiMaggio et al., 1991). Three 
main schools contributed largely to the development of the theoretical stream. The first if 
the Columbia School which has been largely stimulated by the work of Weber (translated 
into English in the 1940s). A dominant researcher of this school is Philip Selznick (1948), 
whose work was strongly influenced by Merton. Selznick distinguished between 
organisation as ‘the structural expression of rational actions’ – as a mechanistic 
instrument designed to achieve specified goals – and organisations viewed as an adaptive 
organic system affected by the social characteristics of their participants and 
environments (Scott, 2001). He argues that social actions are not context-free but are 
constrained. He defines institutionalisation as a process that happens to organisations 
over time. A few years later, at Harvard School, Talcott Parsons (1956) applied his 
general cultural-institutional arguments to organisations. He examined the relation 
between organisations and their environments. He was interested in the ways in which the 
value system of an organisation is legitimated by its connections to the main institutional 
patterns in different functional contexts (Scott, 2001). He differentiated between three 
levels within organisations: the technical, concerned with production; the managerial, 
concerned with control and coordination activities; and the institutional, concerned with 
relating the organisation to the norms and conventions of the community and society. The 
third school is the Carnegie School, with Herbert Simon (1945). Simon, a political 
scientist, developed a theory of administrative behaviour as a reaction against 
conventional economic theories. He was among the first theorists to link the limits of 
individual cognitive capacity with the features of organisational structure (Scott, 2001). 
According to him behaviour is rational in organisations because choices are constrained, 
and individuals are guided by rules. In 1958, March and Simon argued that organisations, 
by developing routines, shape the behaviour of participants, entailing a reduction in 
individual choices (March & Simon, 1993). 
The new institutionalism emerged in the late 1970s from the works of Williamson (1975), 
Hannah and Freeman (1977), Pfeffer and Slancik (1978), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Scott 
(1991), Zucker (1977), and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). It has provided the basis for 
much organisational theory for the past decades (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). This approach 
has its roots both in the works on institutional theory by Selznick, Gouldner, and Zald as 
well as the social constructionist literature in sociology, such as Berger and Luckmann, 
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1967. Its two primary foundational works are the articles of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
and DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  
Both old and new institutionalisms reject rational models of organisation. They both 
emphasise the relationship between organisations and their environments. If both argue 
that institutionalisation constrains organisational rationality, they identify different 
sources of constraints. Old and new institutionalism are characterised by numerous, 
crucial differences in terms of analytic focus, approach to the environment, views of 
conflict and change, and images of individual action. New institutional theory involves an 
interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural 
explanations, and an interest in properties of supra-individual units of analysis that cannot 
be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives 
(DiMaggio et al., 1991). For further insights into the comparison between old and new 
institutionalism see (Brinton & Nee, 1998; DiMaggio et al., 1991; DiMaggio, 1991).  
Meyer and Rowan view institutions as complexes of cultural rules (Meyer et al., 1977a). 
Rational beliefs are seen as important elements of institutionalisation. Rationalisation 
occurs through professions, nation-states, and the mass media, whose efforts support the 
development of larger numbers and more types of organisations (Scott, 1991). 
Organisations are the result of the increasing rationalisation of cultural rules that provide 
an independent basis for their construction. Whereas Rowan and Meyer emphasise the 
macro side of institutionalisation, Zucker looks more closely at the ‘micro-foundation’ of 
institutions (Zucker, 1991)). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) develop the macro perspective 
that has become the dominant emphasis in sociological work (Mizruchi and Fein (1999) 
recorded that DiMaggio and Powell’ paper of 1983 received 160 citations from 1984 to 
1995 in six major journals (Mizruchi et al., 1999)). They distinguish between three 
mechanisms – coercive, mimetic, and normative – by which institutional effects are 
diffused through a field of organisations. It is important to note that all the new 
institutionalism authors mentioned identified the organisational field as the level of 
analysis more particularly suited to the study of institutional processes (Scott, 1991). 
Scott (1991) identifies three analytical elements that compose institutions. They are the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems. ‘These elements are the building 
blocks of institutional structures, providing the elastic fibres that resist change’ (Scott, 
2001). These three pillars are developed later in this section.  
Despite the considerable development of new institutionalism in the social sciences, for 
the purpose of this thesis the focus is on new institutionalism in organisational analysis 
(DiMaggio et al., 1983; Meyer et al., 1977a; Scott et al., 1983; Zucker, 1977). As it will 
be shown later on, institutionalisation is a process by which meaning is created (Scott, 
1987). The next section focuses on the mechanisms that underlie the process of 
institutionalisation.  
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3.4.1 Institution 
There are many definitions of ‘institutions’. The interpretation differs depending on the 
perspective: historical, sociological, political, or economic. Koziol (2000) gives a list of 
16 definitions which, she says, is only a sampling of definitions. There is a huge variety 
and vagueness in the proposed definitions of institution.  
Jepperson defines institutions as a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state 
or property, and institutionalisation as the process of such attainment (Jepperson, 1991). 
According to North (1990) the major role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable structure (but not necessarily efficient) to human interaction” (North, 
1990). The structure constrains human activities by limiting the set of choices of 
individuals.  
Rather than giving a definition, Scott (2001) lists a number of characteristics specific to 
institutions: 
- “Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. 
- Institutions are composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements 
that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life. 
- Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, 
relational systems, routines and artefacts. 
- Institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to 
localised interpersonal relationships. 
- Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes both 
incremental and discontinuous.” 
Scott identifies three pillars that support institutions, namely the regulative, normative 
and cognitive elements (see Table 10). They provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour. The three elements are important and although operating through distinctive 
mechanisms and processes, all of them may work in combination. The regulative pillar 
focuses on rules and laws as legally sanctioned by major players like the state and other 
authorities. The primary mechanism of control is coercion. The normative pillar 
emphasises normative rules that introduce prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory norms 
(Scott, 2001). So norms and values are both included, where values refers to the preferred 
or the desirable, and norms to how things should be done. The normative element defines 
goals or objectives but it also indicates the appropriate ways to pursue them. It therefore 
specifies how actors are supposed to behave. It imposes constraints on social behaviour 
conferring rights as well as responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, licenses as well 
as mandates (Scott, 2001). Certification and accreditation are usually employed as an 
indicator for legitimacy. The third pillar (the cognitive) underlines the shared conceptions 
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that constitutes the nature of social reality. It recognises that internal interpretative 
processes are shaped by external cultural frameworks. The mechanism underlying this 
element is mimetism.  
 
Regulative 
pillar 
Normative 
pillar 
Cognitive pillar 
Mechanism Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Indicators Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of 
action 
Table 10 – Institutional pillars (extracted from (Scott, 2001)) 
Institutions promote stability by installing values (Scott, 1987). According to Scott 
(2001), institutions constrain and regularise behaviour. Jepperson (1991) says that they 
are ‘vehicles for activity within constraint’. They help as much as they constrain. They 
enable people and/or organisations to deal with uncertainties by providing patterns, but 
they also limit choice. Organisations are not free to act as they want. Their actions are 
bounded in a constellation of constraints. Options are limited, which leads organisations 
to become alike through making similar choices. As a result organisations get to a stage 
of homogenisation.  
3.4.2 Isomorphism 
Much institutional theory research has examined isomorphism and especially the causes 
of isomorphism (Davis, 1991; DiMaggio et al., 1983; Mezias, 1990; Palmer, Jennings, & 
Zhou, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) and its consequences (Jepperson, 1991; Zucker, 
1987). An important consequence of institutional isomorphism is organisational 
legitimacy (DiMaggio et al., 1983; Meyer et al., 1977a; Meyer et al., 1983b). Deephouse 
(Deephouse, 1996) tests whether organisational isomorphism increases organisational 
legitimacy in the banking sector. He focuses on two types of legitimacy by examining the 
evaluations of two social actors, government regulators and the general public. Results 
show that isomorphism in the strategies of the banks is related to legitimacy conferred by 
regulators and media.  
To describe the process of homogenisation DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refer to the 
concept of isomorphism. It is defined as a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions 
(Hawley, 1968, in (DiMaggio et al., 1983)). They add in a footnote that the theory of 
isomorphism does not address the psychological states of actors but the structural 
determinants of the range of choices that actors perceive as rational or prudent. 
Isomorphism is a process through which various factors lead organisations to adopt 
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similar structures, strategies, and/or processes. DiMaggio and Powell distinguish between 
two types of isomorphism, competitive and institutional. Competitive isomorphism 
comes from a rationality that emphasises market competition, niche change and fitness 
measures. According to DiMaggio and Powell, competitive isomorphism presents a 
limited picture of organisation. It needs to be complemented by institutional views on 
isomorphism involving organisational competition for political and institutional 
legitimacy as well as market position. Similarity does not arise through competition or 
objective requirements of efficiency but rather as a result of organisations trying to attain 
legitimacy within their larger environments. Institutional isomorphism provides a ‘useful 
tool for understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade much modern 
organisational life” (DiMaggio et al., 1983). 
The isomorphism processes do not have an immediate effect. Homogenisation is time 
related. In the early years of an organisational field – that is, a group of organisations that 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life – organisations that compose it may be 
very diverse. DiMaggio and Powell argue that the diversity disappears over time and 
organisations come increasingly to resemble one another. They identify three 
mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism change occurs: coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphism. These three types derive from different conditions and may 
lead to different outcomes. These mechanisms are of special interest for the purpose of 
the thesis. It will enable a better understanding of the rationalisation(s) that is leading the 
field and thereby a better understanding of corporations’ responses to ethical investment. 
Investigation of the mechanisms will generate knowledge about the pressures exerted by 
ethical investment. The thesis devotes a specific section to the three institutional 
mechanisms (see section 3.5). 
3.4.3 Organisational field 
A key concept of institutional theory is the organisational field. It is an open concept that 
identifies a number of nodes or points of observation in the analysis. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) define organisational field as referring to “those organisations that in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar 
services or products…. The virtue of organisational field as unit of analysis is that it 
directs our attention not simply to competing firms, …., or to networks of organisations 
that actually interact, …,but to the totality of relevant actors”(DiMaggio et al., 1983). 
Fields identify communities of organisations that participate in the same meaning 
systems, are defined by similar symbolic processes, and are subject to common 
regulatory processes. Scott’s definition is broader than that from DiMaggio and Powell. 
He includes into the definition the rules and norms that allow the field to function (Scott, 
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1994). Scott suggests an organisational field is “a set of diverse organisations attempting 
to carry on a common enterprise” (Scott et al., 1995)]. He defines organisational field as 
“a community of organisations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose 
participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors 
outside of the field” (Scott, 1994). For Bourdieu fields of activity are contested arenas 
that emerge from struggles over scarce capital. They are port hoc and empirical 
descriptions of realms of activity. “To think fields is to think relationally” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). A field designates an arena of struggle where resistance to the 
dominant power exists.  
The advantage of using the concept of organisational field is that it enables one to isolate 
a system of organisations that are directly or indirectly linked (Scott, 1998). An 
organisational field is constituted by organisations that consider each other relevant. So 
fields are not fixed group of organisations, but they may vary as the perception of 
relevance differs per individual. Moreover, institutional fields do not emerge fully 
formed. On the contrary they evolve over time through different stages of increasing 
structuration (DiMaggio et al., 1983). The stages take place in the process of 
institutionalisation. In order to better understanding the dynamics that are taking place in 
the field of ethical investment, it is essential to be able to identify at what stage of 
development the field is in, as the processes and characteristics vary. The next section 
depicts the process of institutionalisation and its different phases.  
3.4.4 Process of institutionalisation 
Berger and Luckmann identify institutionalisation as a core process in the creation and 
perpetuation of enduring social groups (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Traditionally, new 
institutional theory has paid less attention to the issue of institution formation than to the 
diffusion of established institutions and their effect on the organisations in a field 
(Jespersen, Nielsen, & Sognstrup, 2001). Nonetheless models have been developed for 
analysing the process of institutionalisation.  
Zucker asserts that “institutionalisation is both a process and a property variable. It is the 
process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the 
same time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or 
less a taken-for-granted part of this social reality. Institutionalised acts, then, must be 
perceived as both objective and exterior” (Zucker, 1977). So institutionalisation is viewed 
as the social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social 
reality. It operates to produce common understandings about what is appropriate and, 
fundamentally, meaningful behaviour (Zucker, 1983). “Institutionalisation involves the 
processes by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like 
status in social thought and action”(Meyer et al., 1977b). According to DiMaggio and 
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Powell (1983) the process of institutionalisation is characterised by four elements that are 
recognisable in any institutionalised field (DiMaggio et al., 1983): 
1) An increase in interaction among organisations within a given field; 
2) The development of inter-organisational structures of control and relational 
patterns; 
3) An increase in the amount of information that organisations within the field must 
process; and, 
4) The development of mutual awareness by members of the field.  
Scott (1994) adds to this characterisation a number of other factors indicating an 
increasing degree of structuration (Scott, 1994): 
5) An increase in agreement about the institutional logic within the field; 
6) An increase in isomorphism regarding the structural form a given organisation 
must adopt within a particular organisational field; 
7) An increase in the structural equivalence of organisational relations within the 
field; 
8) The evolution of an increasingly clearer boundary between the field and other 
social structures, and 
9) The development of a form of order within the field, meaning that a uniform 
awareness concerning the status of various organisational forms is created.  
Through the process of institutionalisation, fields become highly structured. This process 
serves to stabilise and routinise interactions between participants by integrating them 
within the structure of the field. As a consequence, organisations within a highly 
structured field exhibit convergence towards normative practices, thereby lessening the 
diversity of practices and organisational forms within the field. As a result organisations 
tend to become homogeneous. 
Based on the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967), Tolbert and Zucker have designed a 
model of three stages of institutionalisation (see Table 11). They suggest a process of 
institutionalisation in an organisational context – whilst Berger and Luckmann focused on 
the occurrence of institutionalisation processes among individual actors – divided into 
three levels of institutionalisation: habitualisation, objectivation and sedimentation 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). For any process of institutionalisation to start an innovation, an 
idea or a new concept are needed that must go beyond the oral phase into the written 
phase (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000), which must be diffused. The diffusion of 
innovations is essentially a social process and the meaning of an innovation is gradually 
worked out through a process of social construction (Rogers, 1995).  
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A. Habitualisation or the pre-institutionalisation stage 
Habitualisation refers to behaviours that have been developed empirically and adopted by 
an actor or a set of actors in order to solve recurring problems (Tolbert et al., 1996). It can 
be described as a pre-institutionalised institution. It marks the transition to action in that 
certain organisations will move from discussion to action. The innovation may still be 
subject to significant differences in acceptance and interpretation in the field, although 
the phase of habitualisation involves the development of shared definitions or meanings. 
The level of dissemination may depend on whether it involves homogenous organisations 
and is supported by professional norms and/or political-administrative hierarchies 
(Jespersen et al., 2001).  
Habitualisation involves the generation of new structural arrangements in response to a 
specific organisation problem or set of problems. At this stage organisations, as part of 
their searching solutions, look at what the others are doing. They may imitate each other. 
There may be multiple adopters but in few numbers, limited to a circumscribed set of 
similar, possibly interconnected organisations facing similar circumstances, and to vary 
considerably in terms of the form of implementation. Such structures will not be the 
object of any sort of formal theorising and knowledge of the structures among non-
adopter-especially those that are not in direct, frequent interaction with adopters- will be 
extremely limited, in terms of both operations and purpose (Tolbert et al., 1996).  
B. Objectivation or semi-institutionalisation stage 
Objectivation involves wider dissemination and a greater degree of consensus on the 
content and value of an idea. Exchange of positive experiences or authoritative 
mechanisms may further the process. Professionals or their associations may play an 
important role as sources of dissemination, but powerful actors such as high ranking 
administrators or other bodies can also function as facilitators by advocating the 
importance of the new institutions. Even though an innovation has reached the 
objectivation phase, not all of them will survive (Jespersen et al., 2001).  
Exchange of positive experiences: 
- Organisations gather evidence from various sources to assess the risk parameters of 
adopting a new structure. Other organisations have already pre-tested the structure, 
and decision-makers’ perceptions of the relative costs and benefits of adoption will be 
influenced by observation of other organisations’ behaviour. Thus the more 
organisations that have adopted the structure, the more likely will decision-makers 
perceive the relative balance of costs and benefits to be favourable.  
- Champion’s role: set of individuals with a material stake in the promotion of the 
structure (DiMaggio, 1988). Some specific interest groups do play an important role 
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in promoting structural changes in organisations because they have a specific interest 
in it. Champions are most likely to emerge when there is a large potential market for 
the innovation (e.g. when environmental changes have adversely affected the 
competitive positions of a number of established organisations). To be successful 
champions must achieve two major stages of theorisations (Strang & Meyer, 1993): 
creation of a definition of a generic organisational problem, a definition that includes 
specification of the set or category of organisational actors affected by the problem; 
and justification of a particular formal structural arrangement as a solution to the 
problem on logical or empirical grounds (see (Galaskiewicz, 1985)). Theorising 
invests the structure with both general cognitive and normative legitimacy. On the 
basis of such theorising, and the accompagnying evidence, champions encourage the 
diffusion of structures throughout a set of organisations that are not otherwise directly 
connected.  
Structures that have been subject to objectivation and have become widely diffused can 
be described as being at the stage of semi-institutionalisation. At this stage adopters have 
become quite heterogeneous. The impetus for diffusion shifts from imitation to a more 
normative base, reflecting implicit or explicit theorisation of structures. As theorisation 
develops and becomes more explicit, variance in the form that the structures take in 
different organisations should decline. Although the rate of survival of structures at this 
stage of institutionalisation is longer, not all will persist indefinitely.  
C. Sedimentation or full institutionalisation stage 
The sedimentation phase, during which the innovation is fully institutionalised, is 
characterised by complete dissemination to organisations in the field and by significant 
continuity in time and space. Successful institutionalisation depends on weak resistance 
from actors, continuous social and cultural support, and noticeable results (Jespersen et 
al., 2001). 
Full institutionalisation involves sedimentation. This means that the structure has 
survived over time. Sedimentation is characterised by, firstly, the complete spread of 
structures across the group of actors theorised as appropriated adopters and, secondly, the 
perpetuation of structures over a lengthy period of time. Sedimentation is possible if there 
is only weak resistance from actors. Significant resistance would affect the extent of 
diffusion and the long-term retention of the structure. Another factor affecting the 
sedimentation phase if the availability of demonstrable results. A weak positive relation 
between a given structure and desired outcomes may be sufficient to affect the spread and 
maintenance of structures. Full institutionalisation of a structure is likely to depend on the 
joint effects of relatively low resistance by opposing groups, continued cultural support 
and promotion by advocacy groups, and positive correlation with desired outcomes.  
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Dimension Pre-
institutionalisati
on stage 
Semi-
institutionalisatio
n stage 
Full-
institutionalisati
on stage 
Processes Habitualisation Objectivation Sedimentation 
Characteristics of 
adopters 
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Heterogeneous 
Impetus for 
diffusion 
Imitation Imitative/normati
ve 
Normative 
Theorisation activity None High Low 
Variance in 
implementation 
High Moderate Low 
Structure failure rate High Moderate Low 
Table 11 – Stages of institutionalisation and comparative dimensions (extracted from (Tolbert et al., 
1996)) 
3.4.5 Transformation and de-institutionalisation 
The institutional process overlooks two essential dimensions. Both are situated at the two 
extremities of the process of institutionalisation. One concerns the start of the process and 
the other one concerns its end. The two dimensions are close to each other as they both 
deal with deinstitutionalisation: deinstitutionalisation because new processes of 
institutionalisation are transforming the present institutions, and deinstitutionalisation 
because over time the institution fades away.  
The models introduced in the previous section omit the phase of transformation and/or 
deinstitutionalisation. The institutionalisation process is presented as starting from a state 
of nothingness, emptiness, and ending in a state of stability. However one may wonder: 
(1) What are the repercussions and impacts of a new institutional field on existing fields? 
(2) Are institutional fields established forever? Referring to an organisational life cycle, it 
is likely that a field will at a certain moment reach a phase of decline. This phase is 
considered neither in Tolbert and Zucker’s model nor in Berger and Luckmann’s. A new 
institutional field appears because of a certain context, it does not come from nothing but 
leans on, uses, and transforms existing elements out of which a new field emerge. This 
process has repercussions on existing fields that may entail a disappearance or change. 
Although institutional theory emphasises the cultural persistence and endurance of 
institutions, under a variety of conditions, they are susceptible to dissipation, rejection or 
replacement (Oliver, 1992). As would say Boulding there is an “inexorable and 
irreversible movement towards the equilibrium of death” for all organisms (“individuals, 
families, firms, nations, and civilisations”) (Boulding, 1950). All growth must run in to 
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eventually declining (Boulding, 1953). If not, there would eventually be only one object 
in the universe. This section considers literature on the ‘deinstitutionalisation’ issue.  
Institutions may, at different times, disappear or move towards the phase of 
deinstitutionalisation. This refers to the processes by which institutions weaken and 
disappear (Scott, 2001). Oliver (1992) defines it as “the process by which the legitimacy 
of an established or institutionalised organisational practice erodes or discontinues” 
(Oliver, 1992). Deinstitutionalisation means that at a certain moment and under certain 
conditions the social consensus around the meaning and the value of an activity has 
deteriorated. It calls into question the stability and longevity of institutional values and 
practices. Institutions are also vulnerable to reassessment and rejection. 
From weakened law and increase in non-compliance, to the erosion of norms or of 
cultural beliefs, reasons for deinstitutionalisation can be numerous. Zucker (1988) 
suggests that institutionalised elements may erode due to incomplete social transmission. 
It may lead to social entropy, a tendency toward disorganisation in the social system 
(Zucker, 1988). Rules are modified under the pressures of varying circumstances and 
roles eroded by the personal characteristics of those who play them. Oliver (1992) 
describes three general types of pressure toward deinstitutionalisation: political, 
functional, and social. Political pressures result from a changing power distribution that 
provided support for existing institutional arrangements. It happens when a specific 
stakeholder from an organisation with a growing power or visibility no longer holds any 
interest in sustaining an institutionalised practice or perceives the practice as conflicting 
with their own agendas or beliefs. Functional pressures question the instrumental value of 
an institutionalised practice (technical or functional consideration). Deinstitutionalisation 
may be the consequence of changes to the perceived utility or technical instrumentality of 
an institutional practice. If, for example, the economic criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness begin to conflict with institutional definitions of success, the 
institutionalised practice might be reassessed. When social and economic objectives are 
conflicting, it is most likely to lead to the deinstitutionalisation of institutional practices, 
for example when important actors reorient their demands on the organisation so that the 
organisation is rewarded less for the sustained implementation of institutionally accepted 
structures and procedures and more for the social and environmental added value of its 
outputs (e.g. external ethical rating). Social pressures relate to differentiation of groups 
and the existence of heterogeneous, divergent, or discordant beliefs and practices. These 
may be due to three sources: firstly social fragmentation and historical discontinuity, for 
example when the turnover of people is high, secondly external social pressures, 
including changes in government and societal values or expectations, and finally 
structural disaggregation (structural differentiation, diversification and geographic 
dispersion).  
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Institutional researchers have shown little interest for the deinstitutionalisation phase 
(Oliver, 1992; Scott, 2001). The main focus has been the way to stability and repetition 
without considering that the process may end. Therefore empirical studies have mainly 
investigated rule-like status and resistance to change. Scott (2001) describes some studies 
that have focused on deinstitutionalisation (Geerts, 1971; Tolbert and Sine, 1999; and 
Greve, 1998) but as he notes, the indicators employed to assess the extent of 
deinstitutionalisation are very loose, they “range from weakening beliefs to abandonment 
of a set of practices” (Scott, 2001). Zucker (1991) refers to change theorists who have 
given broad explanations of organisational change on the basis of changing interpretative 
schemes and institutional resistance to fundamental organisational transformations (see 
(Zucker, 1991)). This falls out of the scope of this research, but in order to broaden the 
views on deinstitutionalisation it would be of interest to look at organisational growth and 
decline processes (see (Whette, 1987)) as well as organisational learning and unlearning 
(Argyris & Schoen, 1978)]. 
The description of Triodos case in chapter 2 pointed at some elements characteristic of an 
institutional field such as standardisation, formalisation, or structuration. However it 
needs to be further studied and especially to broaden the analysis to the whole field of 
ethical investment. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Scott (1994) provide useful 
characteristics in order to explore whether or not ethical investment has emerged as a 
field. Tolbert and Zucker’s model of stages of institutionalisation will also be used to 
identify in which phase of institutionalisation ethical investment finds itself. This last 
remark on transformation and deinstitutionalisation may be of particular interest for 
studying the field of ethical investment. The movement of ethical investment started as a 
reaction against rules and values especially within the financial world. The movement 
broke into the investment sector in order to change these social norms. It would be 
interesting to investigate whether institutionalisation has transformed the initial 
movement, and if it did so, how and why.  
3.5 Mechanisms of institutionalisation 
Once a set of organisations has become a field, specific dynamics and mechanisms arise. 
As a result organisations tend to resemble one another because institutions, directly or 
indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, exert pressures on the organisations of the 
field. In the long-term organisations become alike. Homogenisation happens because, 
according to DiMaggio and Powell, the process of institutionalisation gives rise to 
mechanisms that exert pressures on organisations and compels them to conform to the 
pressures. If, during the pre-institutionalisation phase pressures will not be felt as highly 
constraining, in the full institutionalisation stage they will become rule-like and therefore 
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difficult to bypass. Therefore it is important to know the level of institutionalisation. 
Depending on the level of institutionalisation, isomorphic processes will differ. 
According to Powell and DiMaggio it is during the last stage – what they call field 
maturity – that the institutional process paves the way for field stability. DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms through which isomorphic change occurs: 
coercive forces that stem from political influence and problems of legitimacy; mimetic 
changes that are responses to uncertainty; and normative influences resulting from 
professionalisation. These mechanisms involve organisational competition for political 
and institutional legitimacy as well as market position. 
These mechanisms are important to understand because they create a certain dynamic that 
supports change. These social processes are macro level mechanisms happening outside 
the organisation but within the organisational field, involving each organisation of the 
field, and affecting individual organisations as well as the whole field. These three 
mechanisms help to get an understanding of why organisations went from state ‘A’ to 
state ‘B’. It focuses on the transitional aspects of change. If ethical investment has 
become, or is in a process of becoming, an institutional field, the mechanisms may be 
recognisable. The mechanisms may not only reinforce the institutionalisation but also 
affect firms’ behaviour. 
The next three sections provide an introduction to the three mechanisms. Although the 
mechanisms are presented separately, all three are connected and not necessarily 
empirically distinguishable (DiMaggio et al., 1983). Each involves a separate process. 
They tend to derive from different conditions and may lead to different outcomes. But 
two or more could operate simultaneously and their effects will not always be clearly 
identifiable. Indeed, institutional pressures may even be cross-cutting and lead to conflict 
(Davis & Powell, 1990).  
3.5.1 Coercive mechanism 
Coercive isomorphism is driven by two forces: pressures from other organisations on 
which a focal organisation is dependent and on organisation’s need to conform to the 
cultural expectations of the larger society. In other words it stems from political influence 
and the problem of legitimacy (DiMaggio et al., 1983). 
Coercive isomorphism, at least in the first instance, is thus analogous to formulations of 
the resource dependence model, in which organisations are viewed as constrained by 
those on whom they depend for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It refers to the type 
of conformity that develops when external organisations have the ability to demand 
compliance. Resource dependence theory proposes that the organisation is interconnected 
with the external environment and must respond to the expectations and pressures exerted 
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by the various sources and that the pressures exerted upon organisations by various 
constituents may represent conflicting demands, the most urgent of which will be 
determined by which of the constituents has control over resource flows if resources are 
scarce, critical, and have no substitutes. Such constraints, in DiMaggio and Powell’s 
view, could include pressures to bring an organisation’s structure in line with the 
demands of powerful constituents. Such pressures may come from governmental 
mandate. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) provide some illustrations: a new environmental 
regulation whereby manufacturers conform to the new regulation by adopting new 
pollution control technologies; nonprofits maintaining accounts and hiring accountants to 
meet the requirements of tax legislation; restaurants maintaining minimum health 
standards; and organisations hiring affirmative action officers to fend off allegations of 
discrimination (DiMaggio et al., 1983).  
Although coercive mechanism has been the most explored of the three mechanisms, 
several researches focus on it. An example is a study by Covaleski and Dirmith (1988) of 
the way in which a large state university was forced into conforming to the state 
government’s budgeting procedures (Covaleski & Dirmith, 1988). They adopt what they 
call a “power” perspective and examine the university’s budgeting process as an example 
of coercive isomorphism. Using archival and interview materials, the study is entirely 
based on qualitative data. Coercive dynamic has been also observed, for instance, in the 
savings and loan industry (Rao & Neilsen, 1992), in human resources management where 
Konrad and Linnehan (Konrad & Linnehan, 1995) study the importance of regulation for 
the imposition and inducement of organisational change, and in life insurance (Lehrman, 
1994). Sutton and al (1994) investigate the adoption of disciplinary hearings and 
grievance procedures for nonunion salaried and hourly employees (Sutton, Dobbin, 
Meyer, & Scott, 1994). Their hypotheses focus on both coercive and normative forces. 
They show how the state exerts coercive pressure on organisations. Ginsberg and 
Buchholtz (1990) also consider the two mechanisms, coercive and normative (Ginsberg 
& Buchholtz, 1990). They investigate the shift from non-profit to for-profit status of 
health maintenance organisations due to dramatic changes in the federal government’s 
policies and in consumers’ expectations.  
Coercive forces are not always direct and explicit. They may be more subtle and less 
explicit (DiMaggio et al., 1983) which might be more relevant for the case of ethical 
investment. In the ethical investment field the lead is not taken by the government. The 
role of the government might be indirect as, for example, it can regulate the information 
to be disclosed by corporations, that is the type and the way companies should report on 
social and environmental issues. At present, coercive pressures occur outside the 
governmental arena. And because of the relative small amount of money invested 
‘ethically’, resource dependence may have little impact. But nevertheless ethical 
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investment raises the problem of legitimacy in society at large. Moreover if a company 
wishes to be listed on a sustainable market index, it must follow a number of 
requirements without which it cannot be listed.  
3.5.2 Mimetic mechanism 
Uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages mimetic or imitative behaviour among 
the members of an organisational field. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) view mimetic 
isomorphism as a response to uncertainty. When organisational technologies are poorly 
understood, that is, when managers are unclear about the relationship between means and 
ends, when there is ambiguity regarding goals, when the environment is highly uncertain, 
or when a clear course of action is unavailable, organisational leaders may decide that the 
best response is to mimic a peer that they perceive to be successful (Davis et al., 1990). 
“When there is uncertainty, organisations imitate other organisations that are perceived to 
be successful and/or similar” (Meyer et al., 1977b). The modelled organisations may be 
unaware of the modelling or may have no desire to be copied. According to Davis and 
Powell (1990), “it merely serves as a convenient source of organisational practices that 
the borrowing organisation may use”. Models may be diffused unintentionally and 
indirectly, for example through employee transfer, or explicitly, for example through 
consulting firms or industry trade unions. Uncertainty may cause managers to look 
outside their own organisations and incorporate the routines, practices, and structures of 
other organisations of the field. Uncertainty is a drive for mimetic isomorphism in which 
organisations adopt the legitimated practices of others.  
Mimetic isomorphism is the mechanism that has attracted the most attention from 
researchers. There is an impressive number of articles focusing on this mechanism (see a 
review in (Mizruchi et al., 1999). The mimetic dynamic has been observed in various 
organisational populations, such as non-profit organisations (Galaskiewicz & Wasseman, 
1989), banks (Lomi, 1995), audit services (Han, 1994), hospitals (Fennell & Alexander, 
1987), college textbook publishers (Levitt & Nass, 1989), public schools (Rowan, 1982), 
municipal government (Tolbert et al., 1983), large corporations (Davis, 1991; Fligstein, 
1985; Fligstein, 1987; Haveman, 1993; Mezias, 1990; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), and 
manufacturing industries (Bolton, 1993).  
Fligstein (1985) tries to capture the mimetic effect concerning the adoption of the 
multidivisional form (MDF). He proposes to examine the percentage of firms in a 
particular industry that had adopted the MDF by the beginning of the decade in question. 
It yields to a supportive finding of four of Fligstein’s hypotheses. Fennell and Alexander 
(1987) hypothesise that acute care community hospitals in the US are more likely to join 
multihospital systems in which multihospital systems already operate. The authors treat 
this hypothesis as an example of mimetic isomorphism. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 
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(1989) argue that organisations are likely to mimic those with whom they have one or 
more boundary spanning ties. Examining contributions to 326 non-profit organisations by 
75 for-profit firms, the authors examine DiMaggio and Polwell‘s suggestion that mimetic 
processes will tend to occur under conditions of uncertainty. Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman show how isomorphism occurs through network ties. Findings are consistent 
with the authors’ hypothesis. Haveman (1993) combines institutional arguments with 
population ecology theory to show that California thrifts tended to imitate the behaviour 
of successful peers by following them into the same markets. She conceptualises this 
similarity of behaviour in terms of mimetic isomorphism. These examples are studies 
focusing on only the mimetic mechanism. Other studies like Mezias (1990) develops 
operational definitions for normative as well as mimetic isomorphism. Two studies by 
Levitt and Nass (1989) and Palmer, Jennings and Zhou (1993) operationalise the three 
isomorphic processes simultaneously (Palmer et al., 1993).  
One issue that is often addressed in the mimetic mechanism is the social network. It is 
also relevant for normative mechanisms which are described in the next section. A social 
network across organisational boundaries helps to disseminate ideas and innovation 
throughout an organisational field (Galaskiewicz et al., 1989). According to Granovetter 
(1985) networks can be useful in overcoming uncertainty and distrust. Rogers (1983) 
shows how innovation spreads throughout a population via networks (Rogers, 1995). 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) show the importance of networks in the mimetic 
process. They demonstrate that organisations are more likely to mimic organisations with 
which they have some ties. They show that intercorporate acquaintanceship networks 
affected decisions involving who would receive corporate philanthropy. Davis (1991) in a 
study on the adoption of the “poison pill” takeover defenses during the 1980s shows the 
importance of interlock network in the diffusion of the process. Haunschild (1994) also 
shows the importance of interlocks and relationships with professional firms for the 
acquisition premiums when acquiring another company (Haunschild, 1994). He shows 
that interlocks act as a mechanism for the transfer of major practices and structures 
among organisations.  
The mimetic mechanism is of interest when studying the field of ethical investment. 
Firstly because being a rather new field it has to diffuse among financial institutions. 
Financial institutions may see in ethical investment some market opportunities and a 
potential to improve its own image. However they do not have experience in ethical 
investment. There are uncertainties about the way to assess companies. Therefore, many 
financial institutions may imitate the assessment methodology developed by other 
financial institutions. It is interesting to note that rating organisations have often been 
established by front runner banks (those that have first had an ethical investment fund) or 
have been created modelling the methodology of those banks. These same rating 
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organisations now advise new financial institutions in the field on setting up ethical 
investment funds. 
Secondly it may occur among corporations which are screened. None of them want to be 
the laggard of the sector. Therefore, companies may imitate the ‘best’ of the sector in 
order to respond in the best possible way to ethical investment pressures in order to be on 
the list of the ‘ethical’ companies.  
3.5.3 Normative mechanism  
Normative isomorphism describes the motivation of organisations to follow taken-for-
granted norms. It results primarily from professionalisation. New-institutional theorists 
have pointed to the role of professions as powerful and important sources of 
rationalisation (Hall, 1968; Meyer et al., 1977a) and as primarily being sources of 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio et al., 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Many of the 
studies emphasising normative processes focus on professional or collegial networks 
(Ruef & Scott, 1998), on interlocking directorates (Palmer et al., 1993), or on the support 
provided by informal ties (Westphal & Zajac, 1994). They can affect prevailing rules, 
norms, and values that the organisations must meet to be recognised as legitimate (Scott 
et al., 1995). 
“Professions are occupational groups that have achieved a high degree of control with 
their own field of work and the organisational framework and rules regulating this field” 
(Jespersen et al., 2001). DiMaggio views professionalisation as “the collective struggle of 
members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work” 
(DiMaggio et al., 1983). Professional norms strive to define the conditions and methods 
of the work (Cartwright, 1998). Professions attempt to obtain normative control by 
regulating professional norms. Thus, professions function as sources of normative 
isomorphism, focusing on their role as carriers of institutional values, norms and 
practices. Beyond the field, professions seek regulative control by influencing public laws 
and regulations (Jespersen et al., 2001). Authers like (Abbott, 1988) and (Larson, 1977) 
have emphasised the complexity of the relationship between profession and state 
(complexity between intervention and autonomy).  
Three important aspects of professionalisation are important sources of isomorphism 
(Powell, 1991). One of these is the growth of professional communities based on 
knowledge produced by university specialists and legitimated through academic 
credentials. The second is the growth and elaboration of formal and informal professional 
networks that span organisations and across which innovations may diffuse rapidly. 
These networks contribute to the rapid dissemination of new models in standardised 
forms. And the third is the emergence of career patterns and titles of professions.  
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Operationalisation of the normative mechanism is, according to Mizruchi and Fein 
(1999), the one mechanism that has received the least attention of the three. They list 
three articles focusing only on normative forces: Galaskiewicz (Galaskiewicz, 1985) 
studies the amount of money which nonprofit charitable organisations received from 
corporations in relation to professional networks; Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991) further 
investigate corporate philanthropy by developing two network contagion models to 
describe corporate contributions officers’ evaluations of non-profit organisations 
(Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991); and Mezias and Scarselletta (1994) examine the 
institutional process of financial reporting standards (Mezias & Scarselletta, 1994). 
 
The three mechanisms previously described take place at the macro level, that is at the 
organisational field level. However at the micro level things may be much more complex 
and dynamic. The institutional mechanisms are the result of intense activity at the micro 
level. The mechanisms may not be known by individual organisations, but they all take 
part in them. It is a non-intended outcome of interactions at the micro level. The next 
section focuses on the organisation level and especially on the responses of organisations 
to the pressures exerted by the macro level.  
3.6 Organisational responses to institutional pressures 
The three mechanisms previously described, mimetic, coercive, and normative, are macro 
dynamics and forces outside organisations. These mechanisms contribute to the shaping 
of norms and values. However institutional theory has been criticised for emphasising too 
much passive compliance to institutional pressures while ignoring the capability of 
organisations to resist these pressures (Oliver, 1991). Institutional pressures limit the 
degree of choice of individual organisations and allow them a very limited range of 
behaviour. Recently institutional researchers have explored how organisations may 
respond “strategically” to institutional pressures. In an article of 1991, Powell suggests an 
extension of the scope of institutional theory by exploring the variation in institutional 
environments created by competing demands (Powell, 1991). Scott (2001) agrees that 
organisations may choose among a variety of strategies in response to institutional 
pressures (Scott, 2001). He nevertheless notes that researchers must consider how 
institutional environments influence and constrain the strategies organisations can use in 
a particular situation. Oliver (1991) proposes an alternative theoretical framework dealing 
with conformity and resistance to institutional pressures. She combines institutional and 
resource dependence theories, as (Goodstein, 1994; Greening & Gray, 1994) also did 
later on. If resource dependence theory agrees that environmental pressures limit choices, 
it nevertheless differs in the range of choice behaviour organisations may use to respond 
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to these environmental pressures and the degree of flexibility the organisation has in 
adapting to its environment (Cartwright, 1998).  
Oliver identifies different strategic responses that “organisations enact as a result of the 
institutional pressures toward conformity that are exerted on them” and she develops a 
“conceptual framework for predicting the occurrence of the alternative strategies” 
(Oliver, 1991). This conceptual framework enables us to examine how institutional 
pressures affect individual organisations. It focuses on the micro level. The framework 
outlines the likelihood of organisational resistance to external pressures for conformity in 
relation to the degree of pressures exerted by institutional expectations.  
In order to be able to explore the research question of the thesis not only the macro level 
should be addressed – organisational field level – but also the micro level – the 
organisation level. One of the objectives of the thesis is to investigate the influence of 
ethical investment on corporations, and especially to research whether or not it stimulates 
corporations to shift towards sustainability. In the ethical investment field, firms are not 
passive organisations confronted with institutional pressures for conformity. In their 
attempt to cope with environmental constraints and uncertainty, they will most likely 
develop strategies to cope with institutional pressures. 
3.6.1 Strategic responses 
Oliver (1991) develops a typology of five potential strategies based on an integration of 
institutional and resource dependence theories. Oliver’s framework incorporates the 
assumption that organisational resistance to institutional pressures is a strategic choice.  
The strategic choice perspectives focuses on the actions organisational members take to 
adapt to an environment as an explanation for organisational outcomes (William Q. Judge 
& Zeithaml, 1992). Its proponents argue that there are numerous purposeful actions in 
organisations and that organisational members have substantial flexibility in shaping their 
own path. Strategic choice focuses on individuals and groups within organisations to 
explain organisational processes. This focus on behaviour assumes that organisational 
actors possess the discretion to act according to their own free will (William Q. Judge et 
al., 1992). Using this perspective Oliver argues that there is an interaction between firms 
and the environment, and that based on the dynamics of that interaction, management 
makes strategic decisions about the appropriate response. The strategies range from 
passive conformity to active resistance, and for each of them Oliver sub-divides three 
tactics. 
Acquiescence 
Organisational acquiescence depends on the organisation’s conscious intent to conform, 
its degree of awareness of institutional processes, and its expectations that conformity 
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will be self-serving to organisational interests. Acquiescence is mainly instrumental, 
aiming at enhancing legitimacy and social support 
- Habit: organisations reproduce actions and practices of institutional environment that 
have become historically repeated, customary, conventional, or taken for granted. 
- Imitate: consistent with the concept of mimetic isomorphism, it refers to either 
conscious or unconscious mimicry of institutional models (imitation of successful 
organisations and the acceptance of advice from consulting firms)  
- Comply: conscious obedience to or incorporation of values, norms, or institutional 
requirements and rules. Compliance is considered more active than habit and 
imitation, to the extent that an organisation consciously and strategically chooses 
to comply with institutional pressures in anticipation of specific self-serving 
benefits.  
Compromise 
Organisations are confronted with conflicting institutional demands, with inconsistencies 
between institutional expectations and internal organisational objectives related to 
efficiency or autonomy. Under such circumstances, organisations attempt to balance, 
pacify or bargain with external constituents.  
This strategy is employed to conform to and accommodate institutional rules, norms or 
values, but in contrast to acquiescence, institutional compliance is only partial and 
organisations are more active in promoting their own interests.  
- Balance: this refers to the accommodation of multiple constituent demands in 
response to institutional pressures and expectations. It is the attempt to achieve parity 
among or between multiple stakeholders and internal interests. 
- Pacify: partial conformity with the expectations in order to conform to minimum 
standards. Energy is put into appeasing the institutional sources.  
- Bargain: effort of the organisation to exact some concessions from an external 
constituent in its demands or expectations. 
Avoid 
Avoidance is defined as the organisational attempt to preclude the necessity of 
conformity. Organisations achieve this by concealing their nonconformity, buffering 
themselves for institutional pressures, or escaping from institutional rules or expectations. 
Avoidance is motivated by the desire to get round the conditions that make conforming 
behaviour necessary.  
- Conceal: this involves disguising nonconformity behind a façade of acquiescence. It 
is often manifested in symbolic acceptance, ‘window dressing’. From an institutional 
perspective, the distinction between appearance and reality is a theoretically 
important dichotomy (Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1983), because the appearance rather than 
Ethical investment 
 104 
the fact of conformity is often presumed to be sufficient for the attainment of 
legitimacy.  
- Buffer: this refers to an organisation’s attempt to reduce the extent to which it is 
externally inspected, scrutinised, or evaluated by partially detaching or decoupling its 
technical activities from external contact.  
- Escape: the organisation may exit the area within which pressures are exerted, by for 
example moving a manufacturing plant to another place were requirements are less 
stringent, or by changing its goal or activity.  
Defiance 
This is a more active form of resistance to institutional processes. A defiant strategy 
represents unequivocal rejection of institutional norms and expectations. It is more likely 
to occur when the perceived cost of active departure is low, when internal interests 
diverge dramatically from external values, when organisations believe they can 
demonstrate their rationality or believe they have little to lose by displaying their 
antagonism towards the constituents that judge or oppose them.  
- Dismiss: organisations ignore institutional rules and values. This is more likely to 
happen when the potential for external enforcement of institutional rules is perceived 
to be low and when internal objectives diverge or conflict very dramatically with 
institutional values or requirements. The organisation counts on a limited chance of 
getting caught.  
- Challenge: this is an active departure from rules, norms or expectations. It is more 
likely to happen when the challenge can be reinforced by demonstrations of 
organisational probity or rationality. For example a company may challenge a 
directive because it is not rational and it feels that its own behaviour is beyond 
reproach.  
- Attack: this is a distinctly more intense and aggressive strategy to depart the 
institutional pressures and expectations. It is more likely to occur when institutional 
rules and expectations are organisation-specific rather than general or defocalised, 
when these values and expectations are particularly negative and discrediting, or 
when the organisation believes that its rights, privileges, or autonomy are in serious 
jeopardy.  
Manipulate 
Manipulation is intended to actively change or exert power over the content of the 
expectations themselves or the source that seeks to express or enforce them. It can be 
defined as a purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence, or control 
institutional pressures and evaluations. In the manipulation strategy, pressures and 
expectations are not taken as a given constraint to be obeyed or defied. Organisations 
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seek to alter, re-create, or control the pressures themselves or the constituents that impose 
them.  
- Co-opt: attempt to persuade an institutional constituent to join in the organisation or 
its board of directors. The intended effect of co-optation tactics is to neutralise 
institutional opposition and enhance legitimacy. For example, giving to a charitable 
foundation to demonstrate that the organisation is supporting something, or co-opting 
with important economic sectors in which the organisation is under regulation. The 
organisation’s objective is to influence institutional sources or processes.  
- Influence: this is more directed towards institutional values or beliefs, or the 
definition of criteria governing acceptable practices or performance. Performance in 
institutionalised environments is itself institutionally defined and prescribed (Hinings 
& Greenwood, 1988), the actual definitions and criteria of acceptable performance are 
often open to strategic reinterpretation and manipulation. The organisation’s objective 
is to neutralise institutional sources or processes.  
- Control: this refers to specific tactics to establish power and dominance over the 
external constituents that are applying pressure on the organisation. The 
organisation’s objective is to dominate institutional sources or processes.  
Goodstein (Goodstein, 1994) draws on Oliver’s theoretical framework for identifying 
factors that influence the strategic responses of organisations to institutional pressures 
and specifically explores organisational responsiveness related to work and family issues. 
He has empirically tested four of the five strategic responses of Oliver’s framework in the 
context of child-care services. Manipulation was not included in his test because it was 
considered as a non-viable strategy in this specific context. He presented hypotheses 
predicting which strategic response to institutional pressures was most likely in different 
situations based on a combination of institutional and technical factors. The strength of 
institutional pressures and the perceived positive or negative effects of implementing 
assessment practices on technical outcomes determined the strategic responses. 
Goodstein talks of strategic responsiveness rather than strategic resistance, term that 
Cartwright (1998) also uses.  
Cartwright and Cashore & Vertinsky have criticised the typology proposed by Oliver. 
They say that it does not adequately consider strategy beyond acquiescence, leaving no 
category for firms that go beyond societal pressures, leading the way with innovation and 
pro-action (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000). The typology does take into account active 
resistance but denies an active acceptance. Debra Cartwright proposes an extension of the 
model based on a combination of two primary theoretical perspectives, namely 
environmental determinism and strategic choice. She includes a category that she calls 
“internalisation” (Cartwright, 1998). When institutional norms and expectations are 
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internalised, organisations may go beyond acquiescence and conformity. Cartwright 
argues that organisations may become opinion leaders and develop their internal practices 
beyond the current institutional expectations, or they may turn the institutional 
expectations into a competitive advantage and promote these values actively. For the 
purpose of her own research she needs to separate the two potential responses, 
acquiescence – that is the mere full conformity to institutional pressures – and 
internalisation – seeking a more active pursuit than mere compliance to the standards. 
Cashore and Vertinsky refer to a ‘proactive category’ (Cashore et al., 2000). The study 
investigates the effect of policy change on corporate choices. The fact that Oliver’s 
categories stop at acquiescence is problematic because it is neglecting the fact that firms 
develop internal procedures for issue management that are able to be proactive and take a 
competitive advantage.  
The missing category pointed out by Cartwright and Cashore brings an interesting 
element to the classification. It binds together the two extreme strategies of Oliver, 
acquiescence and defiance. The internalisation strategy does share one element with the 
acquiescence strategy: conforming to institutional pressures. According to Cartwright 
companies that are in this category fully conform to the institutionalised norms and have 
internalised them. What makes it different from the acquiescence strategy is that 
corporations do not only conform but also take an active role in promoting and 
developing institutional values. This is rather similar to the characteristics of the 
manipulation strategy where organisations try to actively change, influence or control the 
content of the expectations themselves. By developing and promoting institutional values 
organisations take a leading role. Is it not a way to reinforce its position and define the 
rules of the game? Being a leader means that other organisations will mimic/follow it. 
Little by little this leading organisation will naturally take an important role in 
developing, changing and influencing institutional values and norms.  
The internalisation strategy is missing in the framework of Oliver. However the strategic 
responsiveness continuum presented by Cartwright may be criticised. It goes from the 
lower responsiveness to the higher responsiveness within which strategies go from 
defiance to internalisation. Firstly the word ‘responsiveness’ is confusing. It may be 
interpreted in two different ways, one related to strategic responses of companies, and the 
other one related to sensitivity especially when she talks about higher and lower 
responsiveness. This last meaning may be debated as organisations that conform may not 
always be the most sensitive to their environment but simply have objectives that make 
them comply. Secondly the presentation of the strategies in a linear way is questionable 
as it suggests that organisations adopt the strategies in a gradual way going from defiance 
to internationalisation. The last one being the ‘best’ one. However the way organisations 
adopt a strategy is not gradual and an organisation that is today proactively developing 
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criteria, norms and value – applying an internalisation strategy – may in the future 
become the one that is the most resisting to change –shifting to a defiance strategy. 
3.6.2 Institutional factors 
What determines an organisation’s strategy is its willingness and ability to conform or 
resist to institutional pressures. According to Oliver (1991) willingness is “bounded by 
organisational scepticism, political self-interest, and organisational control”, while ability 
is bounded by organisational capacity, conflict and awareness. The willingness and 
ability of an organisation are driven by institutional factors which determine the choice of 
strategic response. Oliver defines ten factors that can be placed all along the chain of 
institutionalisation from macro to micro. Oliver (1991) argues that these factors 
determine the strength of institutional pressures facing the organisation, and that 
organisations will respond differently to these pressures. She positions the responses on a 
scale of levels of resistance. The degree of resistance or acquiescence to external 
pressures depends on the ten factors. Therefore firms, within the institutional 
mechanisms, have a margin of freedom on how to respond, and which strategy to adopt. 
Oliver’s factors are based on five basic questions which determine the choices made by 
the organisations: why these pressures are being exerted, who is exerting them, what 
these pressures are, how or by what means they are exerted, and where they occur. For 
each of the five questions – cause, constituents, content, control and context – she 
determines two dimensions (see Table 12).  
Oliver’s framework brings insights into the organisations’ strategic responses to 
institutional processes. Although the framework is very clear, with well defined variables 
which all aim at predicting the occurrence of the alternative strategies, one may criticise 
its linearity. Oliver presents a very analytical framework which implicitly leads towards 
statistical analysis (see paragraph 3.6.3). She views factors in a simple causal 
relationship. However, institutional factors are not independent entities. They are 
interrelated and they do influence each other. Therefore it is necessary to add dynamics to 
Oliver’s framework (through a system approach for example). This will make it possible 
to put the organisation or group of organisations studied and the variables in a new 
network structure that is not an analytical focus on one individual stakeholder or variable 
but rather a series of multilateral contracts among stakeholders and variables. 
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Institutional factor Predictive dimensions 
Cause: The degree of social legitimacy or 
economic benefit which the organisation 
expects to derive from compliance with 
institutional expectations. 
- Legitimacy or social 
fitness 
- Efficiency or 
economic fitness 
Constituents Multiple and conflicting pressures may 
be exerted on a corporation by numerous 
institutional constituents which constrain 
the organisation’s ability to conform. The 
likely choice can be predicted according 
to the organisation’s resource dependence 
on the constituents. 
- Multiplicity of 
constituent demands  
- Dependence on 
institutional constituent 
Content: The content of the institutional demands 
and the degree to which they are 
congruent with organisational goals or 
the extent to which conformity to those 
demands would constrain organisational 
discretion determine the choice response; 
there may be an interaction of cause, 
constituents, and control, so that 
organisations would be willing to make a 
trade-off between discretionary power 
and economic viability when resource 
dependence on a particular institutional 
constituent is extreme 
- Consistency with 
organisational goals 
- Discretionary 
constraints imposed on 
the organisation 
Control: This has to do with the degree of legal 
coercion implicit in the institutional 
demands and/or the extent of voluntary 
diffusion of institutional norms. 
- Legal coercion or 
enforcement 
- Voluntary diffusion of 
norms 
Context: The degree of uncertainty in the 
organisation’s environment and the 
degree of interconnectedness in the 
institutional environment. 
- Environmental 
uncertainty 
- Environmental 
interconnectedness 
Table 12 – Institutional factors (extracted from (Oliver, 1991)) 
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3.6.3 Operationalisation of Oliver’s framework 
Oliver’s framework of strategic responses to institutional pressures has been 
operationalised. The methodologies used are for a large part quantitative, trying to 
explain the causal link between dependent and independent variables. Out of the eight 
studies operationalising Oliver’s strategic responses, six of them used a quantitative 
approach to test variables in a statistical manner.  
Martens (1998) addresses the strategies used by organisations to manage external control 
and the conditions which affect their choice (Martens, 1998). He statistically tests 
resource dependence theory assumptions that organisations actively seek to avoid 
uncertainties created by dependencies and compares those assumptions to neo-
institutional theory predictions. Using the typology and framework proposed by Oliver 
(1991), he examines the strategies of 344 organisations and 524 interdependent 
relationships between the organisations and their customers, distributors, manufacturers 
and suppliers. Although not particularly strong, the results of the study generally support 
Oliver’s framework. Milliken et al (1998) use a multi-theoretical approach to explore 
why organisations vary in the degree to which they have adopted policies designed to 
help employees manage their work and family lives (Milliken, Martins, & Morgan, 
1998). They examine how work-family responsiveness related to resource dependence 
and institutional factors as well as to factors capturing variation in managers’ 
interpretation of work-family issues. Through a survey they statistically test their 
hypothesis. Although Oliver’s framework is not at the centre of the research, one of the 
hypotheses (3c) is based on Oliver’s argument. Ang and Cummings (1997) empirically 
test individual firms’ strategic responses to institutional influences at a specific time, 
when hypercompetition has altered the competitive dynamics of the industry (Ang & 
Cummings, 1997). They focus on the banking sector. Using data from 226 banks and 
hierarchical moderated regression analyses, they show that the propensity of banks to 
conform to or resist pressures, increase the perceived gain in production economies, 
financial capacity to resist institutional influences, and transaction cost considerations. 
Godstein (1994) applies Oliver’s framework to explore the extent of employer 
involvement in work-family issues, focusing in particular on child care and flexible 
workplace (Goodstein, 1994). He argues that organisations do not respond uniformly to 
institutional pressures, but adopt varying strategies that depend on the nature of the 
institutional impinging on them. He has investigated the sources of variation in the 
strength of institutional pressures and the strategic responses to these pressures through 
archival and survey data. The survey consists of 1239 organisations. Data are statistically 
treated through correlation analysis. Goodstein offers an interesting study on the causal 
dynamics of strategic choice in contexts in which institutional pressures are critical. His 
analysis confirms Oliver’s approach: organisations adopt varying strategies that depend 
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on the nature of the institutional pressures impinging on them. Ingram and Simons (1995) 
extend Goodstein’s application of Oliver’s framework integrating resource dependence 
and institutional theories to explain organisational responsiveness to work-family issues 
(Ingram & Tal, 1995). They use a representative national sample of organisations. Like 
Goodstein they test their hypotheses statistically. They also find strong support for 
Oliver’s conceptualisation of the factors that affect organisations’ degree of compliance 
with institutional pressures. And Cartwright (1998), in her dissertation, tests and extends 
the conceptual model of strategic responsiveness proposed by Oliver. She applies it to 
higher education (Cartwright, 1998). She looks at strategic responsiveness in a highly 
institutionalised context where conflicting institutional pressures exist. She proposes to 
extend the concept of strategic responsiveness to institutional pressures by adding an 
additional level of responsiveness beyond acquiescence that she labels internalisation. A 
Guttman scale is established for the dependent variable, which provides an ordinal scale 
that can be tested by calculating the coefficient of reproducibility. In total 492 schools are 
part of the analysis. Twelve hypotheses are posited to test the model. Results demonstrate 
partial support of the model.  
Some researchers have applied qualitative approaches to investigate Oliver’s framework. 
They are very few. Among them, we find Cashore and Vertinsky (2000). In their paper 
they explore forest companies’ responses to pressures for increased environmental 
protection in North America (Cashore et al., 2000). In order to carry out the investigation, 
they developed a new theoretical framework, based on neo-institutional literature. They 
extended Oliver’s framework by incorporating political science, more specifically policy 
network and regulatory regime literature, into it. They argue that the system of 
governance influences a firm’s approach to different external pressures. Their model is 
then tested through three case studies. Satfford et al also use a qualitative approach. They 
look at the green alliances between environmental NGOs and businesses (Stafford, 
Polonsky, & Hartman, 2000). The authors argue that environmental NGOs can provide 
linkages to societal stakeholders, what they call strategic bridges, to support 
environmental initiatives. They argue first that to be successful alliances need to fulfil 
certain characteristics, and secondly that the alliance is influenced by stakeholder 
pressures. The second proposition is based on Oliver’s framework. They investigate one 
case study, the alliance strategies between Greenpeace and Foron Household Appliances, 
a German corporation. The paper does not show strong conclusions and the way Oliver’s 
framework is applied is not very clear.  
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3.7 Theoretical framework 
The research questions of the thesis deal with institutional field formation and 
organisations’ responses to institutional pressures. The underlying research question 
relates to ethical investment as a change agent towards sustainable development. The aim 
is not to predict change but to understand mechanisms driving the process. Therefore a 
mechanism-centred approach is adopted in order to bring about a certain understanding of 
the development of the ethical investment field, and corporations’ responses to this 
phenomenon. Institutional theory provides a theoretical foundation for exploring social 
mechanisms and it provides insights into how institutional mechanisms come to act on an 
organisational field by focusing on the mechanisms of change.  
This last section proposes a theoretical framework built on the theoretical perspective 
presented in the chapter, with a special focus on mechanisms. The framework will serve 
as a basis for the analysis of the empirical data. Table 13 and Table 14 summarise the 
characteristics of first institutionalisation and second corporations’ responses to 
institutional pressures. 
Figure 14 presents the general framework. It consists of two axes, one going from the 
micro to the macro level, and the second providing a time perspective. The 
institutionalisation process evolves over time, going through different stages: from pre-
institutionalisation to full-institutionalisation (Tolbert et al., 1996). Although they are 
represented as equal, each stage may require more or less time to be reached. The stages 
are represented at the micro level because they are a quality of the field not of the 
organisations. It is therefore a macro level characteristic. From the institutionalisation 
process emerges a certain structure, certain norms and values that are shared and 
recognised by constituents of the field. Institutionalisation of a field may involve the 
deinstitutionalisation of another field, and for one reason or another, the field that has 
been, or is becoming, institutionalised may reverse the process and enter a phase of 
deinstitutionalisation. Although Figure 14 only shows the institutionalisation process, 
deinstitutionalisation should not be excluded.  
The second level represented on the figure is the micro level. It consists of organisation 
responses to the institutional field. They may adopt different strategies: from 
manipulation to acquiescence (Oliver, 1991). Organisation responses may change over 
time. One organisation may adopt different strategies over time according to the level of 
institutionalisation of the field as different types of pressures may be exerted. And 
different organisations may adopt various during strategies in the same phase. The micro 
and macro levels are interrelated; change at one level entails change at the other and vice 
versa. Figure 14 emphasises two important elements: institutionalisation is a process 
involving (a) time and (b) two levels (micro and macro) that are interrelated and interact 
Ethical investment 
 112 
with each other through specific mechanisms. The mechanisms themselves may change 
over time or the pressures resulting from the mechanisms may evolve. The process is not 
linear, but it is a combination of feedback loops. Also, it is not a finite process, in the 
sense that although it has been extracted from a broader picture, it interacts with other 
processes or phenomena that are happening. Its evolution is therefore not independent 
from a larger system. However it is necessary to isolate the phenomenon under study to 
make it intelligible. One must keep in mind that it remains an artificial representation, 
which is simpler than the phenomenon observed (Boudon, 1986; Le Moigne, 1990). 
Figure 15 zooms into Figure 14 at a specific moment ‘t’. It must be seen in relation to 
Figure 14. It emphasises the relationship between the micro and macro levels, that is the 
mechanisms that connect the two levels.  
It emphasises the relationship between the micro and macro levels, that is the 
mechanisms that connect the two levels.  
The theoretical framework outlines a number of aspects presented in the tables below. 
They are organised around the two main objectives of the dissertation. Empirical data 
will concentrate on each of these aspects. The operationalisation is further explained in 
Chapter 4. 
This chapter outlined the general theoretical framework for proceeding with the analysis 
of field construction and organisations’ responses to institutional pressures. Before 
turning to the analysis of the empirical data (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), the next chapter will 
present the methodological approach chosen for this dissertation. 
Figure 14 – General theoretical framework 
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Figure 15 – Zoom in on a slice of the general theoretical framework 
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Institutional mechanisms 
(DiMaggio et al., 1983) 
 
Coercive pressures Interlocks  
 Rules, laws, sanction 
 Control over the resource flows 
Normative pressures Professionalisation 
 Normalisation/standardisation: certification, accreditation 
 Diffusion of norms (channels) 
Mimetic pressures Competition within the sector of activity 
 Uncertainty 
Table 13 – Institutional field, characteristics and mechanisms 
Cause (why is the company being pressurised to conform to institutional expectations) 
Social legitimacy - Strategic utility 
- Legitimacy rationality 
- Organisational interest 
Economic fitness - Economic gain 
- Economic accountability 
- Economic rationalisation 
Constituents (Who is exerting institutional pressures on the company?) 
Multiplicity 
(From constituents) 
- Conflicting pressures; conflicting expectations 
- Incompatible and competing demands 
- Conflicting interests groups 
Dependency 
(Organisation’s 
dependence on the 
constituents) 
- Constituent’s in/ability to control the allocation or availability 
of some critical organisation resource 
- The organisation’s willingness or ability to find alternative 
resources or resource suppliers.  
Content (To which norms or requirements is the company being pressurised to conform?) 
Consistency 
(Constituents 
demands/organisations 
goals) 
- Compatibility with internal goals 
- Validity or legitimacy of institutional expectations.  
Constraint - Loss of decision-making discretion that the pressures impose 
on the organisation 
- Constraint on substantive organisational decisions 
Control (How or by what means are the institutional pressures being exerted?) 
Coercion 
(Legal coercion) 
- Law, government mandate 
- Consequences of non compliance: punitive/enforcement system 
- Regulatory agencies 
- Mechanisms for enforcing compliance 
Diffusion 
(Voluntary diffusion) 
- Spread of values, practices or expectations 
- Imitation and contagion of legitimacy 
- Organisation awareness of the values and practices 
- Organisation scepticism 
Context (What is the environmental context within which pressures are being exerted?) 
Uncertainty - Environmental certainty and predictability 
- Knowledge of the values and norms 
Interconnectedness - Connectedness or fragmentation of the environment 
- Competition within the field 
Table 14 – Corporations’ responses to institutional pressures
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Chapter  4 -  Methodological  
considerations    
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters introduced the objectives of the research – examining the 
formation of the ethical investment field and investigating corporations’ responses to 
pressures exerted by the field, the area studied – ethical investment and the theoretical 
framework based on institutional theory. Chapter 4 focuses on methodological 
considerations. The purpose is to clarify the approach used for collecting and analysing 
empirical data as well as present the limits of the chosen approach, and to identify the 
sources of empirical data.  
The chapter is organised around two main sections: methodology, that is how one goes 
about studying the phenomenon, and methods, that is specific research techniques. The 
methodology section presents the choices related to the level of analysis, the type of 
research and the strategy of enquiry. The section on methods focuses on data collection 
and analysis.  
4.2 Methodological choices 
Institutional theory does not prescribe any specific methodology. It is not associated with 
any standard research methodology or even a set of methods (Tolbert et al., 1996). 
Studies have relied on a variety of techniques, including case analysis, cross-sectional 
regression, longitudinal models of various types and so forth. Empirical work in neo-
institutionalism can be divided into two broad categories (Mohr, 1982; Scott & Meyer, 
1994; Tolbert et al., 1996). The first is characterised by the application of quantitative 
analytic methods to a broad cross section of an organisational field or occasionally to 
panel data over a period of some years. These studies generally test neo-institutional 
theory against alternative theories of organisations (see (Galaskiewicz et al., 1989; 
Palmer et al., 1993; Tolbert, 1985). This has brought useful insights into the breadth and 
relevance of institutional arguments compared to other theories. A second research
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 approach draws on qualitative techniques and close historical case studies to investigate 
field formation, the evolution of institutional forms, and the adoption of organisational 
practices across a broad period of time (Brint & Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio, 1995; 
Fligstein, 1991; Halliday, Granfors, & Powell, 1993; Holm, 1995; Suchman, 1995; 
Tolbert et al., 1983). They provide important insights into the sequence of actions and 
events that drive field formation.  
For the purpose of this research, the methodological choices consist of field study, 
qualitative approach and case study as strategy of enquiry. These choices are motivated 
by the theoretical background and the research questions which ask for an organisational 
level of analysis and a mechanism approach. The following sections presents why the 
choices have been made and discuss their shortcomings.  
4.2.1 A field study, towards a system approach 
Field study has been chosen for three main reasons: it fits the level of analysis defines in 
the previous chapter that is organisational field; it offers a methodological pragmatism; 
and finally it gives the opportunity to adopt a system approach.  
The organisational field is the level of analysis of the thesis (see chapter 3 for a definition 
of organisational field). The research questions of the thesis, and especially the first 
objective, look at the interrelations between a set of organisations forming the field of 
ethical investment. It does not focus on one organisation or one type of organisation but 
all the organisations taking part in the organisational field studied. It encompasses several 
groups of organisation such as financial institutions, rating organisations, corporations, 
and others. Field study provides the required level of analysis but also proposes a way to 
circumscribe the area of study which is the subject of the research (Burgess, 1984). 
However defining the empirical field is not an obvious task and as Anderson et al (1995) 
said “no matter how narrow the definition or how rich the repertoire of collected data, the 
exploration will never result in anything other than one of many possible interpretations” 
(Anderson, Borum, Kristensen, & Karnoe, 1995). This problem cannot be overcome 
however the interpretation can be made understandable but also subject to discuss by 
making choices as clear as possible. In order to define the boundaries of the field of 
ethical investment three sources of information were used. The advantage of these three 
sources is that each of them focuses on different elements that is actors, relations or 
activities (events). The observation-participation within Triodos Bank (see later in this 
chapter) offered rich data regarding the actors involved and the type of involvement they 
have. A second source was provided by the actors interviewed (see later in this chapter). 
It was asked to each of them who do they identify as part of the field. And the third 
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source of information was the analysis of the lists of attendees to the Triple Bottom Line 
Investing conference from 1999 till 2002 (see chapter 6).  
The second reason for which field study has been chosen is because it offers a 
methodological pragmatism (Burgess, 1984). It is way to study the phenomenon of 
ethical investment which fits the research questions and the theoretical perspective. It 
covers the exploration of complex, social, empirical phenomena through the application 
of multiple sources of data (Anderson et al., 1995).  
The third advantage of field study is that it offers the opportunity to adopt a system 
approach because it looks at the whole, not only one agent or actor in the field but also 
interactions between agents, and emerging elements or characteristics. The system 
approach makes it possible to identify linkages among factors that provide an 
understanding of system behaviour over time (Kelly, 1998). It is appropriate to 
institutional theory that locates the source of various organisational practices and 
structural arrangements within a broader context (Davis et al., 1990). Rather than viewing 
the organisation independently of its environment, it puts it within its organisational 
context. It is one of the basic elements of institutional theory. Like institutional theory 
open systems theory insists on the importance of the wider context or environment as it 
constrains, shapes, penetrates, and renews the (Katz et al., 1978). Organisations or 
individuals cannot be separated of their environment, as there is an interaction between 
them and the environment and between the environment and them. Moreover, according 
to Forrester (1975), the system approach a way of getting better insights into the 
mechanisms and dynamics of social processes (Forrester, 1975) which is a central aspect 
of the research questions. 
System approach, a brief presentation 
Although system approach is not direct applied in this research, it is an important source 
of inspiration and influence. Therefore the following paragraphs introduce it briefly with 
a special focus on two concepts coming from this approach which are especially useful in 
the research, namely emergence and feedback concepts.  
The concept of systems thinking has evolved from a number of intellectual traditions and 
has come to mean a multitude of different things (Richardson, 1991). Systems theory was 
proposed in the 1940s by the biologist Ludwig van Bertalanffy and further Poss Ashby. 
Von Bertalanffy was both reacting against reductionism and attempting to revive the 
unity of science. He emphasised that real systems are open to, and interact with, their 
environments and that they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence, 
resulting in continual evolution. Rather than reducing an entity to the properties of its part 
or elements, systems theory focuses on the arrangement of, and relations between, the 
parts which connect them into a whole (Bertalanffy, 1968). This particular organisation 
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determines a system, which is independent of the concrete substance of the elements. The 
development of systems theory is diverse. There are a number of different definitions of 
the concept, but most include the notion of looking at the “big picture” while maintaining 
awareness of the interconnectedness of components of the big picture (Richmond & 
Peterson, 1994). This holistic approach is a particular importance for investigating the 
institutionalisation process of ethical investment. Although researchers have limitations 
as of how much they can integrate in their studies, it is important to be aware that the 
research takes in consideration only one small part of it and to make clear what part it 
looks at. The present study focuses principally on the Dutch case, however the 
development of ethical investment is embedded in the international context. The 
dissertation does not try to provide a complete analysis of the international context, but 
rather position the Dutch case into the international context. Within the Netherlands the 
focus has been on some of the actors involved, financial institutions, rating organisations 
and corporations. Others like NGOs or government have been considered as secondary 
actors therefore less consideration was given. Within and aware of these limitations, the 
research attempts nevertheless to look at the big picture of the development to ethical 
investment.  
The system approach develops two interesting concepts for analysing complex systems: 
emergence and feedback loops. The concept of feedback is intimately linked with the 
concepts of interdependence and mutual or circular causality. The essence of the concept 
is a “circle of interactions, a closed loop of action and information“ (Richardson, 1991). 
The expression of the feedback concept varies a lot (see (Richardson, 1991)), however 
the underlying idea is the concept of closed loop of causal influences. If A influences B, 
and B in turn influences A, A and B form a loop of mutual or circular causality. Elements 
can be added to the loop, they are called polarities. It is the concept of polarity (positive 
or negative) that gives the causal loop its perceived analytic and explanatory power (for 
more information see (Richardson, 1991)).The research question leads to explore the 
interactions and inter-relations between actors. It is therefore relevant to consider the 
feedback loop concept because if a financial institution influences a corporation, one 
should also consider that the corporation in return will influence the financial institution, 
maybe not directly but indirectly thorough other actors such as the rating organisations. It 
is important to consider such loops to better understand the mechanisms at stake.  
The notion of emergence is one of the most important ideas to come from complexity 
theory. Emergence occurs when interactions among objects at one level give rise to 
different types of objects at another level. A phenomenon is emergent if it requires new 
categories to describe it that are not required to describe the behaviour of the underlying 
components (the people or the organisations) (Gilbert & Conte, 1995). For example, 
temperature is an emergent property of the motion of atoms. An individual atom has no 
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temperature, but a collection of atoms does. In social sciences emergence is not obvious 
and the relationship between individual characteristics and social phenomena is often 
debated (see (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 1999)). Emergence comes from individual action. 
Human organisations and institutions, in comparison to animal societies, have the ability 
to recognise, reason about and react to human institutions, that is to emergent features. 
Institutions result from behaviour, which take into account such emergent features. 
Gilbert (1995) calls such reflexive institutions ‘second-order emergence’ (Gilbert, 1995). 
Agents of a field can distinguish patterns of collective action and their actions can be 
affected by the existence of these patterns (Gilbert et al., 1999). Institutions may emerge 
as a non-intended outcome of repeated interactions. The system of institutionalisation can 
be described either in terms of the properties and behaviour of agents, or in terms of the 
system as a whole. The former mode of description focuses on the “micro” level, that is, 
the features of individual agents and their local environment (which they can perceive 
directly), while the latter focuses on the “macro” level, that is, the global patterns or 
regularities formed by the behaviour of the agents taken as a whole. Macro and micro 
levels are not always clearly distinct (they are most of the time intermingled). To rephrase 
institutional theory, homogenisation is an emergent ‘property’ of the institutionalisation 
process. Isomorphism mechanisms defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are a way to 
explain homogenisation. They are the dynamics of the interacting organisations. While 
the strategies suggested by Oliver (1991) are the individual responses of organisations to 
pressure.  
Field study combined with system approach provides the general line for analysing the 
social phenomenon studied in this dissertation. However it still does not provide specific 
methods. Before going into the methods section, other methodological choices need to be 
explained. It concerns the type of research, qualitative of quantitative and the strategy of 
inquiry.  
4.2.2 Choosing for a qualitative research methodology 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that institutional theory does not prescribe any 
specific methodology. However specific studies related to DiMaggio & Powell’s 
mechanisms (for reviews see (Mizruchi et al., 1999)) and Olivier’s framework have 
principally been investigated by means of quantitative methodologies with objective to 
investigate causal relationships (see chapter 3). Qualitative studies constitute a small 
group (for example (Ferguson, 1998; Olson et al., 2003)). The same applies to studies 
related to ethical investment. Qualitative approaches have been very scarce until now, 
while a dominant body of research focuses on the causal relationship of variables related 
to financial and ethical performances. They primarily use quantitative methodology. They 
show that having a good performance in social and environmental terms 
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reinforces/improves the financial performance of businesses. Two aspects are looked at: 
the overall financial results of companies such as return on investment, return on equity 
or earning per common share, and the investment portfolio financial returns. Very often 
regular investment portfolios are compared with ethical investment portfolios.  
Although there is a general trend for quantitative research, for the purpose of this thesis 
qualitative methodology seems more appropriate (see Table 15 for a comparison of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies). The research questions and the theoretical 
orientation described in the previous chapters emphasise the importance of understanding 
how, in what form and in what way the field of ethical investment shaped and how the 
activity of ethical investment can change corporation’s behaviours and practices. It 
stresses the necessity to look at mechanisms to provide understanding rather than 
predictions. The methodology required for this kind of research calls for the interpretation 
of a particular social context. Because quantitative methodology focuses on big scale and 
does not take into account the specificity of the context, it does not suit the research. A 
crucial characteristic of qualitative approach is its ability to investigate mechanisms, 
which quantitative approach does not allow. It also provides a deeper understanding of 
social phenomena than quantitative data. Those are crucial arguments in the case of this 
research (see Table 15 for a comparison between quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies). The research does not intend to predict outcomes but rather to gain 
insights into processes. The complex nature of the system rules out the possibility of 
using causal methodologies because these do not take processes into account. Moreover 
institutional theory is concerned with processes, meaning that it deals with a series of 
occurrences or events rather than a set of relations among variables (Alford, in (Scott, 
1987; Scott, 2001). In process theories time is of the essence. Social phenomena are 
history dependent. Institutional theorists talk about path dependency (Berger et al., 1967; 
David, 1985; Scott, 1987). They do not emerge from nothing, but are marked by a certain 
history and context.  
Denzin and Lincoln give a generic definition of qualitative research: it is a multi-method 
in focus, involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach to its subject matter (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1998). They mean that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them. In social science the qualitative methodology has enjoyed mixed 
support. In many disciplines, apart form anthropology and sociology, they have 
frequently been marginalised as a supplement to core quantitative methodologies 
(Silverman, 1993). The suspicion that qualitative methodologies are not reliable arises 
from the positivist tradition in social science originating in the work of Auguste Come in 
the 1830s, and coming to dominate social science in the mid-20th century (Mackenzie, 
1997). Data produced by qualitative studies are generally not easy to verify, and difficult 
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to observe. It often raises two problems: reliability, that is the degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same 
observer on different occasions; and anecdotalism, meaning that brief conversations, 
snippets from unstructured interviews are used to provide evidence of a particular 
contention (Silverman, 1993). In order to limit these problems, objectivity and rigour 
were both crucial element of attention during data collection and data analysis. More 
specific limitations of specific qualitative techniques are discussed in the next section 
devoted to methods. 
Quantitative research 
methodology 
Qualitative research methodology 
Quantification Interpretation 
Objectivity Subjectivity 
Rule-driven research procedures Flexibility in the research procedures 
Prediction of outcomes Understanding of organisational processes 
Context-free (supporting 
generalisation) 
Grounded with local context (making 
generalisation problematic) 
No research process effects 
assumed 
Recognition of the impact of the research process 
on the research situation 
Table 15 – Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, based on (Cassell & 
Symon, 1994; Lee, 1999) 
4.2.3 Strategy of inquiry: case studies 
“A strategy of inquiry comprises a bundle of skills, assumption and practices that 
researchers employ as they move from their paradigm to the empirical world. Strategies 
of inquiry put paradigms of interpretation into motion” (Denzin et al., 1998). They lead to 
specific methods of collecting and analysing empirical materials which will be developed 
in the next section.  
First strategies of inquiry vary depending on the type of research qualitative or 
quantitative, and then for each type there is variety of possible strategies. Qualitative 
research can involve case study, phenomenological and ethnomethodological techniques, 
grounded theory, biographical, historical, action, and clinical methods. Qualitative 
methodology itself does not favour any single method. Depending on the theoretical areas 
the research builds upon, the methodological choices that are made, and the research 
questions the study addresses, strategies of inquiry can be selected. 
The strategy of enquiry adopted for the present research is case studies (for literature on 
case study in the social research context see (Hartley, 1994; Vaughan, 1992; Yin, 1994). 
According to Yin (1994) a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are clearly evident”. As it will be later developed in 
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this chapter, the field study consists of seven case studies consisting of one in-depth case 
study and six small cases. The in-depth and the small cases address different research 
questions. 
Although the research questions of the thesis leave many possible strategies of inquiry 
open, several reasons support the choice for case study. Case studies can be used to 
explore social processes as they unfold in organisations. It can be useful where it is 
important to understand those social processes in their organisational and environmental 
contexts. It can be tailor-made to explore new processes or behaviour, and are suitable for 
social processes which are little understood (Hartley, 1994). Therefore case studies are 
well suited for investigating the mechanisms of the institutionalisation process of ethical 
investment. It has the property to go into the details of a limited number of cases, which 
is a great value to understand processes especially at the micro level. Case studies also 
provide practical insights, which are necessary for understanding how the activity of 
ethical investment evolved over time. According to Hartley “case study allows for a 
processual, contextual and generally longitudinal analysis of the various actions and 
meanings which take place and which are constructed within organisations” (Hartley, 
1994). The flexibility of case study strategies provides a better insight in the practical 
situation within its ‘natural’ context.  
Two other characteristics of the research reinforce the choice for case study. The research 
questions addresses a ‘how’ type of questions – How did the institutionalisation of ethical 
investment took place? How corporations respond to ethical investment? According to 
Yin (1994), the ‘how’ type of research questions is more adapted to case study. The 
second characteristic is he degree of focus on contemporary rather than historical events. 
Although the research requires looking at developments over time in order to understand 
the present state of ethical investment, it focuses on contemporary events as it analyses 
present influences of ethical investment on firms’ behaviour. Moreover ethical 
investment is a rather recent phenomenon that has developed over the past two decades. 
So its history is very recent. This contemporary aspect allows interviewing and direct 
observation. An important element of the research is the examination of ‘real-life’ 
phenomena. According to Yin (1994), case study is preferred when examined 
contemporary events.  
The explorative character of the strategy, in combination with the type of research 
question (‘how’) supports the choice of this research strategy. It enables the assessment 
of how ethical investment can influence firms’ behaviour, and allows access to in-depth 
information and data related to the field. However, like every other type of inquiry the 
case study has its limitations and problems. Three are here under exposed.  
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One possible limitation is the time-span (Bakker, 2001). Case studies can be very time 
consuming. Initial contacts with potential case studies have to be made, access must be 
gained and information collected. Therefore the number of case studies are often limited. 
This difficulty has been avoided in this research due to a personal involvement in Triodos 
Bank as participant-observer during the whole period of the research and even before the 
research started. The observation-participation offers numerous advantages such as 
accessibility to information, contact with actors of the field, advantages that make it 
possible to overcome some of the limitations of case studies. For example the selection of 
the small cases is based on information available through the observation-participation. 
Another example concerns the access to networks of the field. It helps to get into contact 
with other organisations. One must however remain aware of the fact that if on one hand, 
the involvement made the case studies easier in terms of selection and contacts, on the 
other hand it also did influence choices. The choice of the small case studies has been for 
a large part based on information available in the database of Triodos. Therefore views 
and choices concerning the case studies might have been different if the involvement had 
been in another organisation, or if there had been no involvement at all. 
There are two other important limitations related to case studies: validity and reliability. 
Three types of problem identified by Yin (1994) have been taken into account during the 
research: construct validity that is establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied; external validity that is establishing the domain to which a 
study’s findings can be generalised; and reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a 
study – such as the data collection procedures – can be repeated with the same results.  
In order to overcome the first point, constructive validity, several tactics suggested by Yin 
(1994) have been followed. Several sources of evidence have been used, interviews, 
documentation, and observation for each of the case study (see description later in this 
chapter). It is a way to diminish the limitations of each of the sources, but above all to 
encourage what yin calls convergent lines of inquiry. The multiple sources of evidence 
provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon and thereby lower the construct 
validity problem. It allows more accurate findings. The second tactic is the construction 
of a chain of evidence that is “to allow an external observer to follow the derivation of 
any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusion “(Yin, 
1004). In order to allow the reader to trace the steps in either direction, from conclusion 
back to initial research questions or from questions to conclusions, several steps were 
taken during the collection of data and during data analysis. The circumstances under 
which data have been collected such as time and place of the interview, are provided. 
However names of the people interviewed stay anonymous (see description later in this 
chapter). Citations of interviews, documents and observation relevant for the analysis are 
disclosed in the dissertation with clear mention of the source. The case studies followed a 
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set of specific procedures and question built from the theoretical framework. A so-called 
‘tree of questions’ was built where theoretical questions were operationalised through 
several steps (see later in this chapter). The tree of questions allows to clear link the 
reasoning from the theory to the empirical data. The third tactic used to overcome the 
construct validity problem is reviewing the draft case study by key informants. Only the 
in-depth case study, Triodos, has been reviewed by two responsible of the Triodos Bank. 
They checked the truthfulness and correctness the information reported. Small cases have 
not been reviewed. However, reports of each of the interview has been reviewed by the 
interviewees (see later in this chapter).  
The second point, external validity, concerns the generalisability of case studies’ 
findings. The limited basis for generalising is one of the major critics of case study 
methodology. Yin (1994) notes that case studies are generalisable to theoretical 
propositions rather than populations or universes. In order to diminish this problem the 
following measures have been taken. Because the in-depth and the small cases address 
different question, they have been treated differently. Concerning the single in-depth case 
study (Triodos Bank), additional information from nine other ethical investment funds 
and interviews with other key actors of the field in the Netherlands have been collected. 
The nine funds do not constitute case studies themselves, however they enable to 
crosscheck and complete the in-depth case study. The other cases, the six small cases, 
have been built in a multi-case design. The advantage is that six cases are analysed and 
compared. It therefore brings more robust evidence than single case. However single case 
study was more adapted to the research questions the in-depth case addressed. It enabled 
to get a deep understanding and insight into the process of ethical investment, which a 
multi-cases design would not have allowed because of time constraint. This being said, 
the single and the multi-cases analysed in the research are closely bound to a national 
context which limits the generalisation at an international level.  
As regards the last point, reliability, Yin (1994) proposes the use of case study protocols 
and the development of case study databases. It is important to make clear how the study 
has been conducted, which data have been gathered and how they have been interpreted. 
These points are developed in the following section concerning the methods. 
4.3 Methods  
4.3.1 Data collection 
Methods are specific research techniques. Methods for collecting empirical material can 
be very diverse, ranging from the interview to direct observation, the analysis of artifacts, 
documents, and cultural records, the use of visual materials or personal experience. 
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Several methods may be combined together. Qualitative methodology allows quantitative 
techniques such as statistical correlation, as well as qualitative techniques such as 
observation or interviewing. 
For this research, three main techniques have been combined in order to gather empirical 
data: observation-participation (participation in routine ethical investment work in the 
Netherlands), interviews (interviews with actors of the ethical investment field) and 
documents (reading the ethical investment literature; analysis of ethical funds and 
companies documents). Others techniques such as informal discussion with founders and 
leading opinion-formers in the field, conference attendance, or use of a small 
questionnaire have also been sued. All the techniques have been directed to building a 
fairly solid empirical picture of the process of ethical investment, the formation of the 
institutional field, an understanding of the pressures exerted by the institutionalisation of 
the sector, and the responses from actors to these pressures. Each of the techniques is 
presented in the paragraphs below. Table 16. Provides an overview of the strengths and 
weakness of each of the three main techniques.  
Source Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation Stable – can be reviewed repeatedly 
Unobtrusive – not created as a result 
of the case study 
Exact – contains exact names, 
references and details of an event 
Broad coverage – long time span, 
many events, and many settings 
Retrievability – can be low 
Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
Reporting bias – reflects (unknown) 
bias of author 
Access – may be deliberately 
blocked 
Interviews Targeted – focuses directly on case 
study topic 
Insightful – provides perceived 
causal inferences 
Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
Response bias 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
Reflexivity – interviewee says what 
interviewer wants to hear 
Participation-
observation 
Reality – covers events in real time 
Contextual – covers context of 
event 
Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
Time consuming 
Selective – unless broad coverage 
Reflexivity – event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
Cost – hours needed by human 
observers 
Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events 
Table 16– Strengths and weaknesses of the techniques used in the research (extracted from Yin, 
1994) 
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4.3.1.1 Participation-observation 
A large share of the empirical data has been collected through participation-observation 
within a financial institution, namely Triodos. Becker has summarised the task associated 
with the participant-observer as follows: “The participant observer gathers data by 
participating in the daily life of the group or organisation he studies. He watches the 
people he is studying to see what situation they ordinarily meet and how they behave in 
them. He enters into conversation with some or all of the participants in these situations 
and discover their interpretations of the events he has observed” (quoted in (Burgess, 
1984)). It is different from action research as it does not seek to change or improve a 
situation. “Action research aims to solve pertinent problems in a given context through a 
democratic inquiry where professional researchers collaborate with participants in the 
effort to seek and enact solutions to problems of major importance to the local people” 
(Greenwood & Levin, 1998). Participation-observation aims at observing and 
participating in situations, in specific contexts, with specific actors, in order to better 
understand – rather than seeking a solution to – a problem. Contrary to action research, 
the researcher tries to be as little influential as possible.  
Type of involvement 
There are four types of participation-observation, complete participant, participant-as-
observer, observer-as-participant and complete observer (for more information see (Gold, 
1969)). It is not always obvious to distinguish between the four as it may well happen that 
the position and activities of the researcher shift through time from one to another of the 
theoretical categories (Junker, 1960). Nevertheless the observation-participation 
concerned in this research falls under the category participation-as-observation.  
A personal involvement from November 1998 till September 2003 took place through a 
placement at Triodos Research as a ‘sustainability analyst’. The choice of Triodos 
Research for the observation-participation is explained in a later subsection of this 
chapter. It started before the research began. The number of hours spent there varied over 
time from 128 hours to 32 hours (the last three years) per month. The work carried out at 
Triodos Research was similar to the rest of the analysts’ tasks within the limits of the 
part-time contract. It consisted in screening companies according to social and 
environmental criteria, writing company profiles, sector studies and issue reports – e.g. 
report on specific issues such as unsustainable forestry, sustainable mining, or weapon 
industry.  
Why participation-observation?  
Ethical investment is a new field in formation and therefore subjects to numerous 
changes. The best way to really capture and understand those changes, which are 
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sometimes small or not publicly available and therefore not perceptible by external 
observant, is participation-observation. It offers the opportunity to be part of the field 
among and as part of the actors involved, to experience it in its real life rather than 
reported and translated by someone else. It thereby avoids potential distortions of the 
information  
Observation-participation facilitates the collection of data on social interaction in 
situations as they occur rather than in artificial situations. It makes possible to 
encapsulate the subjective elements of social life. Yin argues that it provides ‘unusual 
opportunities for collecting case study data…[as it gives you the ability] to gain access to 
events or groups that are otherwise inaccessible to scientific investigation’ (Yin, 1994). 
For example this position made it possible to attend various meetings of the department: 
process meetings – related to the daily work such as planning, clients, conferences, 
contacts, etc; content meetings –related to discussions around specific issues such as 
human rights, hazardous substances; annual strategic meetings of the department taking 
place once to twice a year –reviewing the activities of the department over the past twelve 
or six months, and its future activities and strategic direction. Observation-participation 
provides first-hand knowledge (Lee, 1999) which is rich in contextualised detail and 
vivid to the observer. Participation-observation provides very rich information and a deep 
knowledge of the field. Specific information such as how the activity functions, why 
certain actors take specific strategic choices, and how actors interact with each other 
would not have been available otherwise. Moreover, it allows following on a regular 
basis the development and changes happening within the field, which is a crucial aspect 
for this research, and thereby offers the opportunity to capture and experience emergent 
phenomenon of ethical investment in the Netherlands.  
An important added value of observation-participation is its potential for creativity. Its 
flexibility makes it possible to gain insights into new realities or new ways of looking at 
old realities (Denzin et al., 1998). It is an interesting characteristic for developing theory.  
Problems of participation-observation 
Participation-observation does not only have advantages but also presents some specific 
problems (see (Schwarts & Schwartz, 1955)). The participant-as-observer role involves 
situations where the researcher participates as well as observes by developing 
relationships with informants. Unlike complete participation, the researcher makes known 
that he/she is doing an investigation. This role provides the researcher with the freedom 
to go wherever the action is that is relevant to the investigation (Burgess, 1984). This role 
raises also the question of the extent to which a researcher participates. The rather long 
involvement within Triodos Research and the involvement before starting the research 
helped tremendously in gaining acceptance for the role of observer and participant within 
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the department. It enabled a complete integration in the department and prevented any 
resistance from the personnel of the department or even from the whole bank.  
A second aspect that is of importance as participant-observant is the role within the field 
studied. According to Burgess (1984) the variables to consider are the researcher’s 
experience, the age and the sex of the researcher, and the ethnicity. The researcher’s own 
experience has an influence upon the research findings. In the case of this thesis, the 
experience variable was covered through involvement within the organisation, Triodos 
Research, before starting the present research. From November 1998 to September 1999, 
I worked first as a trainee and then as an employee at Triodos Research. During this 
period no research was involved. It provided some valuable experience within the field 
before engaging in the research. The other variables are not of specific relevance for this 
research.  
Burgess (1984) raises third point related to the relationships of the participant-observer 
with the informants. According to him, whilst doing participant observation it is essential 
for participant-observers constantly to monitor the differences between themselves and 
their informants. An important dimension in developing rapport with informants involves 
learning their language. Thanks to the immersion within the field before starting the 
research and the long involvement (five years in total) this problem did not arise. 
Immersion made it possible to gain a very good knowledge of the language used in the 
field. However the problem of influence of the researcher on the researched remained. 
Participant observers are involved in face-to-face relationships with those who are 
researched, and the observers are part of the context that is being observed. This results in 
the possibility that researchers may modify and influence the research context as well as 
be influenced by it. It concerns the researcher’s participation and relationships with 
informants and their impact upon the data that are gathered. Entirely avoiding researcher 
influence on subjects is an idealistic improbability (Denzin et al., 1998), yet there are 
ways to ensure that such an effect is diminished. The naturalness of the observer, coupled 
with its non-direction, makes it the least noticeably intrusive of all research techniques 
(Denzin et al., 1998). Every researcher should be aware that what he or she sees depends 
largely on his/her particular position in a network of relationships. It is therefore 
important to make clear the social position of the observer and observed and the 
relationship between them (Vidich, 1969). In order to minimise influence on/in Triodos, 
it was clearly agreed to have limited responsibility within the organisation.  
Yin (1994) notes that the major problems have to do with the potential biases produced. 
Beside the problem already mentioned the participant encounter the risk of following a 
commonly known phenomenon and becomes supporter of the group or organisation being 
studied. In order to prevent such problem the involvement in Triodos was reduced to 32 
hours per month. A last problem is that the participant role may require too much 
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attention relative to the observer role. These problems have been prevented by making 
very clear the personal involvement within Triodos Research and by agreeing with the 
organisation to devote enough time for taking notes or clarifying certain points.  
4.3.1.2 Interviews 
The second important technique use for the present research is interviewing. In total 33 
interviews were conducted (see Annex 4). Table 17 recapitulates the number and type of 
interviews per group of actor. The interview is a “conversation, the art of asking 
questions and listening” (Denzin et al., 1998). It is not a neutral tool, for the interviewer 
creates the reality of the interview situation. In this situation answers are given. Thus the 
interview produces situated understandings grounded in specific interactional episodes. It 
was used both in the single case study and the multi-cases. 
Interview with Number Characteristics 
Corporation 
managers 
10 Individual interviews except one with two interviewees 
Focused interviews following guidelines  
Semi-structured interview, with open questions 
Recorded 
Ethical fund 
managers 
10 Individual interviews  
Focused interviews following guidelines  
Semi-structured interview, with open questions 
Recorded 
Triodos Bank 
employees 
9 2 group discussions: focused interviews following 
guidelines; semi-structured interview, with open 
questions; recorded 
7 individual interviews: open-ended; unstructured, with 
open questions; not recorded 
Other actors of the 
field 
4 Individual interviews  
Open-ended interviews following guidelines  
Semi-structured interview, with open questions 
One recorded and three not recorded 
Table 17 – Interviews conducted for the purpose of the research 
Type of interview 
Interviewing has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses. Three main categories 
serve to characterise the type of interview:  
- open-ended nature, focused, and formal survey (Yin, 1994) 
- structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews (Junker, 1960), 
- and individual and group interviews (Junker, 1960). 
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In an open-ended interview, respondents are asked about the facts of a matter, as well as 
their opinions about events. In some situations, respondents may be asked about their 
own insights into certain occurrences. In a focused interview, the respondent is 
interviewed for a short period of time –an hour for example. It may remain open-ended, 
but it is more likely that the interviewer follows a set of questions derived from the case 
study protocol (semi-structured type). And formal survey is a more structured type of 
interviews (structured questions).  
7 open-ended and 26 focused types of interviews were carried out in the present research 
among which three were group discussions and the rest individual interviews. All focused 
interviews were semi-structured, with open questions and recorded, while open-ended 
interviews were unstructured, with open questions and not recorded. This last type of 
interview, open-ended, was used for interviews within Triodos Bank and for some 
interviews with specific actors in the field. The purpose was to get complementary 
information that was suggested during the participation-observation but not possible to 
get or to obtain details of specific situations. Most of the time they were informal 
interviews. 
Tow group discussions were carried out within Triodos Bank with selected groups of 
people. Group discussion means that several individuals are simultaneously questioned in 
formal or informal settings (Denzin et al., 1998). The groups of discussion were 
composed of Sustainability Analysts of Triodos Research met twice. There are indeed 
only two groups concerned one related to the management of the MeerWaarde fund and 
one to Triodos Research. It was decided to keep them separated because these two groups 
have a different position and role in the field of ethical investment and therefore they 
have different inside into the activity. The group interview has the advantages of being 
inexpensive, data rich, flexible, stimulating to respondents, recall aiding, and cumulative 
and elaborative, over and above individual responses (Denzin et al., 1998). This type of 
interview is not, however, without its problems. The emerging group culture may 
interfere with individual expression, the group may be dominated by one person, and the 
group format makes it difficult to research sensitive topics. In order to limit this problem 
as much as possible, each of the participants were one by one offered the floor. Moreover 
the chairperson, myself, tried to make sure that everyone had some time to express 
her/himself.  
Two main questions were addressed during the group discussions (with both groups): one 
was related to the influence of ethical investment on corporations and the second was 
related to the relationships of the person from the groups to the other actors of the field. 
The aim of those discussions were to get the impression and believes of the two group 
regarding the activity of ethical investment and to assess the actors with whom they have 
contact as well as the type of contacts they have with them. For the MeerWaarde Fund 
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group, the emphasis was especially on the clients of the fund: who they are, what do they 
expect, what do they ask, how often do they contact the bank, etc. Each of the 
participants received in advance a list of factors potentially exerting pressures on 
companies. The list was only there to provide a support for the discussion. The same list 
was sent to the two groups. Once again the aim of these discussion was to get information 
that was not available from the observation-participation and to discuss deeper some 
specific aspects of the activity which discussion does not take place in the daily work. 
The advantage of group discussion is that it can provide another level of data gathering or 
a perspective on the research problem not available through individual interviews 
(Blumer, 1969; Denzin et al., 1998).  
The interviews with corporations and ethical fund managers were built upon the ‘tree of 
questions’ based on the theoretical model from which a guideline was drawn (see the tree 
of questions later in this chapter). The purpose of the guideline was not to ask fixed 
questions but rather to make sure that the person interviewed went through all the issues 
needed for the report. The interviews consisted of open questions. The interviews aimed 
at collecting impressions, perceptions, discourses of the interviewees. The choice 
regarding the people interviewed is explained later in the case study sub-section.  
Out of 33 interviews, 24 were tape-recorded, with the accord of the respondents, and then 
re-transcribed in a computer document. The advantage of recording is that it provides a 
more accurate interpretation. Interviews’ transcriptions were sent to each of the 
interviewee for a check. Some corrections were made concerning names spelling, dates 
and figures. The names of people interviewed as well as the organisation they represent 
are being kept anonymous for confidentiality reasons. All interviews have been held 
under this condition.  
4.3.1.3 Documentation 
Documentation is very relevant to case studies. It can take many forms. According to Yin 
(1994) documents must be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings 
of events that have taken place. For the purpose of the present research, documents have 
been used for several purposes. They provide valuable information on the organisations, 
are also used to corroborate and increase evidence from other sources, and to provide 
other specific details.  
When analysing and reviewing documents, it is important to understand that they have 
been written for some specific purpose and some specific audience. The strength of 
documents is that they enable the researcher to examine texts written in the participant’s 
own words, and often with substantial care. But the weakness is the potential difficulty in 
obtaining access to documents, incompleteness of some texts, and difficulty in 
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authenticating documents (Denzin et al., 1998). Thanks to the participation in Triodos 
this weakness was minimised.  
Two types of documents may be distinguished, primary and secondary documents. 
Primary sources are materials that are gathered first hand and have a direct relationship 
with the people, situations or events that are studied. Secondary sources are materials that 
have already been published. Both types have been used for the purpose of this research 
project. Table 18 presents all the documents used.  
Source Type of documents 
Corporations Annual reports 
Environmental, social, sustainability reports 
Specific reports and brochures such as business principles, etc 
Corporation website 
Triodos Research profile 
Newspaper cuttings 
Financial 
institutions 
Annual reports 
Environmental, social, sustainability reports 
Specific reports and brochures such as the ethical fund brochure 
Financial institution website 
Newspaper cuttings 
Triodos Bank 
and Triodos 
Research 
Triodos Banks Annual reports 
Specific reports: MeerWaarde Fonds annual report 
Brochures: Triodos Bank, Triodos Research, MeerWaarde Fonds 
Minutes of all the meetings held at Triodos Research 
Internal documents 
Website 
Newspaper cuttings 
Other Newspaper cuttings 
Articles 
Websites of diverse organisations 
Brochures of ethical funds and banks 
Brochures rating organisations 
SiRi Group: minutes of meetings, internal documents, brochure of partners 
Table 18 – Documents used for the purpose of the research 
4.3.1.4 Other methods 
Two other methods have been used to collect data. During the whole research project, 
conferences focused on ethical investment were regularly attended, especially The Triple 
Bottom Line Conference on Ethical Investment during which there was an active 
participation as reporter. This international conference was first held in 1999. Since then 
Methodological Considerations 
 133
it is organised every year and gathers all major actors of the ethical investment field (see 
chapter 6 for an analysis of the attendees). This conference was of special interest 
because of its importance in the field and its popular attendance especially by Dutch 
actors. Practical reasons also influenced this choice as the conference has always taken 
place in The Netherlands except for the last year (Belgium). Conferences are important 
sources of information. They provide valuable information on new developments in the 
field, issues at stake, and actors involved. It was also an important way to meet and 
discuss with actors in an informal way and thereby get a better feeling of what is 
happening within the field not only in the Netherlands but also internationally.  
Secondly, complementary information concerning rating organisations were collected 
through a small questionnaire sent o 10 SiRi partners. The purpose of the questionnaire 
was to get complementary information concerning the relationships and connections 
between rating organisations and the other actors in the field. Partners of SiRi Group 
were chosen because Triodos Research is also a member of the group. The questionnaire 
was sent by e-mail in December 2002 to the contact person of each of the SiRi partners. It 
consisted of four questions related to: 1) (share)owners, 2) advisory committee, 3) 
networks, and 4) memberships. Responses were collected by e-mail, with a response rate 
of 100%. 
4.3.2 Case studies 
Case studies can have different designs and purposes. They can involve either single or 
multiple cases, and numerous levels of analysis (Yin, 1994). Moreover, case studies can 
employ an embedded design, that is, multiple of analysis within a single case study or a 
holistic design, that is single unit of analysis (Yin, 1994). The case study’s strength is its 
ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and 
observations. It typically combines several types of data collection. The evidence may be 
qualitative (e.g. words), quantitative (e.g. numbers), or both. Finally, case studies can be 
used to reach various objectives: to provide description, test theory, or generate theory. 
In this project, the field study consists of a number of case studies. The case studies can 
be classified into two categories: one in-depth case and six smaller cases. The objectives 
are manifold, and include collecting information about: 
- Talk and discourses: what do actors say and believe; 
- Actors: who are they, what are the relationships and flows between groups of actors; 
- Practices: what is the process of ethical investment, what do actors do and what 
changed during the creation and development of the field; 
- Broader authority and rules: the environment and context of ethical investment. 
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4.3.2.1 The Triodos case: a single, in-depth case study 
Triodos case 
The Triodos case is a single in-depth case study, which can be divided into three sub-
cases, Triodos bank, Triodos fund, and Triodos research (see description chapter 2). 
These three subcases belong to the same case because they are very closely related. 
Although they are part of two different organisations, Triodos MeerWaarde fund is 
managed by Triodos Bank NV and Triodos Research by Triodos Holding NV, they have 
very strong and direct ties, and together they form a whole which is of particular interest 
in this study. Triodos Bank and Triodos Research are two different actors in the field of 
ethical investment as one refers to the financial institution group and the other to the 
rating organisations. 
Triodos case study is an exploration of the field of ethical investment. It addresses the 
first research question, that is the formation of the ethical investment field. It aims at 
better understanding the process of ethical investment activity, exploring the connections 
and relationships between actors in the field, evaluating the institutionalisation process of 
the sector and detecting the institutional pressures exerted by the field on corporations. 
The unit of analysis, that is the phenomenon under study (Lee, 1999), is (a) the 
relationships between organisations in the field, and (b) the mechanisms of the 
institutionalisation process.  
Triodos was chosen for case study for several reasons. Triodos case offers the 
opportunity not only to study a bank which manages an ethical investment fund but also a 
rating organisation. It is one of the pioneer Dutch organisations in ethical investment. It 
therefore holds knowledge about the history of ethical investment in the Netherlands, 
aspect which is crucial for investigating the institutionalisation process. Triodos Research 
is the only one rating organisation in the Netherlands. And, as it will be developed later in 
the dissertation, the rating organisation played a central role in shaping the field. A last 
reason, and not the least important, is because the involvement within Triodos Research 
as sustainability analyst started before the PhD project began.  
Crosscheck: analysis of other ethical investment funds  
In order to guarantee the validity and reliability of the findings, data from other sources 
were also collected (see Table 19 for an overview of the sources of information used for 
the in-depth case study). Data from other financial institutions were gathered. Ten Dutch 
financial institutions were investigated. Documentation analysis and interviews were 
conducted. All Dutch banks managing an ethical investment fund at the date of 
September 2001 were approached and ten interviews were conducted. The names of 
financial institutions and people interviewed have to remain anonymous. Financial 
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institutions are numbered from F1 to F9, and people interviewed are recorded from P1 to 
P10. The length of the interviews varied between forty-five minutes to two hours per 
interview.  
Among the people interviewed, seven were responsible for ethical investment funds 
(asset managers), two were analysts (screening of companies for ethical funds), and one 
was Manager of Corporate governance & sustainable investment. The interviews were 
open discussions following a guideline based on the ‘tree of questions’. The interviewees 
received in advance of the interview an e-mail containing the main topics that would be 
discussed. All interviews, except one due to a technical problem, were recorded. The 
interview transcript was sent to the interviewees who sent back their comments; these 
were taken into account during the analysis. Other interviews, some of them unstructured 
and others semi-structured, with key players of the Dutch context, especially Piet 
Sprengers from VBDO as well as international key players were carried out, along with 
participation to events such as conferences meetings on ethical investment (see Table 17).  
Concerning rating organisations, complementary information was collected via a small 
questionnaire. SiRi partners were asked about their connections with other actors. The 
responses of each partner are reported from RO1 to RO11.  
Data are from three different sources, namely observation-participation, documents, and 
interviews, which requires four techniques to collect information: first direct observation, 
second informant interviewing, third documents analysis, and fourth and last direct 
participation. The multi source of information enhances the reliability of the data.  
Triodos Bank  Other Dutch Financial Institutions 
 - Publicly available documents 
- Interviews with fund managers 
and/or analysts (P1 to P10) 
 
 
 
 Other Rating Organisations 
- Participation in Triodos Research on a 
regular basis during four years 
- Attendance to Triodos Research meetings 
- Attendance to Triodos Bank shareholder 
meetings 
- Group interviews 
- Individual interviews with Triodos 
employees  
- Access to all Triodos Research 
documents 
- Publicly available documents 
- Informal discussions with diverse 
Triodos staff 
 - Publicly available documents 
- Questionnaires to SiRi partners 
(RO1 to RO11) 
Table 19 – In-depth case study: sources of information 
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4.3.2.2 Corporation cases: multiple case design 
The multi-case studies consist of six small cases. They are small in the sense that the 
time-span for collecting information was shorter compared to the in-depth Triodos case 
study. Therefore less information and knowledge was accumulated for each case. The six 
cases are organisations within the corporations’ group. For confidentiality reasons, names 
of companies and people interviewed within each firm have to remain anonymous.  
The multiple case design addresses the second research question, that is corporation 
responses to ethical investment. The aim is to explore what corporations say about ethical 
investment, how do they deal with this increasing phenomenon, how do they respond and 
why do they respond in a certain way. Six cases on the one hand do not allow 
generalising the findings to all corporations because the sampling is too small and not 
representative, and on the other do not offer the data quality of an in-depth case study. 
However it was important to analyse several companies in order to compare corporation 
responses because one of the questions is: do they have all a similar response? The 
multiple case design offers the advantage of the replication logic (Yin, 1994). The same 
advantage applies for investigating the influence of corporations on the field of ethical 
investment.  
Study population Companies 
Sample frame Multi-stage sample 
Observation unit CEO, Issue manager, Environmental manager, the person who answered the 
questionnaire (SAM or/and EIRIS) 
Variable Sector of activity; listed in sustainable index; listed on the FTSE 300 and/or 
Dow Jones STOXX 50; Advice sent by Triodos Research; Triodos sector 
study; date of screening 
Constant Listed on the stock market; Dutch companies; available in Triodos Research 
database 
Table 20 – Company sampling 
The sampling procedure to select companies for the case studies is described in Annex 3. 
Table 20 provides the main characteristics of the sampling procedure. The primary 
sample consisted of 631 stock-listed companies which was reduced to six companies in 
the final sampling. Table 22 gives a cross table of the final sample of companies. The 
sample survey is the set of people that has a chance to be selected, given the sampling 
approach that is chosen. (Fowler, 1993). Three main criteria were decisive in the choice 
of companies.  
1. First of all for the sake of consistency and for practical reasons companies had to be 
Dutch companies: information was more easily available, there was more flexibility 
for the interviews, the SiRi partner responsible for doing the screening of the 
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company was Triodos, and it was consistent with the research focus on the Dutch 
context.  
2. Secondly they had to be from different sectors, and the sectors must have different 
characteristics. The characteristics are described through what is called sector 
sensitivity. It was assumed that sectors are not exposed equally to social, 
environmental and political issues and do not follow the same legitimacy processes. 
Sectors in direct contact with consumers are more exposed/sensitive to pressures 
exerted by sustainable investment. That is the case, for example, of the food industry, 
especially with the Genetic Modified Organisms issue. Sectors that are considered 
major polluters or deal with controversial activities are more sensitive sectors. This is 
the case for example with the oil & gas and chemical sectors which have both an 
history of oil spill pollutant releases. Moreover, the observation and experience at 
Triodos Research showed that some firms were more likely than others to change 
towards sustainability and to engage in and with the research department. On the 
other hand some firms had no interest and willingness in improving their 
sustainability performance and to communicate with Triodos Research. For these 
reasons, the sectors have been divided into two categories: ‘sensitive’ and ‘less 
sensitive’. Sensitive sectors are sectors that because of a certain history or specific 
perceived risks are more closely watched by society and the sustainable investment 
community. At the end of the sampling procedure, three sectors of activity were 
represented: Food, Oil & Gas combined with Chemistry, and Media.  
3. Thirdly the sustainable indices had to be taken into account. Sustainable indices such 
as FTSE4Godd and Dow Jones Sustainability are the most visible outcomes of ethical 
screening. They also have been a major event in the development of ethical 
investment. Therefore they may play an important role in the legitimacy process. It 
was decided that 50% of the companies from the sample had to be listed in one of the 
indices, and the other 50% should not be listed.  
For each company data were gathered from the following sources:  
- publicly available information from the company (reports, brochures, website),  
- interview(s) and,  
- SiRi profile. SiRi profiles are reports on the social and environmental performances 
of companies established by one of the members of SiRi. SiRi partners write profiles 
of companies from their own country.  
In total 10 interviews were conducted within the six companies covered by the case 
studies. Corporations are numbered from C1 to C6. The persons targeted for the 
interviews were the following: Chief Executive Officers, corporate communication, 
investor relations or issue manager (see Table 21). These functions were chosen because 
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information, data can be organised into matrices, graphs, networks and charts. It allows 
organising the information in a accessible and compact form.  
• Conclusion drawing 
This part of the analysis consists to give a meaning to the information collected. It means 
noting regularities, patterns, explanations, etc.  
In this research, interviews from the financial institutions and corporations have been 
coded. In order to code the interviews, the computer program Atlas has been used. Codes 
have been derived from the theoretical framework. They are related to setting/context, 
definition of the situation, ways of thinking, process, activities, events, strategies and 
relationships. Information gathered during the observation-participation, that is memos, 
minutes, notes, discussions, has been categorised by themes in a chronological order such 
as stakeholders, methodology, criteria, publications, conference, workshop/training, 
other, employees, Triodos MeerWaarde fund, and remark personnel. And information 
collected from and about companies, such as annual reports, newspaper clips, have been 
summarised so as each corporation had its own file with summariser information.  
In order to display the data format have been used such as matrix, figures, and 
chronological lines. In the whole thesis there is a mix of single-case and multi-case data 
display. For example, in order to study the relationships between actors of the field of 
ethical investment networks have been drawn. Another example is the time line used to 
show the significant events in the development of Triodos Research. When possible and 
relevant, the information has been quantified. It is for example the case in the network 
analysis. A binary (yes = 1, no = 0) coding, or a ranking coding (never=0, sometimes=1, 
often=2) has been used in order to draw graphs. Because it would be impossible to list in 
this chapter all format used, they are presented throughout the thesis when necessary.  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter on methodological considerations presented the choices and considerations 
involved in developing the present study. Qualitative methodology has been selected as 
the most appropriate way to investigate mechanisms. It enables a better understanding of 
organisational processes regarding institutionalisation and legitimacy. It does have some 
limitations, especially concerning the subjectivity issue, and although subjectivity cannot 
be completely avoided a number of measures have been taken in order to keep it down as 
much as possible. Several actors in the field were interviewed, which provided a broad 
view of the sector. Interviews were typed and sent to the interviewees for verification. 
The Triodos case was proofread by two Triodos Bank managers. Because part of the data 
Methodological Considerations 
 141
was based on participation-observation, a particular effort was made in recording 
observations, and keeping track of the information collected.  
Concerning the methods, case studies were chosen. They offer a suitable research 
strategy as they allow the study of a contemporary phenomenon within its local context, 
while considering a broad range of factors. They were collected during a field study 
consisting of several case studies from the same field. Observation–participation is one of 
the central sources of information of the research. It enables an in-depth knowledge of the 
field, actors, activities and relationships. The total immersion during a five-year period 
within Triodos Research had a significant impact on the perception of the field. In order 
to limit this problem, nine other Dutch financial institutions were investigated.  
Table 23 provides a summary of the sources and techniques used in the thesis. The 
multiplicity of the sources and techniques ensures a certain reliability and validity of the 
information.  
After having presented the theoretical perspective in chapter 3 and methodological 
considerations in chapter 4, the next three chapters of the research will investigate the 
empirical data. Each of the chapters will focus on different level of analysis: macro level 
(chapter 5), meso level (chapter 6) and micro level (chapter 7).  
Empirical data Methods of collection 
1 in-depth case study: Triodos 
case 
6 small case studies: 
corporations  
Observation-participation 
Documentary 
Interviews 
Other: Group discussions, questionnaire 
Table 23 – Empirical data: summary table 
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Chapter  5 –  Institutional  and  
international  contexts  
5.1 Introduction 
The deep roots of ethical investment go back to a very long time ago; it was mainly a 
Church-related activity. The modern roots are more often related to political-social forms 
of action often associated with activists. Recently ethical investment changed form again 
and has become a widespread activity among mainstream financial institutions.  
This first section presents the history of ethical investment with a special focus on the US 
and UK because the roots of ethical investment are found in the US and ethical 
investment in Europe started in the UK. Both countries have had an important impact on 
the way ethical investment developed. The second section introduces the activity of 
ethical investing as a financial activity and explores the integration of this activity within 
the financial sector. The last section deals with the concepts of ethics, corporate social 
responsibility and sustainable development.  
The chapter provides a broad picture from the foundation of the movement to its 
worldwide development over time, and the elements that shaped ethical investment. It 
aims at providing the international and institutional contexts in which ethical investment 
developed.  
5.2 Historical context 
This section explores several aspects of ethical investment: its origins, various meanings, 
volume and size, and an overview of the screening and criteria of ethical investment. 
Data cover ethical investment worldwide with a special focus on the US and UK because 
these two countries played an important role in the development and diffusion of ethical 
investment.  
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5.2.1 Roots of ethical investment 
According to Amy Domini, the origins of ethical investing date back many hundreds of 
years (Domini, 2001). In early biblical times, Jewish laws laid down many directives on 
how to invest ethically. In the mid-1700s, the founder of Methodism, John Wesley, 
emphasised the fact that the use of money was the second most important subject of New 
Testament teachings. As Quakers settled North America, they refused to invest in 
weapons and slavery. For hundreds of years, many religious investors whose traditions 
embrace peace and non-violence have actively avoided investing in companies that profit 
from products designed to kill fellow human beings. Many avoid the "sin" stocks -- those 
companies involved in the alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries. Ethical investment 
was principally a movement led by the church.  
The modern roots of ethical investment, which can be dated back to the 1920s, are 
strongly anchored in the United States. The first US mutual fund to meet the needs of 
socially conscious groups was launched in 1928 and was called US Pioneer Fund. In the 
1960s/1970s ethical investment changed. Church investors ran investment portfolios 
using certain ethical criteria and constraints for many years. However, such activity 
attracted little attention and does not seem to have been described by any generic term.  
New issues and new actors joined the ethical investment movement: the Vietnam War 
and apartheid in South Africa fuelled the ethical investment movement especially in the 
US. A number of funds refused to support such a regime. Concerned U.S. investors 
joined international efforts to put economic pressure on South Africa to end apartheid. A 
growing number of investors throughout the 1970s and 1980s used both screening and 
shareholder advocacy to press for change in South Africa. Both individual and 
institutional investors refused to invest in companies who did business in South Africa, 
and sponsored shareholder resolutions asking companies to withdraw from South Africa. 
While the issue was on the agenda of many trade union and church funds throughout the 
1970s, it was in the 1980s that the divestment movement took off. States such as 
Massachusetts and New York instructed their pension fund trustees to take account of the 
situation in South Africa. Ethical investment was used as a tool to lobby against industrial 
activities seen as non-ethical. Investors wanted to express their values by refusing to 
invest in certain companies that were involved, for example, in alcohol or weapon 
production.  
Ethical investment started to spread in an impassioned political climate and was 
transformed from a clerical activity (attempts to use ethical principles in the construction 
of investment portfolios) into a public awareness of ethical investment (the self-conscious 
phenomena ethical investment) (Sparkes, 2001). 1960s/1970s have been crucial decades 
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in the development of ethical investment during which ethical investing became a 
conscious statement. A series of social and environmental movements, from civil rights 
and women’s rights to the anti-war and environmental movements, served to raise 
awareness around issues of social responsibility. These concerns also broadened to 
include management and labour issues, and anti-nuclear sentiment.  
The early stage of ethical investment, up to the 1970s, was dominated by a kind of 
‘avoidance investing’. Churches, anti-war or other groups used ethical investment to 
make a statement – either political or moral.  
5.2.2 What is ethical investment? 
Ethical investment is a concept that has become increasingly well established in public 
consciousness throughout the 1990s. However there is considerable discussion as to what 
ethical investment actually is. A number of authors have addressed the question, 
academics (Anderson et al., 1996; Bruyn, 1987; Cooper & Schlegelmilch, 1993; De 
George, 1990; Mackenzie, 1997; Rockness & Williams, 1988; Sparkes, 2001; Sternberg, 
1994; Ward, 1986) as well as practitioners (Alperson, 1991; Brill & Reder, 1992; 
Demonty, 1999; Domini & Kinder, 1984; Harrington, 1991; Judd, 1991; Kinder, 1993; 
Kinder, Lydenberg, & Domini, 1994; Lang, 1996; Lowry, 1991; Meehan, 1997; Smith, 
1990; Tennant, 1994). Few authors among them Anderson et al (1996), De George 
(1990), Irvine (1987), and Sorell & Hendry (1994) have focused on the philosophical 
aspect of ethical investment (see section 5.4.1).  
One first source of confusion is the name used to designate investment funds with social 
and environmental screens. In the literature one may find a number of different names 
such as ‘ethical investment’, ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI), ‘sustainable 
investment’, ‘conscious investment, ‘mission-based investment, ‘social investing’, or 
‘socially aware investing’. There are however three main names that are commonly used 
and recognised: ‘ethical investment’, ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI), and 
‘sustainable investment’. Although these names may be used as synonyms, some authors 
have pointed out some differences between them. Sparkes (2001, 1995) considers ‘ethical 
investment’ as “the older phrase which is slowly being replaced in general use by 
‘socially responsible investment’ (Sparkes, 1995, 2001). EIRIS, the UK rating 
organisation, describes ‘SRI’ as a softer version of ‘ethical investment’ (SIF, 2002). 
According to Kinder et al. (1994) names are country dependent: ‘ethical investment’ is 
most commonly used in the UK and Canada, whereas ‘SRI’ is more often used in the US 
(Kinder et al., 1994). Authors note that in the UK and Canada ‘socially’ connotes to 
‘socialist’ and leads to infer a narrow, left-wing agenda (Kinder et al., 1994). In the rest 
of Europe one can find all three names, although there is a tendency to use either SRI of 
sustainable investment. The different authors point at several elements that do define the 
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name: time, space and politics. It seems that 1) the name changed over time, 2) there are 
differences between countries, and 3) some names have a specific political colour.  
Another element of confusion is the definition of ethical investment numerous authors 
criticise the lack of consensus on the meaning of the term ethical investment and the fact 
that little academic research has focused on this topic (Cooper et al., 1993; Sparkes, 
2001). This entails some divergences both at a conceptual and practical level.  
Ward (1986) who wrote one of the first UK books on ethical investment made little 
attempt to analyse the term, and considered ethical investment in terms of action: 
“definitions… of exactly what is socially responsible and what is not will vary. Some 
people feel strongly about tobacco, some about armaments, and some about creating 
employment in the inner city. The common factor is that they all think that they should 
not simply hand over their money and sit back”((Ward, 1986) cited in (Sparkes, 2001)). 
In the same period, Domini and Kinder (1984) also emphasised action as opposed to 
analysis: “ethical investing takes this feeling that our finances are a reflection of 
ourselves and carries it to a logical conclusion …(there are) three approaches to ethical 
investing: avoidance, the positive and the activist approach” (Domini et al., 1984). And in 
1990, Craig Smith described ethical investment as a form of boycott ‘analogous to ethical 
purchase: “ethical investors can operate by selling off investments or keeping them and 
using them to press for changes in the companies concerned” (Smith, 1990). All of them 
suggest that ethical investment involves an active participation from the investor side.  
A number of authors like Cooper and Schlegelmilch (1993) have focused their attention 
on the marketing-driven nature of retail ethical investment funds. Button (1988) defines 
ethical investment as follow: “Putting your money into investments which will yield a 
financial return for you, but which do not support areas of business interest that you 
disapprove of, such as arms, tobacco, alcohol, apartheid, violation of human rights” (cited 
in (Cooper et al., 1993)).  
In 1994, Cowton gave a more focused definition. According to him ethical investment 
may be defined as the exercise of ethical and social criteria in the selection and 
management of investment portfolios, generally consisting of company shares (stocks) 
(Cowton, 1994). He contrasted this with the standard description of investment decisions 
which concentrate solely on financial return. He argued that ethical investors care not 
only about the size of their prospective financial return and the risk attached to it, but also 
its source – the nature of the company’s goods or services, the location of its business or 
the manner in which it conducts its affairs. Cowton continued this discussion in a later 
article (Cowton, 1998). Along the same line as Cowton, Wall (1994) considered ethical 
investment as buying (selling) of publicly traded common stocks on the basis of some 
social and environmental criteria (Wall, 1995). This rational approach of ethical 
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investment, focusing on the relationship between financial and social/environmental 
performance has been the most common perspective since the mid-1990s. Sparkes (1995) 
adopts the same perspective: “It is probably time to clarify what is normally meant by 
‘ethical investment’: It does not mean a moral campaign to clean up the Stock Exchange, 
or raise the standards of those who work in the financial field. Ethical investment is 
straightforward, and simply means an investment philosophy that combines ethical or 
environmental goals with financial ones” (Sparkes, 1995). In his 2001 paper Sparkes 
describes it as following: “the key distinguishing feature of socially responsible 
investment lies in its combination of social and environmental goals with the financial 
objective of achieving a return on invested capital approaching that of the market” 
(Sparkes, 2001). 
The above definitions do not address the nature of the term ‘ethical’ and are devoid of 
emotive aspects. They are rather vague and lack analytical precision. Ward identifies 
some areas of concern such as tobacco or armaments. Domini and Kinder emphasise 
procedures: avoiding, positive encouragement and activism. Craig Smith takes a different 
perspective, seeing ethical investment as a subclass of ethical purchase behaviour, with a 
methodology based upon selling shares or activism. All the definitions refer to the action 
of ethical investment rather than the philosophy which underlies it. One may wonder in 
what way ethical investment infringes the classical perspective of investing, as in these 
definitions the economic aspect is still the dominant objective.  
Bruyn (Bruyn, 1987) defines ethical investment as the development of “social screens to 
monitor industrial practices from a social-ethical perspective, setting standards for 
allocating capital for the common good” (Bruyn, 1987). His definition does not only 
describes ethical investment as “the allocation of capital to organisations in the context of 
society with the purpose of making economic returns” but also as “the allocation of 
capital to advance the social and economic well-being of people”. Ethical investment 
involves a conscious and selective way to make investment decisions based on ethical 
factors. It differs from regular investment because the purpose is to advance the social 
well-being of society. Bruyn points out that the allocation of capital affects the power and 
values of people in society in various ways. The Britannica World Language Dictionary 
defines investment in economic terms as “the placing...of money...to gain a profit” but 
does not stop there. The dictionary also notes that investment means “to give power, 
authority or rank to”. Bruyn suggests that capital investment is also a social activity and 
can affect many aspects of the corporate system and even society. It confers power to 
people and therefore can be a tool to stimulate change.  
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5.2.3 Development of ethical investment funds in the US and UK 
As we saw in the previous section, the roots of ethical investment are situated in the US. 
In Europe, the first country to launch an ethical investment fund was the UK. This section 
presents the very different driving forces that stimulated ethical investment in these two 
countries. In the US they came from citizen pressure groups while in the UK the most 
important ‘pressure group’ was the government.  
5.2.3.1 US: Citizen groups pressures 
Vogel’s book “Lobbying the Corporation” provides a general view of the US context in 
which ethical investment grew (Vogel, 1978). In the mid-seventies businesses faced 
increasing pressures from citizens. A growing number of groups and individuals started 
to criticise corporate conduct. There was a movement of ‘lobbying’ corporations. In order 
to lobby corporations, people like Saul Alinsky or Ralph Nader developed the ‘proxy 
tactic’, that is buying company shares and using annual meetings to protest against 
company social policies (for example the Kodak or the General Motor cases).  
By the mid-seventies the dimension of corporate conduct had expanded significantly 
beyond participation in the Vietnam war. It had come to include the treatment of women 
and minorities, investment in the Third World, as well as environmental considerations. 
An important group that stimulated this change was the Council on Economic Priorities 
(CEP). The CEP was created in 1969. It attempted to politicise the investor’s role and 
make it a vehicle for non-governmental public pressures on business. This citizen group 
has affected companies via the press more than via the investment community. It 
published a large number of articles and reports on corporation conduct which played an 
important role in giving a sound commercial basis to corporate social responsibility.  
By the mid-1970s four ethical mutual funds were established and widely reported in the 
financial press. Vogel’s book clearly show that ethical investment in US was motivated 
by a strong citizen concern regarding corporation conduct. It was a protest movement and 
political expression against abuses or/and misconduct. Ethical investment was a way to 
lobby corporation.  
Organisations such as the CEP or IRRC were created. They aimed at either providing 
information on corporate socially-related issues or helping and encourage shareholder 
activism. CEP was launched in 1969 followed in 1972 by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC). Its core business is to provide assistance with the proxy voting 
process with a focus on governance and social responsibility issues. The Interfaith Center 
on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) was created one year later, in 1973. ICCR is an 
international coalition of 275 faith-based institutional investors including denominations, 
religious communities, pension funds, healthcare corporations, foundations and dioceses. 
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An important actor in the field of ethical investment in the US is the Social Investment 
Forum. It is a national non-profit membership association dedicated to promoting the 
concept, practice and growth of socially responsible investing, and was launched in the 
early 1980s. It is an important pool of information on ethical investment and stimulates 
(quantitative) research through the annual Moskowitz Prize which rewards research 
papers that bring 1) practical significance to practitioners of socially responsible 
investing; 2) appropriateness and rigor of quantitative methods; 3) novelty of results.  
KLD started to provide research products and services to the financial services market in 
1988. It is the leading rating organisation in the US but also provides information and 
services worldwide. It created an online research database containing social records on 
more than 3,000 US and international companies. It also launched the Domini 4000 
Social Index in 1990. In January 2001, KLD launched the Broad Market SocialSM Index 
(KLD BMS Index) and the Large Cap SocialSM Index (KLD LCS Index), which tracks 
the performance of the largest socially screened US equities, based on market 
capitalisation.  
Today a large number of organisations are related to ethical investment. The table below 
(Table 24) summarises the number of organisations listed by category in the directory of 
SIF. There are 425 companies in total. They all have an interest in ethical investment 
either as a side activity or main activity. The list is not exhaustive of all US organisations 
in the field of ethical investment, however it gives an idea of its importance.  
Category Number of organisations 
listed  
Banks & Credit Unions 20 organisations. 
Business/Organisational Financing & Venture Capital 17 organisations 
Community Development Nonprofits & Loan Funds 51 organisations 
Consultants: SRI Industry 17 organisations 
Consultants: Advisors and/or Planners 171 organisations 
Consultants: Money Managers 66 organisations 
Institutional Investors & Program Related Investing 10 organisations 
Mortgage Companies 3 organisations. 
Mutual Fund Companies 27 organisations. 
Pension Plan Administration 2 organisations 
Periodicals & Information 16 organisations 
Social Investment Research & Shareholder Activism 30 organisations 
Table 24 - Number of organisations listed on the SFI directory (SIF, 2002) 
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5.2.3.2 UK: State impulse 
Initiatives for UK ethical investment were started in the 1970s by churches, however the 
first registered fund was launched in 1984. It was called Friends Provident Stewardship 
Fund. Ethical investment really started to develop in UK in the 1980s, that is to say about 
ten years later than in the US. The second ethical fund was launched in 1988, the Merlin 
Ecology Fund (now the Jupiter Ecology Fund). It was set up in response to increasing 
concern about environmental issues and sustainable development.  
The Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS), a rating organisation for ethical 
investment, was set up one year earlier (in1983) by a group of churches and charities 
which originally all had investments, and strong convictions of what they thought was 
right and wrong. They needed a research organisation to help them put their principles 
into practice when making investment decisions.  
In 1991, the UK Social Investment Forum (UK SIF) was set up to bring key SRI figures 
together to co-operate in sharing knowledge and advancing the SRI agenda. UK SIF is a 
membership network (see Annex 8). In 2003 it counted 178 members from all over the 
world. 
In 1991, Pensions & Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) was launched. It provides 
company research and policy advice on corporate responsibility and corporate 
governance issues to institutional investors. 
But the real boost for ethical investment in the UK came from the government. In 1998, 
John Denham, the UK Pensions Minister, announced that he was “minded to require 
trustees to disclose to what extent, if any, they have taken account of social responsibility 
considerations in their investment strategy”(Shepherd, 2000). The Minister won early 
support from the pension fund of the Sainsbury supermarket chain, which stated that it 
wanted to improve the environmental behaviour of companies. The 3rd of July 2000 the 
Minister’s proposals became a Law: the SRI Pension Disclosure Regulation, under the 
1995 Pensions Act, came into force. The regulation requires that trustees of occupational 
pension funds disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles the extent (if at all) to 
which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in their 
investment strategies. This has had a considerable impact on the pension funds, 59% of 
which were to integrate social and environmental criteria in their investment strategies in 
2000.  
In response to the amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act, UKSIF started Just Pensions. It 
was initiated in autumn 2000 by the development charities Traidcraft and War on Want 
as a two-year project funded by the Community Fund. Just Pensions aims to educate and 
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influence UK pension funds and other institutional investors about the importance of 
international development issues in their practice of SRI. 
Another key event in the UK, but also beyond the UK, has been the launch of the 
FTSE4Good family of social indices (see section 5.3.4). 
The British government – by enacting the SRI Pensions Disclosure Regulation – has had 
an important influence on the ethical investment movement in the UK. It has clearly led 
to an increase in the total assets invested under social and environmental criteria (see 
section 5.2.4).  
5.2.4 Volume and Size  
The mid-1970s saw a significant expansion of the ethical investment movement in the 
US. In 1975 four American funds emerged – Dreyfus Third Century, Pax World, Pioneer 
Fund and Pioneer II – to meet the needs of individual ethical investors. The South 
African experience, claimed as a victory, caused ethical investment to become “an 
accepted principle in the commercial world, largely pioneered by anti-apartheid action” 
(Kinder et al., 1994). According to the 2001 report produced by the US Social Investment 
Forum, there is over $2,010 billion of assets under management in ethical portfolios 
among which $136 are invested in mutual funds and $1,870 are found in separate 
accounts (SIF, 2001). Figure 16 shows the number of funds as well as the amount of 
money invested under ethical screening (not corrected from inflation rate) in the US 
during the period of 1975 to 2001. Both the number of funds and assets under 
management experienced the largest growth between 1997 and 1999. Total assets have 
increased by 35% from 1999 ($1,490) to 2001 ($2,010), 280% from 1997 ($529) to 2001 
and 1,118% from 1995 ($165) to 2001. According to the SIF 2001 report, the growth rate 
of assets found in socially screened portfolios was over one and a half times that of all 
professionally managed investment assets in the US. In 2001 there was a total of $19,900 
billion in investment assets under management in the US, compared to $16,300 billion in 
1999, an increase of 22%. According to these figures, socially screened assets represent 
more than 10% of the total assets under management, and according to Bauer (2002), as 
of 30th of December 2000, the percentage of mutual funds under social screening 
represented 2.26% of the total mutual funds (Bauer, Koedijk, & Otten, 2002a). Note that 
the 2001 figures, although still going up, reveal a slow down of the curves. It may be 
interesting in the near future to check whether this tendency is continuing or whether it is 
an accident. If it continues, one may wonder whether or not ethical investment has 
reached some kind of maximum threshold.  
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Figure 16– Ethical investment in the US from 1975:2001 (source: (Social Investment Forum, 2002) 
including “screening only” + “both screening and shareholder”) 
In the UK, the first registered ethical fund was launched in 1984: the Friends Provident 
Stewardship Fund. In 1988 a second ethical fund was launched: the Merlin Ecology Fund 
(now the Jupiter Ecology Fund). In 1997 the total values of assets with social and 
environmental criteria was of £23 billion and in 2001 it was of £225 billion. It increased 
by over £200 billion across four years (Sparkes, 2002). This amount includes all types of 
assets: unit trusts, Churches and charities funds, pension funds, insurance companies (see 
Table 25). Until 1997 churches held the largest amount of assets. But in 1999, pension 
funds started to use social and environmental screens and brought a large amount of 
assets, and in 2001 another actor joined in, the insurance companies which are today by 
far the largest investor. The UK Social Investment Forum published a survey in October 
2000 that shows that 59% of the largest pension funds had incorporated social 
responsibility issues into their investment strategies (Shepherd, 2000). As for the unit 
trusts, in 2001 there 62 funds (out of 1972 retail funds in the UK) representing £3.5 
billion - nearly 2,000 times the original estimate made by City Observers when the first 
ethical fund was launched (Shepherd, 2000). Scandinavian countries, Germany and the 
Netherlands first developed what is called ‘green investment’ such as the Triodos Green 
Fund. Those funds exclusively take into account environmental aspects. They usually 
invest in green technologies for example windmills, solar energy. Ethical funds 
considering social and environmental aspects came later. By the end of 1997, about DEM 
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1 billion ($0.49) were invested in ‘green’ funds in German-speaking European countries 
(Austria, Germany, Switzerland), about 0.2% of the total mainstream funds.  
 1997  1999  2001  
SRI Unit Trusts  2.2  3.1  3.5  
Churches  12.5  14.0  13.0  
Charities  8.0  10.0  25.0  
Pension Funds  0.0  25.0  80.0  
Insurance 
Companies  
0.0  0.0  103.0  
Total  22.7  52.2  224.5  
Table 25 - Growth in Total UK SRI Assets (£bn) (Sparkes, 2002) 
Recent studies from the SiRi Group show the recent figures of ethical investment in 
Europe. They published two reports, one in June 2001 and one in October 2002. Reports 
cover ethical investment in 13 countries, namely the UK, France, Sweden, Belgium, 
Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Austria, Norway, Poland, and 
Finland. Portugal, Greece and Ireland were also covered but researchers of the study did 
not identify any funds matching the strict definitions used in this study (SIRI Group, 
2002). As of October 2002, there were 280 green, social and ethical funds operating in 
Europe, an increase of 11% compared to June 2001 (SiRi Group, 2001; SIRI Group, 
2002). Figure 17 shows the number of green, social and ethical funds in Europe. The 
number for 2001 has been calculated by projecting the figure of the first semester 2001 to 
the whole year. The total number of funds in Europe reached 282 (at Q4 2001). The 
number of funds has been multiplied by 70.5 between 1980-84 and 2000-01 and by 1.8 
between 1995-99 and 2000-01 (SiRi Group, 2001).  
The total assets that are socially screened have increased from 11.1 billion Euro at the 
end of 1999 to 14.4 billion Euro at the end 2001 (SIRI Group, 2002). According to the 
SiRi 2002 report four countries – United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Belgium –
account for more than 68% of the funds available in Europe (see Figure 18), and three 
countries – UK, Sweden, Netherlands – hold 58% of the total European ethical retail 
asset (see Figure 19). Between 1999 and 2001, the number of funds in France increased 
by +170%. Although ethical investment is more developed in Northern Europe, Southern 
countries like Italy and Spain are increasingly showing interest (SustainaAbility, 2000). It 
is interesting to note that the 2002 SiRi report observes a relative saturation of the market. 
Although the number of funds and the asset under management grew rapidly and 
considerably, the percentage of total mutual fund assets remains small. As shown in 
Table 26, as of 30th of December 2000, the percentage of the total domestic fund market 
that is held by ethical funds in Europe did not go over 1.5% (Bauer et al., 2002a).  
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Figure 17 – Europe: Number of funds cumulated in the period 1980-2001 (Total= 251 + 31 estimation 
II sem. 2001) (SIRI Group, 2002) 
Country % of the total domestic fund market 
that is held by ethical funds 
Belgium* 0.80% 
France* 0.01% 
Germany 0.04% 
Italy* 0.45% 
Sweden* 1.46% 
Switzerland* 1.12% 
The Netherlands 1.20% 
United Kingdom 1.35% 
Table 26- Overview of ethical fund market as of 30/12/2000 and *31/12/99 (extracted form (Bauer et 
al., 2002a)) 
Other parts of the world have also been active in the field of ethical investment, 
especially South Africa, Japan and Australia. In Asia, especially since the launch in 2001 
of the Association for Sustainable & Responsible Investment in Asia (AsrIA), ethical 
investment is starting to grow. The total amount of money under management in Asia is 
around US$2.5billion (AsrIA, 2003). Japan and Hong Kong are the most active countries 
with seven ethical funds. In a survey of financial analysts in Australia, 77% said that they 
believed awareness of environmental factors among their colleagues has increased in 
recent years, and a further 82% agree that environmental concerns will become 
increasingly important for investments markets (UNEP, 1999). Socially responsible 
investment assets represent $13.9 billion in total (Deni Greene Consulting Services, 
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2002). The number of fund has been multiplied by 6.7 between 1996 and 2002. As of 
September 2002 there were 74 ethical funds. 
Figure 18 – Europe: Number of funds per country at 30/06/2001 (N=251) - Source: (SiRi Group, 
2001) 
Figure 19 – Europe: Asset under Ethical screening per country - 1999 & 2001 (million Euro) – 
Source: (SIRI Group, 2002) 
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5.2.5 Screening and Criteria 
5.2.5.1 Ethical criteria 
Ethical investment involves the action of screening. This results in the selection or 
rejection of a stock or bond for a portfolio based on a set of predetermined criteria (also 
called screens; in this thesis ‘screens’ is used when referring to a set of criteria of the 
same type). Just as with regular funds, screening includes financial criteria, but unlike 
regular funds it also contains social, environmental and ethical criteria. The criteria used 
(social, environmental and ethical) have developed and changed over time.  
Kinder and Domini (1997) present a brief overview of the evolution of social screening in 
the US and suggest the shape of screening in the future (Kinder, 1997). According to the 
authors, investors want their investments to reflect their principles. From simple 
assertions of repugnance towards war or tobacco, ethical screening has evolved into 
proxies for a sophisticated assessment of the relationship between corporations and the 
societies within which they operate. The authors present criteria as tools for 
implementing a philosophy. In their history of exclusionary and qualitative screening, 
they underline the crucial impact of religious sources of criteria in the ethical investment 
movement (Kinder et al., 1994; Kinder, 1997).  
According to some authors there has been a spectacular growth in the items covered by 
the list of ethical investment criteria (Anderson et al., 1996; Beloe, 2000; Kinder, 1997). 
Beloe (2000) notes that if, originally ethical investment used to cover just a few areas, 
today it embraces over 3000 different criteria with new concerns – such as biotechnology 
or hand-gun manufacture  continually supplementing existing criteria (Beloe, 2000). 
The Triodos case, described in Chapter 2, shows that criteria have changed over time. 
Some existing criteria have been re-defined (that was the case for example in Triodos 
Case for some of the sustainable sectors such as health care); some criteria have been 
added (‘pornography’ was added to the Triodos fund criteria in 2002); some criteria have 
been deleted (telecommunication has been deleted from the Triodos list of sustainable 
activities in 2002).  
Criteria are closely linked to major changes in society. They may be related to social, 
economic, political or cultural aspects. For example September 11th 2001, with the attack 
on the World Trade Centre, has made people rethink and maybe reconsider the screen 
about weapons. Right after the event Marc Russel-Jones, director of FTSE4GOOD 
France, said in an interview:“…we are not opposed to weaponry in itself. Every country 
is entitled to defend itself” (Bayard & Motte, 2001). Cowton (1999) presents a very 
relevant paper about the practice of ethical investment in which he discusses the 
development and implementation of ethical criteria for one specific fund in the 
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UK(Cowton, 1999). The main change has been the shift from a negative to a positive 
approach, entailing the development of new criteria.  
Another example that shows the link between ethical investment criteria and the social, 
economic and political contexts is the Microsoft case. In 2000 KLD, an American rating 
organisation, faced questions from its clients: the organisation was asked to take position 
regarding the Microsoft antitrust trial (Lydenberg, 2000c). Historically antitrust issues 
have not been used as a criterion by KLD. In an interview Steve Lydenberg said that the 
case brought up series of questions (Lydenberg, 2000a): how far can investors and rating 
organisations go in the screening? Where are the boundaries of the ethical investment 
movement? What is the role of government? This case is interesting because it shows all 
the reasoning behind the decision of whether to add a criterion or not. Although KLD 
condemns the behaviour of Microsoft, the article concludes that it is of the government’s 
responsibility to resolve the issue and not of a rating organisation. “It is neither necessary 
nor appropriate for social investing, through the imposition of a screen, to act in a way 
that might appear to undercut or substitute for government regulatory action at this time” 
(Lydenberg, 2000c). The author raises an interesting question about the limit to the role 
of ethical investment: “it should not unrealistically take on itself roles that are better and 
more naturally played by government and society more generally” (Lydenberg, 2000c).  
According to Anderson (1996) the list of ‘ethical’ concerns is long and incoherent. He 
criticises criteria for being based not on ethical reasoning but on opinions. Mackenzie 
(1998) made a distinction between two kinds of fund: the market-led funds and the 
deliberative funds (Mackenzie, 1998). He argues that funds from the first category choose 
criteria on the basis of their perception of market demand. Criteria might then fluctuate 
and change a great deal. Funds from the second category choose criteria on the basis of 
reasoning about the ethics of corporate practice. Market-led funds, by not making use of 
ethical reasoning in their choice of ethical criteria, fall under the critic of Anderson.  
Besides these more analytical surveys, there are many descriptive articles and guides 
concerning criteria (ICCR, 1998). These guides provide useful insights into the shared 
understandings of the ethical investment community. They attempt to describe each 
criteria used by ethical investment manager such as environment, product quality, 
working conditions, South Africa, etc. They also contain interesting accounts of the 
history, purpose and practicalities of ethical investment.  
An interesting example is the framework developed by Hoffman et al. (1997). It is based 
on the following thesis: “Technological developments, economic systems, and monetary 
structures do not drop down form heaven. They are neither perfect nor incapable of being 
influenced but are rather results of social processes within a culture” (Hoffmann, Ott, & 
Scherhorn, 1997). For the elaboration of his criteria he has adopted a value-tree analysis 
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(VTA) developed by Ortwin Renn. The objective of this method is to provide a stronger 
emphasis for moral or evaluative (axiological) components against the predominance of 
technical or economic criteria (efficiency, profitability). The VTA method originated in 
rational-choice theory with respect to collective decision-making. The tree for the ethical 
evaluation of companies comprises three main dimensions, which constitute the three 
main branches of the value tree. They are environmental compatibility, social 
compatibility and cultural compatibility. Hoffmann considers culture as an important 
dimension as the moral understanding inherent in cultures plays an important role in the 
development and definition of environmental and social issues.  
5.2.5.2 Screening: four generations  
The screening process used for ethical funds (or indices) may combine different types of 
screens. For example Triodos MeerWaarde Fund combines exclusionary, inclusionary 
and comparative screens (see chapter 2 section .3.1 for a definition). However the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index and the FTSE4Good only use a combination of exclusionary 
and comparative screens. 
The evolution of the screening process has often been split into four generations (Ethibel, 
2003b; Observatoire de la Finance, 2001). Each generation refers to a different 
combination of screens. Although each generation corresponds to a development in time, 
it is difficult to clearly define each period. One of the reasons is that the development of 
ethical investment varies across countries. Some countries may have been through all the 
phases while other may have skipped one or two. Moreover funds from different 
generations may co-exist. One generation does not exclude another. Some funds evolve 
from one generation to another one but at a different pace and in different ways and other 
funds may strategically choose to stay in a certain generation. Although there is a general 
tendency to move towards the last generation, this is however not the case for every fund.  
First generation: focus on exclusionary criteria 
The first generation of ethical investment funds is based on what is called exclusionary 
criteria. Historically this type of screening was the first to be applied in the field of ethical 
investment. It grew out of deep personal convictions that it would be wrong to make 
money from certain industries (Domini, 2001).  
Traditionally these are criteria used by church groups, such as Pax World Fund in US 
(launched in 1971) or the Friends Provident Stewardship Trust in UK (launched in 1984). 
They eliminate a company from consideration for investment if it is involved in a 
particular area of social concern. It takes a “refusal to profit from” stance (Lydenberg, 
2000b). Through exclusionary screens investors state that they do not want to benefit, 
under any circumstance, from what they perceive is the harm to society caused by 
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companies involved in these areas. The company is excluded from consideration 
regardless of positive social or/and environmental initiatives it may have taken. For 
example when a company is involved in the production of weapon, ethical investors 
using a weapon exclusionary screen exclude it, regardless of the company’s initiatives in 
the social and environmental areas. Whole industry sectors are excluded from their 
investment portfolios. However, no screening is applied to companies belonging to the 
“accepted” sectors (Observatoire de la Finance, 2001). 
The way exclusionary criteria are applied differs: it can be either turnover or activity-
related or process-related. Turnover-related means that the percentage of turnover related 
to the screen is looked at. If the percentage exceeds the threshold set up by the rating 
organisation or the investor, the company is excluded. Percentages applied vary among 
funds. At Triodos for example it is 5%. Process-related exclusionary criteria 
automatically and directly exclude companies that are involved in one of the criteria. 
Triodos excludes any company involved in child labour.  
The number and definition of exclusionary criteria vary a lot. Box 1 shows the diversity 
of definitions for the criterion ‘Tobacco’. Definitions disclosed have been extracted from 
different ethical funds. Exclusionary criteria may vary from fund to fund, from region to 
region and have evolved over time: South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s or abortion in 
the US, genetic engineering, nuclear power, or pornography in Europe, and aboriginal 
rights in Australia.  
In spite of some differences a large number of exclusionary criteria are commonly used in 
the ethical investment community: alcohol, gambling, tobacco, weaponry, human rights 
and animal testing. This set of criteria was developed at the very beginning of the ethical 
investment movement and has hardly changed. Table 27 shows the most exclusionary 
criteria used in the US between 1995 and 2001. The screen the most used since 1995 has 
been tobacco. Gambling, weapons and alcohol are increasingly used, by 1999 they all 
reached 80%.  
‘named tobacco companies’ 
‘any company in which tobacco or alcohol accounts for more than 10% of its total business’ 
’companies with major interests in tobacco or alcohol’ 
’companies materially involved in tobacco or alcohol’ 
‘companies significantly involved in the production or sale of tobacco or alcohol’ 
‘companies who produce tobacco or alcohol’ 
‘companies with interests in tobacco or alcohol, including supermarket selling alcohol’ 
‘over 5% of turnover yielded by tobacco-related business’ 
‘tobacco makers and distributors earning more than 15% of turnover’ 
Box 1 - Example of diversity in definition of exclusionary screens extracted from ethical funds or 
rating organisations: Case of the tobacco and alcohol issue 
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 1995 1997 1999 2001 
Tobacco 86% 84% 96% >50% 
Gambling - 72% 86% >50% 
Weapons 64% 69% 81% >50% 
Alcohol 73% 68% 83% >50% 
Birth Control/Abortion - 50% 23% Less than 30% 
Environment 38% 37% 79% >50% 
Labor/Fair Employment 22% 25% 38% >50% 
Human Rights 42% 23% 43% >50% 
Animal Welfare 24% 7% 15% 30% to 49% 
Table 27 - US most common screens (SIF, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001) 
Second generation: focus on inclusionary criteria 
According to Observatoire de la Finance (2001), the second generation of funds appeared 
in the mid-1980s. Screenings are based on a more positive approach: companies are 
assessed according to their “positive contribution” to society (Observatoire de la Finance, 
2001). It mainly refers to green funds focusing on pollution control technologies which 
emerged as a result of a wave of environmental problems in Europe (forest dieback, acid 
rain, eutrophication, etc.).  
These funds are based on inclusionary screens. This involves seeking out companies 
demonstrating a commitment to social or environmental issues. Just as the first generation 
excludes whole sectors, the second generation does the opposite and includes entire 
sectors thought to have a positive impact on society or/and stimulate development 
towards sustainability such as organic farming, renewable energy and sustainable means 
of transport. Companies included in such portfolios are usually small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
Third generation: focus on the three Ps (People, Planet, Profit), use of comparative 
criteria 
Third generation funds, which emerged in the second half of the 1990s, aim at achieving 
both financial performance and sustainability, i.e. good environmental, economic and 
social performance (Observatoire de la Finance, 2001). This generation includes a new 
type of criteria, the comparative criteria.  
Comparative or relative screens take a different approach from exclusionary or 
inclusionary screens. This approach usually takes into consideration the leadership’s 
strategic commitments and vision, company policies and codes of conduct which have 
been set up and their results (practices, performance indicators, etc). It looks at areas such 
as the environmental management system, employee relations, diversity, community, and 
product quality. This assessment looks at the relationship of the company with its 
stakeholders, what is in place and how does it work within the company. The 
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stakeholders considered the most important are: the environment, employees, community, 
vendors and contractors and shareholders (corporate governance). The selection process 
is based on a more comprehensive approach. 
Contrary to the exclusionary criteria that are based on “should not do”, relative criteria 
are based on the ‘best in class’. Benchmarking is at the core of this generation of funds. It 
uses the market as a tool to stimulate companies. The third generation funds do not 
exclusively use relative screens. Some of them combine screens, like Triodos 
MeerWaarde Fund: exclusionary, inclusive and relative screens.  
Fourth generation: focus on communication with stakeholders 
A fourth generation may be arising (Ethibel, 2003b; Observatoire de la Finance, 2001). 
Just like the third generation funds, these use relative screenings or a mix of the three 
type of screens. However the funds are using a more complex set of social, 
environmental, ethical and human rights indicators, frequently combined with wide-
ranging exclusionary criteria. It also seems that there is a new emphasis: communication 
with 'stakeholders'. Funds are getting more and more sensitive to communication and 
transparency. For example, in 2002 Triodos Research added a new category to company 
evaluation which is called ‘Transparency and communication with stakeholders’. 
Companies are increasingly being asked to be open and active/proactive with their 
environment at large. It is not enough to report, companies must also be open to dialogue.  
 
The four generations presented above highlight a certain evolution of the screens over 
time. There was a shift from an exclusionary to a best-in-class approach, with lately an 
emphasis on the company’s relationship with its stakeholders.  
5.2.6 Conclusion 
The history of ethical investment is linked to religious groups, the most known being the 
Quakers, who refuse any connection with specific businesses. For a long time they have 
excluded what they regard as ‘bad’ companies. Although the literature on ethical 
investment refers mainly to the US, religious groups in Europe have also adopted the 
same strategy, such as the Methodist Church in the UK.  
From the early stage of ethical investment up until the1970s, the dominant investor was 
religious groups. In the 1960s/1970s, a movement related to corporate conduct started to 
emerge in the US. US citizen groups attacked corporations for misbehaving. The battles 
were against discrimination, war and pollution. Citizen groups used ethical investment to 
lobby corporations. It provided them with two important options to wield power which, in 
reference to Hirschman (Hirschman, 1970), can be described as exit and voice. Through 
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the activity of investing, selling and buying, shareholders can exert the exit form of 
power. Shareholders that are unsatisfied with company ‘X’ sell the shares and buy shares 
from another company. Exit of shareholders in response to a sustainability performance 
decline will result in loss of capital for the company. Investors hope that by selling the 
shares, it will result in an unbalance between sellers and buyers, entailing at a drop of the 
share price. The other option, voice, can be activated through shareholder activism 
(Graves, K., & S., 2001; Hoffman, 1996; Pearce & Ganzi, 2002). Rather than simply 
divesting from companies engaged in activities they consider being contrary to their 
values, investors can choose to actively invest and use their positions as shareholders to 
affect corporate behaviour. Shareholders interact direct with the company and thereby 
want to make their voice heard. The resort to voice, rather than exit, is for the 
shareholders to make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the 
firm. Exit and voice options are not exclusive. They are both useful and necessary and it 
is best to find an equilibrium between the two. Voice option can be used as a preventive 
strategy in order to alert the company and exit can be used as ultimate solution if the 
company does not act/react on the alert sign. 
Citizen groups have greatly contributed to the development of ethical investment in the 
US. In the UK, there was a time lag of around ten years. Just as in the US, ethical 
investment started with Churches, but then the government played an important role. At 
the end of the 1990s a Minister proposed a law for pension funds to disclose whether or 
not the fund integrated social and environmental criteria. This created a powerful 
incentive for pension funds to revise their investment strategies. It is interesting to note 
that in the US and UK the push for ethical investment came from very different actors as 
well as the motives; an activist tool in US and a new way of investing in the UK (“Ethical 
investment means choosing investments that reflect your values” (EIRIS, 2001)).  
As regards the meaning of ethical investment, there is much confusion and uncertainty. 
The literature review shows that there is no agreement. Definitions reviewed describe 
ethical investment in terms of actions. They do not address the nature of the term 
‘ethical’, ‘socially responsible’ or ‘sustainable’. It is also interesting to note that ethical 
investment is identified by several names which adds to the confusion about the meaning, 
but also shows a certain diversity. The screens used, exclusionary, inclusionary or 
comparative, have evolved over time. There was a shift from pure exclusion to a more 
positive benchmarking approach. Within each type of screen, it seems that the criteria 
used are pretty much the same among the funds. It is especially noticeable for the 
exclusionary criteria where in 2001 in the US 8 criteria were used by more than 50% of 
screened funds.  
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When looking at the figures, ethical investment has enormously expanded, especially 
since 1995. That is the case in the US, UK and other countries as well. It can be qualified 
of an international phenomenon.  
5.3 Financial context 
This section investigates ethical investment as a financial activity. Ethical investment is, 
as the name indicates, an investing activity, that is the purchasing of shares selectively in 
profit-making companies listed on the stock market. In order to better understand the 
process of ethical investment, it is of importance to review some basic aspects of 
investing.  
Ethical investment has also been an important phenomenon in the ‘greening’ of the 
financial sector. For a long time financial institutions have been absent from the 
sustainable development debate. However since the early 1990s they are facing 
increasing pressures to integrate and stimulate sustainability. In this section, ethical 
investment is placed in the context of the greening of financial institutions.  
5.3.1 Ethical investment: an investing activity 
Investing refers to several and different types of activity. Productive investments such as 
a firm’s purchasing a new machine or planting a seed may be distinguished from 
financial investment such as the purchase of a bond or share. This thesis deals with 
financial investment on the stock market and only investment from private financial 
services. It does not address public international financial institutions such as multilateral 
development banks or bilateral export credit agencies. It also excludes all investments in 
commodities such as gold or cocoa. But what is a stock market? How does it work? Who 
invests? Those are the types of questions addressed below. 
5.3.1.1 The Stock Exchange 
Whether investing directly, by holding Stock Exchange securities, or indirectly, by 
saving through a pension fund or insurance company, the individual investor is providing 
funds for investment in the company sector, be it manufacturing or services (Rutterford, 
1993).  
The stock market is the place where investors make financial investment. Classical 
approaches of financial investment consider that the financial investor has no direct 
interest in the type of products or services produced by the company. His only concern is 
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the amount of money he has invested in the equity or shares5 of the company and how 
much money he will receive in the future. “This type of investment is ‘pure’ in the sense 
that the investor has no interest in his investment other than the future income it will 
generate” (Rutterford, 1993). Investors are completely detached from the companies as 
organisations. Companies are basically represented by a figure, the earnings (Zorn, 2003).  
Quoted investments consist of the exchange of a known amount of money in return for 
the expectation of future receipts of money. The financial investments which are quoted 
on the Stock Exchange can be bought and sold by investors at any time. Quoted and 
marketable securities are those that have a market price. A stock market quotation is not 
to be confused with a ‘listing’. Although most quoted securities are listed, which means 
that the issuers of the securities have to comply with rules laid down by the Stock 
Exchange, some are unlisted, and yet can be bought and sold at a market price.  
The role of the Stock Exchange is twofold. It is a way for companies to transfer risk. A 
company may decide to share or transfer some of the risk of producing or servicing a 
product by issuing securities to investors. The investors will take on the risk of the 
company via the medium of the Stock Exchange. In this way, the Stock Exchange in its 
role of primary market enables the risk of physical investment to be transferred to 
financial investors. The second function of the Stock Exchange is to act as a secondary 
market, where securities can be traded throughout their lives. Stocks and shares are 
marketable, meaning that they can be bought and sold at any moment of their lives. Each 
investor has different consumption preferences. Compared to physical investments that 
are most of the time and naturally long term investment, financial investments are short 
term oriented. Through the marketability the long term is transformed into short term.  
The major types of investor on the Stock exchange have changed over time, with the 
main change being the decline of individual investors and the rise of institutional 
investors. Individuals now invest indirectly in the stock market through the institutional 
investors. Savings are channelled into pension funds and insurance companies and, to a 
lesser extent, into unit trusts and investment trusts (Rutterford, 1993; Zorn, 2003).  
5.3.1.2 Investing institutions 
In Europe and the US, equity investments have gained great popularity in recent years 
both among households and institutional investors (investment funds, life insurance 
companies and pension funds) (European Central Bank, 2001). In Europe, the share of 
                                                 
5 Share is a specific type of security, sometimes known as equity to reflect ownership of the company. 
‘Security’ is a general term for any type of financial investment traded on the Stock Exchange.  
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equity in financial assets held by these two categories of investors almost doubled 
between 1995 and 1999.  
There are four main channels that can be used by investors to invest (European Central 
Bank, 2001): 
- investment funds (collective or non-collective); 
- investment in life insurance products, which can be managed directly or indirectly by 
the insurance company (through collective or non-collective investment funds); 
- investment in pension funds, which can be managed directly or indirectly by the 
insurance company (through collective or non-collective investment funds) 
- and direct holdings of equities.  
In 2002 in the UK, where the volume of socially screened portfolio is the highest in 
Europe, among the institutional investors the ownership of ordinary shares in listed 
companies is as followed: insurance companies (40%), pension funds (32.2%), units and 
investment trusts (8%), and other financial companies (19.8%) (National Statistics, 
2001).  
Typically, investing institutions do not consider environmental and social aspects in their 
investment design. Investment management companies manage their funds to attract a 
wide consumer base and to minimise risks.  
5.3.2 Sustainable banking 
Ethical investment is managed by financial institutions such as investment banks, mutual 
funds or pension funds. For a long time the financial sector has been considered as a 
‘clean’ activity because of its limited social and environmental impact compared to other 
industries. Therefore there was very little pressures to integrate sustainability in its 
activities. However in the 1980s but especially in the 1990s transnational organisations 
like the United Nations and the European Community pointed at the responsibilities of 
financial institutions towards sustainable development.  
Ethical investment is one of the activities that contributed to the ‘greening’ of the 
financial sector.  
5.3.2.1 Sustainability: a growing awareness among financial institutions 
For a long time financial institutions have denied their role and responsibilities towards 
sustainable development. However financial institutions are key economic and social 
actors, and thereby can have a decisive role.  
An important element that has triggered the awareness and willingness of financial 
institutions to consider sustainability in their business is liability risk for which three 
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events have been crucial. Firstly, in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the U.S. backed up the Environmental 
Protection Agency 's (EPA) efforts to clean up contaminated sites. This Act – also known 
as Superfund – made owners of contaminated sites liable for the cleanups. Although the 
Act exempted lenders from ownership status, due to the complexity of the issues 
involved, some banks were forced to enter into the court procedure and some recorded 
financial losses (Environmental Protection Agency, 2001). Secondly, nine years later 
(1989) the European Commission issued the Directive on Civil Liability for Damage 
Caused by Waste. According to this document the liability for damage caused by waste 
could be assigned to both a producer of the waste and a person "who had actual control of 
the waste, if he is not able within a reasonable period to identify the producer" (extracted 
from (Schmidheiny & Zorraquin, 1996)). The bankers' community found the wording 
"actual control" potentially dangerous, since the interpretation of the phrase could lead to 
lender's liability in certain instances. And thirdly, there was the Fleet Factors case in 
1990. The Fleet Factors Corporation case was among the first in a series of legal 
proceedings in the U.S. that eviscerated the banks' exemption from Superfund liability. 
The liability issue has been an important element that started to question the role of 
financial institutions within sustainable development. Although it is a rather negative 
approach, financial institutions were forced to consider environmental aspects in their 
business.  
In addition to the liability issue, some initiatives took place at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative (UNEP FII) was launched in 1992. It was 
developed to “promote the integration of environmental considerations into all aspects of 
the financial sector's operations and services.” (United Nations Environment Programme, 
1999). This initiative targeted a broad range of financial institutions from commercial 
banks and investment banks to venture capitalists, asset managers and multi-lateral 
development banks and agencies. The same year UNEP FII launched the Statement by 
Banks on Environment and Sustainable Development through which signatories commit 
themselves to integrate environmental considerations in their internal banking operations, 
subscribe to the precautionary approach to environmental management, and support and 
develop suitable banking products and services designed to promote environmental 
protection. In 1992 five financial institutions were signatories to the Statement, by April 
2002 there were 192 commercial banks from more than 50 countries (UNEP, 2002).  
In 1993, the European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the 
Environment and Sustainable Development (the Fifth Environmental Programme) 
recognised that financial institutions exercise considerable influence over most areas of 
economic activity: “financial institutions which assume the risk of companies and plants 
can exercise considerable influence -in some cases control- over investment management 
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decisions which could be brought into play for the benefit of the environment” (European 
Community, 1993). Under the Fifth Environmental Action Programme the European 
Commission published the so-called Green Paper on remedying environmental damage. It 
outlined that the strict liability system should be backed by joint compensation funds 
financed by industry to pay for the costs of environmental restoration where a polluter 
could not be found, was unable to pay, or where its liability could not be established 
(IISD, 1999).  
In 1997, the Delphi report came out. It states clearly that sustainable development should 
be at the core of financial markets activity (Delphi International LTD & s, 1997). The 
report’s authors argue that the definition of sustainable development makes explicit that 
sustainable development is about capital, the core of financial markets activity. 
According to the Delphi report, financial institutions can help by removing any 
unnecessary obstacles to accessing finance, and by ensuring finance is readily available at 
the lowest practical cost.  
In 1997 BankAmerica Corporation became the first major U.S. financial services 
company to endorse the CERES Principles, a set of principles defining corporate 
environmental policy. These principles were developed by a coalition of investors, 
companies and environmental groups called the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES). Corporations that have endorsed the CERES 
Principles or similar guidelines have traditionally been firms in the energy and 
manufacturing industries. BankAmerica was the first Fortune 500 multinational financial 
services company to sign such a set of principles. Bank Boston, the oldest U.S. 
commercial bank, shortly followed the BankAmerica's example (Bank Of America). By 
endorsing principles developed by a non-profit organisation these financial institutions 
have clearly demonstrated an increase in bankers' interest in sustainable development 
issues.  
In May 1999 UBS AG was the first bank to receive certification according to the ISO 
14001 environmental standard.  
In 2000 in the UK, a new regulation related to the disclosure of the use of social and 
environmental information by pension funds has been enforced (see section 5.2.4). And 
more recently, still in the UK, The London Principles of Sustainable Finance have been 
developed. It is a voluntary code for financial institutions that demonstrate their 
commitment to the financing of sustainable development (Pearce & Mills, 2002). It 
focuses on the role of financial institutions in providing financial services that facilitate 
economic prosperity, while ensuring that the projects and business activities financed 
protect or enhance the environment and social development.  
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The events listed in Table 28, although not exhaustive, show that since the 1980s and 
especially the 1990s financial institutions have had to face increasing pressures to 
recognise their responsibilities towards sustainability. Pressures started in the US with 
environmental liability, which came in Europe nine years later. In 1992, it became a 
global issue when the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) established a 
unit devoted to the financial sector. Up until recently, the focus was on the environment 
and ethical investment was not part of the debate. However recent events, especially the 
Delphi Report and the book of Schmidheiny and Zorraquin (Schmidheiny et al., 1996), 
show that the focus has broadened toward the whole concept of sustainability. Moreover, 
it is interesting to note that ethical investment has become an important element of the 
greening of the financial sector (Bouma et al., 2001). A number of articles present it as a 
promising activity where financial institutions can ‘make a difference’. 
Another important event for financial institutions but especially for ethical investment has 
been the creation of sustainable indices such as the Dow Jones Sustainability and the 
FTSE4Good. It has brought sustainability right into the stock market (see section 5.3.4).  
1980 Superfund instituted in the U.S. 
1989 EC Commission issues the Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
1990 Fleet Factors case, US 
1992 UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative (FII) 
1993 Fifth EC Environmental Action Programme –Towards Sustainability 
1993 Green Paper on remedying environmental damage (EU) 
1997 Bank America became the first Fortune 500 bank to endorse CERES Principles (US) 
1999 UBS, first bank to obtain the ISO 14001 certification 
1999 (September) Dow Jones Sustainability, Dow Jones Indexes & SAM Sustainability Group 
launch Sustainability Indexes 
2000 SRI Pensions Disclosure Regulation (UK) 
2002 The London Principles of Sustainable Finance (UK) 
Table 28 - Events and initiatives that have shaped the role of the banking sector in sustainable development 
5.3.3 Financial institutions’ approaches to sustainability 
Financial institutions’ approaches to sustainability vary. An important body of the 
literature considers that the approach varies according to what ‘sustainability’ means for 
financial organisations (Barannik, 2000; Coulson, 2001; Figge, 2001; Mauser, 2001; 
Pederson & Atkins, 2001). It may be considered as a risk: most of the time it means 
financial risk such as pollution redemption but it can also be reputation risk. 
Sustainability may be an opportunity, for example launch of a new range of environment-
friendly products, or a competitive advantage in order to differentiate an organisation 
from its competitors. Sustainability may also be more deeply integrated into the 
organisation’s values and be a kind of ideology or raison d’être the organisation stands 
for.  
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Jeucken (2001) distinguishes four different stages of financial institutions’ approach to 
sustainable development: defensive, preventive, offensive and sustainable banking. The 
first stage is defensive. In this stage a financial institution is non-active and may try to 
delay or oppose new legislation. Organisations in this phase usually perceive 
sustainability as a risk and have an inactive or reactive attitude. They do not want to 
change except if they are forced to. Opportunities like cost savings are not taken up. The 
second phase is preventive. This stage diverges from the previous because potential cost 
savings and eco-efficiency are considered. This phase involves an inactive attitude, 
waiting for change to happen, and a risk perception of sustainability that may at the end 
bring some cost savings. The third stage is offensive. In this stage financial institutions 
consider their external activities in addition to the internal. Sustainability becomes a 
market opportunity. The organisation sees an opportunity to improve its business and its 
image by integrating sustainability. Its attitude is proactive with an optimisation 
perspective or even interactive – trying to be innovative and leading. The last phase is 
sustainable banking. During this phase the focus is entirely on sustainability. The 
objective of the financial institution is to have the highest sustainable rate of return. This 
phase necessitates sustainability to be an ideology rather than a market tool. According to 
Jeucken, financial institutions develop through these different phases over time. However 
the last stage is hardly reachable, as it requires placing sustainability at the core of the 
organisation. Triodos Bank in the Netherlands and the Co-operative Bank in the UK are 
two examples of the very few banks in the Sustainable phase (Bouma & Jeucken, 1999). 
Whatever the phase a financial institution is in, sustainability can be operationalised at 
several levels of the organisation’s activity. UNEP FII distinguishes five areas of banking 
operations (United Nations Environment Programme): 
- Internal banking operations and housekeeping; 
- Credit and investment risk assessment and management;  
- New lending and investment opportunities (new financial products and services);  
- External communication and co-operation;  
- Staff awareness and training. 
The categories of UNEP can be divided into two aspects: internal and external. Internal 
concerns housekeeping such as power usage, paper use, and business travel, and training 
and awareness raising of the staff. The external category includes the services of financial 
institutions such as lending, investing, but also external communication by increasing the 
awareness of their customers about sustainability issues (Scholes, 1997).  
Financial institutions offer ways to stimulate and contribute to sustainable development. 
The Delphi report (1997) views the role of financial institutions towards sustainability as 
follows (Delphi International LTD et al., 1997): as valuers (assessing risks and estimating 
returns); as victims of environmental change and realised environmental risks; as 
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innovators (development of new financial products to encourage sustainable 
development); as polluters (consuming natural resources); as investors (supply of 
investment needed to achieve sustainable development); and as powerful stakeholders (as 
shareholders and lenders they can influence that management of companies). In 
particular, they can create opportunities for sustainable business through their financing 
policy and may be influential through their activities. Jeucken (2001), Schmidheiny et al. 
(1996) offer a comprehensive introduction to the role and responsibility that financial 
institutions have towards achieving sustainable development. 
5.3.4 Sustainability indices 
The development of the ethical investment movement has led to the creation of specific 
market indices based on financial, social and environmental information. These indices 
are called social or sustainability indices.  
The first social index was launched in the US in 1990 by KLD Research & Analytics, 
Inc. The index is called Domini 400 Social Index. Its selection is based both upon ratings 
and exclusionary criteria determined by KLD (KLD, 2002). The exclusionary criteria 
used are: civil nuclear weapons, weapons, gambling, alcohol and tobacco. The Domini 
400 Social Index is a selection of the most responsible companies in the S&P 500. The 
family of KLD indexes has since grown to include several American indexes: the LCSI, 
which groups 730 companies, the Russell 1000, and most recently, BMSI, which include 
2200 companies from the Russell 3000. Subsequently numerous other indexes have been 
set up in North America, especially by investment funds, such as the Citizens Index 
(launched in 1994) or the Calvert Social Index (launched in 2000).  
In 1999 a new index was established. For the first time it was called a ‘sustainable’ index. 
It was been introduced with widespread media coverage and has had an important echo?? 
on the financial community. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) has been 
launched in September 1999 to track the performance of companies that are leaders in 
sustainable development. For the first time the emphasis was on sustainability including 
social and environmental aspects. Its partnership with a well-established index publisher 
and its wide coverage turned it into an important reference. The DJSI is focused on 
meeting financial markets' demands for (DJSI, 2001): 
• A global, rational, consistent, flexible and, most importantly, investable index to 
benchmark the performance of investments in sustainability companies and funds; 
• An independent reliable index as a basis for derivatives and funds focused on 
sustainability companies.  
The DJSI meets these demands by combining the expertise and resources of its partners: 
Dow Jones & Company, the world's leading global index provider; and SAM 
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Sustainability Group (Sustainability Asset Management), an independent, Zurich-based 
company focused on integrated corporate sustainability in financial services and world-
renowned pioneer in corporate sustainability assessment. 
DJSI consists of two indices: Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes World (DJSI World) and 
Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes Stoxx (DJSI Stoxx). The DJSI World consists of more 
than 300 companies that represent the top 10% of the leading sustainability companies in 
59 industry groups in the 33 countries covered by the biggest 2500 companies in the Dow 
Jones Global Indexes (DJSI, 2003). The DJSI World is composed of specialized indexes 
excluding companies that generate revenue from alcohol, tobacco, gambling, armaments 
& firearms or all of these industries. Note that the index changed name in 2001. It used to 
be called Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes (DJSGI) the two first years (from 1999 
till 2001).  
2001 saw the launch of a new index: the DJSI Stoxx for European companies. The index 
is subdivided into sub-indexes based on sectorial exclusion screens – tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, heavy weapons, and firearms (DJSI, 2003). The DJSI Stoxx tracks the 
performance of the top 20% of the companies in the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index that lead 
the field in terms of sustainability. The DJSI World consists of the top 10% of the leading 
sustainability companies in each of the DJSI industry groups.  
Two and a half year later, in July 2001, the FTSE4Good was launched. The 
FTSE4GOOD family of indexes (four indexes) was established by the FTSE corporation 
(owned by the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange). FTSE4GOOD 
distinguished itself by its policy of donating all of the income generated by license to 
UNICEF. The family is made up of four benchmark indexes: Global, Europe, US, and 
GB, in addition to four trading indexes which are a tool for the creation of derivatives. 
The same selection criteria (screening rules and definitions) are applied to all of the 
indices. They are defined by a committee independent of the FTSE made up of specialists 
in the ethical investment field. This committee is also in charge of supervising the 
application of the rules and following the trends in selection criteria. Based on the screens 
defined by the FTSE4GOOD indexes committee, the EIRIS research institute, with the 
assistance of its network of partners, is in charge of the information gathering process and 
selection according to criteria defined by the FTSE4GOOD. Companies involved in 
tobacco, weapons and nuclear power are excluded (FTSE, 2003).  
The Dow Jones Sustainability and the FTSE4Good indices have been acclaimed and seen 
as a victory. But they also have been the subject of criticism such as “FTSE4Good is 
nothing more than traditional stick market capitalism dressed up to look socially 
responsible” (Mackenzie & Cartridge, 2002). The indices have been an important step to 
bring ethical investment to the heart of the financial market. The Dow Jones 
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Sustainability and the FTSE4Good indices have stimulated other smaller index providers 
such as the London Sustainability Index and ASPI Eurozone in France, both launched in 
2001.  
5.3.5 Conclusion 
The individual investment decision by economic agents is often construed as a present 
sacrifice for future benefit. Classical and neoclassical economists always view investment 
as an economic end, whose aim is to contribute to wealth. In this view the investment 
decision is conceived in purely economic terms (see (Turner, Pearce, & Bateman, 1994)). 
As described above, in the classic view investors do not have direct contact with 
corporations. They are completely detached from the stock-quoted companies and their 
only concern is the amount of money invested.  
However the history of ethical investment suggest that ethical investors have a different 
type of relationship with corporations, manage the fund differently, and have different 
objectives. Ethical investment breaks off with the traditional way of investing by firstly 
taking into account non-economic variables, secondly by seeking to establish a direct 
relation with corporations (for example through shareholder engagement) and thirdly by 
considering social and environmental performances as equally important as financial 
performance. Bruyn (1987) describes ethical investment as a form of investment that has 
brought “a conscience into capital market” (Bruyn, 1987).  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, financial institutions are facing increasing pressures to 
take into account sustainable development. All activities of financial institutions need to 
be reconsidered. Investment is part of it. The UNEP FII and the European Commission 
consider ethical investment as one of the activities through which financial institutions 
can make a difference.  
According to Jeucken (2001), financial institutions do not have the same attitude towards 
sustainability. They may be defensive, preventive, offensive or sustainable. Financial 
institutions may engage in ethical investing for several reasons. They may wait for a law. 
That was the case for example in the UK; although the new law did not require pension 
funds to use ethical criteria, figures in section 5.2.4 show that it has been an important 
incentive. Financial institutions may perceive it as an opportunity: there is a demand for 
ethical investment. Or a last motive may be based on the core values of the organisation. 
For a bank like Triodos, whose mission is to “contribute to a more people-orientated 
society – one which respects people, the environment and culture” (Triodos Bank, 
2000a), ethical investment may seem to be the only way of investing.  
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5.4 Ideological context 
This section intends to picture the ideological context in which ethical investment has 
developed. The aim is not to provide a complete literature review but rather to review it 
in the context of ethical investment and to link it to the changes that happened over time 
within ethical investment.  
5.4.1 Ethics in ethical investment 
Ethics is the study of moral problems (Hospers, 1963). It addresses the norms that guide 
human behaviour (O'Hara, 1998). Taylor defines ethics as “philosophical inquiry into the 
nature and grounds of morality” (Taylor, 1975). The term ‘morality’ refers as a general 
name for moral judgements, standards, and rules of conduct. A moral norm may be either 
a rule of conduct or a standard of evaluation. That is, it may be a requirement that anyone 
in certain circumstances should do, or refrain from doing, a certain kind of action. Or the 
norm may be a standard of evaluation, which we implicitly refer to whenever we decide 
whether something is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, worthy or worthless. The 
rules of conduct and standards of evaluation someone uses in their moral judgements 
need not to be the conventionally accepted norms of a society’s established moral code. 
They may instead be norms which the individual has chosen for himself after having 
rejected the conventional morality of his society. The rules and standards a person or an 
organisation accepts become part of his/her ‘philosophy of life’, guiding his/her choices 
and giving direction to his/her conduct. It provides reasons for considering that some 
goals are worth striving for more than others (Taylor, 1975). Ethics provides rational 
grounds and moral norms for acting and judging.  
In a study carried by Raymont Baumhart asking businessmen “What does ethical mean to 
you”, fifty percent of them defined ‘ethical’ as ‘what my feelings tell me is right’; 25 
percent defined it in religious terms as what is ‘in accord with religious beliefs’; and 18 
percent defined ‘ethical’ as what ‘conforms to the golden rules’ (in (Velasquez, 1992)). In 
popular usage the term ‘ethics’ has a variety of different meanings and businessmen do 
not feel comfortable with such a term.  
Ethical investment, by referring to ‘ethics’, implies a moral judgement, that is right or 
wrong, good or bad, better or worse, ought to be or not to be. It expresses values. These 
judgements are applied on the basis of some explicit or implicit standards that require, 
prohibit, or allow specific kinds of behaviour. Ethical investment raises questions 
concerning whether or not corporations’ decisions and behaviour violate any moral 
standards. It does not automatically mean that the corporation is behaving immorally but 
only that there is some reason to examine more closely whether or not it does or does not 
conform to some moral standards.  
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Ethical investment does not define what is ‘ethical’, it concentrates on how moral 
standards apply to business policies, practices and behaviour. Business organisations are 
embedded in a larger societal context. They are a subsystem of the larger social system. 
As such they cannot exist without the tacit consent of the larger system. The conduct of 
business raises a number of ethical issues, for example because they are multinational 
corporations operating in several nations, because they use raw materials. The process of 
ethical investment is a way to assess corporations’ behaviour against some moral 
standards. The questions are: What are the standards? and How are these standards 
translated? Figure 20 shows an example of moral reasoning. The judgement that the 
company is unjust is based on a chain of reasoning that appeals to a moral standard.  
Moral standards  Factual information  Judgement 
Example: A 
company is unjust 
if it does not treat 
minorities and 
whites equally 
 Example: 
Corporation A black 
people are paid less 
compared to whites.  
 Example: 
Corporation A is 
not unjust 
(discrimination 
practice).  
Figure 20 – Example of ethical reasoning (extracted and adapted from (Velasquez, 1992)) 
The history of ethical investment shows that churches have dominated the movement for 
a long time. The moral standards were clear, they referred to religious standards. 
However, in the 1970s and 1980s citizen or environmental groups joined the movement, 
followed later by very diverse types of investors – especially when mainstream banks and 
pension funds started to show interest for such funds. This change implied a change in the 
moral standards used. Citizen groups did not refer to religion but to human rights for 
example. Reference standards became diverse and ethical justifications not always clear. 
It led Schwartz (2003) to question the foundation of ethical investment: “If the ethical 
investing movement were to be honest and forthright, they would not label their screens 
as "ethical" at all. They are simply screens developed with the intention of reflecting 
intended investor's social, religious, or political attitudes or beliefs, and nothing more. To 
be considered ethical screens, the behaviour in question must derive support beyond the 
moral standard of cultural relativism.” (Schwartz, 2003).  
In their article, Anderson et al (1996) ask: “What has “Ethical Investment” to do with 
Ethics?”(Anderson et al., 1996). They question whether or not ethical investment funds 
have the right to use the term ‘ethical’. The article does engage with the ethics of ethical 
investment and is strongly critical of current ethical investment practice in the UK. The 
authors argue that ethical investment is ‘not very good ethics’. They even claim that 
ethical investment does not deserve the title ‘ethical’. They critic the oversimplistic way 
in which ethical investment consider ethics: “It is a simplicity which ill fits them for  
csfser 
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ethical work” (Anderson et al., 1996). Investing ethically cannot be a straightforward 
matter. The issues involved require to be disputed and are often complex but ethical 
investment has a tendency to reduce complexity, to focus on particular causes and elevate 
them into absolutes, disregarding difficulties and counter-arguments. According to the 
authors ‘ethical’ has become a ‘trade’ name for financial companies.  
Other authors like (Irvine, 1987), (De George, 1990) and (Sorell & Hendry, 1994), and to 
a smaller extent (Sternberg, 1994) and (Boatright, 1999) have also addressed the ethical 
dimension of ethical investment but with another perspective.  
Irvine (1987) deals with the notion of the ethics of investing. He examines the ethical 
implications of investing that stem from the non-contractual obligations of investors. 
Distinguishing the ethical dimensions of investing from aesthetic and egoistical concerns, 
he argues that two popularly accepted principles, the Evil-Company Principle – which 
suggests that one should never invest in an evil company – and the Tainted-Profits 
Principle – which suggests that one should never profit from the wrongdoing of others – 
are inadequate guides to ethical investing. In their place, he proposes what he calls the 
Enablement Principle which suggests that one should not invest in such a manner as to 
enable others to do wrong. Although his arguments are vulnerable (see the reply from 
(Lamier, 1997)), Irvine offers an interesting discussion on what is morally wrong in 
connection with ethical investment. He also discusses how investors can affect a 
company’s ability to conduct its business – through two issues the Old-Stock Objection 
and the Small-Purchase Objection. Irvine concludes in both discussions that investors 
have, albeit indirectly, a real potential to influence the way a company conducts its 
business.  
De George, Sorell and Hendry and other articles are concerned with the responsibilities 
of shareholders towards corporations. De George (1990) discusses whether shareholders 
are responsible for the company’s activity as part-owner of the company. He claims that 
“shareholders cannot be held morally responsible for what the firm does since the 
shareholder is in fact very distant from the causal relations between an action of the 
corporation and its effects - but this does not relieve shareholders of all moral 
responsibility” (De George, 1990). Indeed he argues that if a “company has a policy of 
engaging in unethical practices, then no one can morally support its activities through the 
purchase of stock” (De George, 1990). De George’s account of ethical investment is 
generally a normative one mainly asserting what ethical investment should involve.  
Sorell and Hendry (1994), like De George, open the discussion with the responsibilities 
of shareholders. Unlike De George, they claim that shareholders are not the owners of 
companies (Sorell et al., 1994). However, they accept that shareholders do have 
responsibilities for companies. Their discussion is not related to the kind of issues ethical 
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investors are concerned about but to more general considerations of, for example, the 
duties of loyalty owed by shareholders to companies in the event of a take-over bid. 
Another important issue raised by Sorell and Hendry (1994) is the question of whether 
the ethical concerns of ethical investors conflict with their other objectives or duties as 
shareholders. They ask the following question: “Aren’t the interests of ethical investors in 
things other than owner value and nothing else?“ If so, it questions ethical investment as 
an ethically appropriate activity. Sorell and Hendry argue that it is possible for an 
investor to combine long-term owner value and ethical goals. Others, like (Frenkel, 
1998), (Hart & Ahuja, 1996), (Waddock & Grave, 1997) or members of the Tomorrow’s 
Company (Tomorrow's Company, 1995) support the same argument. The basic argument 
is that socially and environmentally responsible business is often good business (win-win 
situation). Indeed most of the ethical or social funds, such as Eco Performance Portfolio 
from SBC (Switzerland) or the Environmental Value Fund form Storebrand Scruder 
(Norway) state clearly that by investing with ethical considerations, one should expect a 
higher than average long term financial performance. However conflicts between ethical 
and long-term owner value objectives may well arise. Sorell and Hendry (1994), although 
they do not give a full answer, suggest that it involves deep questions about “how far the 
obligations that derive from the roles one has, including that of investor, can free one 
from the obligations that one is under as a human being”. Through their answer Sorell 
and Hendry imply that one may regard one’s wider ethical responsibilities to be over-
riding the narrow ones due to a particular role. If so, ethical investors may claim that their 
more general ethical responsibilities are more important than their narrow concerns as 
shareholders. Sternberg (1994), asking the question “What if owners want something 
other than maximum financial value from their organisation?” gives a somewhat similar 
response: “Owners are perfectly entitled to devote their organisations to all sorts of ends. 
To the extent that they pursue something other than maximum long-term owner value, 
however, they are simply not engaging in business”. According to Sternberg, 
shareholders have certain responsibilities, particularly to other shareholders. She suggests 
that the main reason to be a ‘responsible shareholder’ arise from the requirements of 
prudence to insure that the companies the shareholder invests in are well managed. 
However Sternberg places the maximisation of long term owner value as the defining 
purpose of business. For her, ethical investors and ethical consumers should not divert 
business from its primary purpose, but instead commit their resources to other charitable 
ends.  
Literature on ethical investment does not directly address the issue of ethics or the ethical 
questions raised by ethical investment. Discussions focus essentially on methodology 
(how and what to do) rather than ideology. Authors and practitioners have had difficulties 
to engage in analysing the definition of the term ‘ethical’. The history of ethical 
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investment links it to churches. It was associated to ‘sin’ stocks and avoidance strategy 
(the first generation of screening). Ethics was reduced to religious moral standards. The 
new wave of ethical investors did not refer to the same standards, and over time the 
ethical investment movement shifted from a direct reference to ethics to concepts like 
sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. The next sections 5.4.2 and 
5.4.3 present these two concepts.  
5.4.2 Sustainable development 
The roots of sustainable development go back to the early 1970s. Hajer (1995) provides 
an interesting analysis of the emergence of the concept focusing on the institutional 
process out of which the new discourse of ecological modernisation derives social 
support. Environmental concern really emerged in the early 1970s. In 1970, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched an 
Environment Committee which functioned as a think-tank for ideas that sprang up in 
academia (Hajer, 1995). In 1972 an important event brought sustainable development on 
the political scene. The United Nations held a conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm around the theme ‘Only one Earth’. At the time, this was the biggest UN 
conference ever held. The same year saw the publication of a report raising the 
environmental paradigm: Limits to Growth from the ‘Club of Rome’. The report 
discusses whether or not continuing economic growth would inevitably lead to severe 
environmental degradation and societal collapse on a global scale (Meadows, 1972; 
Pezzey, 1992). For the first time the environmental issue was portrayed as global crisis. 
In 1980 UNEP published a report, ‘World Conservation Strategy’, the first to officially 
discuss the concept of ‘sustainable development’ as such (United Nations, 1980, World 
Conservation Strategy, United Nations, New York). This report followed up on ideas 
proposed by nature conservation organisations such as WWF and the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN, formerly the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources). In this report the concept of conservation was clearly defined, the emphasis 
being on its human dimension. It consisted of three factors: maintaining ecological 
processes, preserving genetic diversity and utilising species and ecosystems in a 
sustainable fashion (IUCN, 1998).  
In 1984 the OECD held a conference on Environment and Economics that has been 
influential in the development of the concept (Hajer, 1995). The economy and the 
environment were presented as compatible through the concept of ‘pollution prevention 
pays’.  
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published 
the report ‘Our Common Future’ also known as the Brundtland report. It was the result of 
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negotiation within an international group of politicians, civil servants and experts on the 
environment. It brought the concept of sustainable development into the global debate. 
The definition scope was enlarged, integrating social responsibility and especially 
poverty. According to the report, sustainable development would enable the eradication 
of poverty in developing countries on the one hand, and on the other the creation of a new 
balance between material wealth in developed countries and the preservation of 
ecological systems as the basis for life. The definition in the Brundland Report, today the 
most widely recognised and used, is the following: sustainable development is a 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987). According to the Brundland 
Commission, sustainable development is not restrictive. Its only restriction relates to the 
prevailing state of technology and the social organisation of natural resources and the 
capacity of the ecological system to absorb the effects of human activity. No economic 
restrictions were mentioned at that time. The Commission furthered its definition of 
sustainable development by emphasising the notion of change: “In essence, sustainable 
development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction 
of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are 
all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet needs and 
aspirations” (WCED, 1987). It is not a goal; it is a social process in which the principles 
of sustainable development are taken as starting point for assessing ecological, social, and 
economic aspects of decisions in an integrated way through interactive learning processes 
(Carley & Christie, 1999; Roome & Clarke, 1999).  
The next major event that “cemented [the concept] into the international political arena” 
(Bebbington, 2001) was the ‘Earth Summit’ held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. During the 
United Nations Conference for Environment and Development (UNCED) 180 
participants agreed on the fact that environment and development were interdependent, 
indivisible and equal in rank. The Earth Summit stated that all human activities, and 
indeed social prosperity in its traditional narrow sense, should be subsumed under the 
principle of environmental sustainability. Development and social prosperity can only be 
achieved to the extent that the natural resource basis is not endangered (principle 15 of 
the UNCED Declaration). However, the Earth Summit has been criticised for being a 
failure, especially because it did not discuss key structural features of unsustainability 
(Hildyard 1995 in (Bebbington, 2001); see for more critics (Miller, 2002)).  
First of all, sustainable development is a confusing concept. In his 1992 paper, Pezzey 
provides a list of 33 definitions of sustainable development (Pezzey, 1992) and reports in 
1997 to have found five thousand (Pezzey, 1997). It is however widely recognised that 
sustainable development is about balancing three important dimensions: economic, social 
and environmental. This has been translated into ‘People, Planet, Profit’ (the three Ps) or 
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the ‘triple bottom line’ (Elkington, 1997). Sustainable development is also described in 
terms of vision expression, value change, moral development, social reorganisation or 
transformational process toward a desired future or better world (Gladwin & Kennelly, 
1995). The Brundtland definition provided room for interpretation. As a consequence, the 
notion of sustainable development remains fuzzy, elusive, contestable and/or 
ideologically controversial (Gladwin et al., 1995; Levin, 1993).  
Secondly, sustainable development has developed within the context of the United 
Nations (Bebbington, 2001), although environmental NGOs such as IUCN and World 
Wide Fund have also played an important role (see in Hajer, 1995). Hajer’s study shows 
that in the 1980s the concept of sustainable development took a new turn to take a more 
economic-oriented discourse. This has been one of the main arguments of the OECD 
which already in the mid-1980s emphasised the need to look at economic and 
environmental issues as essentially intertwined. However, the understanding of 
sustainable development has also been influenced by corporations. According to 
Hoffman, “corporations have seized on sustainability as an issue they can handle 
themselves” (Hoffman, 2001). They have developed task forces, established vice 
presidential positions, and joined government studies in order to address the agenda and 
business implications of sustainability. The confusion about the concept of sustainable 
development helped them to play an important role in shaping it. Their views have been 
central especially because they brought a certain pragmatism to the concept which 
allowed developing standards (for example the Global Reporting Initiative).  
5.4.3 Corporate social responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been the subject of innumerable articles, books, 
papers, and forums. Views on CSR have evolved over time. Four main periods can be 
distinguished. 
The twenties  
At the start of the nineteenth century the activities of the business community were 
mainly separated from the remainder of society. The drive for profit and growth was 
unrestrained. By the beginning of the twentieth century there was some awakening 
among the business community to human rights and a growing recognition that people 
and land were assets to be preserved rather than just commodities to be used.  
According to Heald, a not ‘clearly-formulated doctrine of social responsibilities’ emerged 
in America in the twenties (Heald, 1961)]. Managers such as Gerard Swope of the 
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General Electric and E.A. Filene of the TCF6, acknowledged that their growing interest in 
harmonious relations with employees, stockholders, customers and the public resulted 
quite as much from the exigencies of profit under changing economic conditions as from 
moral or social concerns (Heald, 1961). Heald argues that this new trend was partly due 
to the professionalisation of the new generation of independent corporate managers. 
There were at that time a growing number of men who attended business and professional 
schools. Regulations, trade associations and schools were starting to promote ethics in 
business. One of the most significant consequences of this development was the growth 
of the corporate philanthropy area.  
From the postwar period until the sixties 
Although it was not until the late 1970s that interest in corporate social involvement and 
responsibility became a phenomenon of general interest, a significant period in the 
history of corporate social responsibility is the postwar years.  
After the Second World War, some notable activities and discussions about the role of 
business in society in Europe were started. In particular, it was those business leaders 
with religious convictions that helped promote concerns about social responsibilities of 
business and the need for ethical considerations in commerce (Marinetto, 1999). In the 
postwar years, Christian business leaders held a special role in the history of corporate 
philanthropy. George Goyder, involved in Christian Frontier Council, wrote two seminal 
texts, The future of Private Enterprise (1951) and The responsible Company (1961). The 
basic theme of both texts was that companies are responsible to a wider constituency than 
just their shareholders. Goyder argued that workers, consumers, the local community and 
society at large all have a stake in the private company (Marinetto, 1999).  
At the beginning of the 1950s, the dissociation of business from the church was 
increasing due to changes in capitalism. At that period the ownership of business started 
to change as well. Financial institutions were becoming involved as both investors and 
shareowners in private companies. By the end of the 1950s, there was a change in the 
ownership of companies. The trend went from one major shareholder proprietorship to an 
increase of minority share ownership. There was a separation between ownership and 
control. Companies are controlled through what John Scott terms a ‘constellation of 
interests’. (Scott, 1980). Modern corporations did not disregard socially responsible 
activities. But it was mainly in terms of charitable gifts. A study by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in 1957 showed that the majority of British firms claimed an interest in 
                                                 
6 The Century Foundation, formally the Twenties Century Foundation: Research foundation that undertakes 
analysis of major economic, political and social institutions and issues. TCF was founded in 1919 and 
endowed by Edward A Filene.  
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philanthropy but only 12 out of 381 had definite policy guidelines (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1957).  
In the mid-sixties, the main issue or fear was the automation of the production processes, 
that might cause unemployment problems. This exerted considerable pressure on 
corporations to continue providing jobs. This consideration introduced an entirely new 
dimension of social responsibility (Heller, 1976a).  
From the seventies –to the nineties 
Corporate social responsibility has strong Americans roots. It has been often presented in 
the 1970s as a challenge to Friedman’s view. This perspective changed in the 
1980s/1990s, CSR and Friedman’s view were not presented as opposite but rather 
complementary views. 
Concerns for corporate social responsibility rose significantly in the seventies. This 
coincided with the increased concern for a corporation’s image. In 1976, the OECD 
issued the first version of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The guidelines 
provide principles and standards for responsible business conduct. In the late seventies-
early eighties companies had to adapt to an ever-increasing demand for information from 
the public. In 1984, Edward Freeman published his seminal work “Strategic 
management: A stakeholder Approach”, which has played an important role in changing 
the view on companies using the stakeholder perspective.  
If American corporations were prepared to tackle major social problems by the 1960s, 
European corporations showed the beginning of a modern era of corporate social activism 
in the early 1970s. “At the mid-point of the seventies there could be no question but that 
the pressure of social responsibility on the corporation had increased, was increasing and 
ought to go on increasing” (Heller, 1976b).  
Business spokesmen and academics penned several articles and texts on the subject of 
social responsibility between 1973 and 1976 (see a review in (Marinetto, 1999)). Several 
studies carried out in the 1970s confirmed the increasing awareness among companies of 
corporate responsibility (Melrose-Woodman & Kverndal, 1976; Webley, 1974). In 1975 
Learson, then President of International Business Machines Corporation, said: ‘In the 
future, a corporation will be judged as much by its social usefulness as by its ability to 
make a profit’ (extracted from (Hargreaves & Dauman, 1975)). In the mid-seventies, the 
belief quickly spread that management must include in its objectives discharging its 
responsibility to the community just as it had accepted its responsibilities to its 
shareholders, customers and employees (Hargreaves et al., 1975).  
The seventies were also marked by the rise in power and militancy of the trade unions 
and the emergence of consumer groups. One of the most powerful and significant 
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consumer groups in the US was led by Ralph Nader. This period saw many external 
groups starting to put pressure on corporations and criticising business behaviour.  
In the 1970s the main elements of corporate social responsibility were charitable and 
community donations, and unemployment. In the 1980s corporate social involvement 
expanded. In a survey of 1975 by the UK Public Relations Consultants Association in 
which one thousand of Britain’s leading executives were asked what the phrase “social 
responsibility” meant to them, employee came up as the main social responsibility, after 
charities and community.  
Corporate social action during the 1980s was not confined to philanthropic giving 
schemes. A characteristic feature of this period was the efforts by government and 
sections of the private sector to actively involve business in society.  
It is also during this period that the concern for the natural environment came up within 
corporate social responsibilities. There was a growing realisation that production, 
distribution and consumption were having an increasing impact on the environment. 
End of the 20th century – beginning of the 21st century 
Today, corporate social responsibility is being promoted both at the national and 
international levels. There are various international initiatives such as the UN Global 
Compact (2000), the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (2000).  
Norms and values have changed and are developing through society. Citizens no longer 
refer to government or churches to assess the moral content of social action. There is a 
new public arena in which norms, values, social expectations and objectives for CSR 
evolve in an interaction between various parties, including civil organisations, trade 
unions, and firms. Corporations have gained in power, but new actors have also entered 
the CSR arena.  
One of the characteristics of the end of the century is the emergence of the concept of 
sustainable development at the heart of the corporate social responsibility debate. Both 
concepts seem to have become inseparable. Stigson, Executive Director of WBCSD, says 
that “businesses should integrate social responsibility in their attitude, and to achieve that 
they should use Sustainable development as the route” (Stigson, 2001). The European 
Commission, when communicating on sustainable development, emphasises the 
importance of corporate social responsibility.  
All institutions such as governments and European bodies are providing their own 
definitions and conceptions of corporate social responsibility. In 2001, the European 
Union published the so-called ‘GreenPpaper’ on ‘promoting a European framework for 
corporate social responsibility'’ (European Commission, 2001). In March 2000, the 
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European Council asked companies to take and state their social responsibility regarding 
best practices for lifelong learning, work organisation, equal opportunities, social 
inclusion and sustainable development. In the Green Paper the European Commission 
defines corporate social responsibility as a concept whereby companies decide 
voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment. Via this document, 
the European Commission hopes to promote a new framework for the CSR based on 
European values. The report makes a clear reference to financial institutions as one of the 
factors driving companies towards CSR. This Green Paper should be followed in 2002 by 
an action programme devoting special attention to the preparation of voluntary European 
guidelines for company reporting. The GRI initiative will probably be used as reference 
for the guidelines.  
CSR refers to the role of corporations in society and to corporations’ moral 
responsibilities (see (Wempe, 1998) for a discussion on morality and corporations). It is 
mainly concerned with the ability of firms to respond to social pressures as the following 
definitions point out: “The first (definition) is that any organisation has a responsibility 
for planning and managing its relationships with all those involved in or affected by its 
activities, or with those who, in turn, can affect the ability of the organisation to operate 
effectively and achieve objectives. For relationships to be meaningful, there must be a 
dynamic response, sensitive to changing trends and attitudes. So a second definition of 
social responsibility is simply that it is the anticipated, planned and managed response of 
an organisation to social and political change. Indeed this theme of the management of 
change is fundamental to any practical discussion on social responsibility.” (Hargreaves 
et al., 1975); socially responsible firms are “those companies which monitor and evaluate 
environmental conditions which focus on the demands of various stakeholders” 
(Ackerman, 1975).  
CSR was initiated by the business sector. It was a response to the increasing criticism 
corporations were receiving. According to Heller (1976) business has become unpopular 
and feels compelled to make strenuous efforts to become less unpopular. He argues that 
there has been a growing concern for the corporation’s image as perceived by the 
community, both through corporate actions and the words of its spokespersons, as well as 
a growing sensitivity to criticism from outside, leading to more strenuous efforts to 
justify the corporation’s existence and activities (Heller, 1976b). He also noticed the rise 
of the consumerist movement and its influence in raising critical standards in the media. 
Ralph Nader was one of the key actors in the rise of the consumer movement. He 
attacked General Motors, and in particular the Corvette car, in order to obtain legal action 
to enforce behaviour changes.  
CSR has been an important instrument to show that the business community does not 
only seek profit – as argued by Friedman (1962) – but also the well-being of its 
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environment and society in general. Through CSR the business community argues that 
firms (should) contribute to the welfare of people and planet as its own welfare. 
Therefore two important elements are crucial to CSR. Firstly companies are in relation 
with ‘stakeholders’, they act with, and on, stakeholders. CSR points out the significance 
of the relationship of the company with its stakeholders and society at large. The second 
element is the long-term perspective. CSR underlines the need to think not only for the 
present but also for the future.  
CSR responds to the demands of ethical investors and more generally to a variety of 
social, environmental and economic pressures. It is a way for corporations to show what 
they are doing to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment.  
5.4.4 Conclusion 
The roots of ethical investment are deeply connected to churches and religious moral 
standards. Reference to ‘ethics’ was for a long time a way for ethical investment to 
distinguish itself from regular investment funds. It did not mean that regular funds were 
amoral but that they were not in line with ethical investors’ moral standards. ‘Ethics’ was 
a distinctive sign and referred to clear norms. However, ‘ethical’ has shifted away to be 
replaced by sustainability and corporate social responsibility. The shift did not happen 
suddenly. For a while the ethical investment movement was lacking a clear guiding 
reference. Since the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s most of the ethical 
funds refer to sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. The change is 
visible in the name: it used to be ‘ethical investment’ and became in the 1990s 
‘sustainable investment’ or ‘socially responsible investment’. But the screening process 
also changed from exclusionary or avoidance to a benchmark based on People, Planet and 
Profit. This shift has allowed the ethical investment movement to avoid references to the 
church and build a new image and a new rationalisation. 
The ‘ethical’ dimension of ethical investment has been reduced to religious moral 
standards. Moreover ethics is a term that businessmen are not always fond of. It raises 
numerous questions about what it is and what it means.  
Sustainable development and CSR also deal with moral standards — moral standards are 
“ matters that are of serious consequence to our human well-being…[i.e.], concerned with 
behaviour that can seriously injure…human beings” (Velasquez, 1992). Sustainable 
development and CSR are the translation of certain ethical norms which have resulted in 
a number of guidelines. Both concepts have been approached in an instrumental way, 
providing responses rather than raising questions. By referring to sustainable 
development ethical investors take this translation for granted. 
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Coming back to Figure 20, the factual information does not refer to the moral standards 
but to a translation of moral standards. By referring to sustainable development and CSR, 
ethical investors have added a link between the moral standard and the judgement. The 
focus has shifted from identifying or explaining the moral standards on which their 
judgements rely to producing evidence that a given policy or action is conform to, or 
violates the standards. The moral standards have become unspoken and assumed. Ethical 
investors have become disconnected from the ethical issues.  
5.5 Changes in the ethical investment field 
This chapter investigated the institutional and international contexts of ethical investment. 
Several characteristics come out of this analysis and highlight some changes within the 
field of ethical investment. Some of them strengthen elements already pointed out in 
Chapter 2.  
Ethical investment has become an international phenomenon. Triodos case already 
highlighted this aspect through the increasing number of relationships with international 
actors. In this chapter, figures show that during the last decade ethical investment has 
spread over many countries from the US and Europe to Asia and Australia. The UK and 
US remain the two dominant countries in terms of number and size of ethical investment 
funds.  
Ethical investment has developed into a commercial project. The roots of ethical 
investment are in the US. In its first form, it was mainly connected to religious groups 
who did not want to support specific activities. They were applying negative criteria in 
order to avoid what they called the ‘sin stocks’. In the 1970s, still in the US, a new form 
of ethical investment started. It became a more political tool to protest against companies’ 
misbehaviour. This tool came to Europe in the 1980s, which marks the beginning of a 
new form of ethical investment. The first UK ethical investment fund, Friends Provident 
Stewardship (1984), but also a large number of the funds launched after the 1980s-1990s, 
do not aim at protesting. They are primarily financial products and ought to be financially 
profitable. The 1980s-1990s mark an important shift in the history of ethical investment 
from a religious and contest activity to a commercial project.  
Ethical investment funds have diffused within the financial sector. The number and size of 
ethical investment funds has increased significantly, especially during the last decade. 
Mainstream financial institutions, banks but also pension funds, have started to set up 
ethical investment funds. This characteristic explains the increasing number of clients of 
Triodos Research between 1997 and 2002 that was pointed out in Chapter 2.  
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New types of actors have emerged in the field of ethical investment, as was noticeable in 
the case of Triodos. New organisations have been established for the purpose of ethical 
investment. They have specific functions such as screening companies, rating 
organisations for example EIRIS (UK) or KLD (US), or gathering and diffusing 
information for example UK SIF or ASrIA (Asia). These last two characteristics – the 
diffusion of ethical funds and the setting up of new types of organisations – suggest an 
increase in the density of interorganisational contacts and a clearer structuration of the 
field.  
In the 1990s there emerged a new institutional context encouraging the development of 
ethical investment especially among mainstream financial institutions. Non-
governmental, governmental and intergovernmental organisations started to point the 
finger at the financial sector because of its non-engagement towards sustainable 
development. For example in 1992, UNEP set up a special unit for stimulating the 
greening of the financial sector; in 2000 the UK government voted a new regulation 
requiring pension funds to disclose their SRI policy; in 2001 the EU published its Green 
Paper on CSR. This new institutional context created coercive pressures on financial 
institutions to participate to sustainable development.  
The criteria used for ethical investment present some signs of homogenisation. Over the 
years ethical funds have tended to increasingly use similar criteria, especially from the 
exclusionary type. This is linked to the elements of formalisation and standardisation 
noted in Chapter 2. 
Ethical investment has changed identity from an ethical oriented movement to a CSR-
related activity. Sparkes (2001) made it very clear when she wrote “ethical investment is 
not a moral campaign”. The first generation of criteria were based on an exclusionary 
approach and referred to some ethical principles. However the third, and today most 
widespread generation focuses on comparative criteria and refers to sustainable 
development and CSR concepts. The values and meaning carried by the ethical 
investment community have changed. Ethics did not fit into the new commercial 
approach of mainstream financial institutions. As a consequence, criteria changed from a 
negative approach based on punishment — exclusion of the bad companies – to a positive 
approach based on reward — the best companies are selected. This suggests a mimetism 
between the ethical investment and CSR movements but also the rallying of the field of 
ethical investment to another field.  
The field of ethical investment reveals also a number of areas of unclearness and non-
agreement. There are intense debates related to the definition of ethical investment and 
no agreement as to what ethical investment is and how it should be performed. Criteria, in 
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spite of a move towards homogenisation, remain diverse and multiple. This suggests that 
there is not yet a shared definition of the field of ethical investment. 
This chapter also underlines possible conflicts between the values carried by the ethical 
investment community and the values of the financial sector. Historically ethical 
investment is built on very strong ideologies, first religious and then political. In the 
1980s/1990s it changed into an apolitical activity and a commercial project where 
profitability became a prerequisite for its existence. This new direction may conflict with 
the initial motives and values of ethical investment. Another area of conflict is to be 
found within the investment community. Investing is a highly institutionalised activity 
with its own rules, norms and values. The arrival of ethical investment is a disturbing 
element for financiers with new values and new norms. This suggests conflicting 
institutional logics within the field of ethical investment. Institutional logics are the 
socially constructed rules, beliefs and practices by which organisational and social actors 
give meaning to their social reality (Scott, 2001). They are both material and symbolic, 
and constitute a set of implicit values and assumptions about how organisational reality 
should be interpreted and what constitutes appropriate behaviour (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Rubin, 2001). Logics are acquired in the course of historical development (Scott, 
2001).  
This chapter focused on the macro level of analysis. It is in this institutional and 
international context that ethical investment emerged in the Netherlands at the beginning 
of the 1990s. The next chapter will turn to the meso level of analysis and investigate more 
particularly the Dutch case. 
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Chapter  6 –  Institutionalisation  of  ethical  
investment:  the  Dutch  case  
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presented the international and institutional contexts in which ethical 
investment developed. It highlighted some characteristics of the organisational field. The 
activity developed into an international phenomenon which has significantly diffused 
within the financial sector. The form of ethical investment has evolved over time: it has 
shifted from being an activist activity to a commercial project. Along with this shift a 
number of changes have taken place: emergence of new actors, signs of homogenisation, 
standards, and change of identity from an ethically-oriented movement to a CSR-related 
activity. But the chapter also pointed at some areas of unclearness, non-agreement and 
conflict that indicate that the field is in formation.  
Chapter 6 focuses on one specific country, the Netherlands. The Dutch ethical investment 
case started at the beginning of the 1990s. The chapter explores the institutionalisation 
process of ethical investment. Section two and three describe the diffusion of ethical 
investment in the Netherlands from a niche to a mainstream activity, the context in which 
it developed, and the different ethical investment funds. Section four investigates the 
understanding of and the practices of financial institutions in the field. Sections five and 
six focus on the actors in the field: identification, roles and relationships. The seventh 
section explores one specific element of the institutionalisation process namely 
professionalisation. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the institutionalisation 
process of the ethical investment field in the Netherlands.  
6.2 Diffusion of ethical investment 
The first form of ethical investment in the Netherlands appeared in the 1970s. The 
Hollandsche Koopmansbank mainly used to manage labour unions’ funds that were 
closely related to the socialist and social democrat political parties in the Netherlands 
(P3). They applied some sort of exclusionary criteria driven by a strong political 
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background: they excluded from their portfolio any companies involved with countries 
with an apartheid regime (South Africa), or with companies where human rights were 
violated (Chile, South Asia). This type of screening started at Hollandsche 
Koopmansbank because of a demand from their clients. 
In 1990, Triodos Bank launched its life insurance, MeerWaarde Polis, based on social 
and environmental screening (see Chapter 2). This initiative was mainly internally driven. 
Around the same period an organisation called Memo, composed of a council of 
churches, congregations, environmental groups and including the managing director of 
Triodos Bank, started to think about launching a trust fund that would respect their 
values. As a result an investment company, ABF, was created to manage the ethical fund 
(called Het Andere Beleggingsfonds), which was launched in 1991. At that time there 
was little experience in Europe of ethical investing. Founder members of the fund looked 
mainly at US practices in order to develop their own methodology and screens. From 
1991 till 1998, ABF conducted the social, environmental and financial screening 
themselves. However they soon realised that they needed a ‘professional’ research 
organisation (P1). In 1998, they asked SNS Asset Management to carry out the social and 
environmental screening. 
The second ethical fund was created in 1993 by ASN bank, Aandelenfonds. The bank 
was asked by its clients to develop an investment fund that could reflect the bank’s 
values. According to the fund manager, clients really wanted to invest on the stock 
market, because it was financially more attractive, but they were also becoming more and 
more conscious of the power of large companies in society (P3). They said to ASN Bank: 
“we want to choose where to invest. We don’t want to put our money anywhere.” ASN 
Bank had already some experience with this kind of investment because they used to 
manage investment for the Hollansche Koopmansbank – which is now part of SNS asset 
management (Real Groep, the insurance company which owned the Hollansche 
Koopmansbank, and ASN Bank merged in 1997). As ABF had done, ASN looked at what 
was going on abroad, especially in the US and UK and decided to set up its own research 
group for the screening of companies. The fund manager describes the first screening as 
follows: “we took a paper and we wrote what we wanted to know” (P3). They contacted 
trade unions, NGOs and other types of organisations in order to get the information they 
needed according to their criteria. From the beginning they decided to send 
questionnaires to companies. Companies were very surprised and were asking ASN: 
“What is that? Why do you want to know that?” (P3). Companies were not used to being 
asked questions about the way they were handling human rights, environmental 
problems, etc. At that time business environmental or sustainability reports were very 
rare. It was very difficult for fund managers and analysts to get the right information. But 
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“at that time questions were less detailed and less numerous” (P3). Little by little the 
research group grew and became more structured and more professional.  
In 1996 VBDO, The Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development was 
created. This organisation was partly initiated by the financial institutions already active 
in ethical investment (Triodos, ABF, ASN and SNS) and partly by the government (see 
Chapter 2, section .3.5.5). VBDO plays a central role in the Netherlands, enabling its 
members, which today consist of most of the Dutch banks, to regularly meet and discuss 
matters related to ethical investment.  
In 1997, Triodos Bank launched the third Dutch ethical investment fund, the 
MeerWaarde Fund. Like ASN and ABF Triodos looked at practices and experiences 
abroad (see Chapter 2). They also decided to carry out the research themselves in order to 
develop criteria that fitted the bank’s values. The bank immediately realised that 
screening could not be improvised. A good, thorough, systematic, and structured research 
for the selection of companies was necessary. Therefore the Triodos Research 
department, entirely devoted to screening, was created in 1997.  
ASN and Triodos are both specific type of banks. They have very strong social and 
environmental commitments. They are both what is called social banks at the margin of 
mainstream banks. They criticised the lack of transparency and the discriminatory system 
of financial institutions. They launched an ethical fund not only as a financial product but 
also as a way of protesting against the established financial system and (mis)behaviour of 
corporations. For both banks, ethical investment was a way to invest without infringing 
their organisational values. According to the fund manager of ASN there were two main 
reasons for launching an ethical investment fund: firstly because clients were asking for 
it, and secondly because it was a new instrument “to make a difference” (P3). ABF, ASN 
and Triodos have been the pioneers of ethical investment in the Netherlands. 
In the years1998-2000 ethical investment grew slowly in the Netherlands. But around 
2000 it changed and became a product offered by mainstream banks. During the years 
2000 and 2001, 9 new funds were launched. As of November 2002, there were 13 ethical 
investment funds in the Netherlands (see Figure 21). Note that the increase is not only 
due to the entrance on the market of new providers but also to the splitting of existing 
products, such as the Triodos MeerWaarde Fund. In 2002, most Dutch banks proposed an 
ethical investment fund.  
At the end of 2000, ethical investment totalled more than Euro 828 million. Ethical 
investment has gained a market share relative to total Dutch investments. It accounts for 
more than 1.2% of the total investment market (Bauer, Koedijk, & Otten, 2002). 
However this is still very small compared to the total market. It remains a niche sector. 
Robert Rubinstein (of the Holland-based ethical consultancy Brooklyn Bridge) said, 
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“Sure the market is growing, but it’s still pathetically small. The big financial institutions 
all offer some kind of ethical product, but that’s it. Many of them don’t bother to promote 
or really sell it. They just seem to be offering them for the sake of it. Most big financial 
houses still have less than one percent of their assets in ethical vehicles, and the biggest 
market player is still ASN Bank, the oldest, with 35 percent market share. A long process 
of cultural change lies ahead. At the moment, big financial institutions see SRI as a 
reputational issue. They need to start seeing it as a strategic investment issue. Until they 
are convinced, SRI will not develop sufficiently” (extracted from (McCallin, 2003)). 
In parallel to the increase in funds, a number of organisations emerged: in 1999 Brooklyn 
Bridge was launched, a consulting organisation whose activity focuses on SRI (advice to 
companies, fund managers and individuals), and that organises the yearly Triple Bottom 
Line Investing Conference; in 2000 Triodos Research became the official Dutch rating 
organisation; in 2000 also another consulting organisation started, Your Good Choice 
specialised in SRI; in 2002 VBA, the Dutch Analysts Association, started a working 
group on SRI. Websites devoted to ethical investment were created such as Duurzaam 
vermogensbeheer and Duurzaam-beleggen. And a Chair in Socially Responsible 
Investment was open at the Institute for Responsible Business (EIBE) at the University of 
Nyenrode.  
In 2000 also, new types of investors showed interest in ethical investment. Two major 
Dutch pension funds, PGGM and ABP, announced that they would invest a portion of 
their assets in a sustainable way. For both funds, the main, essential objective is to have 
out-performing portfolios. If not, such a strategy may be reconsidered, or even excluded. 
In order to stimulate other Dutch pension funds, Your Good Choice initiated an 
organisation for pension funds called SODP (Foundation for Supporting Sustainable 
Pension funds). It aims at helping pension funds that want to take a further step in 
implementing sustainable criteria in the core asset process (See Chapter Triodos, section 
.4.3). The number of pension funds integrating social and environmental screens in their 
investment policy is soon expected to increase (see (Hummels & Timmer, 2003)). And 
lately, in 2002, insurance companies have drawn up a code of conduct addressing ethical 
investment issues in 2002. The code has not yet been applied.  
The diffusion of ethical investment in the Netherlands has been rather fast. It started at 
the beginning of the 1990s on the initiative of social banks and within a decade it had 
spread to all the major banks (Table 29 for a list of the ethical investment funds in the 
Netherlands in 20012). The Dutch case can be placed in the 1990s shift described in the 
previous chapter. It started as a commercial project although at the beginning it was 
balancing between two dimensions: activist tool and financial product. However, figures 
show that at the beginning of the 2000s ethical investment had become part of 
mainstream financial products.  
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Financial 
institution 
Fund Year of 
launch 
Asset (Million 
Euro) 
1/01/2002 
Investment funds    
ABF/ASN bank Het andere beleggingsfonds 1991 184 
Triodos bank Triodos MeerWaarde Mixfonds 1997 May 37.9 
 Triodos MeerWaarde Aandelenfonds 2000 October 15 
 Triodos MeerWaarde Obligatiefonds 2000 October 9.2 
ING Bank ING Duurzaam Rendement Fonds 2000 May 61 
ASN ASN Aandelenfonds 1993 March 298 
 ASN Obligatiefonds 2002 January 45 
 ASN Mixfonds 2002 January 185 
Robeco Groep RG Duurzaam aandelen Fund 1999 February 145 
SNS Reaal Invest SNS Duurzaam Anndelenfonds 1998 
November 
27.6 
ABN AMRO ABN AMRO Duurzame Wereld Fond 2000 May 60 
Postbank Postbank Duurzaam Aandelen Fonds 2001 March 9.63 
Aegon Aegon Aandelen Duurzaam 2001 October 24.4 
Kempen Capital 
Management 
Orange SeNSE Fund 2002 
November 
Not available 
Private banking    
Fortis Bank Mees Pierson 2001 Not available 
Table 29 - Ethical investment funds in The Netherlands, 2001 (Molen, 2002)) 
Figure 21 - Ethical investment in The Netherlands (in thousands of guilders and number of funds) 
(data source(VBDO, 2002)) 
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6.3 Financial institutions: initiators of ethical investment in the 
Netherlands 
Several elements in the previous section provided evidence that ethical investment in the 
Netherlands has been initiated by financial institutions. This makes it a unique case in the 
international context, and a very different one from the US and UK cases examined in 
Chapter 5.  
In the 1990s, ethical investment started in the Netherlands on the initiative of a small 
group of social banks. This same group supported the creation of the Dutch Organisation 
for Sustainable Development (VBDO). And one of the banks of this group launched the 
Dutch rating organisation Triodos Research. Those two organisations, VBDO and 
Triodos Research, played a significant role in diffusing ethical investment – providing the 
necessary structure for other banks to adopt it.  
The government also played an important role, not directly by stimulating ethical 
investment but by putting pressure on the financial sector to show commitment to 
sustainable development. In Chapter 5 it was shown how at the international level, 
financial institutions have been criticised for their lack of engagement since the beginning 
or middle of the 1990s.  
In 1989, the Dutch government established national environmental targets for several 
sectors of the Dutch economy stipulated in the National Environmental Policy Plan 
(NEPP) and the National Policy Plan Plus (NEPP+) (Bouma & Jeucken, 1999). In the 
NEPP and NEPP+, the banking sector was not directly targeted but was mentioned in 
connection with the clean-up costs of their customers. This did not affect banks. However 
as a consequence of the NEPP, a new sector focused on environmental technologies grew 
in the Netherlands. In 1998, financial institutions were directly targeted by the Dutch 
environmental policy of the government in its Policy Document on the Environment and 
the Economy. In 1999 a new initiative was established: the Environmental Dialogue 
between Banks and Governments. Its purpose was to stimulate environmental 
improvements through the development of new financial products and services and 
through an optimal match between the environmental and fiscal policies of the 
government (Bouma et al., 1999). The end of the 1990s displayed a clear will on the 
government’s part to increase the environmental awareness of the financial sector.  
In March 2001, the same year the European Commission published its ‘Green Paper’, the 
Dutch government issued a ‘white paper’ to present its perspective on CSR (Ybema, 
2000). The government stated that CSR – defined as a company caring for its domestic 
and foreign social effects – is a current priority for the Dutch government. The 
government wanted to support CSR, not through regulation – arguing it is not a suitable 
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tool – but through individual initiatives. In this paper the Social and Economic affairs 
ministry discussed the role of the government in promoting CSR. Corporate social 
responsibility was described as the conscious guidance of business activities towards 
creating value in three dimensions in the longer term: not only in terms of financial-
economic variables, such as share values, but also in an ecological and social sense. 
These values referred to the Triple P bottom line: profit, the production of goods and 
services; people, the consequences for people, inside and outside the company; and 
planet, the effects on the natural environment. With the White Paper the Dutch 
government reaffirmed its determination to promote corporate social responsibility within 
the business community, among which financial institutions.  
Dutch financial institutions felt increasing pressure and took action to show commitment. 
One of the first initiatives from the financial sector, jointly with the government, was to 
develop a unique tax incentive scheme for green investment known as the ‘Green Savings 
and Investment Plan’. It was introduced in 1992, and launched in1995. Dutch Green 
Funds have the characteristics of offering a unique tax incentive scheme. Private 
investors are not taxed on their interest and dividend income, provided that this derives 
from investment in certain green investment funds. These green investment funds, in turn, 
have to invest in certain green projects. Bouma, Jeucken, & Klinkers (2001) and 
Scholtens (2001) provide more extended information on the Green funds (Bouma, 
Jeucken, & Klinkers, 2001; Scholtens, 2001).  
A study conducted by Jeucken (2001) shows that Dutch banks are among the best 
regarding sustainability issues; it contains a survey of state-of-the-art sustainability and 
banking among 34 mainstream international banks (Jeucken, 2001). The survey includes 
three Dutch banks: ABN Amro, ING Group and Rabobank Group. Dutch banks are 
among the front-runners while most of the banks (53%) are in the group of the stragglers 
with a rather defensive approach. ABN Amro and ING Group have an offensive approach 
and Rabobank is qualified as sustainable banking (see Chapter 5 for a description of the 
approach). The three Dutch banks have an environmental assessment system, an 
environmental policy, and publish an environmental report. All three offer environmental 
funds, insurance, leasing and advice services. Two of them offer environmental loans and 
climate products (ING and Rabobank). In addition Rabobank offers micro-credit and 
environmental venture capital.  
In their strategies for improving their sustainability performance, financial institutions 
adopted ethical investment. This reflected a market opportunity –there was demand for it 
– but also offered a mark of commitment to sustainable development in line with their 
general strategy. By 2002 all major Dutch banks and investment houses offered some 
kind of ethical vehicle encompassing all shapes and sizes of retail financial products 
(McCallin, 2003).  
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6.4 Ethical investment funds: definition, motives and criteria 
6.4.1 Unclear definition 
Ethical fund managers in the Netherlands have some difficulties in grasping what is 
ethical investment. A number of them said: “There are lots of names”(P4), “There is no 
clear definition, no standard definition”(P8); “It is difficult to define because it is linked 
to several personal values, that are different for each individual” (P3). Box 2 discloses 
some of the definitions fund managers gave during the interviews. All of them referred to 
criteria and/or what type of companies it includes.  
Behaviour of companies with respect to environment and social issues - Exclusion of certain 
activities or behaviour (P1) 
What we believe is that SRI includes the following: companies act in a way that doesn’t 
harm the environment and people or social systems. (P2) 
Sustainable investment is for us the third generation type of investing with a combination of 
absolute and relative criteria, and with today situation as a starting point. (P4) 
We have criteria looking at negative aspects and also positive screening. We classify companies 
on the basis of the best performance in the sector (P5) 
It is investing in sustainable companies, companies that are sufficiently ‘sustainable’ (good, very 
good, acceptable) (P6) 
We look in our investment approach not only to financial criteria but also to social and 
environmental criteria (P7) 
We want to invest in companies that have a good track record from an social, environmental and 
financial aspect. (P8) 
Box 2 – Definition of ethical investment by Dutch fund managers 
Ethical investment in the Netherlands is called by different names. Among the ten Dutch 
ethical funds investigated in this thesis, three of them use ‘ethical investment’, four 
‘sustainable investment’, one ‘SRI’ and two use ‘SRI’ and ‘sustainable investment’ 
interchangeably. The three using ‘ethical investment’ are the first three funds launched in 
the Netherlands. One of them is thinking of changing the designation: ‘sustainable’ 
instead of ‘ethical’. The fund manager explained that this change was being considered 
because ‘sustainable’ is more objective and more internationally recognised. 
6.4.2 Differences in motives 
There is a clear distinction between the funds. Funds that use the name ‘ethical’ are 
referred to as the ‘old’ funds while funds that use ‘sustainable’ are referred to as ‘new’ 
funds. ‘New’ fund managers do not like the reference to ethics because of the questions it 
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raises and the connotations is has (religion). They prefer to talk about sustainability or 
corporate responsibility. 
This distinction is made by fund managers themselves but also by other actors in the 
field, such as corporations, investors and some NGOs. The old and new funds have 
different connotations. Table 30 shows the perception of the two types of fund by the 
fund managers and companies’ managers interviewed. According to the managers of the 
old funds, this tendency to use ‘sustainability’ instead of ‘ethical’ came in 2000.  
Old funds as viewed by managers from 
the new funds 
New funds as viewed by managers from the 
new funds 
Religious inspired Based on sustainability, the triple bottom line  
Exclusionary, Sin stocks 
Negative funds 
Positive 
Best in class approach 
Not excluding too many sectors 
Subjective 
Ethical norms and values 
Questionable  
Morality preacher, Negative connotations 
Fundamental and fundamentalists 
Ideological funds 
More objective, organic, vivid 
Idea of future 
Practically inspired 
More pragmatic 
Stimulate companies 
Less about excluding, more about influencing 
and informing 
Old flower-power generation, Old-fashioned 
Niche player 
 
Market opportunity 
We are an investment house first, profitability 
is a priority 
We don’t impose our views on our investors 
Old funds as viewed by managers from the 
old funds 
New funds as viewed by managers from the 
old funds 
Profitability, although important, is not the 
sole priority 
Knowledge  
Serious and rigorous 
Engaged (institution as well as investors)  
As institution we do have values that are 
reflected in the fund 
Superficial screening 
Marketing tool 
The content is weakening 
Ideological motive is lost 
Just look at the best of sector 
Table 30 – Views on the ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds by fund managers (source: interviews) 
In practice, fund managers in the Netherlands do not favour references to ethics. They 
prefer using ‘sustainable’ or ‘responsible’. Ethics, they say, raises numerous questions: 
“What is ethics? Whose ethics?” (P4) It is a difficult dimension/aspect because “as soon 
as you start to talk about ethics every body has a different opinion and there is no right 
or wrong in this subject” (P2), “ethics has to do with believe of people or companies” 
(P3), “it is subjective” (P3, P4, P5). In general financial institutions do not wan to be 
perceived as “moral preacher” and therefore are careful about the ethical dimension. 
When referring to ethics most of the time fund managers talk about the exclusionary 
criteria: “We do have some ethical exclusions (weapons, tobacco, pornography, 
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gambling, nuclear power, fur, human rights) but what we really would like to have in the 
future is a fund that has only positive criteria, but at this moment that’s not possible 
therefore we have ethical criteria” (P2); “On a fundamental level there is ethics every 
where but to us in the day to day business we tend to equate ethical issues with exclusion 
constraints (no alcohol, no nuclear energy)” (P10). It is also the ethical dimension which 
is said to make the difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds.  
All ethical fund managers interviewed in the Netherlands but one referred to sustainable 
development, either directly quoting the Brundtland definition or indirectly referring to 
the 3Ps or the triple bottom line. The one who did not refer to sustainable development 
was the manager of an old ethical fund. This fund manager found the definition of 
‘sustainability’ confusing and not yet suitable for this kind of investment (P1). He said: 
“We don’t have the so-called 3 Ps principles or sustainability. We were from before, 
these concepts were not yet existing” (P3). The ethical fund manager of the other old fund 
mentioned sustainability but not exactly as the reference. He referred to the ILO 
conventions rather than to sustainability. For the rest sustainable development is the 
“backbone” (P2) reference whether as an aim or as guiding principle – this is not always 
clear. Most of the time, it seems to be both simultaneously. During the interviews, when 
asked what ethical investment is, one of the fund managers answered: “sustainable 
development”.  
Fund managers from the ‘old’ funds tried to justify their position while the fund 
managers from the ‘new’ funds tried to make clear that they do not belong to the older 
generation. The group of ‘old’ funds feels that ethical investment activity is changing. 
They say that the content of the ‘new’ funds is weakening. ‘New’ funds see the ‘old’ 
funds as a niche market and moral preachers. ‘New’ fund managers do not consider ‘old’ 
funds as direct competitors because they do not have the same market and targets 
(investors). They describe the ‘old’ funds as negative funds, that is “don’t do this, but do 
that” (P12). The ‘new’ funds consider themselves first as investment houses where profit 
is an important aspect of the activity. ‘New’ fund managers refer to sustainability. They 
do not talk about ethics. There is a clear split between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds.  
‘Old’ and ‘new’ funds have been launched for different reasons. For all of the financial 
institutions managing the ‘old’ funds, the ethical investment fund was their first mutual 
fund. They started such an activity because their clients wanted to invest on the stock 
market – there was a demand for mutual funds. However, both the financial institution 
and the potential investors wanted to do this in such a way that the fund would respect 
certain values. Clients of those banks, Triodos and ASN, are specific groups of people 
with an exceptionally high environmental awareness. One of the reasons that motivated 
Triodos Bank to launch the MeerWaarde Fund was also that they saw the possibility to 
reach and influence large corporations, which were out of their focus.  
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Managers from the ‘new’ funds had different reasons for launching an ethical investment 
fund. For all of them, the fund was not their first mutual fund. They were all familiar with 
investing on the stock market. During the interviews four main reasons came out:  
(1) Competitors are doing it. 
“…we felt pressures for our competitors” (P2);  
“…our competitors are doing it” (P2) (P6);  
(2) It is good for the image. 
“…one of the ways to show our commitment to sustainability” (P4);  
(3) It is a good market opportunity (P2) (P3)(P7) (P8) and financially interesting: 
“…we saw a trend in the market. It was going to be a new market development.” (P6) 
“…there is one thing we want to prove:… It is not only good for society and the 
environment… but it has also a good performance” (P2);  
“… to achieve an above average financial returns and at the same time giving clients 
the opportunity to colour their money” (P4) 
“The reason why we do that (sustainable investing) is because we think that in the 
long run it would lead to higher returns or to the same return but with less risks” (P7) 
(4)  They were afraid of a new regulation, especially after the UK regulation for 
pension funds (P2) 
An important difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds is the way they present the 
values the fund stands for. The ‘old’ fund managers argue that their fund’s values reflect 
the organisation’s values: “it is closely related to our mission statement” (P3). Financial 
institutions from the ‘old’ funds use ethical, social, and environmental criteria for all their 
funds. On the other hand managers from the ‘new’ funds say that their fund’s values are 
the values of their clients (the investors). ‘New’ funds “don’t impose [their] views on 
investors” (P8). For financial institutions managing the ‘old’ funds, ethical investment 
products are not regular products. Most of their other funds do not apply social or 
environmental criteria. ‘Old’ funds are more internally oriented while ‘new’ funds are 
more market oriented.  
Another aspect that differentiates these two categories is the arguments used to present 
the funds. The ‘old’ funds claim that they hope or want to change companies’ behaviour: 
“we want to see companies changing behaviour” (P1), “… …to help to create a better 
world” (P3). It is one of their primary goals. Of course ‘managers do not deny the 
important of the financial performance of the fund, but as one of them noted investors are 
willing to accept under-performance as long as the fund applies thorough criteria:  
“…It is interesting to note that there are some shareholders that find the performance 
too high. They say that they want to invest in sustainable companies, but they make 
clear that the high performance is not their aim. They don’t look for the highest 
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performance, but rather for the highest social and environmental performing 
companies. Their motives are more on principles than on financial return. They feel 
the need to say it, to make it clear to everybody, so they say it during annual 
meetings. Most of the people of this group mentioned the economic performance as 
an important argument (five persons interviewed).”(P3) 
Managers from the ‘new’ funds present social and environmental screens as a way to 
obtain outperforming funds. The objectives of the funds are primarily to obtain a good 
financial performance: “…the aim is to deliver the best investment performance” (P8); 
“…the performance is what counts”(P7); “…we believed that it would be profitable… we 
knew that the return of portfolio with SRI filter at least matches the returns of 
conventional portfolios” (P2; 109:110; 204:205).  
If fund managers have difficulties in defining what ethical investment is, they clearly 
make a distinction between what they call the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ funds. Table 31 
summarises the differences between the two groups. Several aspects come into play. 
Financial institutions from the ‘old’ funds are social banks. This characteristic puts them 
at the margin of the financial sector. They launched an ethical investment fund because of 
a certain ideology while financial institutions from the ‘new’ fund acted because of a 
market opportunity.  
It is also interesting to note that during the interviews, it came out that investors from the 
‘old’ funds are quite actively following the management of the fund in terms of the 
companies that get selected. Annual meetings of the ‘old’ funds are always attended by a 
large number of the investors, who ask questions especially on ethical issues. This does 
not happen, or less, with the ‘new’ funds.  
Old funds New funds 
• Ethical investment • Sustainable investment 
• Socially Responsible Investment 
• All funds managed by the financial 
institutions are either ethical or green 
funds 
• The ethical fund is one fund among a 
number of other regular funds managed 
by the financial institution 
• First institutions to launch ethical 
funds in the Netherlands (in the 1990s) 
• Ethical funds were launched at the 
beginning of the 2000s  
• Social banks • Mainstream banks 
• Client’s demand 
• Internal drive 
• Competitors effect 
• Market opportunity 
• Values of the ethical fund reflect the 
values of the organisation 
• Values of the fund reflect clients’ values 
(investors) 
• Desire to change corporations’ 
behaviour 
• Desire to have a more profitable fund 
(compared to regular funds) 
Table 31 – Differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds 
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6.4.3 Standardisation of the ethical criteria  
At first, ethical investment funds in the Netherlands were based on exclusionary criteria 
(see also history of Triodos MeerWaarde Fund in chapter 2). Some sort of comparative 
criteria were also used, but they were not written down. Ethical selection was based on 
‘feelings’. In the UK and US most of the funds, if not all, used exclusionary criteria in the 
early 1990s. Ethical fund managers in the Netherlands did the same. Little by little the 
comparative criteria developed and at the end of the 1990s the focus changed towards 
comparative criteria  
According to ethical fund managers the criteria have hardly changed over time: “in the 
content the criteria never changed” (P1). Additional criteria have been included such as 
GMO (P1) (P2) (P3) (P4) (P8), medicines for the poor (P4). But for most of the criteria, if 
there has been any change, it has been in the refining of the definition. A fund manager 
from an old fund noticed that although the “main criteria haven’t changed over time, the 
indicators, or what you mean by it has changed”…“the main criteria are always the 
same. They have not changed… but how do we look at it has changed” (P3). Although 
names of criteria have not changed, the understanding and thereby the implementation 
have changed. Criteria evolve over time according to societal development, scientific 
knowledge and political trends.  
An important evolution seems to be the ‘officialisation’ of the criteria. There has been a 
need to spell out the criteria and the way they are applied: “it was not formally written but 
we were already doing it”(P1).  
On the basis of a report from VBDO (2002) and some additional information, a 
comparison of the social and environmental criteria used by 11 Dutch financial 
institutions shows that if there are some differences in the exclusionary criteria among 
those 11 financial institutions, there is little difference in the comparative criteria (see 
Annex 6). All of the funds use exclusionary criteria. The number of exclusionary criteria 
varies from 2 to 28. Exclusionary criteria have been classified in three categories: 
controversial sectors (meaning that the whole sector is excluded), controversial products 
or services (meaning that a company is excluded if producing or offering the product or 
service), and controversial production processes (related to practices such as violation of 
human rights). Of these three categories, “controversial sectors” is the least popular. In 
this category, the most used criteria is weapons production. Only two funds (two ‘old’ 
funds) use all of the criteria. The other funds (the ‘new’) use between one and two 
criteria. In the second category related to products and services, one of the ‘old’ funds 
uses the most criteria (11) and one of the ‘new’ uses none. For the rest the number of 
criteria varies between 7 and 9, with one fund using 3. The most popular criteria are 
tobacco and gambling. In the third category, controversial production processes, all but 
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one (a ‘new’ fund) use criteria from this category. ‘Old’ funds once again are using more 
criteria. The most popular criterion is surprisingly forced labour closely followed by 
violation of human rights. ‘Old’ funds tend to use more exclusionary criteria than ‘new’ 
funds. They use between 28 and 25 criteria, while ‘new’ funds use between 2 and 21. 
These criteria are not used the same way by all the funds. There is another distinction 
based on ‘used’ and ‘preferably not’. ‘Used’ means that the criterion is always used, and 
‘preferably not’ means that it is sometimes used according to the case. When the 
‘preferably not’ are subtracted, the number of criteria used in total varies between 28 and 
1.  
As of the comparative criteria, they have also been classified into three categories: 
general, environmental and social aspects. Each of them consists of several aspects such 
as environment management. For the three categories, there is a high degree of 
homogeneity among the funds. In total the number of aspects used by funds varies 
between 19 and 12. Both ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds use comparative criteria.  
Concerning the inclusionary criteria, 82% of the funds use them. It has not been 
researched how many are used and which.  
It is interesting to note that all funds use exclusionary and comparative criteria, and 
almost all of them inclusionary criteria. Comparative criteria are rather homogeneous 
amongst the funds. The distinction is on the exclusionary criteria. ‘Old’ funds tend to use 
more exclusionary criteria than ‘new’ funds.  
Rating organisations do play an important role in the definition of the criteria. A majority 
of the fund managers interviewed (6 out of 10, among which two are not from the same 
organisation) mentioned that a rating organisation helped them with the definition and 
choice of criteria. Numerous ethical funds have developed their criteria in collaboration 
with a rating organisation. All Dutch ethical funds use the services of one or several 
rating organisation (Triodos Research, EIRIS, SNS, Innovest, SAM Sustainability Group 
and KLD). As Chapter 2 showed, rating organisations work internationally and tend to 
develop international standards. This homogenisation among rating organisations has a 
direct impact on ethical funds. Funds tend to become alike. Funds may have different 
definitions and motives but they get similar information from rating organisations. 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
The Dutch case does not differ from the international context regarding the definition of 
ethical investment: fund managers have difficulties in defining ethical investment. They 
are confused by the several names and the multiplicity of values it represents. They 
mainly describe it in terms of actions, that is excluding and including.  
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When looking at the criteria and methodology used by all the funds, there is little variety. 
They all use exclusionary and comparative criteria, and most of them also use 
inclusionary criteria; except that ‘new’ funds tend to use less exclusionary criteria than 
‘old’ funds. But what is interesting is that all fund managers use the services of one of 
more rating organisations. Rating organisations have become an indispensable partner in 
the management of ethical funds. Moreover a number of them use the same information 
provider (four of them use Triodos Research, four KLD, four SNS).  
The analysis of the Dutch case shows a split between ethical fund managers: the ’old’ and 
the ‘new’. Both groups do not want to be mixed up with each other, although in practice 
there are only small differences. The ‘old’ fund managers describe themselves as more 
serious and rigorous while describing ‘new’ funds as superficial and market oriented 
(without values). On the other hand, ‘new’ fund managers describe ‘old’ funds as 
fundamentalists and moral preachers, while they describe their funds as more objective, 
pragmatic and positive. What distinguishes them are the motives for which they engaged 
in ethical investment and the values they attach to the activity.  
6.5 Institutional actors  
Institutional actors create (produce), embody and enact (reproduce) the logics of the field 
(Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). Actors are both agents, who exercise power to 
affect and alter existing systems and rules, and carriers, who embody and reflect existing 
norms and beliefs (Scott et al., 2000).  
6.5.1 Overview 
Laumann et al. suggest that analysing participants lists at specific events is a way to 
identify actors in the network under investigation (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1983). 
A conference may be defined as “a meeting of individuals or representatives of various 
bodies for the purpose of discussing and/or acting on topics of common interest” 
(Longman, 1978). It may be referred as an event.  
For the purpose of this research the lists of attendees to Triple Bottom Line Investing 
conference (TBLI) from 1999 (first TBLI conference) to 2002 has been investigated. The 
TBLI conference was chosen because first of all interviewees from financial institution 
and corporations’ managers mentioned it; also a number of them, especially fund 
managers, said they attend it regularly and if they had to choose between several 
conferences they would first go to the TBLI. Secondly the TBLI is one of the world's 
largest international event dealing with ethical investment. The list of attendees of the 
four first conferences have been analysed. 
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The first TBLI conference held in 1999 counted 146 attendees from 10 different 
countries. Attendees from the Netherlands represented 62% of the total attendees. The 
second well-represented country was the USA with 11%. The UK, France and Belgium 
represented between 5 and 6% each. The five other countries were Switzerland, Sweden, 
Germany, Denmark and Norway. The conference has been very successful and its 
number of attendees kept growing: 2000: 354, 2001: 349, and 2002: 411. In four years 
the number of attendees has been multiplied by 2.8. In 2002, attendees were from 26 
different countries, among which the Netherlands was still the most represented with 
21%, followed by the UK (22%), USA (14%) Belgium (9%) and Switzerland (6%) 
(TBLI, 2003).  
Attendees have been distributed into 14 categories according to the type of organisation 
they represent (see Annex 7). Table 33 highlights the categories that are the most 
represented. There are three of these: financial institutions, consulting organisations and 
corporations. The category ‘financial institution’ has always been the strongest 
represented (above 30%) of all categories. Consulting organisations also count a rather 
large percentage, which has always been above 10%, and once in 2001 above 15%. The 
number of corporations has been increasing over the years: 9% in 1999, to reach 20% in 
2002, making it the second most important category. The NGO category, in contrast with 
corporations, decreased over the years. In 1999 it was the third most important category 
(13) after financial institutions and consulting organisations. In 2001 and 2002 it dropped 
to 4% putting it in 7th position. 2001 seems to show several changes in the categories 
representation. If NGOs became less represented, stock markets, press, and rating 
organisations increased. The government category shows an increase in 2002.  
The analysis of the TBLI attendees from 1999 till 2002 shows interesting tendencies in 
the field. The number of participants in each of the categories increased from 1999 to 
2002. The category ‘stock market’ records the highest increase in number of participants 
(multiplied by 9), although it represents only 2% of all TBLI participants. Another 
impressive and interesting increase is the press (multiplied by 7.33), then comes UNEP 
and UE (multiplied by 7) and corporations (multiplied by 6.23). The interest of the press 
and intergovernmental bodies clearly shows that ethical investment is becoming more 
important in the political (government category has been multiplied by 3.67) and societal 
debate (university multiplied by 3.1). The number of rating organisations represented has 
also increased (multiplied by 3.2, from 10 representatives of rating organisations in 1999 
to 31 in 2002). As for financial institutions their increase is less visible (multiplied by 
2.3). The lowest increase concerns NGOs, only multiplied by 0.79.  
The analysis of TBLI attendance shows that financial institutions and corporations are the 
most important actors, ethical investment is getting increasing attention from the press 
(see Table 32), while NGOs seem to be withdrawing from the discussion platform.  
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As for the content of the conference, TBLI is increasingly becoming a procession of best 
practices, where corporations come and present the way they deal with sustainability 
issues, and a place where new tools for ethical investment are displayed. 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Trouw 6 8 7 15 18 16 
Financieel Dagblad 9 6 13 15 19 33 
Table 32 – Number of articles mentioning ‘sustainable investment’ in two Dutch newspapers: Trouw 
and Financieel Dagblad (source: newspaper’s websites, January 2004) 
Code Category 1999 2000 2001 2002  <5%  
FI Financial institutions and related 39% 33% 38% 32%  5-10%  
CO Consulting Organisations 14% 14% 16% 12%  10-15%  
NGO NGOs and trade unions 13% 9% 4% 4%  15-20%  
CSR CSR organisations 3% 2% 3% 2%  20-25%  
EI Ethical Investment organisations 2% 1% 3% 1%  >25%  
IP Index providers 1% 1% 2% 2%    
J Journalists 2% 2% 3% 5%    
C Corporations 9% 17% 12% 20%    
RO Rating organisations 7% 7% 8% 8%    
U Universities 7% 9% 5% 8%    
G Governments 2% 1% 1% 3%    
IGO Intergovernmental organisations  1% 0% 1% 2%    
O Others 1% 4% 3% 1%    
Table 33 – Percentage TBLI categories (1999:2002) 
6.5.2 Changes in key actors 
Four types of actors will be investigated, namely companies, financial institutions, rating 
organisations, and investors. These four groups fulfil a primary function in the field of 
ethical investment, either supplying information or services or buying services, and have 
direct link to one another. Companies have a double function: they provide information 
for the screening and offer investment opportunities for investors. Financial institutions 
also have a double function; they offer and manage the ethical investment fund and buy 
the services of rating organisations. Rating organisations provide the company screenings 
and other services to financial institutions. Investors buy financial investment services.  
Financial institutions are becoming increasingly interested in ethical investment and 
therefore are a growing group of actors. Looking at the attendees of the TBLI, since 1999 
it has always been the dominant group of actors. However the type of financial 
institutions involved has changed. At the very beginning, in the early 1990s, there were 
mainly alternative/social financial institutions such as Triodos. But over time mainstream 
financial institutions have taken over the group. And in the near future one may expect 
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pension funds to become an important type of financial institution. Those different types 
of financial institutions have different motives for and approaches to ethical investment. 
The role of the financial institutions group has changed as well. It has shifted from 
financial institutions doing everything (screening and fund management) to financial 
institutions responsible only for the fund management. They have delegated the screening 
to rating organisations.  
Rating organisations emerged in a large number of countries. In the Netherlands there is 
only one, but in the UK for example, or the US, there are several of them. Rating 
organisations collaborate or work together. SiRi Group is a good illustration of 
collaboration gathering eleven rating organisations. Over time they have created a 
function with a title, ‘sustainability analyst’, that they all use and by which they are 
recognised. This title appeared in the 2000s. The number of activities they offer has 
increased over time, but the core activity remains corporate profiling. One new activity is 
sustainable Management Consultant. For a number of rating organisations this activity 
came up in the late 1990s-early 2000s. The third core activity is rating. Within Triodos 
this activity developed because new clients were interested in such a product.  
Corporations subjected to screening have increased in number. When ethical investment 
started sustainability analysts focused on national companies, specific sectors, and large 
corporations. Today screening concerns all types of companies from any country, 
however it remains focused on large corporations. 
Investors is a difficult group to assess because little empirical data has been gathered in 
this group of actors. However, according to fund managers, investors have changed over 
time and change according to the type of financial institution. Investors from ‘old’ funds 
are more committed than investors from the ’new’ funds. This may be explained by the 
fact that clients of social banks are in general more sensitive to, and aware of, 
environmental and social issues. They chose the bank for this reason. Investors from the 
‘new’ funds have less interest in what ‘ethical’ or ‘sustainable’ means.  
6.6 Relationships between actors 
This section focuses on relationships between groups of actors. Relationships are 
explored in three main ways: membership of organisations related to ethical investment 
or CSR organisations; organisations represented in ethical advisory committees; and the 
frequency of contacts with the various groups of actors.  
Please note that because in the Netherlands the number of rating organisations is limited 
to one, the investigations of the rating organisations in section 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 have been 
extended to the SiRi network, a network of rating organisations with which the Dutch 
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rating organisation, Triodos Research, collaborates (see Chapter 2 for a description of the 
SiRi Group). SiRi consists of 11 rating organisations, including Triodos Research, from 
eleven different countries. 
6.6.1 Connections with ethical investment and CSR organisations 
The business relationships of each of the rating organisations, financial institutions, and 
corporations with ethical investment organisations (EI organisation) and CSR 
organisations were investigated. Please note that Triodos MeerWaarde Fund and Triodos 
Research have been integrated in their respected groups. Managers from rating 
organisations (comprising the SiRi Group), financial institutions, and corporations were 
asked the following questions: Is your organisation a part/member of any networks? Is 
your organisation a member of any organisations or/and working groups linked to ethical 
investment or/and CSR? Do you or someone else from your organisation sit on any 
advisory committees from other organisations? Do you have any contacts with any 
organisation or network related to ethical investment, CSR or sustainable development? 
In addition websites of each of the organisations examined were screened to find out 
partnerships, memberships with ethical investment, CSR or/and ethical investment related 
organisations.  
Fifteen EI and CSR organisations were identified, meaning that at least one of the actors 
is a member, partner, sits on the board or takes part in the network. Annex 8 lists and 
provides a short description of the sixteen organisations. EI and CSR organisations have 
different targets but both groups focus on social responsibility and sustainable 
development. However EI organisations promote these within the investment community 
while CSR organisations do this within the whole business community. EI organisations 
are focused on one specific activity. In average CSR organisations were launched before 
the EI organisations. A majority of them were launched before 1995, while most EI 
organisations were launched after 1995.  
The collected data show that corporations and rating organisations are members of very 
distinctive organisations: corporations are members of CSR organisations and rating 
organisations are members of EI organisation. As for financial institutions, they are 
members of both EI and CSR organisations (see Figure 22, Table 34, and Annex 10). 
GRI is the only organisation of which actors of the three groups are members. Note that a 
dotted line has been added between corporations and CERES because although 
companies of the present sample do no present links with CERES, this organisation 
contains a large number of corporations, mainly from the US.  
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Financial institutions’ membership of both EI and CSR organisations may be explained 
because they are part of both groups: they are stock quoted corporations subject to 
screening and managers of ethical investment funds. Most of them are members of 
VBDO (80%). The two that are not a member are part of a larger financial group that is 
itself a member of VBDO. 50% of them are members of (or are connected to) GRI. This 
does not mean that they are very active within GRI but they do find it important to be 
informed and up-to-date regarding GRI developments. The most popular CSR 
organisation is WBCSD: 4 financial organisations are members of it. All of them but one 
is a member of at least one organisation (EI or CSR). The one that does not have any 
links is a pension fund (the only one among the ten financial institutions studied). It is 
however a member of other organisations such as SODP. In total 29 connections were 
found, representing an average of 2.9 connections per financial institutions. There is no 
noticeable difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ funds.  
Figure 22 – Ties with EI and CSR organisations 
The corporations group records a higher average of connections per company (3) than 
financial institutions. This high result is mainly due to two companies, C1 and C4, each 
of which counts 8 connections. They are connected to 60% of the list of the 15 EI and 
CSR organisations, and 90% of the CSR organisations. They are far more connected than 
the other corporations. The others count 1, 2 or zero connections. The two highly 
connected corporations are from two different industrial sectors, but are both 
sustainability leaders in their own sector and both are listed on the sustainable indices.  
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The connections of the rating organisations vary a great deal. One of them is connected 
(RO4) to 80% of the EI organisations, while two others (RO7 and RO9) have no 
connection at all. The average number of connections per rating organisation is 1.9. It is 
important to note that the 11 rating organisations screened are all part of the same group 
(SiRi Group) and therefore share information between them. The most popular EI 
organisation is UK/US SIF, 6 out of 11 are members. It is interesting to note that 5 out of 
11 rating organisations are a member of, or connected to GRI. Like the financial 
institutions, they do not necessarily take an active role within GRI but they find it 
important to be updated on its development. The group of rating organisations is 
international. Some of them are connected to national networks but this has not been 
presented in Table 34.  
 FI C RO Together 
Eurosif 10% 0% 19% 10% 
UK&/or US SIF 3% 0% 29% 10% 
ECGS 0% 0% 19% 6% 
CERES 3% 0% 5% 3% 
VBDO 28% 0% 5% 13% 
CSR Europe 3% 11% 0% 4% 
GRI 17% 11% 24% 17% 
BSR 3% 11% 0% 4% 
Samenleving & 
Bedrijf 
10% 11% 0% 7% 
BITC 0% 11% 0% 3% 
Conference Board 0% 16% 0% 4% 
WBCSD 14% 11% 0% 9% 
DuVo 0% 11% 0% 3% 
SNV 7% 11% 0% 6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 34- Relationships with EI and CSR organisations 
Cross-relationship analysis between EI and CSR organisations was carried out. No 
significant connections could be found. The analysis was based on information disclosed 
by the organisations (websites and publicly available reports). It looked at ties between 
each of the EI and CSR organisations that is, whether or not they are member, partner, 
founder, initiator or shareholder of any of the EI or CSR organisations. Ten ties could be 
found. The most significant were Eurosif and UN Global Compact. Two organisations 
are member of the Eurosif and four of UN Global Compact. Note that the cross-links 
remain either among CSR organisations or among EI organisations (GRI being the 
exception, EI and CSR organisations are members of GRI).  
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6.6.2 Connections through the ethical advisory committee 
An Advisory Committee of a corporation is understood as a group of people (independent 
or not) that provides advice on, and is consulted about, matters related to ethics, 
sustainable development and/or corporate social responsibility. An Advisory Committee 
in a rating organisation is understood as a group of people (independent or not) that 
provides advice on, and is consulted about, matters related to the screening process 
(methodology, criteria, selection of companies). An Advisory Committee for a financial 
institution is understood as a group of people (independent or not) that provides advice 
on, and is consulted about matters related to the management of the ethical fund (criteria, 
methodology, company selection). 
Table 35 presents the breakdown (in percentage) of the composition of ethical advisory 
committees per group of actors. When the composition of the upcoming committee was 
known, it was taken into account in the data (such as F2, and RO9). Corporations, 
financial institutions and rating organisations were asked whether they have an advisory 
board and who its members are.  
Figure 23 provides a graphical representation of the ties created through the advisory 
committee (see also Annex 10). The bold arrows are the most significant ties (more than 
20% of the organisations do have a member from this group). Note that one of the 
organisations (C1) does not have an official advisory board but has a group of people that 
plays the role of advisory board. It has been counted as an advisory committee but there 
was no information available about who sits on the committee. Please note that in 
numerous cases members of advisory committees sit in their own capacity, and do not 
represent a specific organisation. However for the purpose of the thesis, they have been 
classified according to the organisation they work for.  
Out of the three groups of actors, 55% of them do have an ethical advisory committee, 
15% were in the process of setting one up, 30% did not have any ethical advisory board 
and did not intend to have one in the near future. Nine (ten if counting other) different 
categories are represented on the advisory board.  
Two categories have a distinctive higher representation, namely academics (21%) and 
NGOs (25%). These two groups are in the majority in all organisations, except financial 
institutions. The rest varies between 15% and 2% with in decreasing order: financial 
institutions (15%), corporations (13%), Government (8%), consulting organisations (8%), 
journalists (4%), investors (2%), CSR organisations (2%) and others (2%). The category 
‘other’ is due to a member of the advisory board of F4 who, at the time of the interview, 
was not yet known. Note that a number of categories are not at all represented, such as 
rating organisations and EI organisations.  
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Seventy per cent of the financial institutions have an advisory committee related to their 
ethical fund. One financial institution (F2) is going to set up a committee in the near 
future (as of the date of the interview a consulting organisation was playing the role of 
advisory committee). That means that in the very near future 80% of the financial 
institutions will have an advisory committee. Representatives of 8 categories are 
included: NGO, financial institution, company, government, university, consulting 
organisation, investor and journalist. The two most represented categories are corporation 
and NGO – both with 19%. In general members of the advisory committees are not very 
diverse. Three of them (F2, F5, and F7) are composed of only one category. The most 
diverse committee is F4 with five categories represented.  
Fifty percent of the corporations have an advisory committee and 33% are in the process 
of setting one up. The two that do not have any committee and do not intend in the near 
future to set one up are from the same industrial sector, the Media (C5 and C6). Advisory 
committees consist of 2 to 4 categories. As with financial institutions the categories the 
most represented are NGO (33%) and university (33%). The two other categories 
represented are CSR organisation (the only committee including this category) and 
consulting organisation.  
45% of the rating organisations have an advisory committee, but 18% are in the process 
of setting one up. That is the lowest rate of the three groups of actors. Committees consist 
of one to five categories. RO4 is the only one with five categories, and RO5 the only one 
with only one category. University and NGO, once again, are the most represented (29% 
both).  
 FI C RO Total 
FI 14% 0% 19% 15% 
C 19% 0% 10% 13% 
NGO 19% 33% 29% 25% 
I 5% 0% 0% 2% 
CSR 0% 17% 0% 2% 
G 14% 0% 5% 8% 
U 10% 33% 29% 21% 
CO 10% 17% 5% 8% 
J 5% 0% 5% 4% 
O 5% 0% 0% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 35- Member representation on ethical advisory committees 
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Figure 23 – Ties between organisations through advisory boards 
6.6.3 Contacts frequencies 
During the interviews each of the interviewees was asked a number of questions related 
to their contacts with actors in the field especially financial institutions, investors, rating 
organisations, consulting organisations, corporations and NGOs. Questions were related 
to the type and frequency of contacts. However the questions were open ones and were 
used as guidelines, and interviewees did not give very precise answers. Therefore results 
must be cautiously interpreted. The analysis of the interviews’ content provides an 
estimation of the intensity of the contacts.  
This analysis concerns only financial institutions, corporations, and the Dutch rating 
organisation. The analysis of the rating organisation is based on the observation-
participation.  
Two specific aspects have been looked at: the frequency of contacts and the centrality of 
the group of actors. The frequency concentrated on the existence of the relationship – is 
there any relationship to measure and the amount of relationships. This measure is 
difficult to capture through perception (Krackhardt, 1987) or documentation (Higgins, 
McClean, & Conrath, 1985), however for the purpose of the study, only a broad indicator 
is used, differentiating relationships at 3 main levels. The relationships are determined on 
a scale from 0 to 3: 3 frequent and regular contact, 2 frequent or regular contact, 1 not 
frequent and not regular, and 0 no contact. And the centrality refers to an individual 
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actor's position in the network relative to others. It evaluates an actor's prominence 
(Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994). Centrality is a useful concept as it shows us how 
important an individual is in the flow of information and the structure of a network. 
In order to define the frequency of contacts several aspects are taken into account: 
- Members of advisory committee  
- Organisation of/participation to common event such as “the day of ethical 
investment’, but also shareholder meeting, development of training course or 
workshop together 
- Working processes (visits, interviews, consultation of stakeholders) 
- Membership, partnership, ownership, sponsorship (“We are part of/is a member of”) 
- Type of relationship (managerial, contractual, informational, social) 
- The way interviewee talked about the actors (see Table 36) 
0 1 2 3 
Not ourselves 
I haven’t had 
contact… 
We don’t have 
contacts… 
Not directly… 
We still have to 
make our 
relations with…  
They never ask 
directly… 
No 
it happens… 
Not too many contacts… 
It happens once in a 
while… 
Yes, but usually during 
conferences… 
Some times but not often… 
It happens more and 
more… 
Sometimes… 
That does not happen 
often… 
Some contacts… 
Not on a constant basis… 
We have access to… 
We are inviting… 
I was invited… 
We try to contact them… 
For some occasions… 
Once or twice a year… 
Every year… 
Close relation… 
It happens quite often… 
A kind of partnership has 
developed… 
On a continuous bases… 
We have some good co-
operations… 
Quarterly meetings… 
We have contacts with… 
Quite a few… 
I have contacts with… 
We work together with… 
Like once every two 
months on average…  
Do have already quite a 
lot of dialogue with… 
Lots of 
contacts… 
Many 
contacts… 
 
 
Table 36 – Interview analysis: scoring the frequency 
Table 37 displays the frequencies combining the different sources. These relationships 
are shown in a diagram using different line thicknesses: the thicker the line, the higher the 
frequency (Figure 24). Please note that when relationships were not clear, in-between 
frequencies have been used such as 0/1, 1/2, or 2/3. For clarity’s sake, these in-between 
frequencies have been rounded up in the diagram (0/1=1, 1/2=2, and 2/3=3).  
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 Financial 
institutions 
Rating 
organisation 
Corporations Tota
l 
FI 2 3 ½ 6.5 
RO 3 3 3 9 
I 2 1 ½ 4.5 
NGO 2 3 3 7.5 
C 1 3 2 6 
CO 1 1 0 2 
EI 2 3 ½ 6.5 
CSR 1 0/1 2/3 4 
G 0/1 0/1 1 2 
IGO 0 0/1 0 1 
U 1 1 1 3 
Total 15.5 19.5 17 52 
Table 37 – Frequency of contacts between groups of actors 
Rating organisations are the most connected group of actors, with the highest total 
frequency (19.5), and are the most contacted (9). NGO is also a group of actors which is 
frequently contacted (7.5). These two groups may be regarded as two central actors of the 
network. Note that these two groups have very different roles in the network. Rating 
organisations have a central place in the supply chain, while NGOs are of importance in 
the opinion forming. NGOs sit on numerous advisory committees and are frequently and 
regularly consulted for information and advice on sustainability issues by all three groups 
of actor (FI, C and RO). Organisations that do have contacts with NGOs, usually do not 
hide it, on the contrary it is generously communicated. In third and fourth position come 
financial institutions, equal with EI organisations and corporations. There are a couple of 
actors that record a rather low total frequency of contacts: consulting organisations, 
government, inter-governmental organisations, and universities.  
The diagram (Figure 24) allows us to highlight some elements that are not visible in the 
table. There are three important areas in which rating organisations, corporations and 
financial institutions are all involved. One of the areas links these three groups of actors 
to NGOs, a second one to EI organisations and a third one to CSR organisations. There 
are three major flows of connections around the central core formed by ranting 
organisations, financial institutions and corporations. A connection could be added 
between NGOs and EI organisations and NGOs and CSR organisations.  
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Figure 24 – Ethical investment diagram 
6.6.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the relationships reveals some interesting patterns/structure. In terms of 
membership there are two important lines: on one side, financial institutions and rating 
organisations have developed links with a number of EI organisations, and on the other 
side financial institutions and corporations have developed links with CSR organisations. 
There are two separate groups of actors, EI and CSR organisations. Financial institutions 
are linked to both because, being corporations, they are also directly concerned by CSR 
in their own management. GRI and CERES are the only organisations that link all three 
groups: financial institutions, corporations and rating organisations.  
Ethical advisory committees are an increasingly widespread element among the three 
groups of actors. The committee offers a platform where different actors meet and 
discuss. The dominant actors represented on the committees are Universities and NGOs. 
Those two groups provide legitimacy to the decisions and actions taken by the 
organisations. The three groups of actors have rather similar members’ representatives on 
their committees.  
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The frequency of contacts shows that there are strong links between financial institutions-
rating organisations and rating organisations-corporations. Financial institutions and 
corporations do not have frequent contacts through the activity of ethical investing.  
6.7 Professionalisation 
The expansion of ethical investment has been accompanied by the advancement of 
consensus about many aspects of the activity and the development of a specific and 
specialised knowledge. The previous section and preceding chapters (2 and 5) pointed at 
several elements that suggest a process of professionalisation. This section focuses on this 
aspect and explores to what extent a professional body has emerged. The activity refers 
mainly to the screening and selection of corporations for the ethical investment universe. 
The following paragraphs highlight elements that are characteristic of professionalisation, 
some of which have been described more in detail in previous chapters. 
Professionalisation implies increasing specialisation and transferability of skill, the 
proliferation of objective standards of work, the spread of tenure arrangement, licensing 
or certification, and the growth of service occupations (Wilensky, 1964). New-
institutional theorists have pointed to the role of professions as a powerful and important 
source of rationalisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and as primarily being a source of 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Professionalisation involves the 
development of a rationalisation or rational system for relationship. Weber regards 
professionalisation as an aspect of the process of rationalisation (in (Ritzer, 1975)).  
Views on ‘professionalisation’ differ among authors (see (Freidson, 1986; Larson, 1977; 
Ritzer, 1972)). The central task of professionalisation lies in the construction of a 
knowledge basis for an occupation.  
6.7.1 Screening, a fully-fledged activity 
Specific organisations have been created in order to carry out the screening and all other 
activities related to ethical investment, namely rating organisations. In the 1990s 
numerous rating organisations were set up: eight of the SiRi partners started between 
1990 and 1999, one started in 1986, and two in 2000. A certain number of rating 
organisations became independent. For example Triodos Research detached its activity 
from Triodos Bank and became independent in 2000. In 2002 a second distinction was 
made between fact-finding and advisory services. A similar separation of activities 
happened in two other SiRi partners: Ethibel and Stock at Stake in Belgium (2001), and 
Avanzi and Avanzi SRI Research in Italy (2002).  
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Rating organisations have become distinctive organisations with clearly-defined 
activities. The activity of rating organisations has evolved over time. They all perform 
similar core activities with recently some diversification. An important new aspect is the 
advisory services. Rating organisations increasingly offer advice to financial institutions 
as well as corporations. Another important element that shows that screening has become 
a fully-fledged activity, is the development of a specific title.  
Rating organisations have taken on a central role within the field of ethical investment. 
Over the last few years the supply chain has become clearer. Roles have been better 
defined that is, who provides the information, who does the screening, and who the 
clients are. Rating organisations have become recognised information providers on 
corporations’ social and environmental performance. All ethical funds have turned to 
rating agencies. Rating organisations have become indispensable, which was not the case 
a few years ago. In the Netherlands, the first funds developed a department within their 
own organisations to carry out the screening. That was the case with Triodos Bank. Very 
soon banks realised that they needed a professional body to do the screening because it is 
expensive and requires skilled workforce, and also because specific knowledge is 
necessary. Rating organisations have become the norm in ethical investment. An ethical 
fund that did not use the services of a rating organisation might be perceived by the 
ethical investment community as not reliable. The development of rating organisations’ 
services has managed to offer the clients, financial institutions, a service that the client 
cannot perform itself. To a certain extent, it makes financial institutions dependent on 
rating organisations for managing their ethical funds.  
“Rating organisations are becoming more and more important... rating organisations 
are becoming more and more powerful. …Almost all SRI funds in the Netherlands use 
rating information. Every body is dependent on them because funds can’t gather the 
information by themselves.” (P2) 
“…we felt that we needed an external expertise…. For more than a year we have 
invested time in finding the right research partners…” (P4) 
6.7.2 Training for sustainable analysts 
Training and education are a crucial aspect of professionalisation, where skills are taught 
and transferred.  
There are no specific schools or university programmes related to ethical investment or 
designed for sustainability analysts, although this is starting. Recently the University of 
Nyenrode opened a Chair in Socially Responsible Investment.  
However universities and especially business schools organise guest lectures from 
professionals for the students. In 2002, a programme for corporation managers at the 
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Rotterdam School of Management had a specific module on ethical investment. Triodos 
Research was invited to give a lecture. Boston College in Massachusetts offers graduate 
courses in the Department of Sociology. These provide material relevant to ethical 
investment. The professors who teach them include Severyn Bruyn, who wrote “The field 
of social investment” (Bruyn, 1987), and Ritchie Lowry, author of “Good Money: a 
Guide to Profitable Social Investing in the ‘90s” (Lowry, 1991). It is interesting to note 
that business ethics and corporate social responsibility are growing disciplines at 
university level. Here are some examples of programmes: Business & the Environment, 
Imperial College, University of London, Responsibility & Business Practice, University 
of Bath; Social, Ethical & Environmental Accountability, University of Glasgow. There 
are also numerous professional programmes such as Social & Ethical Accounting, 
Auditing & Reporting offered by The National Center for Business & Sustainability or on 
AA1000. The UKSIF website devotes a whole page on education related to ethical 
investment. As of April 2002, eleven courses were listed (UKSIF, 2002).  
Some specific courses are organised for sustainability analysts. For example, since 2001 
SiRi Group has been organising a training program for partners’ analysts every year.  
6.7.3 Professional networks 
There has been a rise in networks among professionals of ethical investment. The driving 
forces behind the networks go well beyond finding a rallying point for self-identification. 
They serve to exchange information, to control practitioners, to lobby, to provide mutual 
support. The formation of such networks is accompanied by attempts to define more 
clearly professional tasks. They also are a way of eliminating practitioners who are 
deemed incompetent by the emergent professionals (Hall, 1968) and to find social 
recognition (Larson, 1977). Literature on professionalisation refers to professional 
associations rather than networks (Hall, 1968; Larson, 1977; Wilensky, 1964). However 
in the case of ethical investment there are no professional associations as such but 
networks of rating organisations and/or financial institutions managing ethical funds.  
The previous section 6.6 analysed the organisations of which rating organisations are a 
member. At the Dutch level, the most representative is VBDO, and at the international 
level Eurosif. These types of organisation have increased over time. Networks like 
VBDO and Eurosif play an important role in diffusing information, education, 
information exchange and setting norms: “we are trend-setters…We are supported by 
investors, and pension funds, that give us a certain importance” (Sprengers, 2001). For 
example VBDO initiated the Transparency guidelines which are now promoted 
internationally through Eurosif. These networks also aim at representing the ethical 
investment community before national governments or supranational organisations such 
as the European Commission (see Box 3), but also in front of corporations: “VBDO is 
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looked as being a professional organisation. It makes us more important, and gives an 
access to companies… Because of professionalisation you have a greater impact on 
companies” (Sprengers, 2001).  
Ethical fund managers are sometimes at the margin of the financial institution they work 
for: “I am the only one working on the sustainability issue “ (P7); “We are a kind of an 
island in this company” (P10). Although they are most of the time supported by the 
management team, their work is rather different from the rest of the organisation. Ethical 
investment organisations or/and networks provide them with a sense of professional 
kinship. Durkheim believed that the main purpose of a professional association is to 
“associate, for the sole pleasure of mixing with their fellows and of no longer feeling lost 
in the midst of adversaries, as well as for the pleasure of coming together, that is, of being 
able to lead their lives with the same moral aim” (Durkheim in (Vollmer & Mills, 1966)). 
It provides a platform where professionals can develop a kind of consciousness. The 
networks contribute to building a professional identity, which is still somehow building 
up in the field of ethical investment (see Chapter 5). It has been pointed out several times 
that the ethical investment community wants to be seen as ‘professional’ not as activists 
or NGOs: “If Ethical investment would ask the same requirement than NGOs, the 
movement would lose its power. Ethical investment must have another position than 
NGO. It represents investors not activist.” (Sprengers, 2001); “Ethical investors must 
have a specific position. Being activist is bad for the ethical investment movement… If 
ethical investment is seen as an NGO it will lose its credibility and companies won’t be 
willing anymore to talk to ethical investors...Make clear the difference between activist 
and investors.” (Triodos MeerWaarde Fund, 2001).  
• To inform, educate and provide a European network for discussion about SRI for our 
membership, national SIFs and other stakeholders.  
• To actively expand that network, through the support of new national SIFs and the 
development of existing ones  
• To enable a pan-European exchange of information and expertise among members of social 
investment forums (SIFs) with SRI actors in those countries where there are not yet SIFs  
• To support and encourage a greater sense of social accountability at a European level 
amongst investors - both corporate and individual - and by financial institutions.  
• To initiate and publish research related to legislation, policies and practices for the integration 
of social, environmental and ethical issues into European financial services  
• To encourage transparency, disclosure and active share ownership, with regard to corporate 
practise and governance, and investment objectives and processes  
• To produce European responses from the SRI community to EC policy documents by gaining 
the information through exchange seminars, workshops and other forms of communication 
Box 3 – Eurosif’s aims (Eurosif, 2003) 
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6.7.4 Proliferation of standards of work 
The power literature on professionalisation emphasises the attempt of professions to 
dominate their area of work (Abbott, 1991; Freidson, 1986). Professionalisation goes 
through a phase of codification and standardisation of the products. “And yet it must not 
be so clearly codified that it does not allow a principle of exclusion to operate: where 
everyone can claim to be an expert, there is no expertise” (Larson, 1977). Codification 
and standardisation are also a way to make a profession recognisable and distinct. 
Moreover it allows a measure of uniformity and homogeneity in the “production of 
producers” (Larson, 1977).  
Out of earlier chapters, three events concerning the screening process as well as ethical 
funds embody an attempt at codification. The SiRi Group developed a Quality 
Management System which all members are required to follow. This System covers data 
gathering, knowledge management, contact with stakeholders, relationships with 
corporations and incorporation of feedback. It ensures a consistent approach to 
information gathering and analysis (see chapter 2). Although the system applies only to 
the SiRi partners (11 rating organisations worldwide), it is a first attempt to clarify 
working procedures. The objective of SiRi is to guaranty a minimum quality and to 
provide comparable data. The quality management system is a first attempt to formally 
describe what should be done when screening corporations. The system also provides a 
way to control the activities of each of the SiRi partners.  
The second event concerns the Transparency Guidelines (see chapter 2). Originally 
initiated by VBDO, the guidelines are promoted at the European level by Eurosif. Their 
objective is to create more clarity for asset managers, research providers and other 
stakeholders. Signatories must provide clear and updated information about a series of 
aspects such as investment criteria, research process, evaluation and implementation, 
engagement approach, voting policy and periodical activities. The guidelines do not 
prescribe specific working procedures or criteria, but demand transparency of the ethical 
funds in order make clear what might be expected from the fund. The guidelines may 
result in homogenisation of the ethical funds. None of the fund wants to be seen as the 
laggard and therefore fund managers will carefully watch what others do and try to 
imitate each other. A mimetic mechanism may start, especially because there is much 
uncertainty about what ethical investment is.  
The third event is the European Quality Label launched by Ethibel in Belgium. It is a 
registered collective quality label that was originally registered for the Benelux and now 
for all the countries of the European Union. “This label offers the investor a real 
guarantee that these investment funds only invest in companies selected on the basis of 
ethibel’s comprehensive evaluation model. When it comes to portfolio composition, these 
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may only include shares and bonds included in ethibel’s investment register.” (Ethibel, 
2003) Ethibel controls the methodology as well as the portfolios of funds that want to get 
the label. According to Ethibel “‘sustainability screening’ requires a special expertise that 
banks and other financial institutions usually do not have. By using the ETHIBEL label, 
banks and other providers of "sustainable" funds in Europe make it clear to their 
customers that their funds are regularly verified by this independent organisation” 
(Ethibel, 2003). As of July 2003, 16 Belgium funds and one Italian fund are entitled to 
the label.  
These three events show a certain proliferation of standards or norms which protect the 
public as well as professionals against quacks.  
6.7.5 Professional knowledge 
There is rising concern about professional knowledge. As Larson (1977) argues, 
knowledge can be cultural capital from which a profession derives income and power 
(Larson, 1977). Knowledge permits effective practices and may help legitimate 
professional authority (Abbott, 1991). According to Wilensky (1964) any occupation 
wishing to exercise professional authority must find a technical basis for it. The screening 
activity is not based on high technical skills, but it does make use of specific tools to 
screen companies in more efficient ways, and to analyse the information collected in a 
more systematic way. These tools are computer programs, databases and internet search 
tools. For example some rating organisations have developed software programmes for 
databases of ethical investment information on corporate performance such as 
SOCRATES from KLD, or EPM from EIRIS. These can be described as tools rather than 
techniques. 
The specificity of the screening activity is based on knowledge of a broad variety of 
issues such as human rights, environmental problems, or employees’ rights. Such issues 
are continuously in development. Sustainability analysts need to be alert to all new 
developments. Their knowledge is closely related to CSR and sustainable development.  
The concern about knowledge is visible in several ways. There are journals and 
newsletters in which professionals try to collect relevant new knowledge such as the 
GreenMoneyJournal.com, ethicalinvestor.com, or Ethical Performance. This last one 
describes itself as “a monthly newsletter for professionals with a corporate social 
responsibility or socially responsible investment brief” (Ethical performance, 2003). The 
number of newsletters related to ethical investment has mushroomed during the last few 
years. Numerous rating organisations produce their own newsletter such as SiRi Group 
with ‘The Global SRI Reporter’, or the ‘What's New in Social Investment’ of EIRIS. . 
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Conferences are one of the best ways for building a community of interest. They allow 
people to meet others who share their concerns, and to find out who is doing what in the 
field. Conference presentations are also valuable in terms of educating the attendees, 
fostering leadership in those presenting, and bringing the field to the attention of the 
media. The number of conferences on ethical investment has not ceased to increase, and 
the type of attendees has become more diversified (see Table 38 and section 6.5.1). In 
1999, the first Triple Bottom Line conference was held in Rotterdam, Netherlands, and it 
has become an annual conference. In the US the 13th conference ‘SRI in the Rockies’ was 
held in 2002. It is a major annual event for SRI gathering major players of the social 
investment community. Those are just two examples among many.  
“Not everything is interesting…”(P3) 
“We try to be selective….” (P4) 
“The most important” (P5) 
 “Since two years they are growing like mushrooms.” (P9) 
Triple Bottom Line Investing P2, P3, P4, P5, P7, P8 and P9 
Day of ethical investment (NL) P2, P3, P4, P5, P8, P9 
Other ethical investment conferences P2, P3, P5 
CSR conferences (BSR, CSR Europe, SVN, 
GRI, and other) 
P1, P2, P3, P4, P5  
Table 38 – Conferences and seminars mentioned by ethical fund managers during the interviews 
There is an increasing number of forums and seminars being organised. Many of them 
aim at keeping actors of the ethical investment system updated on specific issues. For 
example Amnesty International organises seminars on human rights targeting those 
involved in assessing companies. In the Netherlands, every year a “Dag van het Ethische 
Beleggen” (Day of ethical investment) is organised.  
There are speeches and presentations: actors in the ethical investment field, most of the 
time from rating organisations and financial institutions, are increasingly often asked to 
talk at conferences related to sustainable development, corporate social responsibility, 
ethics and business, and others. These presentations are very often made available as a 
published document, helping to increase the knowledge base of the sector. Many 
speeches are available on the UKSIF website (UKSIF, 2003). 
There are also an increasing number of reports, surveys and studies about ethical 
investment. There has been a number of general surveys on ethical investment. One 
might distinguish between the academic studies such as Bruyn ((Bruyn, 1987), Rockness 
and Williams ((Rockness & Williams, 1988), Perks (Perks, Rwalinson, & Ingam, 1992), 
Mackenzie (Mackenzie, 1997), and the journalistic surveys such as Sustainability 
(SustainaAbility, 2000), Tennant (Tennant, 1994), and numerous others. This category is 
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quite heterogeneous. It covers surveys of the screening process, and development of the 
ethical investment movement.  
Many practical guides to ethical investment, designed for the investing public or for fund 
managers, have been written in the last decade. (Lang, 1996; Mackenzie, 1993; Meehan, 
1997; Sparkes, 1995; Ward, 1986) have written guides about various aspects of ethical 
investment in the UK. (Alperson, 1991; Brill & Reder, 1992; Domini & Kinder, 1986; 
Harrington, 1991; Judd, 1991; Kinder, 1993; Kinder, Lydenberg, & Domini, 1994; 
Lowry, 1991) have done the same in the US. There are other guides such as (Demonty, 
1999) for investing in Belgium, (Alternative Economiques, 1999) in France and 
(Schneeweiss, 1998) in Germany. There are also books providing information on source 
material relating to ethical investment issues, mainly internet sources, such as in 
(Broadhurst, Watson, & Marshall, 2003).  
Another aspect not directly related to professional knowledge but worth mentioning is 
public awards. “No movement is successful unless it has ways to reward its stalwarts, and 
one of the better ways is to provide them with public recognition for their 
achievements”(O'Brien, 1998). Ethical investment does have its own awards. For 
example the Moskowitz Prize which is given every year. Named after SRI pioneer Milt 
Moskowitz, this prize supports research into the various aspects of socially responsible 
investment including social screening, comparative performance, community 
development banking and direct investment. Another example is the SRI Service Award. 
It is given to the person who has been the most influential as regards the growth of 
responsible investing within the previous year. 
6.7.6 Conclusion 
Ethical investment, and especially sustainability screening, may not be described as a 
profession however it does display some of the characteristics of professionalisation.  
Sustainability screening is a full time occupation with its own title ‘sustainability 
analyst’. The practitioners do have a specific knowledge which makes them expert in 
screening corporations. There are no schools or programme trainings to become a 
sustainable analyst. There is only some training organised which refers to what Ritzer 
(1975) calls rational trainings. Sustainability screening is a very new activity. The know-
how has been developed and is held by practitioners. Although the knowledge of 
sustainable analysts may be described as a potpourri of expertise drawn from a number of 
disciplines, they do possess a knowledge that no one outside the occupation has. They are 
specialists. They have the monopoly of a particular skill that has been built over time. 
However because their knowledge is not systematic, it may be better to describe them as 
experts rather than professionals.  
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Sustainability screening has a clientele which mainly consists of financial institutions. 
However the literature on professions makes a clear distinction between customers and 
clientele. A customer determines what services and/or commodities he wants while a 
client buys what the professional tells him. The professional has complete authority over 
the client, while “the customer is always right” (Vollmer et al., 1966). This distinction is 
rather extreme and may not be applicable to all professions. Rating organisations have 
little authority over their clients/customers. However they do have quite a sizeable 
influence on the fund design and the criteria used. Several ethical fund managers pointed 
out during the interviews that rating organisations are the ‘specialists’, the ‘experts’ and 
that they do trust them.  
6.8  Characteristics of the Dutch ethical investment field  
This chapter presented the field of ethical investment in the Netherlands. Three main 
periods of time mark the evolution of the field. The period from the 1970s until the 
beginning of the 1990s can be qualified as an embryonic form of ethical investment. One 
labour union fund was applying some sort of exclusionary screening. However criteria 
were not defined and there was no system to collect and treat the information. The second 
period started at the beginning of the 1990s and lasted until the end of the 1990s. Ethical 
investment started to attract more attention from a specific type of financial institutions: 
the social and ethical banks such as Triodos. The period can be defined as a transition 
time during which ethical investment was in an ambiguous position, falling between an 
activist activity and a commercial project. The roots of the first ethical investment funds 
are firmly implanted in the environmental movement. Both Triodos Bank (described in 
Chapter 2) and ASN are banks committed to the protection of the environment and even 
politically engaged (for example with the Green System). They are what institutional 
theorists call peripheral organisations that are niche banks at the margin of the financial 
sector. Institutional theorists suggest that peripheral actors are less affected by pressures 
for social conformity and therefore are more inclined to come up with innovation and 
new ideas. Moreover peripheral players are often disadvantaged by prevailing 
arrangements. They can benefit more from an innovation than core players (Leblebici & 
Salancik, 1991). The peripheral banks of the Dutch financial sector have been real 
institutional entrepreneurs (in reference to (DiMaggio, 1991; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 
2000)). They brought a new idea within the financial sector and managed to get it 
accepted by more powerful economic players, that is mainstream financial institutions. 
They have played an important role in getting ethical investment out of the activist image 
and transforming it into a viable commercial project. Triodos Bank played a particularly 
significant role by setting up the rating organisations. This initiative shows the 
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willingness to detach the activity of ethical investment from its activist image and to 
propel it among the mainstream banking activities, which contributed to the 
transformation into a commercial project. This transition period was a tumultuous phase, 
but also a decisive and constructive stage in the evolution of ethical investment. Around 
2001-2002, ethical investment clearly became a mainstream financial activity. Ethical 
investment is no longer a marginal activity. All major Dutch banks offer an ethical 
investment fund, and pension funds and insurance companies are showing serious 
interest. It is also increasingly the subject of regular articles in Dutch major newspapers 
(see Table 32).  
The Dutch field of ethical investment developed within, and in relation with, the 
international context described in the previous chapter (see Annex 9). The 1990s shift at 
the international level is also noticeable in the Dutch case. Ethical investment in the 
Netherlands followed the general tendency that transformed the activity into a 
commercial project. However the Dutch case remains unique because of the role of the 
Dutch financial institutions in the field. In the US, citizen groups have largely promoted 
ethical investment. In the UK, the government encouraged its development. In the 
Netherlands, ethical investment has been developed by financial institutions. Contrary to 
the UK or US, where the first rating organisations and a number of ethical investment 
related organisations have been created by non-governmental or religious groups, in the 
Netherlands Triodos Research and the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable 
Development (VBDO) have been either initiated or supported by financial institutions. In 
the 1990s the financial sector faced increasing coercive pressures to become ‘green’. 
These pressures came from customers who increasingly asked for ‘sustainable’ products 
and services—the impressive growth of the net profit of Triodos Bank, representing a 
‘sustainable’ bank, reflects the increasing demand (see Chapter 2). Pressure was also 
applied by the government which in 1998, published its Policy Document on 
Environment and the Economy and in 1999 started an initiative aiming at creating a 
dialogue between banks and the government. This placed considerable pressure on banks 
to show their commitment to sustainability. These pressures provided the necessary 
context for banks to look for new tools and activities that could reduce the pressures. 
Mainstream financial institutions saw in ethical investment an opportunity to 
conform/increase congruence with social expectation/demands.  
Ethical investment in the Netherlands is in a process of institutionalisation. The analysis 
of the empirical data unveils some characteristics of an institutional field, some element 
of which where pointed out in the description of the Triodos case. There is an increase in 
interaction between organisations in the field. The analysis in Chapter 2 of the networks 
of Triodos MeerWaarde Fund and Triodos Research showed that the interactions between 
organisations of the field increased between 1997 and 2002. This finding is confirmed in 
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this chapter: the analysis of the TBLI conference showed that the number of attendees 
kept increasing between 1999 and 2002, and a number of new discussion platforms were 
created such as the EI organisations where actors meet. Inter-organisational structures of 
control and relational patterns have developed. The analysis of the relationships between 
actors revealed a clear structure in the field where rating organisations have taken a 
central role. There is an increase in the flow of information. As many interviewees 
noticed, conferences related to ethical investment are increasingly numerous, along with 
publications in periodicals, newspapers, and books. The analysis of the TBLI conference 
attendees showed that the number of press representatives has been increasing over the 
years. At the same time funds are becoming more and more transparent (see Chapter 2 on 
the Transparency guidelines) and corporations too (see next chapter). The activity of 
ethical investment is becoming increasingly standardised. The diffusion of ethical 
investment has been accompanied by a developing consensus about the activity of ethical 
investment. Ethical investment funds have rather similar criteria and methodologies. The 
professionalisation process has played a crucial role in the standardisation.  
However other characteristics of institutional fields identified by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) and Scott (1994) have not been met. There is no sign of a mutual awareness by 
members of the field that they share a common meaning, there is no evolution of an 
increasingly clearer field boundary, and there is no agreement about the institutional 
logics that guide the activity. Empirical data show that fund managers are rather evasive 
when defining ethical investment. They are not able to provide a common definition. 
They also use different names (‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’) and argue about their different 
meanings. Another characteristic of the Dutch field is its division between ethical 
investment funds, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. The ‘old’ funds represent the first banks that 
launched a fund, that is the peripheral financial institutions, and the ‘new’ funds are those 
launched later, principally by mainstream financial institutions. When mainstream banks 
started to get involved in the field of ethical investment, in the late 1990s, the activity was 
still under development and therefore poorly understood. There were numerous 
ambiguities regarding methodology and criteria. This encouraged a mechanism of 
mimetism: managers of the ‘new’ funds copied what the ‘older’ funds were doing. 
However the mimicry concerned only the criteria and methodology but not the values. 
Mainstream financial institutions did not want to be associated with the ‘deep green’ 
movement. They therefore took care to differentiate themselves from the ‘old’ funds that 
they described as “moral preacher” or “fundamentalists”. This division has created some 
tension within the field and points at different logics that guide the activity. However 
there are some signs that indicate that ‘old’ funds are moving towards the general 
tendency. One of the most significant examples is the change of the name of the fund. 
One manager of an ‘old’ fund said that they were thinking of replacing ‘ethical’ by 
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‘sustainable’. The presence of tensions shows that the development of an institutional 
field is not a smooth process. It involves conflicts at the micro level which are not always 
perceptible at the macro level (at the international level for example).  
This chapter investigated the Dutch field of ethical investment with a special emphasis on 
financial institutions due to their crucial role in the institutionalisation process. The field 
displays a number of elements, but not all, that are characteristic of institutionalisation. 
This suggests that the field is still in formation and not fully institutionalised.  
After the investigation of the macro level in Chapter 5 and the meso level in Chapter 6, 
the next chapter will go back to the micro level of analysis and explore corporations’ 
responses to ethical investment.  
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Chapter  7 –  Corporations’  responses  to  
ethical  investment    
7.1 Introduction 
The two previous chapters provided an overview of the emergence and constitution of the 
ethical investment field internationally. Chapter 6 revealed the uniqueness of the Dutch 
case especially due to the role of the financial institutions in setting up the field. The 
analysis of the Dutch field showed that several elements of institutionalisation are met but 
not all. As was already pointed out in Chapter 5, this suggests that the field is still in 
formation and not fully institutionalised.  
Chapter 7 focuses on one specific group of actors: corporations. In particular, it 
investigates corporations’ responses to ethical investment. Six Dutch stock-quoted 
corporations are investigated, making use of Oliver’s framework (see description in 
Chapter 3). Oliver identifies five institutional factors describing the nature of institutional 
pressures that motivate strategic responses: cause, constituents, content, control, and 
context. These factors determine the strength of institutional pressures that organisations 
face. According to Oliver organisations respond differently to these pressures. For the 
purpose of the research, Oliver’s factors have been re-specified according to the 
characteristics of the field of ethical investment and for each factor one to two relevant 
elements have been defined (see Annex 11 for a description).  
Section 2 of this chapter provides a short presentation of the cases. Section 3 explores 
how corporations’ managers perceive ethical investment: how they describe it and what 
they say about it. This section is based on interview analysis. Section 4 investigates 
specific elements related to the CSR approach of the six companies. Data for this section 
have primarily been collected from the companies’ publications. Section 5 focuses on 
sustainable indices. It combines data from both the interviews and publications. Section 6 
analyses the strategic responses of the six corporations investigated. 
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7.2 Presentation of the case studies 
This section presents the six companies analysed in this thesis. The six cases are stock 
quoted corporations with an average turnover of 43 billion Euro (ranging from more than 
150 to 4 billion Euro), and an average number of employees of 85,137 (ranging from 
more than 250,000 to 30,000). They are all among the leading companies in their 
respective sectors, both nationally and internationally.  
For each case study data have been gathered through interviews with managers (see Table 
39), publicly available information, websites, and Triodos Research company profiles. 
The company sample has been selected according to a methodology described in Chapter 
4. The sample consists of companies from three different sectors, Oil and Chemicals, 
Food, and Media. The sectors have been carefully chosen in order to include in the 
sample companies from sensitive sectors (Oil & Chemicals and Food) and companies 
from less sensitive sectors (Media). For a definition of ‘sensitive’, see Annex 3. Each 
sector contains one company listed on at least one of the sustainable indices (FTSE4Good 
or/and Dow Jones Sustainability Indices), and one company that is not listed (see Table 
40). 
Interviewees  Company Sector 
Reference Category 
C1 Oil and Chemicals P11:  CEO 
  P12: Corporate Communication 
C2 Oil and Chemicals P13a:  Investor Relations 
  P13b: Environmental manager 
C3 Food industry P14: Corporate Communication 
  P15: Environmental manager 
C4 Food industry P16: Corporate Communication 
  P17: Environmental manager 
  P18: Investor Relations 
C5 Media P19 Corporate Communication 
C6 Media P20 Corporate Communication 
Table 39 – Corporation interviews: overview 
Note that inclusion into the Triodos MeerWaarde Fund has not been a criterion of 
selection for constituting the sample. However it is relevant to take this aspect into 
account in the analysis of the case studies. Figure 25 shows Triodos Research’s 
sustainability rating of the six cases studied. The rating does not take into consideration 
exclusionary criteria but is based on comparative criteria. The total average of the six 
companies between 2001 and 2002 increased by 11.5%. Two of the companies, C3 and 
C5, have a lower rating in 2002 than in 2001. C5 has the highest increase (+42%). C1 and 
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C4 come significantly out as the best companies. There are no significant differences 
between the other four companies, except C5 in 2001. 
In the rest of the chapter, managers that have been interviewed are referred to by their 
reference and the company they belong to (for example P11/C1). 
C1   C2   C3   C4   C5   C6    
 F D T F D T F D T F D T F D T F D T 
1998   No   No   Yes   No   Yes   Yes 
1999 - Yes No - No No - No Yes - Yes No - No Yes - No Yes 
2000 - Yes No - No No - No Yes - Yes No - No Yes - No Yes 
2001 Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
2002 Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
Table 40- Corporations status in the FTSE4Good and Dow Jones Sustainability Indices, and in the 
Triodos Meerwaarde Fund, 1998:2002 (as of September of each year) 
F = FTSE4Good Europe and Global 
D = Dow Jones Sustainability Indices World and Stoxx 
T = Triodos Meerwaarde Fund 
Corporation C1 
Corporation C1 markets oil, natural gas, and chemicals. Since the launch of the 
FTSE4Good and Dow Jones Sustainability indices, the company has been listed as one of 
the best in its sector. However Triodos MeerWaarde Fund has always excluded C1 from 
its investment universe because of its major involvement in one of its exclusionary 
criteria, oil & gas extraction. Triodos Research screened C1 for the first time in 2000. 
This late screening is due to the fact that until 2000 Triodos Research had for unique 
client Triodos Bank: the company was automatically excluded because of its significant 
involvement with exclusionary criteria. Therefore no profile was produced. In 2000 
Triodos Research acquired new clients with different criteria than Triodos Bank which 
did not exclude C1. As a result, since 2001 company profiles are produced on a yearly 
basis.  
Corporation C2 
Corporation C2 is a chemicals manufacturer. C2 has been selected in none of the 
sustainable indices, nor in the Triodos MeerWaarde Fund. The main reason for excluding 
C2 from the Triodos fund is its involvement in the production of environmentally 
dangerous substances. Triodos Research’s first profile dates from 2000. Since then yearly 
updates have been carried out.  
Corporation C3 
Corporation C3 is active in the food products sector. C3 has not been selected in any of 
the sustainable indices. The company has, however, been selected in the investment 
universe of Triodos MeerWaarde Fund. The company is not involved in any of the 
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exclusionary criteria of the fund and is among the 50% best of its sector according to the 
sector study. Triodos Research carried the first screening of C3 in 1998. Since 2000 the 
profile has been updated yearly. 
Corporation C4 
Corporation C4 is active in the food products sector, just like C3. The company has been 
selected in both sustainable indices FTSE and Dow Jones but excluded from the Triodos 
MeerWaarde Fund. The main reason for excluding C4 from Triodos MeerWaarde Fund is 
its involvement in one of the exclusionary criteria, animal testing (non-medical related). 
Triodos Research produced the first company profile of C4 in 1999. Since then Triodos 
Research has carried out yearly updates of the company.  
Figure 25 – Sustainability rating of the six cases 2001 and 2002 (source: Triodos Research) 
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Corporation C5 
Corporation C5 is active in the media sector. The company has been selected in one of 
the sustainable indices, the Dow Jones, and in the investment universe of Triodos 
MeerWaarde Fund. The company is involved in none of the exclusionary criteria of 
Triodos bank and is amongst the 50% best of its sector regarding sustainability 
performance. Triodos Research screened C5 for the first time in 1999. Since then Triodos 
Research has carried out yearly updates of the company. 
Corporation C6 
Corporation C6 is also active in the media sector. The company has not been selected in 
any of the sustainable indices. However it has been included in the investment universe of 
Triodos MeerWaarde Fund. The company is involved in none of the exclusionary criteria 
of Triodos bank and is amongst the 50% best of its sector regarding sustainability 
performance. Triodos Research screened C6 for the first time in 1999. Since then Triodos 
Research has carried out yearly updates of the company. 
7.3 Perception of ethical investment 
This section presents managers’ views of ethical investment. The analysis is based on the 
data collected during the interviews.  
7.3.1 Managers’ views of ethical investment 
Definition 
Corporations’ managers show a great deal of confusion as to what ethical investment is. 
Interviewees could not provide a definition of ethical investment. P18/C4 quoted a 
definition given in a booklet published by UBS, Sustainability Investment, the Merits of 
socially responsible investing (Larry Chen, 2001) and explained that “basically… it takes 
into consideration not only the risks and the return characteristics of an investment but 
also the economics, environmental and social ramifications of an investment. And they 
try to incorporate all of these in a decision making process” (P18/C4). Another 
interviewee from C2 said that it “very much looks into the three Ps. So they are not only 
looking at your profitability but also if you are doing sufficiently on environmental 
aspects and also on other aspects” (P13b/C2). Managers complained that ethical 
investment does not present a singular and clear definition and they often have difficulties 
to say what it is all about (see Box 4). 
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P18/C4 made the remark that ethical investment does not differ much from regular 
investment: “I think that they use at a certain extent the same investment criteria as the 
main stream funds, but they put some sort of additional screens on top of that” (P18/C4).  
But an important aspect of ethical investment is the development of the sustainability 
indices, the FTSE4Good and Dow Jones Sustainable Indices. Most of the interviewees 
reduced ethical investment to the sustainability indices. The creation of the indices has 
had a strong impact on companies. It is clearly the most important aspect of ethical 
investment because it publicly displays companies’ sustainability performance. All 
managers consider it a positive thing to be listed on the sustainable indices. However 
some of them find it more important to be listed than others. Because of the special 
interest corporations showed towards sustainable indices both during interviews and in 
their reports, a later section is specially devoted to that topic (see section 7.5). 
•  “different views... different criteria….that's a problem”; ”We all have different views on 
what it [ethical investment] means”…(P11/C1) 
• “I doubt if they have a very clear view themselves”…” It is not always clear what they talk 
about” (P14/C3) 
• “It is not universal. They don’t look at it the same way”…”the problem in this area [of 
ethical investment] a lot is not clear for people”…“There are quite a lot of definition [of 
ethical investment” (P18/C4) 
• “It is difficult to give a single concrete answer. I think sustainable investment is investment 
in… in those issues, which…there is not just one thing” (P17/C4) 
Box 4 –Ethical investment a confusing phenomenon for corporations’ managers 
Ethical investment in society 
Corporations’ managers are not at all surprised by the increasing interest of investors in 
ethical investment. Ethical investment is regarded as a “logical development in the 
present society” (P11/C1), “it is a reflection of trends in society” (P13a/C2), “it is a 
trend” (P14/C3 and P18/C4). People show increasing interest in social and environmental 
issues; therefore it seems normal that they also display this interest when investing. 
P13a/C2 remarks that ethical investment reflects “the direction towards which the society 
is going, and nothing is not going to stop it” (P13a/C2).  
Nevertheless, there is a slight difference between the six companies. C1, C2, C4 and to a 
certain extend C3 integrate ethical investment in a more general societal awareness and 
demands related to social and environmental concerns. They consider it “normal” 
(P11/C1) that society questions corporations: “I think that if you, as a company, accept 
that your impact on the society has increased, you have to accept the consequences of 
that…“ (P11/C1). The other two companies, C5 and C6 do not explicitly make a 
connection between ethical investment and a more general and societal tendency.  
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Size 
All interviewees agreed that ethical investment represents a very small percentage of the 
total investment market:  
“The amount of capital involved in the so-called ethical investment category is 
relatively small… It is a minor part” (P12/C1) 
“At this moment the total amount of ethical funds is relatively low compare to all 
other funds available “…“Even if you don’t want to go in that direction…there is 
still sufficient funds available to do your business”…”It can never be so that we 
are cut from investment because of….[ethical investment]”…“Ethical investment 
is a very small part of the total investments.” (P13b/C2) 
“It is a couple of percentage” (P13a/C2) 
“Let’s be honest, SRI is still an extremely small field, ok growing rapidly, but still 
small compare to the total size of mainstream investment” (P17/C4) 
Nevertheless they all mentioned that it is a growing phenomenon, especially since 2000. 
Their appreciation of the growth was based on different aspects. Managers from C1, C2 
and C4 noticed the increase of the ethical investment market, while managers from C3, 
C5 and C6 noticed the increased number of questionnaires from the ethical investment 
community. A number of managers mentioned the recent interest from pension funds and 
expect this to make a significant change.  
“It is, for sure, a trend and it will increase”(P13b/C2) 
“Some of the big funds are obliged to invest a certain percentage in the green 
funds. Predicting that the trend is continuing, then all funds will have to make this 
kind of investments. [It] is increasing and gaining importance.” (P13a/C2). 
“You see that there is quite a lot of money going into this kind of funds, the 
‘duurzame ontwikkeling fonds’. And also and already with big banks.”(P16/C4). 
“It is definitively more and more happening…I think that it is becoming much 
more active…Ethical investment is a fast growing segment in the market”…“Even 
if the ethical funds in themselves are very small, they all have it, and some are 
more public about it than others, but you see that it is starting to influence the 
rest”(P18/C4) 
Difference between ethical funds 
Some of the interviewees (P12/C1; P14/C3 and P17/C4) noticed that ethical funds are not 
all the same. They made a distinction between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ funds. P12/C1 
favoured the ‘new’ funds (he called them the ‘sustainable’ funds) because they are "more 
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relative, organic and practically inspired", while the ‘old’ funds (he called them the 
‘ethical fund’) are the "hard core…[and] the fundamentalists"…”much more religiously 
inspired and much older than sustainable development investment” (P12/C1). On the 
other hand P14/C3 seemed to support the ‘old’ funds because banks engage in such 
activity “out of conviction” and do not “only us[e] it as a marketing tool” (P14/C3).  
Ethical investment and sustainable development 
There is quite a mixed feeling among managers concerning the way the ethical 
investment community translate sustainable development/CSR and assess companies. 
Some like P11 and P12 from C1 made clear that corporations and ethical investment do 
not share the same views on sustainability: “they [ethical investment] have their view of 
what they consider as sustainable or ethical” (P11/C1), ”I think that the philosophy of 
sustainable development, as it is becoming visible now amongst the broad variety of 
industries and businesses, is still something else than ethical investment” (P12/C1). Note 
that C1 is the only company of the sample that presents a clear view on what is 
sustainable development and its implications for the business. P14/C3 and P17/C4 are 
doubtful. According to P14/C3 “it depends on the approach”, and P17/C4 said: “it gives 
an indication but well the system never gets out something that is more wise than what 
you put in, silly things in, silly things out”. Other managers were more positive when 
asked whether screening from rating organisations provided a good representation of their 
company’s sustainability: “they do have good points. All the things are, let’s say, the ones 
you should strive for” (P13b/C2); “I think, in our situation, mainly yes. But I think it is 
because we are very open” (P18/C4); “I must say that 9 out of 10 times they were 
right”…”It helps you in the way that you know more what the outside world expects from 
companies” (P20/C6).  
Shareholder engagement 
Shareholder engagement in the Netherlands is very limited. A number of managers 
interviewed acknowledges the increasing interest of shareholders in social and 
environmental issues: “If you go back perhaps 10 to 15 years, in annual/general meetings 
of companies shareholders would question management about the costs of following the 
sustainable investment principles, the costs of being socially responsible, and they would 
say ‘well are you not doing too much, having a negative impact on financial results’. 
What you see nowadays, is that shareholders question companies about the amount of 
efforts they put into social acceptance and sustainability…most shareholders nowadays 
accept that in order to be successful as a company you have to do more than come up 
with good financial results””(P11/C1). However, the number of questions asked during 
the Annual Meetings is very limited and they are usually asked by VBDO.  
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Critics and problems related to ethical investment 
Managers from the Oil & Chemicals and Food sectors complained about the exclusionary 
criteria. P12/C1 disagreed with the exclusion of fuel energy and P13b/C2, P14/C3 and 
P18/C4 complained about the animal testing criteria. All three noticed some tension 
between what was requested by the exclusionary criteria and what they think is possible 
and/or sustainable. P12/C1 described the exclusionary criteria as an “easy play”: “Their 
[ethical investors] route is an easy one. They can make this choice because others are 
doing other choices” (P12).  
C1, C2, C3, and C4 complained about the increasing amount of questionnaires from the 
ethical investment community. This was not raised by managers from C5 and C6. These 
last two companies are of a smaller size than the first four and they are from the media 
sector, thereby less likely to infringe the exclusionary criteria. The increase in 
questionnaires leads certain companies to carefully select which questionnaires they are 
going to answer: “we have the discussion on how important the sender of the 
questionnaire is. And depending on the importance of the sender we fill it in or not. We 
have a very pragmatic approach because otherwise it could be busy the all day filling in 
the questionnaires. That’s not our prime job“ (P13b).  
Managers have raised other criticism, especially about the questionnaires: they are too 
theoretical and sometimes disconnected from business reality (P13a/C2); questions are 
difficult to answer because not adapted to the specific business the company is in 
(P13a/C2; P14/C3; P18/C4; P19/C5; P20/C6) or because questions are not clear 
(P14/C3). Nevertheless managers consider it important to answer the questionnaires, and 
generally they do.  
What do managers think they are expected to do  
According to a large majority of the interviewed managers, the recipe to get a good 
ranking depends on the following elements: have business principles, show transparency 
and openness with stakeholders, disclose information either in the annual report or in a 
separate CSR report. Business principles have been especially claimed by C5 and C6. 
They both hope that by establishing business principles they will answer a large number 
of the ethical investment community questions. Only C2 believed that providing results 
such as quantitative data and real progress would help them to get a better rating.  
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7.3.2 Case comparison 
Table 41 offers an overview of managers’ perceptions of ethical investment. Two groups 
of companies can be distinguished: on one hand C1, C2, C3 and C4 and on the other C5 
and C6. Companies from the first group perceive ethical investment as a phenomenon 
representative of a general societal trend and part of this tendency. Also all interviewees 
agreed that it is still only a small percentage of the stock market, and pointed at the 
growing interest from shareholders, especially pension funds. All four companies display 
some interest in sustainable indices. Although they do not consider it a “goal” to be listed, 
they regard being listed as a positive element for the company’s reputation. Companies 
from the second group react differently. They do not connect ethical investment to a 
general and societal tendency. They regard it as a growing but not very significant 
phenomenon. As regards sustainable indices, interviewees did not show any specific 
interest in being listed. They were rather indifferent.  
The distinction between the two groups suggests a difference between the sectors of 
activity. The first group consists of companies from the Oil & Chemicals (C1, C2) and 
Food (C3, C4) sectors, both of them sensitive sectors. The second group is composed of 
the two companies from the Media sector (C5, C6). 
7.3.3 Ethical investment, an element of CSR 
The general tendency, and especially in the cases of C1, C2 (Oil & Chemicals) and C3, 
C4 (Food), is to consider ethical investment as an element of 'a' segment of the emerging 
field of corporate accountability and CSR. Interviewees talked about CSR rather than 
ethical investment. They had difficulties in distinguishing it from CSR. Typically when 
asking questions about ‘ethical investment’, managers responded by talking about ‘CSR’.  
This became even more obvious when looking at who or which unit of the corporation is 
responsible for answering questions from the ethical investment community. Most of the 
people involved are from public affairs, corporate communication and investor relations 
units (see Table 42). These same units, especially corporate communication and public 
affairs, are also responsible for preparing and writing companies’ reports and brochures.  
C1 Public affairs 
C2 Corporate communication and Investor Relations 
C3 Corporate affairs and Corporate communication 
C4 Corporate affairs 
C5 Corporate communication, and sometimes Investor Relations 
C6 Investors relations 
Table 42 - Who answer the questions from the ethical investment community? 
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Ethical investment is categorised as a ‘corporate affair’ issue. Harlow defines this 
function as “a distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain 
mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between an 
organisation and its publics; involves the management of problems or issues; helps 
management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion; defines and 
emphasises the responsibility of management to serve the public interest; helps 
management abreast of and effectively utilise change, serving as an early warning system 
to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and ethical communication 
techniques as its principal tools” (cited in (Hutton, 1999)).  
In the six companies studied, corporate affairs is at a high level in the organisation’s 
hierarchy and is in direct contact with the executive board. C1 established the unit a long 
time ago (no date available) and C3, C4, and C5 in the 1990s. In C2, Investor Relations is 
in charge of the corporate affairs function. And in C6, P19/C6 said that they are going to 
set up a working group within the company devoted to CSR. It is also interesting to note 
that corporate communication and investor relations tend to go together: “Investor 
relations were before part of the treasury department, but we decided that the 
information part of the Investor Relations was becoming so important that it was logic to 
combine it with corporate communication” (P19/C5). As noted P16/C4: “In the Investor 
Relations department it has not been the highest priority to deal with this kind of 
investors. So it has been left to the corporate affairs people who happen to work on 
CSR”.  
The ethical investment community seems to be submerged within a wider field and does 
not come out distinctly. It is difficult to ascertain whether the ethical investment 
community is considered as ‘a’ stakeholder among others or ‘an’ activity among others. 
As a stakeholder, it is not yet significant enough and as an activity is not different enough 
from the wider field of CSR. It makes the analysis difficult because ethical investment is 
not directly perceptible in the managers’ discourse.  
7.4 Corporations’ assessment 
As noted in the previous section, managers consider that there are three important 
elements in order to get a positive screening by rating organisations: business principles, 
transparency and openness with stakeholders, and reporting. This section analyses the 
companies’ approach regarding these three specific elements plus two others: the 
constitution of an ethical committee within the company and the company’s commitment 
to sustainable development.  
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These five elements are aspects according to which corporations are viewed and judged 
by outside stakeholders. Sustainability rating (from rating organisations) is for a large 
part based on these elements. First of all, they represent crucial sources of information 
(especially reports), and secondly they are regarded as a reflection of a company’s 
commitment to sustainability.  
In this section companies are assessed on each of these five elements. The assessment is 
based on the company’s annual reports (financial, environmental and sustainability 
reports) from 1996 till 2002 and company websites (screened in 2003).  
7.4.1 Analysis 
Business principles 
Interestingly all six companies have (or are going to, for C6) established Business 
Principles. C1 and C4 were the first companies to make these publicly available, 
respectively in the early 1970s and in 1998. However C1 revised its Principles in 1997 
and C4 in 2001, in both cases in order to include – among other things – their support for 
human rights. The revision of C1’s business principles also included support for 
sustainable development.  
C2, C3 and C5 all published their Business Principles in 2001. As for C6, P20/C6 
announced that the company is working on a document and should publish it in 2003. 
Stakeholder pressure has been the main stimulus for C3, C5 and C6 to set up or make 
publicly available their Business Principles. Interviewees said that a number of 
stakeholders were asking about their Business Principles.  
Business principles are presented as the “values” of the company. P19/C5 and P20/C6 see 
business principles as a way to answer the increasing number of questions from 
stakeholders and especially from shareholders.  
“I hope that we can do this more efficient from now [answer to ethical investment 
and stakeholders questions], as we are now in the process of finalising the text of 
the business principles… and I hope that with these business principles we can at 
least answer, I hope, half of the questions” (P19/C5). 
“They are asking you again and again and they will come up with these questions 
about business principles, and after a while you still don’t have business 
principles, I think than yes it will harm you. Because nowadays it is becoming 
more and more important. You have to formulate them, to come up with 
them.”(P20/C6) 
“The main thing is that at this moment we don’t have any external guidelines, that 
we communicate outside, but this morning I had a discussion with the CEO about 
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CSR and I made some suggestion and he said OK to start with it. So I expect 
within this year we will have guiding principles and we will communicate it to our 
employees and also to the external world.” (P20/C6) 
Ethical committee 
Four companies, C1, C2, C3 and C4 have or are going to (C2) have an Ethical 
Committee. The role of these committees is to advise the company on sensitive issues 
such as GMOs and to inform the company about emerging issues in society.  
C5 and C6 do not have an Ethical Committee and do not intend to set up one in the near 
future. They do not see the necessity of having such a committee.  
Reporting 
There is a clear distinction between two groups of companies: on one hand C1, C2, C3 
and C3 (Oil & Chemicals and Food sector), and on the other C5 and C6 (Media sector). 
C1, C2 and C4 all published their first Environmental Report in 1996. C3 did this in 1992 
and 1993 but stopped because “nobody asked for it” (P15/C3). C2 and C4 were the first 
and only companies of the sample to publish a Sustainability report, respectively in 1997 
and 2000. C3 announced in 2002 that they were working on a Sustainability Report 
which should be published in 2004. These four companies, even if they do not have a 
Sustainability Report, extensively report (C1 and C4) or at least mention in their annual 
reports and/or websites (C2 and C 3) social and environmental matters. Since 2000 all 
four have integrated the sustainability dimension in their corporate objectives.  
C5 and C6 do not report on sustainability issues. However in 2001, the annual report of 
C5 started to refer to “social responsibility” and to report on aspects such as the 
environment and social initiatives.  
Transparency and openness with stakeholders 
The issues of transparency and openness are very closely related to reporting. These two 
notions have been looked at in terms of what companies say about being transparent and 
open. This section does not assess how transparent and open companies actually are.  
Transparency and openness have become increasingly popular among the firms in the 
sample. All six claim to be transparent and to seek dialogue with their stakeholders. They 
all recognise that businesses “need” to be transparent. They consider this as a requirement 
and do not question it.  
Managers argue that being transparent and open is important for several reasons: 
- It enables the company to “find what society expect from the company and work 
with that” (P11/C1), to “know what people feel and think about your business and 
what they want you to do or to be” (P14/C3); 
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- It is a way “to avoid negative impact on your financial results” (P11/C1); not to 
“be seen as an irresponsible company” (P16/C4).  
- It is a way ”to give the impression that really something is happening [inside the 
company]” because “if you don’t write about it in your annual report, that means 
that you don’t do anything” (P14/C3); “If you are not transparent people will not 
know, and when they don’t know they will bang at your door and say ‘Hey guys 
you have a problem in Chile or Australia’…it will have an article…”(P16/C4) 
Commitment to sustainable development 
Sustainable development is a new concept for most of the companies in the sample. Three 
of them, C2, C3 and C5 first addressed the concept in their annual reports around 2000 
and 2001, and C6, as late as 2002, had not addressed the concept. C1 and C4 were 
concerned about sustainability much earlier. Both companies claimed their commitment 
to the principles of sustainable development as early as 1996.  
In general all the companies refer to the Brundtland report to define sustainable 
development. But as P11/C1 pointed out, the concept is clear but “How do you do that in 
practice? …That’s a very difficult question. In my view, it is very difficult to answer in 
very concrete terms”…“to what extend can you, indeed, apply what I will call the 
sustainability principles“…“[it] is easily said and much more difficult to really to do” 
(P11). P11/C1 and to a certain extend P17/C4 are the only ones raising the question of the 
operationalisation of the concept. Other managers did not seem to view this as a problem.  
All six companies consider sustainability as well as CSR as important aspects of 
businesses; “Sustainability is a topic that plays an increasingly important role within the 
framework of the company’s activity” (C3, 2001). Some describe it as “a license to 
operate“ (P11/C1 and P20/C6), or “the social acceptance of the way… of the type of 
business you are involved in and the way it is conducted” (P11/C1) or “it is necessary for 
the continuation of our business” (P18/C4). CSR is also considered as the necessary 
element to be profitable in the long term: “the winners of the future are actually the 
companies that are quite active in the CSR area…[they] are the companies that will in 
the longer term have better performances“…“we believe in order to get in the long-term 
profitability it [CSR] is necessary”(P18/C4). However none of the interviewees consider 
it as a competitive advantage. P17/C2 pointed out that sustainability is an important 
element at the corporate level but not at the production level, arguing that sustainability is 
not an argument for selling products. This point was also made by other managers such as 
P13a&b/C2 and P14/C3.  
C2, C3, C5 and C6 remained very vague as to what sustainability is and what it implies. 
C1 and C4, on the contrary, offered a very clear view of what sustainability means for 
their companies. It is worth noting that their views have evolved over time. In 1996 and 
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1997, C1 and C4 displayed some uncertainty as to what sustainability is, and what and 
how to report about it. But very quickly they developed their own perspectives and 
translations. Both companies have adopted a stakeholder approach to sustainability, 
however in a slightly different perspective. C4 defines sustainability through discussions 
with its stakeholders. C1 has established a constant dialogue with its stakeholders not to 
define what sustainable development is, but to assess whether or not its actions, practices 
and policies are accepted by the stakeholders: “To a large extend you have to rely on the 
reaction you get from your stakeholders when it comes to proposing such a decision. 
Then you have to judge whether there are in agreement or there are in disagreement. If 
there are in disagreement, you have to ask the question ‘Can I do something about it?’ 
(P11/C1).  
7.4.2 Changes between 1996 and 2002 
Companies have been assessed on each of the five elements described above. They have 
been given a score between 0 and 1, which is explained in Table 43. ‘Zero’ means that 
the company does not show any evidence of this aspect and ‘one’ means that it does. The 
aim is to analyse companies changes concerning these specific elements between 1996 
and 2002.  
Figure 26 represents the results of the assessment per company and Figure 27 shows 
aggregated results per company (cumulating the four elements) and per element 
(cumulating the six companies).  
There is a clear difference between companies. C1 has been the first company to display 
the five aspects assessed (in 1997), followed by C4 (in 2000). These two companies are 
the most advanced in terms of reporting and stakeholder dialogue. They are considered 
by the FTSE4Good and Dow Jones Sustainability Index as the best of their sectors by far. 
One should note that C1 is excluded from the Triodos ethical funds, whereas C4 is 
included. The companies are from two different sectors: C1 from Oil and Chemicals and 
C4 from Food. C3 is expected to cover four elements in the near future. The three other 
companies, C2, C4 and C5, are far behind; but all three are expected in the near future to 
show some improvement. This suggests a difference per sector in the sample of 
companies investigated, where Oil & Chemicals and Food companies offer the best 
performance and Media companies the worst.  
Business Principles is element that gets adopted the fastest by all six companies. In the 
‘near future’, Business Principles is the only element which is expected to be adopted by 
all six companies – while in 1996 only one company had business principles (C1).  
The two elements the least adopted are reporting practices and the ethical committee. The 
first one, reporting, is due to a methodological problem. All six corporations increasingly 
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report on issues related to sustainability/CSR. However in order to obtain a ‘1’ in the 
assessment, they need to have a sustainability report. Therefore the increase in reporting 
is not well captured by the data. Nevertheless, in 2000, 2001 and 2002 one can see a 
noticeable change in corporations’ reporting, especially those that were lagging behind 
(such as C3, C2, C5 and C6). As for the ethical committee, it is a typical element of the 
Food sector and to a lesser extent of Oil & Chemicals. Companies from the Media sector 
do not intend to set up such a committee. This may be explained by the fact that they do 
not have to debate about very sensitive issues such as GMOs or non-renewable sources of 
energy. They say themselves that they are in a non-polluting business: “people know 
being a publisher you don’t pollute” (P20/C6). They therefore do not feel the need to get 
advice from an external panel. In the near future the four companies of the two sensitive 
sectors are going to have such a committee.  
Aspect 
considered 
Code Categories 
Business 
Principles 
BP 0 No The company does not have any publicly 
available business principles  
  1 Yes The company has publicly available business 
principles 
Ethical 
Committee 
EC 0 No The company does not have an ethical advisory 
committee 
  1 Yes The company has an ethical advisory 
committee 
Reporting R 0 Nothing No social or environmental report or 
information on the website, neither separately 
nor as part of the annual report 
  0.5 Environmental or 
Social report 
One of them: social or environment report 
(web, annual report or separate).  
  1 Sustainability 
report 
Sustainability report: social and environmental 
Sustainable 
Development 
SD 0 No commitment No mention of sustainable development in the 
corporate objectives/strategy or purposes 
  0.5 Partial 
commitment 
Mention of SD but: it is not clear what that 
means for the company; it is only a sub-issue, 
not really part of the company's objectives 
  1 Full commitment SD is part of the corporation strategy, 
objectives, or purpose. The company considers 
it a priority 
Transparency 
and openness  
T&O 0 Nothing Transparency and openness are not an issue 
  0.5 Secondary or 
ambiguous 
position 
Transparency/openness are vaguely mentioned 
  1 Primary Transparency/openness are emphasised in the 
company's objectives/purpose/strategy 
Table 43 – Scores for assessing the five elements 
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1999-2001 was a period that recorded a number of changes. Business Principles, 
Transparency & Openness, and commitment to Sustainable Development were 
increasingly being adopted by companies. In 2001 three companies published their 
Business Principles (C2, C3, and C5.) and three claimed to seek transparency and 
openness (C3, C5 and C6). The increase was also due to a higher commitment to 
sustainability between 1999 and 2000 because of C2 and C3. This period corresponds to 
the increase in ethical investment in the Netherlands (see Chapter 6) and to the launch of 
the sustainable indices.  
C2, C3, C5 and C6 displayed some changes around 2000. Then, all of them started to 
adopt some of the elements analysed. C2 and C3 already started in 1999 while C6 and C5 
started in 2001. Companies from the Media sector adopted the different elements later. In 
the near future, meaning 2003/2004, C1, C2, C3 and C4 will probably have most of the 
aspects in place, while C5 and C6 will not.  
On the basis of these results, C1 and C4 may be described as the ‘leaders’, C2 and C3 as 
‘followers’ and C5 and C6 as ‘laggards’.  
Figure 27- Cumulated results: a) per company, b) per element 
7.5 Sustainability indices 
As mentioned in section 7.3.1, sustainable indices played a strong role in drawing 
managers’ attention to ethical investment. This section first presents the way corporation 
managers talk about sustainability indices, then analyses the way corporations use the 
indices.  
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7.5.1 Sustainable investment: a symbol of good sustainability 
performance 
All the managers interviewed were aware of the sustainable indices, the FTSE4Good and 
the Dow Jones Sustainability indices (DJSI) (see Box 5). They all knew what these are 
and when they were launched. They consider them as an important phenomenon and they 
also said that “knowledgeable people in the business regard those indices as important” 
(P11/C1).  
There are some differences among the six companies. Managers from C1, C2, and C4 
(C1 and C4 are listed but not C2) mentioned the indices very often during the interviews. 
Companies’ documents, reports, brochures or websites also disclose a lot of information 
about the indices. The other three, C3, C5 and C6, acknowledge the phenomenon but 
with less enthusiasm and vigour. However there is a general belief among companies 
that: 1) listed companies are the best regarding social and environmental performance as 
well as financial performance; 2) indices are a kind of social test regarding companies’ 
sustainability performance; 3) indices are used as indicators by stakeholders. Therefore 
sustainability indices have grown as an important phenomenon within the business 
community.  
Sustainability indices represent some kind of social norm and what a company should do 
or strive for. P11/C1 described it as “what is generally acceptable and expected from a 
company” (P11/C1). Therefore companies ought to be ‘in’: “If you are not [in], if you are 
not up to standard to be in there, it could become a goal for you to work on, to become 
member of it. That has positive values in itself, working towards stepping over 
boundaries and entering the FTSE4GOOD” (P12/C1).  
Managers consider the ratings provided by sustainable indices as good indicators of the 
company’s sustainability performance. The six companies investigated – even those that 
were not listed – agreed with the outcomes of the ratings. They saw the outcomes of the 
ratings as a reflection of what they do. It is what people/stakeholders see: “it is a 
reflection of recognition that people feel that you are doing good on CSR” (P18/C4). 
Sustainable indices are good social indicators for managers. If they are excluded from the 
indices, it does not necessarily mean that they do something ‘wrong’, but rather that the 
public/stakeholders get the ‘wrong’ picture. Interviewees believe that they can improve 
their rating by publishing Business Principles, and thereby hope or expect to be listed on 
the sustainability indices.  
Being listed on the indices is perceived as a positive development by managers. It is a 
reward and an “honour” (P14/C3) --“we are proud to be in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index being the leading company in the sector” (P18/C4). It represents an achievement of 
sustainability performance. And it also contributes to the company’s reputation — it is 
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“free publicity stating that the companies do well in this area”(P18/C4). Being listed not 
only means that the company is a ‘sustainable’ company but also that it is among the best 
companies of its sector: “companies that are listed on the Dow Jones Sustainable Index… 
these are the best companies there are … these companies are better companies in 
general.” (P13b/C2).  
“external driving force, society’s expectation and business climate” (C1, 2001) 
“Global sustainable development awards” (C1, 2002) 
“important phenomenon... an expression of the contemporary view” (P12/C1) 
“important part of reputation (P12/C1) 
“expression of being visible, recognised as a relevant force, as a relevant party in society” 
(P13b/C2) 
“question of reputation… a kind of PR [public relation]”…“it is good to be there”…“it has some 
advantages” (P13b/C2) 
“… it is a kind of honour…it is good” (P14/C3). 
“world’s most environmentally responsible business” (C4, 2000a) 
“recogni[tion of] our achievements” (C4, 2000b). 
“public recogni[tion] by others” (C4, 2003) 
“a reflection of recognition that people feel that you are doing good on CSR”(P18/C4).  
“a reflection of what you are doing in this area… something which is good with an external check 
on the thing you believe in.”(P18/C4) 
Box 5 – What managers say about sustainability indices 
7.5.2 Corporations’ approach to sustainability indices 
Companies have different approaches to sustainable indices. Companies that are listed on 
the indices disclose it in their report and website. However there are differences on the 
way they report (see Table 44). C4 immediately reported about being listed in its 1999 
Sustainability report. Since then the company has been reporting on the indices more and 
more extensively every year. In 2002, the Sustainability reports mentioned them four 
times, including once in the Chairman’s statement. Information about indices has also 
been placed under the “News & Awards” section on the website, and several speeches of 
the Chairman refer to them. C1, however, did not report immediately about being listed. 
Although the company was already listed in 1999, this only got mentioned in the 2001 
Sustainability Report in which there are several references to the sustainability indices. In 
2002, index listing was presented as a reward. C5 is somewhat different. It mentioned its 
inclusion in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index in 2002 but in a very reserved way and 
without pomposity. The manager interviewed did not know that the company was listed. 
C1 and C4 place much emphasis on the fact that they are listed. They present this as a 
proof that they are doing well, especially since 2001. On the contrary C5 remains rather 
discrete about the subject.  
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The non-listed companies also react differently. C3 and C6 do not show much interest in 
being listed. However C2 considers the indices very seriously and wants to be listed as 
soon as possible. In 2001 the company produced a document in which it says: “the 
advantage of being listed on something like the Dow Jones Sustainable Group Index 
would be to underline that commitment [to sustainable development]. But it would go 
further than that. The chemical industry doesn’t have the best reputation, based on 
perception. It we can change that perception and get people outside the industry to 
believe in what we’re trying to do, then that would be a very important step forward. A 
listing could also be important when we try to recruit people in the future. People like to 
work for a responsible company, one that is thinking about environment. (C2, 2001) The 
two managers interviewed made clear that the company is working on getting selected 
into the indices: “We are not a front runner but we are working on it with a step by step 
approach” (P13a/C2); “We think that if we move in that direction, within one or two 
years we will automatically qualify” (P13b/C2). C2 is not listed but obviously wants to 
be—“of course we are aiming to be on that list“ (P13b/C2)-- although at one moment one 
of the interviewees said that it is not a goal to be listed—“ But it is not a goal as such it is 
the result of the way you work.” (P13b/C2).  
Table 45 classifies companies according to whether or not they are effectively listed on at 
least one sustainable index and whether or not they consider it important to be listed. The 
table clearly shows that C1, C2, and C4 consider listing more important than C3, C5 and 
C6. C3 is the only exception. The indices have created a certain amount of competition 
between companies. This is especially noticeable regarding C2.  
In terms of responses, C1 made clear that the ethical investment community would not 
influence its activities and behaviour. The company has a “strong identity” and shows 
confidence about what it has to do. They do answer questions for the ethical community 
but would not carry out extra research to comply with the requirements. C2 takes care to 
answer the “important” questionnaires, mainly meaning questionnaires sent for the 
sustainability indices and some major banks. Managers from C2 also made clear that they 
want “to do it their way”. They insisted on the fact that the company is not yet ready to 
answer but very soon they will and will for sure be selected on the sustainable indices. C3 
and C4 were the most easy-going companies; they answer as much as possible because it 
is in their interest to do it and because they consider it important. C5 answers all 
questions but is not convinced of the added value for its companies. And C6 claims not to 
be ready yet for answering any questions.  
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C1  
2001 “C1 was included in the UK’s FTSE4Good index launched in 2001 and was rated first 
in the energy sector of the global Dow Jones Sustainability Index. These indices 
include companies that meet criteria on social and environmental performance, There 
has been rapid growth in socially responsible investments funds in recent years; in 
2001 they were worth some $3 trillion in the USA alone. This shows the growing 
importance that investors are giving to considering not just how much profit is made 
but how it is generated” (C1, 2001). 
2002 “Global sustainable development awards: Shell was ranked top of the energy sector in 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. The index tracks the financial performance of 
companies that have made sustainability a key driver of business strategy” (C1, 2002). 
C4  
1999 “C4’s commitment to sustainability was recognised in 1999 with our inclusion in the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index. This index uses a systematic methodology to 
identify companies that lead the way in taking a strategic approach towards 
sustainable business development” (C4, 1999).  
2000 “In 2000 we were recognised as one of the world’s most environmentally responsible 
business – coming first in our industry sector of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
Our achievement in extending our environmental perspective to the whole life cycle of 
our products was noted by the judges.” (C4, 2000a) 
2001 “For the third consecutive year we topped our industry sector in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability World Indexes.”…“SRI and performance indexes: C4 is included in two 
stock indexes, the FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (where we 
continue to rank best in sector). In the 6th Business in the Environment Index – an 
annual survey of corporate environmental engagement- we were ranked second 
overall and first in our sector.” (C4, 2001) 
2002 “For the fourth year running we have led our sector in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes” (C4, 2002a); “C4 is included in two leading stock market indexes, the 
FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (where we continue to rank 
best in sector)’”.(C4, 2002b). 
C5  
2002 “C5 has been selected as an index component of the Dow Jones Sustainability World 
Indexes and Dow Jones STOXX Sustainability Indexes in 2002.”(C5, 2002) 
Table 44 –Citations of companies reporting on sustainability indices 
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 Consider it important 
to be listed 
Do not consider it 
important to be listed 
Listed C1, C4 C5 
Not 
listed 
C2 C3, C6 
Table 45 – Is it important to be listed on the sustainability indices? 
7.5.3 Sustainability indices: a CSR certification 
Sustainable indices are considered as a kind of signal that makes rational assumptions 
about the intentions and future behaviour of companies. Companies see index listing, and 
present it as, a reward.  
All six companies admitted being confused about what ethical investment is. But they all 
know what they have to do if they want to be listed; just as with ISO certification, they 
need to fulfil a series of requirements. It seems rather clear to corporations what they 
have to do to get listed on the indices.  
Sustainability indices are used as a kind of ‘sustainability certification’. Inclusion in 
sustainability indices provides validity, a status hierarchy, and builds up the reputation of 
corporations. Sustainable indices serve as ‘certification contests’. A contest denotes an 
index competition in which performances are ranked and argues subsequently that early 
performances are more significant (Rao, 1994). Such certification contests provide a 
social test. Rating organisations benchmark corporations and assess their conformity to 
some socially recognised norms. Results of the screenings are brought to the public 
sphere through market indices and funds. Rao (1994) asserts that certification contests 
provide extrinsic criteria of fitness and reduce the ambiguity caused by lack of standards. 
In other words in the best case, that is when listed, sustainability indices contribute to the 
corporations’ legitimacy, and in the worst case, that is when not listed, do not affect the 
company.  
7.6 Corporations’ responses to ethical investment 
This section analyses companies’ responses to ethical investment. The analysis follows 
Oliver’s framework described in Chapter 3 and is based on the previous data – that is on 
what managers said during interviews and what the companies have published.  
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Corporations’ responses to ethical investment have changed over time and differ per 
company. The important events that changed corporations’ responses are the creation of 
the sustainable indices in 1999 and 2001. Around this period, companies started to 
consider ethical investment differently.  
Response to ethical investment is closely related to a corporation’s approach to 
sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. These are perceived by the 
six companies as important aspects of corporate legitimacy. Interviewees pointed out that 
corporations are expected to engage in and commit to sustainability. They all noted that 
they are under increasing pressure from their stakeholders to show good social and 
environmental performances and be transparent. A proper, desirable and appropriate 
company should demonstrate commitment to protect the environment, enhance social 
welfare, and dialogue with its stakeholders. There is a common feeling that companies 
that are not able to display such characteristics may in the near future be regarded as 
inappropriate. Therefore corporations increasingly provide signals of their commitment, 
such as business principles, ethical committees, reporting and the establishment of 
corporate affairs units. Those signals contribute to the building of the corporation’s 
reputation. Ethical investment gained importance when in the late 1990s it clearly 
adopted the CSR governance model.  
7.6.1 Before 1999/2000 
Until 1999/2000 the six companies did not consider seriously the ethical investment 
community. It was a marginal activity both in terms of size and number of ethically 
screened portfolios and in terms of actors involved. Ethical investment funds were not yet 
diffused among mainstream financial institutions and mainly concerned small socially-
minded banks.  
The criteria of ethical investment were very diverse and numerous. There were no 
standards. And criteria were also rather stringent and required from companies some 
significant changes. This created some uncertainty for companies but also conflicting 
pressures between the funds. Also criteria were not always compatible with companies’ 
goals and objectives. They were mainly based on the exclusionary methodology and 
referred to as ‘ethics’. They were neither aligned with the more general CSR models or 
represented a shared set of norms and values.  
Another element of uncertainty concerned the concept of sustainable development. 
Ethical investment referred to this concept. However not all of the six companies were 
familiar with it. If C1 and C4 had already had a clear view on sustainable development 
for some years and had already translated the concept internally, the others – C2, C3, C5 
and C6 – did not. Indeed C1 and C4 were far ahead of the ethical investment community.  
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The period before 1999/2000 presents a number of characteristics that, according to 
Oliver’s framework, would lead to defiance or manipulation strategies (see Annex 12). 
Corporations did not feel any significant pressures from the ethical investment 
community. They did not adopt any active strategy such as the manipulation strategies 
described by Oliver. They did not consider doing this, which would better fit under the 
dismissing type of strategy. This does not mean that companies would not answer 
sustainability analysts asking them questions but they did not show specific interest in 
doing so.  
7.6.2 After 2000 
The period after 2000 is characterised by a new institutional context. The previous 
Chapters showed that the norms and values of the ethical investment community shifted 
from ethics to sustainable development and from punishment to reward. The Triodos case 
showed that over time, rating organisations tend to adopt standard CSR models, reducing 
criteria multiplicity. In the Netherlands, but also internationally, ethical investment is 
becoming a mainstream financial product offered by major banks and increasingly getting 
attention from pension funds. But one of the major events has been the creation of the 
sustainability indices, the Dow Jones Sustainability and the FTSE4Good. As described in 
section 7.5, corporations show a particular interest in this new development.  
Around 2000 the institutional context changed. The diffusion and institutionalisation of 
the activity provided the ethical investment community with tools and power to affect 
companies’ legitimacy. Ethical investment is not the activity of a small marginal group 
anymore but is supported by a large section of the financial community. Moreover 
criteria have developed in such a way that they fit into a larger societal demand related to 
CSR. The assessment of sustainability performance produced by rating organisations has 
become not only relevant for the ethical investment community but also for a larger set of 
stakeholders. Managers also recognise that in the long run it affects the economic fitness 
of corporations by affecting share prices and thereby creates a certain dependence on the 
ethical investment community.  
This new institutional context creates new institutional pressures. However if before 
1999/2000 the six companies responded in a similar way, after 2000 there are some 
differences (see Annex 12).  
C1 and C4 
C1 and C4 show the most active responses. They have to a certain extend co-opted and 
influenced the setting of the standards for ethical investment. Their response fits into their 
broader approach to CSR and sustainable development in which ethical investment is 
integrated as one element. Both corporations have a proactive (in reference to (Ackoff, 
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1974)) approach to CSR and are recognised as leading companies by their peers but also 
by the ethical investment community. Their leading position and their highly connected 
CSR network have played an influential role in the formation of the ethical investment 
field and especially in the setting of ethical standards. Ethical investment standards have 
to a large extent become consistent with C1 and C4’s goals and are not constraining 
because to a certain extent they are aligned with their own standards. For both companies 
the legitimacy factor is rather moderate because of their already established leading 
position. Their inclusion into the sustainability indices confirms their position but does 
not directly affect their legitimacy; they also do not necessarily need to be recognised as 
leaders.  
C1 and C4’s responses to ethical investment are difficult to qualify within Oliver’s 
framework. Although four of the factors fall under the acquiescence strategy, C1 and C4 
do not merely follow the taken-for-granted norms or blindly obey the rules. Both 
companies have opportunistically used sustainability indices as a tool to demonstrate and 
reinforce their leading positions and acceptability to other actors. They show an active 
response and an ability to exert power over the contents of the expectations themselves. 
Their responses go beyond acquiescence. They are opinion leaders and are able to 
develop their internal practices beyond the institutional expectation but also to turn the 
expectations into a competitive advantage. C1 and C2 response correspond to the missing 
strategy pointed out by Cartwright (1998) and Cashore & Vertinsky (2000), that is 
internalisation.  
C2 and C3 
C2 and C3 are in a kind of in-between position: they are neither leaders nor laggards. 
They are the followers. Therefore they are more sensitive to the effect of ethical 
investment because it can either positively or negatively affect their legitimacy. If ethical 
investment was not an important element for C1 and C4 because of their already 
established leading position, it can make a difference for C2 and C3. These corporations 
compare and are compared to the leaders, creating an important competitive effect. 
Moreover they are both in a sensitive sector where companies are under significant 
societal pressures regarding social and environmental matters. Because standards of the 
ethical investment community are based on those of leading companies, compliance with 
the norms requires from C2 and C3 some changes (for example to integrate sustainable 
development into their objectives, or write a sustainability report). This can be 
constraining and is not always in line with the company’s goal. Moreover, for C2 and C3 
sustainable development is still an uncertain area and they have not yet developed a 
strong CSR network compared to C1 and C4. The sanction for not complying with the 
norms is high, especially for C2: exclusion from the sustainable index increases the gap 
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between them and the leading companies. It therefore reinforces their position of 
followers.  
C2 and C3’s response meets a number of the characteristics of the avoidance and 
acquiescence strategies defined by Oliver (1991). To a certain extend the companies want 
to conceal the gap with the successful leading companies but they also imitate them and 
comply with the CSR standards as much as possible.  
C5 and C6 
C5 and C6 are less affected by ethical investment and pressures related to social and 
environmental matters in general. It is only recently that these companies have started to 
be affected by the pressures.  
The analysis carried in section 7.4 reveals that in 2000-2001 these companies adopted a 
new approach towards sustainable development and CSR. They started considering some 
of the five elements studied. Complying with ethical investment standards is still a high 
constraint for those companies who do not have any sustainability reporting system or 
business principles in place. Moreover sustainable development is not always consistent 
with their objectives because it has not yet been integrated. If C5 has carried out some 
changes and tried to align its objectives on the CSR model, C6 has not done this yet. 
However, according to the manager interviewed, the company is soon going to publish its 
Business Principles.  
The institutional context does not create any strong pressures on C5 and C6. Being listed 
or not listed on the sustainable indices is not a high sanction or reward. It is not used as a 
distinctive sign in this sector. C5 and C6’s response balances between avoiding and 
ignoring the pressures. They both tend to reduce the extent to which they are externally 
inspected and evaluated. They both “hope” to answer the ethical investment community 
questions by establishing business principles. Although this may also be the case for 
other companies, C5 and C6 tend to avoid institutional pressures through concealment or 
buffering tactics involving disguising nonconformity behind a façade of acquiescence.  
7.6.3 Diversity of responses 
Corporations’ responses vary over time and per company. Table 46 provides an overview 
of the responses identified.  
Until the late 1990s, the six companies investigated ignored or were unaware of the 
pressures exerted by the ethical investment community. It is however important to note 
that at that time ethical investment was in a transition phase and was seeking some sort of 
standards to screen the sustainability performance of companies, while C1 and C4 were 
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already well advanced on the subject and even ahead of the ethical investment 
community. They had already developed schemes and standards for themselves.  
Around 2000 the institutional context changed and corporations adopted new types of 
responses. Several points come out of the analysis of the data: 
- Three main groups of response have been identified: C1 & C4, C2 & C3, and C5 & 
C6. These three groups correspond to the classification made earlier in this chapter: 
leaders (C1 & C4), followers (C2 & C3) and laggards (C5 & C6). The leaders’ group 
has the most active strategy. This suggests that the responses of companies to ethical 
investment may be related to their general approach towards CSR and sustainable 
development.  
- Corporations do not respond to the same pressures or ethical investment does not 
exert similar pressures on the six companies. C1 and C4 singled out some elements of 
ethical investment and brought them into their own strategies. They transformed the 
sustainable indices into a kind of CSR certification. Rather than a pressure they saw 
an opportunity to reinforce their leading position. C3 but especially C2 responded to a 
competition factor: because their competitors, C1 and C4, were listed on the 
sustainability indices, they considered that they ought to be listed in order to be 
among the best companies. As for C5 and C6, pressures are not very strong yet. They 
respond to a normative pressure related to CSR coming from society at large but to 
which the ethical investment community is adding more force. 
- Companies do not seek the same degree of legitimacy regarding CSR and sustainable 
development matters. C5 and C6 do not seek a CSR certification while the other four 
do. Although the data do not confirm this (but only suggest it), it seems that there is a 
sector effect. In several instances the analysis of the data suggests a distinction 
between on the one hand, the Oil & Chemical and Food sectors and on the other, the 
Media sector (for example regarding the way managers perceive ethical investment or 
the reporting practices of companies).  
- Corporation responses are not always clear-cut. It may be argued, for example, that to 
a certain extent all six companies avoid the pressures by adopting the five elements 
studied. Moreover corporations’ responses do not exactly fit Oliver’s framework. 
They present characteristics of several strategies such as buffer and dismiss or imitate 
and acquiesce.  
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 Before 1999/2000 After 2000   
 All companies C1 & C4 C2 & C3 C5 & C6 
Strategic response Dismiss Co-opt/Influence Imitate/Comply 
& 
Conceal/Buffer 
Conceal/Buffer 
& Dismiss 
     
Factors     
Cause     
Legitimacy Low Moderate High Low 
Efficiency None Low Low Low 
Constituents     
Multiplicity High Low Low Low 
Dependence None Low Low Low 
Content     
Consistency Low High Moderate Moderate 
Constraint High Low High High 
Control     
Coercion None Moderate High Low 
Diffusion Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Context     
Uncertainty High Low High High 
Interconnectness Low High Moderate Low 
Table 46 – Corporations strategic responses: an overview 
7.7 Managing the pressures 
This chapter investigated corporations’ responses to ethical investment. Responses 
evolved over time. Until the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s, corporations were 
able to ignore any pressures exerted by the ethical investment community. The 
institutional factors created conditions that privileged responses of the defiance type: the 
pressures affected neither the social nor the economic fitness of the companies; actors in 
the field where marginal financial institutions; the criteria of ethical investment were not 
adapted to businesses, maybe “too naive” as one of the sustainability analysts of Triodos 
Research pointed out; and there was no specific means to exert the pressures. 
Nevertheless corporations were already facing pressures to face their social and 
environmental responsibilities (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2). But in the 1990s ethical 
investment did not refer directly to the concepts of sustainable development or CSR. 
Corporations associated the activity with marginal and extreme groups.  
A key event marks a change in corporations’ responses to ethical investment: the 
introduction of the sustainable indices, the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices in 1999 and 
the FTSE4Good in 2001. This new element provided the ethical investment community 
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with the necessary means to exert pressures on corporations, reinforcing the institutional 
factor of control. Corporations reconsidered ethical investment and revised their 
strategies. The sustainability indices may be the key event that triggered companies’ 
attention, however in the development of ethical investment it did not come alone. The 
indices are one of the outputs of the institutionalisation process of the field. The end of 
the 1990s also saw a number of changes in the field such as increasing interest from 
mainstream financial institutions, professionalisation, and to a certain extent 
standardisation and structuration creating new institutional pressures (see Chapters 5 and 
6). After this key event, corporations adopted a diversity of strategies. 
In the late 1990s/beginning 2000s, corporations integrated ethical investment as one 
element of a broader field, CSR. Ethical investment then became compatible with, and 
relevant to, corporations’ goals and objectives. Corporations, and especially certain 
sectors such as Oil & Chemicals and Food, are increasingly expected, but also required, 
to provide evidence of their social and environmental commitment. Therefore their 
perception of ethical investment has changed; it has become a way to enhance a 
corporation’s social fitness and in the future to prevent economic risks. Being positively 
screened by ethical investors fulfils a strategic utility. That is particularly true for C1 and 
C4 (one company is from the Oil & Chemicals sector, the other from the Food sector, and 
both are listed on the sustainability indices). These two companies did not wait for ethical 
investment to exert significant pressures, but they behaved pro-actively and strategically 
used it. They turned the sustainability indices into a CSR certification, thereby enhancing 
their social legitimacy and protecting an economic gain in the long term—they expect 
regular investment funds to adopt social and environmental criteria very soon. C1 and 
C4’s response is difficult to fit into Oliver’s framework. It suggests the missing strategy 
identified by Cartwright (1998) and Cashore & Vertinsky (2000); they call it 
“internalisation”. This strategy stresses active acceptance: C1 and C4 do not resist the 
pressures but use and influence them in a strategic way.  
C2 and C3 responded differently. These companies are from the same sectors of activity 
as respectively C1 and C4, but contrary to C1 and C4 they are not sustainability leaders in 
their sectors; they are followers. They do operate in rather similar environmental 
contexts, and therefore are increasingly required to show a good sustainability 
performance. The introduction of the sustainability indices and the use of the indices as 
CSR certification by the listed companies created an important competitive dimension for 
C2 and C3. It became a sign that the company is ‘one of the best’. These two companies 
adopted a mixed strategy combining the acquiescence and avoidance types. There is a 
certain aspect of mimetism: listed companies provide the model of the successful 
companies. C2 and C3 therefore imitate the listed companies, for example by establishing 
business principles or publishing CSR reports. This same response can also be considered 
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as a form of disguising nonconformity. C2 and C3 provide the required answers to the 
ethical community in order to be positively screened, but these answers do not mean that 
they actually comply with expectations. They can be regarded as a symbolic acceptance.  
Companies from the Media sector presented a different type of response. Until recently 
the Media sector has been less subjected to pressures related to social and environmental 
matters. Therefore C5 and C6 may not seek the same degree of CSR legitimacy than the 
other four companies. In 2002, at the time of the investigation, CSR was not a big issue 
for them. They did not perceive any strategic utility in being listed on the sustainability 
indices: C5 did not claim its inclusion on the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices. These 
companies showed mixed responses that combine the avoidance and defiance types of 
strategy. They did not provide a response specific to pressures from the ethical 
investment field but rather to a more general stream of pressures related to CSR.  
Does ethical investment affect a corporation’s legitimacy, as was suggested in the 
introductory chapter? Until 2000 it did not have any impact on a corporation’s 
legitimacy. However since 2000 it does contribute to the process of legitimation. Ethical 
investment has become linked to CSR and sustainable development, which corporations 
increasingly need to legitimate their actions and existence. Being positively screened and 
ultimately listed on the sustainable indices provides companies with an external 
accreditation that they not only are conform to social and environmental norms but also 
that they are among the most sustainable companies. Two important elements have 
enabled ethical investment to affect corporate legitimacy. First the association of the 
activity to the field of CSR. And second the strategic choice of certain companies, such as 
C1 and C4, to display it as a CSR certification. Certain companies – like C2 in the sample 
studied – want to be listed and try to conform as mush as possible to the criteria such as 
producing business principles or a CSR report. Several sustainability analysts noticed the 
growing interest of companies in social and environmental screening after the launch of 
the sustainability indices. Ethical investment affects corporate legitimacy positively 
because some companies have deliberately and strategically turned it into an accreditation 
body but there is no sign that it affects corporate legitimacy negatively. 
Oliver’s framework (1991) provides a valuable tool for analysing organisations’ 
responses to institutional pressures. It incorporates the assumption that organisational 
resistance to institutional pressures is a strategic choice. It outlines the likelihood of 
organisational resistance to external pressures for conformity in relation to the degree of 
pressure exerted by the institutional expectations. The case of ethical investment 
corroborates Oliver’s perspective. The analysis of the six corporations shows a diversity 
of strategies: the six companies were not affected similarly by the pressures and they did 
not respond in the same way to the same pressures. The analysis suggests a distinction 
between the sensitive sectors (Oil & Chemicals and Food) and the non-sensitive sector 
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(Media), but also between leaders, followers and laggards. It demonstrates that 
corporations do not simply comply with institutional pressures but respond strategically 
according to their individual interest and the specific context they operate in.  
However, Oliver’s framework, as was pointed out in Chapter 3, is linear and promotes 
linear analysis. It does not consider interactions between organisations and the field and 
does not make it possible to take into consideration the role and impact of organisations’ 
responses in the institutional field. Nevertheless being part of the field of ethical 
investment, corporations have transmitted their interests back to the field. This specific 
point will be further analysed in the concluding chapter which will adopt a more holistic 
approach.  
Based on the empirical data analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the next chapter will develop 
the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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Chapter  8 –  Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters outlined the development of the ethical investment field in the 
Netherlands from the beginning of the 1990s until 2002 and analysed corporations’ 
responses to the pressures exerted by this emerging phenomenon. Chapter 2 documented 
how the activity started within the Dutch bank Triodos and how it evolved over time. It 
also described the various aspects of the activity: fund management, company screening 
and selection. Chapter 5 highlighted firstly the international development of the ethical 
investment field and secondly the shift from an activist activity to a commercial project 
dominated by mainstream financial institutions. Chapter 6 examined the development of 
ethical investment in the Netherlands. It detailed the diffusion and institutionalisation of 
the activity involving professionalisation, standardisation, structuration, increased 
interaction between actors in the field, and increased flow of information. However 
institutionalisation has not created a common definition of what ethical investment is. On 
the contrary data pointed at some disagreement within the field as well as conflicting 
logics. Chapter 7 investigated corporations’ responses to ethical investment. It presented 
how in 1999-2000 corporations changed strategies towards ethical investment, 
highlighting a diversity of strategies. Each of these chapters focused on different levels of 
analysis: Chapters 2 and 7 on the micro, Chapter 5 on the macro and Chapter 6 on the 
meso level. 
Chapter 8 builds on the empirical data presented in these four chapters to further analyse 
the two research questions of this dissertation. It also presents some theoretical 
considerations and finally proposes closing commentaries regarding the potential of 
ethical investment to contribute to sustainable development.  
8.2 On the research questions 
Two research questions were addressed in the dissertation: (1) What are the nature and 
characteristics of the institutionalisation process of the field of ethical investment? and 
(2) How do corporations respond to the pressures exerted by ethical investment? Both 
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research questions have been approached from a theoretical and empirical perspective, 
focusing on the field of ethical investment in the Netherlands. Empirical data were 
collected and analysed in the Dutch context. Findings are therefore limited to a specific 
geographic scope. The data used do not make it possible to generalise the findings to the 
international level. Because of the international character of ethical investment, as was 
shown in Chapter 5, it would be interesting to investigate the development of the activity 
in other countries and conduct comparative studies. It would be a valuable contribution to 
the literature on ethical investment and it would allow analysing the institutionalisation 
process at the international level. This section draws conclusions regarding the two 
research questions.  
8.2.1 Institutionalisation of ethical investment 
The Triodos case, presented in Chapter 2, pointed at several signs that were announcing 
changes in the field of ethical investment. Chapters 5 and 6 analysed those changes in 
terms of institutionalisation. They showed that ethical investment has become “a 
recognised area of institutional life”. There is a public discourse about ethical investment 
and there are organisations and occupations that are concerned with activities related to 
this concept. Empirical data highlight that the field of ethical investment fits many of the 
indicators of institutionalisation as identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott 
(1994): an increase in interaction among organisations within the field; the development 
of inter-organisational structures of control and relational patterns; an increase in the flow 
of information; and an increase in isomorphism regarding the activity of ethical 
investment. However other indicators are not present: the development of mutual 
awareness by members of the field that they share a common meaning; an increased 
clarity of field boundary; and an increased agreement about the institutional logic that 
guides the activity. 
Ethical investment is a maturing field still in a process of institutionalisation. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, it started to develop in the Netherlands in an international and 
institutional context which was changing. Ethical investment was shifting from an 
activist-related activity to a commercial project. In the Dutch case, financial institutions 
played an important role in initiating the activity and rating organisations in 
professionalising it. The data shows that ethical investment has been captured by 
mainstream financial institutions. In this new activity, they recognised some strategic 
interests: it offered them a means to reduce pressures to become sustainable organisations 
while creating new market opportunities. The capture of the field by mainstream financial 
institutions has initiated a number of changes within the field such as the diffusion of 
funds among mainstream financial institutions, or professionalisation. It has produced a 
new institutional context which has created new types of pressures on corporations. In 
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relation to these changes, corporations have adopted new responses to the pressures 
exerted by the ethical investment community. Since 2000 some of them have applied a 
more active strategy and managed to appropriate some aspects of the field, namely the 
sustainability indices. They have used this specific element strategically in order to serve 
their own interests. They have turned the indices into a CSR certification to enhance their 
legitimacy.  
Both the capture by mainstream financial institutions and the appropriation of the 
sustainability indices by corporations had a significant impact on the field especially in 
making ethical investment a viable commercial project and transforming it into an 
element of the broader field of CSR. The paragraphs below develop four specific aspects 
of the institutionalisation of ethical investment. Firstly the Dutch field did not start in a 
complete vacuum but developed in a specific historical and international context. 
Secondly the field of ethical investment is a maturing field still in a process of 
institutionalisation. Thirdly and fourthly, it is argued that ethical investment has become a 
viable commercial project and that the field has been taken over by another field, namely 
CSR.  
Ethical investment: an idea that has evolved in time and space 
The field of ethical investment in the Netherlands did not start in a complete vacuum. 
Chapter 5 showed that its development was embedded in a broader context both in time 
and space.  
The idea of ethical investment started in the US several decades ago. In its first form, 
ethical investment was mainly connected to religious groups who did not want to support 
specific activities. They applied negative criteria in order to avoid what they called the 
‘sin stocks’. In the 1970s, sill in the US, a new form of ethical investment started. It 
became a more political tool to protest against companies’ misbehaviour. Citizen groups 
took up the idea of ethical investment because it can provide shareholders with tools to 
exercise power towards corporations (this is described as the exit and voice option in 
Chapter 5 in reference to Hirschman (1970)).  
The idea came to Europe in the 1980s, which also marks the very beginning of a new age 
of ethical investment; when it became a commercial product. The first ethical fund in the 
UK (the Friends Provident Stewardship) was launched in 1984 as a range of three funds: 
a unit trust, a life assurance fund and a pension fund. In the Netherlands the first fund was 
launched in 1991 by ABF. These two funds, as well as the next two funds launched in the 
Netherlands by ASN bank and Triodos bank, were motivated by strong beliefs and values 
and connected to specific groups such as environmentalists or churches, but did not aim 
at protesting. They were financial products and ought to be profitable.  
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The development of ethical investment in the Netherlands started in this transition period 
when ethical investment was halfway between an activist tool and a commercial project. 
In 1990, when ethical investment started in the Netherlands, there was much confusion 
about what ethical investment was and especially how to do it. Very soon a rating 
organisation was set up, initiated by a financial institution. It played a key role in ridding 
ethical investment of its activist image and transforming it into a professional activity.  
Ethical investment: a field undergoing a process of institutionalisation 
Chapter 3 presented a model of institutionalisation developed by Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996). The model includes three phases: habitualisation or pre-institutionalisation, 
objectivation or semi-institutionalisation, and sedimentation or full institutionalisation.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the ethical investment field in the Netherlands has been 
maturing. Before that there was an embryonic form of ethical investment represented by 
the very few funds applying some sort of exclusionary criteria. However there was no 
discussion about it or system to carry it out. It was done on a purely instinctive basis and 
without any organised approach. It was in 1991 with the launch of the first ethical 
investment fund that the field started to take shape. A group of individuals from different 
organisations sat together and started to talk about ethical investment, trying to define 
what it is and translate it into action.  
The field developed very quickly. Within a few years a number of developments took 
place regarding structuration, professionalisation, and normalisation. By the end of 2002, 
some characteristics showed the field to have reached a semi-institutionalisation stage. 
Marginal financial institutions have championed the activity and showed that it is a 
successful one. Mainstream financial institutions, banks but also pension funds, are 
thinking about or even starting to adopt it. There is a certain degree of consensus about 
the activity in which professionalisation has played an important role. Criteria and 
methodology have been standardised, enabling a normative rather than imitative diffusion 
of ethical investment.  
However other aspects of the field indicate that its institutionalisation process is still in 
the pre-institutionalisation phase. The institutional field shows many areas of contention 
and elements of the field that are in continued flux and development. There is no shared 
definition of common meaning about the activity. Data showed that there is a division 
within the field between the ‘old’ funds and the ‘new’ funds. Although there is a certain 
degree of standardisation, norms are still in the process of being defined. There is a 
certain structuration of the field but it is still evolving. For example in 2002 a new 
organisation, SODP, was set up to respond to the specific needs of pension funds.  
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The analysis of the field of ethical investment shows that the different characteristics of 
institutionalisation do not develop at the same time and at an equal speed. This makes it 
difficult to identify exactly at what stage the field of ethical investment is.  
A viable commercial project 
Chapter 5 pointed at the shift in the nature of ethical investment from an activist-related 
activity to a commercial project. It is in this transition period that ethical investment 
started in the Netherlands, creating an unclear and ambiguous situation. However today it 
has become a viable commercial project. Three factors have played a determining role in 
the development and orientation of ethical investment. 
The first factor is professionalisation. As was shown in Chapter 6, a professional body, 
rating organisations, emerged from the field of ethical investment. A new function of 
‘sustainable analyst’ has been created for the activity of ethical investing. Rating 
organisations have built an expertise – sustainability analysts – and structures – rating 
organisations – to provide services to ethical fund managers. It has had an important 
effect to change the activist, amateurish, and subjective image of ethical investment into a 
more visible, serious and professional activity. Rating organisations have worked on 
standardising and making the criteria more objective. They have become the ‘specialists’ 
providing a certain type of knowledge but also a representative body for ethical 
investment. Financial institutions that want to set up an ethical investment fund know 
whom they have to address and corporations have learnt to know rating organisations, 
what they want and what they do.  
The second factor is the adoption of ethical investment by mainstream financial 
institutions. At the very beginning (early 1990s), a lot of questions were asked about the 
financial performance of ethical portfolios. The first mainstream financial institutions that 
launched an ethical investment fund played an important role in turning the activity into a 
financially viable project. This contributed to a mechanism of mimetism between 
financial institutions: banks that do not have an ethical investment fund copying those 
that have one and are successful. Academic studies reinforced this mechanism. It was 
pointed out in the introduction of the dissertation that most of the research on ethical 
investment focused on the relationship between financial and social/environmental. Most 
of them show a positive or at least neutral relationship. It provided mainstream financial 
institutions with a strong argument to engage in this activity. A number of them quote 
such research in their brochures or in their discourse to present the fund. 
Finally, a third factor is the use of the sustainability indices as a CSR certification by 
corporations. Chapter 7 highlighted the strategic use of sustainability indices, Dow Jones 
Sustainability and FTSE4Good, by some of the corporations studied. By turning indices 
into a CSR certification, they present them as a symbol representative of the 
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sustainability performance of a company. Corporations thereby recognised it as a valid 
activity and provided the ethical investment community with a power of legitimation. 
This strategic use created competitive pressures on companies: ‘sustainable’ companies 
are expected to be listed on sustainability indices; if they are not, it implicitly means that 
they are not among the best.  
Rating organisations, mainstream financial institutions and corporations have to a certain 
extent validated the activity of ethical investment and contributed to making it a viable 
commercial project.  
The field of ethical investment taken over by the field of CSR 
The field of ethical investment used to be a distinct field, however it has been taken over 
by another field, namely CSR. Two main groups of actors have played a crucial role in 
the take-over, namely the mainstream financial institutions and corporations.  
Mainstream financial institutions engaged in ethical investment for several reasons. One 
of them was the increasing pressure from governmental, inter-governmental and non-
governmental organisations to show their commitment to sustainable development. Their 
decision to launch an ethical investment fund was a strategic response aimed at reducing 
the pressures. They therefore wanted ethical investment to be clearly linked with the 
concept of sustainable development.  
Corporations also played a significant role in the take-over of ethical investment by the 
CSR field. They strategically used the sustainability indices to enhance their image of 
socially and environmentally responsible company. Corporations too felt pressures from 
their stakeholders to improve their social and environmental performances. Although 
being listed on the sustainability indices does not directly improve their performance, it 
provides them with an external accreditation of their good performance.  
Financial institutions and corporations transmitted their interests back to the field 
(Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002). The lack of clarity of the field and the lack of a shared 
meaning offered them strategic opportunities to turn ethical investment into an element of 
the broader CSR field.  
8.2.2 Corporations’ responses 
Six Dutch stock-quoted companies from three different sectors, Oil & Chemical, Food 
and Media, were analysed in order to explore their different responses over time to ethical 
investment. The analysis pointed at three main elements: firstly the ethical investment 
community is exerting coercive pressures on corporations; secondly ethical investment 
affects corporate legitimacy to a certain extent; and thirdly, three corporations have 
adopted a variety of responses. These three points are developed below.  
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Data collected consisted of externally reported information. The sources of information 
were various documents publicly available from the companies such as annual reports, 
websites, or various brochures, and interviews with managers mainly from investor 
relations or communication departments. These sources mainly provided information on 
‘what the company says’ but not on ‘what the company actually does’ or on ‘what is 
happening internally’. The choice of these sources was motivated by the fact that 
sustainability analysts for ethical investment base their assessments on the same 
information. The data offered the advantage of reflecting changes in corporate 
communication towards the ethical community and thereby making it possible to 
investigate the responses.  
However it also presented a number of disadvantages. It did not provide insights into how 
companies process pressures exerted by corporations internally. Moreover the view on 
ethical investment presented by the company was not representative of the whole 
company but of a specific department which was already being used to deal with ethical 
investors. Another problem brought by this type of data is the limitation for analysing 
changes in corporations’ behaviour and practices. Complementary information and 
interviews with a broader set of managers would provide texture and depth to the analysis 
of the six case studies and greatly enrich the conclusion on the potential of ethical 
investment to influence corporations.  
Coercive pressures 
The ethical investment community has become an additional source of coercive pressure 
related to social and environmental issues for companies. They have been facing 
increasing requests from their stakeholders to display socially and environmentally 
responsible practices and behaviour. Ethical investment has rallied and reinforced this 
general trend by shifting its reference from a marginal view to a more socially accepted 
view, CSR. It supports the idea that sustainability performance is a good indicator of the 
company’s social and economic fitness.  
Corporate legitimacy  
As highlighted in Chapter 7, ethical investment influences the social fitness of 
companies. Through screening, ethical investment directly evaluates companies’ 
suitability as regards social actors’ values and expectations for action. The impact of 
ethical investment is even greater since the launch of the sustainable indices: Dow Jones 
Sustainability and FTSE4Good. These indices make the assessment publicly available 
and attract a lot of attention from the press. Complying with ethical investment standards 
and being listed among the ‘best in class’ provides a way to enhance corporate 
legitimacy. Ethical investment gives a credible account of the sustainability performance 
of companies. 
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The ethical investment community has a very limited impact on companies’ economic 
fitness. As of 2002, the size of the ethically screened funds remains very small compared 
to regular investment funds. Ethical investment does not present a financial risk for 
corporations although a number of them do recognise its growing importance. 
Nonetheless companies find it important to answer questionnaires sent by rating 
organisations and some of them consider it valuable to be listed on the sustainable 
indices. An essential motivation for getting listed is because it provides a way to gain 
social recognition and improve their social fitness. Ethical investment represents a 
positive contribution to corporate legitimacy. However not all companies seek the same 
level of legitimacy regarding social and environmental matters. The findings of Chapter 7 
suggest that companies from sensitive sectors (Oil & Chemical and Food) are more 
actively seeking support than companies from the non-sensitive sector (Media).  
Diversity of strategic responses 
The six corporations studied in this dissertation did not feel any pressures from the ethical 
investment community until the end of the 1990s-beginning 2000s. Around 2000 
corporations’ responses changed. A key event stimulated this change: the launch of the 
sustainability indices. During the same period (end of the 1990s), the ethical investment 
community made clear references to concepts such as CSR and sustainable development 
and became a mainstream activity. The institutional pressures were starting to change and 
became stronger. In response, the leading corporations (in the sample studied) revised 
their approach to ethical investment and adopted a proactive strategy.  
The six corporations studied did not display similar responses. C1 & C4 adopted an 
active response, which has been categorised under ‘internalisation’. C2 & C3 were the 
companies with the highest need for legitimacy; their response was a combination of 
acquiescence and avoidance strategy. C5 & C6 were the companies that were the less 
receptive to the change in the field; their response was a combination of avoidance and 
defiance strategy.  
The findings support Oliver’s argument that organisations are not passive and conforming 
across all institutional conditions but that they adopt strategic and tactical responses to the 
institutional environment (Oliver, 1991). The analysis of the six corporations highlighted 
that organisations were not affected by, or sensitive to, the same pressures.  
However if the six corporations analysed displayed a diversity of strategic responses, they 
converged in terms of concrete responses. In the dissertation five specific aspects were 
looked at: reporting, business principles, ethical advisory committee, transparency and 
openness with stakeholders and commitment to sustainable development. The analysis 
suggests some mimetism between corporations, where companies like C1 and C4 were 
looked at as successful corporations. C1 and C4 were the first corporations to have all 
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five elements in place and they are both listed on the sustainable indices. Over a period of 
six years, all six companies had business principles, most of them showed commitment to 
sustainable development and transparency towards their stakeholders, and CSR reporting 
was becoming increasingly an issue. Companies that were not listed on the sustainable 
indices expected to be listed as soon as they had arranged these five elements.  
The case studies also show that corporations are getting increasingly organised to respond 
to the ethical investment community. When Triodos Research carried out its first 
company screenings, in 1997, it was difficult to get information from companies. There 
are two main reasons for that: firstly companies did not have the information and 
secondly companies did not know what the rating organisation was about and what they 
were going to do with the information. The first reason is very important. It reveals 
another mechanism that happened outside the field of ethical investment but in which the 
ethical investment community has played an active role: standardisation of sustainability 
reporting (see (Koziol, 2000)). Increasingly various actors are asking companies to 
disclose information related to social and environmental matters. The ethical investment 
community is one of them. In the 1990s and especially in the late 1990s – when the 
Global Reporting Initiative was launched – there was a tremendous move towards a 
standard form of reporting. Leading companies, such as C1 and C4, investigated in this 
dissertation, have been playing an important role in crafting the standards. They have 
been used as models and were much more advanced than most of the other actors 
involved in the process. Since the mid-1980s C1 and C4 have been developing 
‘sustainability’ standards and environmental management codes. For example, in 1989 
two environmental codes were created involving key trade association and environmental 
groups: the Responsible Care Program sponsored by the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association and the Valdez Principles sponsored by CERES, a coalition of 
environmentalist and activist shareholders (see (Hoffman, 2001; King & Lenox, 2000; 
Olson et al., 2003)). The involvement of companies is visible through the analysis of the 
CSR organisations (see Chapter 6), that have been important partners during the 
development of the standards. C1 and C4 are members of a large number of CSR 
organisations. In 2003 companies were increasingly disclosing information and getting 
organised to answer questions. They have hired CSR managers, usually based in the 
corporate affairs or corporate communication department, who are prepared to face 
public questions. As several studies have showed, the corporate affairs function has been 
professionalised (Clark, 2000; Hargreaves & Dauman, 1975; Hutton, 1999; Lagerwey, 
Hemels, & Heillmann, 1997; Lange, 2000; L'Etang, 1999; Ruler, Vervic, Flodin, & 
Butschi, 2001). Companies are now ready to be screened and know what types of 
questions to expect. They have also learned to know more about rating organisations – 
what they do and how they use the information – by working with them in the process of 
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reporting standardisation but also through screening. Uncertainties have been reduced and 
enabled partnerships between rating organisations and corporations.  
8.3 Theoretical discussion 
The analysis of the ethical investment field shows that the formation of a field is not a 
smooth process. It evolves through a long process of interactions between actors and 
emerges from, and in, a specific context. This section presents first the theoretical 
contributions of the dissertation and then discusses some specific aspects pointed out by 
the investigation of the field of ethical investment. 
8.3.1 Theoretical contributions 
A major contribution of this dissertation to institutional theories is the expansion of the 
empirical base of the theory. It does so in three respects. Firstly, this research investigated 
the institutionalisation of a commercial project. Organisational field studies have 
principally focused on fields comprising government agencies (DiMaggio, 1983; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1983), non-profit organisations or professions such as health care (Scott, Ruef, 
Mendel, & Caronna, 2000), museums (DiMaggio, 1991), and education (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977b; Tolbert, 1985). Commercial projects have received little attention from 
institutional theorists. This dissertation adds to this area of research.  
Secondly, the dissertation explored an institutional field which is in formation. 
Institutional fields have mostly been investigated once they were already formed and 
shaped. A number of research projects address field dynamics and organisational 
isomorphism building on DiMaggio and Powell (1983)’s definition and characteristics of 
organisational fields. But very little research investigates the emergence of organisational 
fields: how and why does a field come to be what it is? Recent studies have developed 
aspects of field emergence, often focusing on the development of organisational forms 
that appear as wider activity, policy, or industry fields get (re)organised, or on the 
activities of institutional entrepreneurs (see (Olson, Ventresca, & Stevenson, 2003) for a 
review). This dissertation investigates the formation of an institutional field focusing on 
its emergence. It therefore contributes to the literature on institutional theory by bringing 
new insights into how fields emerge.  
Thirdly, the 1983 DiMaggio and Powell’s paper, “The iron cage revisited”, has been a 
major contribution and highly influential work in the new institutional theory of the last 
20 years. They further developed the work of Meyer and Rowan (1997) related to 
collective rationality. They argued that organisations become similar not because of 
competition or efficiency requirements but rather as a result of a legitimatisation process, 
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a search for social recognition. DiMaggio and Powell (1983)’s paper has generated a 
prodigious number of studies (for a review see (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999)). However 
research tends to focus on field operations and hardly considers the process of 
structuration, rather concentrating on structural determinants. This dissertation differs by 
addressing and developing mechanisms.  
8.3.2 Field structuration and consolidation 
The dissertation described the institutionalisation process of ethical investment in the 
Netherlands. The analysis was based on a theoretical model built from institutional 
theory. The empirical case studied suggests some nuances but also new elements related 
to field structuration and consolidation that need to be further explored. These are 
developed in the following paragraphs.  
Characteristics of institutionalisation 
The analysis of the field of ethical investment brings up nuances and new characteristics 
regarding some of the theoretical elements of a mature institutional field identified by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  
There is a higher level of interaction between organisations in the field, but not equally 
among organisations. The number of interactions has increased for some of the actors in 
the field and decreased for others. In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that on the one hand in 
2002 Triodos Research had fewer contacts with investors and Triodos Bank had fewer 
contacts with corporations than they had in 1997. And on the other hand in 2002 Triodos 
Research had more contacts with other rating organisations than it had in 1997, and both 
Triodos Research and Triodos Bank had increased contacts with ethical investment 
organisations such as Eurosif and VBDO. Rating organisations have become a central 
actor in the field around which most of the interactions concentrate. The increase in 
interactions between rating organisations and other organisations of the field is much 
higher than between the other organisations of the field.  
The case of ethical investment reveals another nuance related to the characteristics of 
institutional fields: not only the number but also the quality of contacts changed. Several 
examples illustrate this point: rating organisations and corporations have developed a 
partnership-type of relation and financial institutions and rating organisations have 
developed a supplier-client type of relation, neither of which were present in the early 
1990s. The quality aspect is important because it affects not only the number but also the 
type of interactions (see also section 8.4.)  
There is not only an increase in the amount of information circulating ‘within’ the field of 
ethical investment among organisations of the field, but also ‘about’ the field from actors 
outside the field. There are conferences such as the annual TBLI international conference 
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or the annual ‘Dag van het Ethisch Beleggen’ Dutch conference, websites entirely 
devoted to ethical investment such as Duurzaam Beleggen (www. Duurzaam-
Beleggen.nl), and organisations such as VBDO which bring together actors of the field 
and where they exchange information. There is also an increasing number of articles in 
the press or academic articles in journals about ethical investment. The analysis of the 
TBLI attendees showed that press interest has increased between 1999 and 2002. Ethical 
investment hits regularly main newspapers such as the Financial Times (see for example 
(Warwick-Ching, 2003)). There is another aspect related to the flow of information which 
is reflected in the transparency guidelines. The objective is to “create more clarity” 
around ethical investment (Eurosif, 2003). The guidelines require ethical fund managers 
to disclose information related to the policy and practices of the fund. This marks a first 
attempt at controlling what is or should be ethical investment. The case of ethical 
investment shows that the flow of information increased. However some nuances need to 
be brought regarding why it increased and how the information is used.  
Finally the case of ethical investment does not reveal an increasing mutual awareness 
among participants that they share a common meaning system. However the field reveals 
other elements. Firstly the institutionalisation of the field has been accompanied by a 
consensus about the activity: criteria and methodology are becoming increasingly similar 
across ethical funds. And secondly the field demonstrates a rhetoric isomorphism: actors 
in the field tend to use the same wording, to develop a common language. This is 
illustrated, for example, by the ‘old’ fund managers who are thinking about changing the 
name of the fund (or already have done so): they want to use ‘sustainable’ instead of 
‘ethical’; or by the fund managers that use the same labels for the criteria. However, what 
each of them actually means is not the same. This comes out clearly when analysing the 
two groups of financial institutions, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. They also have different 
motives for engaging in the field. 
It could be interesting to bring the concept of boundary objects used by Star and 
Griesemer (1989). They define boundary objects are “objects which are both plastic 
enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, 
yet robust enough to maintain a common identity” (Star & Griesemer, 1989). As a 
boundary object, ethical investment is a common point of reference of conversation for 
actors in the field (people can all agree they are talking about ethical investment), they 
even use similar wording to a certain extent. However actors do not actually talk about 
the same thing; they attach different meanings to ethical investment. Ethical investment is 
plastic enough to adapt to changing needs (boundary objects are working arrangements, 
adjusted as needed; they are not imposed by one community, nor by appealing to outside 
standards) and satisfy different concerns simultaneously. Nonetheless Chapter 6 showed 
that there are some conflicts within the field due to different meanings. This raises a 
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question about the elasticity of ethical investment as a boundary object. It could be 
studied in the future when the field will be mature. 
Field boundaries 
Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that the boundaries of the field of ethical 
investment are not clearly defined. The take-over of the ethical investment field by the 
CSR field has created ambiguity about the field boundaries. Ethical investment has 
become an element of the CSR field because actors share the feeling that they are 
involved in a similar activity. However the ethical investment activity itself has remained 
a distinct activity. This raises the question: is the field of ethical investment defined 
around a common technology/industry or around a common issue?  
Institutional theorists usually define fields around common technologies or common 
industries. Hoffman proposes another perspective, in which he argues that fields are 
formed around issues that bring together various field constituents with disparate 
purposes (Hoffman, 1999). The analysis of the ethical investment field challenges both 
approaches. The field does not simply focus on one issue or one industry but rather on 
several interests and issues interwoven together. There are different types of actors 
involved: financial institutions, corporations from very different sectors of activity and 
rating organisations. Actors who get involved in the field pursue various interests. Ethical 
investment deals with several issues and/or actors link it to different issues, such as CSR, 
sustainable development, ethics.  
It seems difficult to answer this question given the state of development the field is in. 
This problem in identifying what defines the field, technology or issue, makes the 
boundaries of the field difficult to draw and calls for an extension of Hoffman’s 
argument.  
Institutionalisation: a portfolio of micro-mechanisms 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain the homogeneity of organisational forms and 
practices through three isomorphism mechanisms: coercive forces that stem from 
political influence and problems of legitimacy; mimetic changes that are responses to 
uncertainty; and normative influences resulting from professionalisation. The 
identification of these mechanisms has been very important in understanding the 
institutionalisation process. However they are somehow rather general and do not capture 
the dynamics of field constitution. Analysis of the ethical investment field suggests that 
field construction is a complex process created through actions of, and interactions 
between, actors and involving a portfolio of micro-mechanisms that go on in combination 
and interrelation with each other. 
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The case of ethical investment illustrates several mechanisms, some of which have 
already been mentioned earlier in the dissertation. The following list builds on existing 
macro mechanisms and proposes new micro mechanisms: 
- the capture of ethical investment by mainstream financial institutions;  
- the local motives which stimulate actors to enter the field (Olson et al., 2003);  
- the identity crisis;  
- the mimetic adoption of criteria for ethical investment funds (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983);  
- the normative forces that result from professionalisation (DiMaggio et al., 1983);  
- the creation of new platforms that bring together actors of the field (all or some of 
them) in new combinations and venues (Olson et al., 2003);  
- the delegation of the screening activity to rating organisations that provide them with 
an important intermediary role;  
- the co-optation by corporations of the setting of ethical standards;  
- and the appropriation of some aspects of ethical investment by corporations.  
The idea of ethical investment has been transposed in different contexts, by different 
actors, motives and logics. ’Transposition’7 refers to ideas, or schemas in Sewell’s term, 
that can be brought in a new and not fully predictable situation when the opportunity 
arises (Sewell, 1992). There is the appropriation of an idea in a novel situation which 
often generates reinterpretation or translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1998; 
Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Olson et al., 2003).The shifts analysed in Chapter 5 – from 
a religion-related activity to an activist tool and then to a commercial project – can be 
described as transposition. This constitutes a crucial phase in the institutionalisation of 
ethical investment. Before that ethical investment was a minor activity within society, not 
organised, and connected to marginal actors. In the 1990s, ethical investment was 
captured by financial institutions. This significant transposition was accompanied by a 
translation of the sustainable development concept within this new context.  
The capture of ethical investment by financial institutions has been gradual and was 
underpinned by different local motives. This mechanism explains “why actors situated in 
diverse and disconnected social locations find themselves drawn to” be involved in an 
activity, in this case ethical investment (Olson et al., 2003). It started with socially and 
environment-oriented banks such as Triodos, that had strong internal motives for 
launching an ethical fund. In the 1990s Dutch banks faced increasing coercive pressures 
to become ‘green’. These pressures came from customers who increasingly asked for 
                                                 
7 ‘Transposer’ (transpose) in French means: “faire changer de forme ou de contenu en faisant passer dans 
un autre domaine: (to cause something to change in form or content by causing it to pass into another 
domain), Le petit Robert (date 1999) 
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‘sustainable’ products and services but also from governmental and intergovernmental 
organisations such as the UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative in 1992 and the Dutch 
Policy Document on Environment and Economy of 1998/1999 (see Chapter 6). Dutch 
banks faced increasing pressures regarding their commitment to sustainability. Ethical 
investment was perceived as an opportunity to reduce those pressures. However the 
activity needed to be reformulated and reshaped to fit into the financial sector’s norms 
and values. Mainstream financial institutions did not want to be associated with the ‘deep 
green’ movement, or “moral preachers”, “fundamentalists” organisations.  
The capture of ethical investment by financial institutions brought new motives and 
logics but also a new concept: sustainable development. When ethical investment started 
in the Netherlands (beginning of the 1990s), there was no reference to the concept of 
sustainable development. The early stage of ethical investment in the Netherlands was a 
transition phase involving several shifts: from an activist activity to a commercial project; 
from ethics to sustainability; from ad-hoc to a standardised screening; from a marginal to 
a mainstream activity involving translation. The activity of ethical investment was new 
and unknown to financial institutions — they did not know what it was and how to do it – 
but sustainable development was also a novel concept for them.  
In the 1990s and especially towards the end of the 1990s, when mainstream financial 
institutions became dominant in the field, ethical investment became an arena of 
numerous conflicts and struggles. As it was pointed out in Chapter 6, there were different 
motives that were source of conflicting logics within the field but also of an ‘identity 
crisis’. First adopters/developers of ethical investment in the Netherlands, the social 
banks, operated in reference to its previous form (before the 1990s shift). Their 
motivation was related to protection of the environment and respect for the people. 
However, because there was a demand from their clients to develop an investment 
product, ethical investment offered them the opportunity to satisfy their clients and to 
keep their ‘green and social’ image. When mainstream banks started to adopt this 
activity, its identity changed. First adopters could not recognise it any more or identify 
with this new form of ethical investment; ethical investment had lost its initial (for them) 
identity. This clearly comes out in the distinction between ‘old’ and ’new’ funds 
described in Chapter 6. Fund managers of the ‘old’ funds do not associate themselves 
with the identity and image of the ‘new’ funds, and vice versa.  
However, ‘old’ funds are tending to change to look more like the ‘new’ funds. As noted 
by Sevón (1996), organisational identity is not stable; it develops in “an ongoing and 
never-completed accomplishment” (Sevón, 1996). ‘Old’ funds are slowly changing in 
accordance with the new wave of ethical investment funds (the ‘new’ funds). For 
example they are adopting the same wording – they already have or are thinking of 
changing the name of the fund to use ‘sustainable’ instead of ‘ethics’ — and they are 
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reworking and changing their criteria and methodology – fewer exclusionary criteria. The 
change in criteria is not a choice but rather, it is imposed by the development of the rating 
organisations. Because the screening and rating activity have been delegated to a 
professional body, the rating organisations, fund managers are dependent on what rating 
organisations provide. Rating organisations have developed during and around the new 
wave of ethical investment funds, that is the mainstream financial institutions’ funds. 
These funds privilege comparative criteria and the CSR model. The professionalisation 
has been a source of normative force on the fund creating resource dependencies — fund 
managers do not have the choice but use what rating organisations provide, and norms — 
rating organisations are developing (in an international context) norms for screening 
companies (see for example the SiRi Group). 
The process of translation took some years and involved international organisations. The 
first funds in the Netherlands were copied from experience abroad (US and UK) because 
they had no know-how. This very first phase of mimetism did not last long. Soon, and 
especially due to the spreading of ethical investment to mainstream financial institutions, 
adjustments were necessary and were delegated to Triodos Research, the Dutch rating 
organisation (delegation mechanism), which became the expert in ethical screening.  
Rating organisations have played an important role as intermediary in the process of 
translation (in the Netherlands but also in other countries such as France, see (Dejean, 
Gond, & Lecas, 2003)). Triodos Research was created by one alternative bank, Triodos 
Bank, and in 2000 it became an independent organisation owned by three financial 
institutions among which the initial founding bank, one mainstream bank and one pension 
fund. This development reflects what happened to the field of ethical investment, 
captured by mainstream financial institutions. Mainstream financial institutions became a 
dominant actor in the field bringing with them new motives and logics. Rating 
organisations developed the idea of ethical investment to transform it into an activity that 
was compatible with mainstream financial institutions’ logics and the more general 
sustainable development trend. The story of Triodos Research shows the process it went 
through. It involved a redefinition of the criteria (to rework them in the framework of the 
sustainable development concept), homogenisation (something that could be applied to 
all clients and to all companies screened but also something that could be comparable 
with international practices), and procedural approach (something that could be checked 
and repeated).  
The creation of new platforms and venues has contributed to the mechanism of 
translation. Following/building on the working paper by Olsen et al. (2003) on 
environmental management codes, ethical investment has created new activity platforms 
that “bring together actors in new combination and venues” (Olson et al., 2003). The new 
venues identified in this dissertation are rating organisations, ethical advisory 
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committees, networks and conferences. The rating organisations have been specifically 
created for the activity of ethical investment. Their role is important, both as 
intermediaries translating sustainable development in the activity of ethical investment 
and as diffuser of ethical investment among financial institutions (especially through 
professionalisation). Ethical advisory committees have recently become the ‘normal’ 
thing to do for running an ethical investment fund but also for rating organisations. The 
committees are platforms where individuals from various organisations discuss and 
exchange ideas related to ethical investment and sustainable development. Their role is to 
provide advice to the fund or rating organisations management teams but also to provide 
legitimacy to funds or rating organisations’ decisions (related to criteria or selection 
decisions). Networks such as VBDO in the Netherlands, or Eurosif at the European level 
and conferences such as the TBLI have increased. They provide platforms where the 
activity is discussed, diffused, and shaped.  
Corporations directly and indirectly co-opted the setting of ethical standards. On the one 
hand they did so directly and strategically by claiming some elements of ethical 
investment, namely the sustainability indices. They turned sustainable indices into CSR 
certification and thereby conferred a legitimacy power on ethical investment. This 
appropriation mechanism reinforced the ‘successful’ story of ethical investment and 
made financial institutions and corporations allies instead of enemies. And on the other 
hand they co-opted the setting of standards indirectly by, in the broader context, playing 
an important role in defining what is sustainable development. It is indirect because it 
was not directly meant to influence the activity of ethical investment and started well 
before ethical investment got involved in the stage of sustainable development.  
The micro-mechanisms described above are only illustrative and need to be further 
explored. They are of a different kind and nature, happening at different levels (ranging 
from micro to macro) and different times. They do not necessarily occur independently; 
on the contrary they are combined and interwoven. They generate different outcomes but 
all contributed to the formation of the field. In order to investigate such micro-
mechanisms, institutional research needs to focus on case studies or ethnographic 
methods in order to get information at the micro level rather than focus on the macro 
level.  
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8.4 Closing commentaries 
This dissertation began by posing the broad question: What is the potential of ethical 
investment to contribute to sustainable development? This section discusses some 
possible answers suggested by the dissertation. The aim is to raise new questions for 
actors of the field of ethical investment rather than bringing any answers.  
Yes, ethical investment increases shareholders’ awareness of sustainability issues… 
Ethical investment offers a means to diffuse information related to sustainable 
development within a specific group of social and economic actors, and investors, and 
therefore may stimulate social and environmental awareness. It may encourage investors 
to reconsider their investment strategies but it may also trigger investors’ questions on 
corporations’ behaviour and practices: What can one expect/want from companies? How 
far can a company go? What are they accountable for? Because investors are also 
consumers, such reconsiderations and questions may affect their consumption behaviour.  
The tables displayed in Chapters 5 and 6 show that the number of ethical funds and the 
amount invested under ethical criteria is increasing. Investors are increasingly inclined to 
integrate social and environmental criteria in their investment strategy. The reasons why 
they do this vary from personal principles/beliefs to economic gain. Companies have also 
recognised this growing interest for ethical investment funds, and although they do not 
feel an immediate threat, they are watching developments very carefully.  
…but investors have disengaged from the process of ethical investment.  
Professionalisation and institutionalisation have created a distance between investors and 
companies. A characteristic of ethical investment in the 1970s in the US was the 
engagement of the investors to change corporations’ behaviour either by going to the 
shareholder meetings or by lobbying companies. For investors, ethical investment was a 
way to enter in direct contact with corporations. In its new form as a commercial project 
in the Netherlands, investors have not had these contacts. Investors have delegated all 
responsibilities for engagement to the financial institutions which, in the Dutch context, 
are not active in attending shareholder meetings or lobbying companies. It is for this 
reason that investors were not directly approached in this dissertation.  
Moreover, investors do not have much choice as to what is ethical or sustainable. Criteria 
for ethical investment funds have been pre-defined and they have little if any influence on 
them. Criteria have been standardised (to a certain extent). When investing in an ethical 
fund, investors do not have to think about what it means and how it works. They pass on 
the entire responsibility to manage the fund to financial institutions. As a result, they are 
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hardly involved in the debate about sustainable development; they do not question 
companies’ behaviour themselves; and they show limited interest concerning what types 
of companies are in the portfolio.  
The distance between investors and companies and the disengagement from the screening 
process limit the influence of ethical investment on the investor-consumer. It reduces the 
potential to increase awareness and it diminishes the chance of influencing the 
consumption behaviour of investors. What are the chances that investors will ask 
themselves “If a company is said to be not ethical enough to include in one’s investment 
portfolio, is the same company ethical enough for me to buy its products?” if there is no 
personal involvement or questioning.  
Yes, ethical investment initiated a reform within the financial sector to consider the 
concept of sustainable development… 
Ethical investment is one of the most active banking activities related to sustainable 
development. It attracts a growing number of financial institutions. By the end of 2002, 
most of the mainstream banks in the Netherlands offered an ethical investment fund. The 
launch of an ethical fund has, in some cases, entailed the creation of special units within 
the financial institution devoted to sustainability issues. It has encouraged financial 
institutions to think about the concept of sustainable development and produce documents 
stating their perspectives and views about it. The activity of ethical investment has also 
favoured the involvement of financial institutions in specific networks such as VBDO or 
conferences such as the TBLI where they have the opportunity to discuss issues related to 
sustainability.  
Ethical investment has been an important phenomenon. It has brought significant changes 
within the investment activity and has initiated a reform within the financial sector to 
consider the concept of sustainable development. The word ‘reform’ is intentionally 
chosen because in involves important structural and procedural changes in a highly 
institutionalised sector. For example pension funds, such as PGGM, started to revise their 
investment strategies in order to integrate sustainability criteria. Ethical investment 
played a significant role in increasing awareness within the financial sector and 
promoting sustainable development.  
…but institutionalisation has created a distance between financial institutions and 
actors in the ethical investment field. . 
Professionalisation has been an important factor for the diffusion of ethical investment; 
however it also created a distance between certain between financial institutions and 
corporations & NGOs.  
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Chapter 2 proposed an analysis of the Triodos Bank network related to ethical investment 
activity at two specific points in time: 1997 and 2002. It showed that the intensity of 
contacts of the Triodos Bank with companies and NGOs diminished. This was also 
noticed in the case of other Dutch banks in Chapter 6. Financial institutions have 
delegated the social and environmental screening to rating organisations and therefore 
have limited contacts with actors in the field, except rating organisations. Rating 
organisations are in charge of the screenings and the updating of the social and 
environmental criteria. They are monitoring the contacts.  
Rating organisations have become an intermediary creating a distance between financial 
institutions and companies and limiting the interest and involvement of financial 
institutions in the debate concerning sustainable development criteria. Some of the 
interviews show that financial institutions do not wish to enter into the difficult debate 
about what a sustainable company is: ”We don’t have training [on sustainability or CSR] 
because an external manager [rating organisations] does that [the screening] for us” 
(P7). The creation of such a distance between financial institutions and actors in the field 
sets question marks over the integration of the activity within the organisation and the 
potential of ethical investment to influence other activities of the bank. A number of fund 
managers said that they were an “island in the bank”.  
If institutionalisation has on the one hand reinforced connections between some actors, 
especially between rating organisations and other actors, it has on the other hand reduced 
the contacts between financial institutions and other actors in the field. Responsibilities 
have been delegated to the ‘experts’, the rating organisations and thereby financial 
institutions have a limited involvement in the process of ethical investment. This distance 
limits the potential of ethical investment to promote and stimulate sustainable 
development within the financial sector.  
Yes, ethical investment stimulates the debate around sustainable development… 
From the ethical investment field emerged a number of new organisations such as rating 
organisations, ethical investment-related organisations (for example VBDO and SODP in 
the Netherlands, Eurosif, etc), but also conferences. As was mentioned in the previous 
section, new platforms and venues were created (in reference to Olsen et al. (2003)) 
allowing new patterns of interaction between actors. These platforms and venues 
stimulate the debate on sustainable development. This promotes the translation of the 
concept of sustainable development from an abstract concept to a pragmatic set of criteria 
to assess corporate sustainability performance.  
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…but standardisation may paralyse the debate. 
Chapter 6 pointed out that the activity of ethical investment is becoming standardised. 
Criteria and methodologies are becoming increasingly similar. This development is a 
characteristic of the institutionalisation process (DiMaggio et al., 1983).  
A number of actors in the field of ethical investment welcome and encourage 
standardisation. There are a lot of advantages related to standardisation. It enables better 
co-ordination, facilitates interaction, enhances compatibility and makes communication 
easier. “The knowledge or expectation that others are following a certain standards makes 
it unnecessary to spend time and resources gathering detailed information about the likely 
behaviours of others” (Brunsson & Olsen, 1998). It also makes it easier for companies. It 
reduces the number of possibilities and questions they need to consider. However 
standardisation also raises many questions. 
The standardisation of ethical investment has transformed the activity: it has moved from 
asking critical questions to assessing whether or not companies comply with certain 
standards. Through the institutionalisation process, ethical investment has lost some of its 
capacity to be critical. It is now principally about conforming. For example ethical 
investment does not want to get involved in sensitive issues such as globalisation (see 
Microsoft monopolistic behaviour case).  
One might wonder whether standardisation is an added value for influencing corporations 
to move towards sustainable development. If ethical investment is to stimulate 
sustainable development, it raises the following question: are the criteria of ethical 
investment funds stimulating sustainable development? How can one know what 
standards are best? Are the standards applicable to all or only to those that have taken 
part in their development? But also one may argue that standardisation sterilises 
discussions and debates around the issue of sustainable development rather than stimulate 
it.  
Yes, screenings have evolved and developed towards a system that rewards the ‘best in 
class’ corporations… 
Criteria for ethical investment have developed over time. Chapter 5 highlighted four 
generations of screenings evolving from exclusionary, to inclusionary, and lately 
comparative. Comparative screening offers a new approach: it does not focus on negative 
aspects but on the positive aspects of companies’ policies and practices. Instead of 
excluding ‘bad’ companies, it is a way to select the ‘best in class’. It is based on a system 
of reward rather than punishment. The intention is to stimulate corporations to improve 
their sustainability performance.  
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…but the screening system is for an important part based on information provided by 
corporations themselves. 
The new generation of ethical investment funds favours comparative screens rather than 
exclusionary criteria. However this development brings a dependency problem: rating 
organisations becoming dependent on corporations.  
There is an important difference between exclusionary and comparative screenings. 
Exclusionary screening is based for a large part on information provided by third parties 
such as trade unions and NGOs. Comparative screening is for a large part based on 
information provided by the company. The criteria deal with corporate management 
systems, policies, or business principles. For example they ask whether the company has 
an ISO 14000 certification or business principles; whether company policy covers or 
mentions human rights, environmental problems, animal welfare. The sources of 
information for carrying comparative screenings are company reports, interviews with 
company manager, websites. NGOs and other third parties are hardly consulted for this 
type of screening because they are seen as less relevant.  
This new development has made rating organisations, those that carry out the screening, 
dependent on the information corporations are willing to provide. Without the 
information provided by companies, rating organisations can only produce very limited 
company profiles. Companies provide them with raw material that they treat. This raises 
some questions related to corporations exerting pressures on rating organisations, the 
impact on the screening results, but also the objective of ethical investment: What does 
ethical investment want to assess? 
Yes, ethical investment has become a product offered by mainstream financial 
institutions… 
Ethical investment has become a product offered by mainstream financial institutions. 
This development has had a significant impact on the size and number of funds applying 
ethical screening. Their involvement in the field has had a positive affect in turning 
ethical investment into a viable commercial project. In the future, it may also enable 
ethical investment to reach a critical mass which will provide the ethical investment 
community with a financial power over companies.  
…but it involves new types of relationships raising new dependency problems.  
Firstly, stock-quoted corporations are customers of mainstream financial institutions. The 
first financial institutions that launched an ethical investment fund in the Netherlands 
were niche banks. These do not have stock-quoted corporations as clients. Their clients 
are small and medium enterprises, usually not stock-quoted or part of the top 500. 
However mainstream financial institutions have stock-quoted corporations as clients. 
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This creates a difficult situation: on the one hand mainstream financial institutions have 
to satisfy their clients, and on the other hand they may exclude a company, which is one 
of their clients, and thereby declare it to be a ‘bad company’. Mainstream financial 
institutions must therefore be careful in excluding corporations because this may have 
repercussions on other parts of their activity.  
Secondly, mainstream financial institutions are themselves stock-quoted companies and 
are thereby themselves subject to screening. They have another stake: their own 
reputation. It is in their own interest to be listed on the ethical investment funds or 
indices. If they offer a product claiming to select only ethical or sustainable companies 
and they are themselves excluded from these types of portfolio, this may create some 
confusion.  
The two points developed above show that new types of relationships have developed 
creating some dependency problems: financial institutions are to a certain extent 
dependent on stock-quoted corporations because they are their clients; financial 
institutions need a good rating for their own reputation. These new types of relationships 
and connections need to be considered more in depth as they may diminish the room for 
manoeuvre of the ethical investment community. One risk is that it may pull ethical 
criteria down and thereby deprive ethical investment of all its capacity to be critical as 
well as its potential to stimulate sustainable development.  
Yes, ethical investment creates some pressure on corporations… 
In a previous section, it was argued that the ethical investment community is exerting 
coercive pressures on companies to improve their sustainability performance.  
…but it raises the decoupling issue. 
The ethical investment community joins a larger sustainable development-related 
community (as described in the previous section) to exercise coercive pressures on 
companies. Companies are asked to move towards sustainable development. In order to 
select and name the most sustainable companies, the ethical investment community 
screens companies. Ethical screening is for a large part based on information provided by 
corporations. This is especially true for the comparative type of criteria. If companies 
want to get a good ethical profile, they need to disclose information. Therefore the ethical 
investment community is pushing companies to publish reports. And this is what 
companies are doing. The analysis of the six corporations has shown that companies are 
increasingly reporting, setting up special departments for answering questions, and 
establishing business principles. This raises the following question: Does this mean that 
corporations have moved towards sustainable development? 
Ethical Investment 
 286 
Disclosing information related to social and environmental matters is an important step 
but is it enough to stimulate change towards sustainable development? One may wonder 
whether the pressure exerted by ethical investment to report more is the right kind of 
pressure. One of the risks is that it may push companies towards buffering strategies 
rather than new practices and behavioural change. In Oliver’s framework (1991), 
buffering refers to “an organisation’s attempt to reduce the extend to which it is 
externally inspected, scrutinised, or evaluated by partially detaching or decoupling its 
technical activities from external contacts” (Oliver, 1991).  
Decoupling is a mean by which organisations increase legitimacy. Companies adopt new 
behaviour and practices ritually or ceremonially in order to hold back the institutional 
pressures to change at a more fundamental level.  
Isn’t this what a large number of companies are doing because of CSR pressures? And 
isn’t ethical investment helping the decoupling process by basing its assessment mainly 
on corporate information disclosure? 
Ethical investment provides an easy way for a company to get the label of a ‘sustainable 
company’. If a company provides enough information in the way it is required and if it is 
ready to answer questions, it is almost guaranteed to get a reasonable profile. This 
stimulates companies to undertake a symbolic adoption that involves separating structural 
elements from internal activities, mounting external displays of confidence, and inviting 
ceremonial inspection to protect core operations from external scrutiny (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977a). Decoupling may be seen as what some environmentalists call “green washing” 
(Beder, 1998; Tokar, 1997; Greer and Bruno, 1998). Meyer and Rowan implied that 
decoupling is inevitable – that its converse, close alignment between institutionally-
demanded change and the organisation’s technical systems, harms organisations because 
it “merely makes public a record of inefficiency and inconsistency” (1977).  
If the ethical investment community wants to make a positive contribution to sustainable 
development, it needs to break the negative circle of decoupling. The institutionalisation 
of ethical investment has made it rely on standards which are mainly based on corporate 
communication such as business principles, social and environmental reporting. Ethical 
investment needs to get further than corporate communication. Communication is 
necessary for awareness. But it is also necessary to go more in depth and to check 
whether corporations do what they say. Is it the role of the ethical investment community 
to carry out this task? The question remains open. In any case it cannot do it on its own. 
The ethical investment community could take part in the new task and try to stimulate 
others to get involved in it too. 
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Annexes  
Annex 1- Structure of Triodos bank and Triodos Holding 
(Triodos Bank, 2002)  
 
Triodos Custody BV Triodos Assurantien BV Triodos Fonds management
Triodos Bank Dutch office
Triodos Values Fund
Triodos Bank Belgian office
Triodos renewable Energy Fund
Triodos Bank UK office
Triodos Bank NV
Foundation for the Administration of Tridos Bank shares
Holders of depositary receipts
Strategic investments Espana BV
Strategisch participaties
Seed capital funds
Project Development
Tridos Ventures BV
Triodos-Doen
Hivos-Triodos Fonds
Triodos Venture Capital Fund
Triodos Climate Clearing House
Solar Investment Fund
Solar Development Group
Triodos Fair Share Fund
Triodos International Fund Management BV Triodos Advisory Services BV
Triodos Foundation (UK)
Triodos Funds (B)
Triodos Funds (NL)
Triodos Funds
Triodos Holding NV
Triodos Holding Foundation
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Annex 3- Corporation sampling procedure 
SAMPLE UNITS 
a) Primary sample unit: Triodos database 
The primary sample unit is defined by the database available at Triodos Research. It consists 
of stock-quoted corporations that have been screened according to social and environmental 
criteria by Triodos Research analysts. As of December 6th 2001 the database contained a total 
of 631 companies world-wide. 
b) Secondary sample unit: country - Dutch companies 
Triodos Database contains corporations from 16 different countries. For practical and 
consistency reasons – the research is based in the Netherlands, interviews were conducted 
with Dutch ethical fund managers – the nationality criteria is used in this secondary sample 
unit. Dutch companies are selected from the primary unit in order to compose the secondary 
sample unit. This results in 101 Dutch companies.  
c) Tertiary sample unit: Sectors 
As of December 2001, companies were not all screened according to the same process. There 
are two different processes. For a majority of the firms the screening has been carried out 
within the framework of a sector study. It means that companies have been screened and then 
compared to the corporations of the same sector of activity. Their social and environmental 
performance is assessed and ranked against all the companies of the same sector including 
firms from different countries. ‘Sector’ represents the sector of economic activity. From 1997 
to 2000 the sector classification used was the AEX. Since 2000 the MSCI classification has 
been used. For the purpose of the present research, a ‘sector study’ refers to the Triodos 
designation, which may concern the AEX or the MSCI according to the date the sector study 
was carried out. Among the sector studies there are several kinds of studies (this is a result of 
Triodos Research changing over time): national, European and world-wide sector studies. 
This is not taken into account in the selection of sectors.  
The second way Triodos Research screens companies is by considering the firm on an 
individual basis. In this case, the corporation is not compared to the rest of its sector but 
screened independently of the sector’s performance. The company is therefore not ranked but 
only assessed. Such a screening is usually conducted when a client has a specific demand 
concerning a company. The company is then provisionally screened until a sector study has 
been carried out.  
The selection criteria for the tertiary sample unit are at two levels. The first one concerns the 
screening methodology: to be selected a company should be part of a sector study. In the 
secondary sample there are 12 sectors in total for which Triodos Research have carried out 
sector studies. This represents 70 companies. 28 other companies were also screened but are 
not part of a sector study.  
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The second criterion of selection concerns the sustainability indices, namely the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, and FTSE4Good. The sustainability indices are the most ‘visible’ 
instrument of sustainable investment. The observation at Triodos Research showed that in 
general companies are very sensitive to being taken up in a sustainable index. The selection 
criterion relates to the sectors: to be selected a sector should contain at least one company 
listed on a sustainable index. Both criteria have to be fulfilled in order for the company to be 
part of the tertiary sample unit. The first one was motivated by practical reasons. Sustainable 
indices were chosen as criterion because their creation has been a crucial event in the 
development of ethical investment. The criterion is related to the question whether or not 
being listed (or not) on an index has an effect on the company’s behaviour.  
Out of the 12 sectors 4 fulfilled the second condition: financial institutions, media, oil & gas, 
and food. The financial sector was excluded from the sample for methodological reasons. 
Some of the financial institutions investigated for the purpose of the research (FI1 to FI10) 
would also have been found in the corporation sample. As of December 2001, the Oil & Gas 
sector study consisted of only one company. It was therefore coupled with the sector study 
’Chemistry’. These two sectors do have a close connection regarding their activities, and the 
social and environmental issues at stake. The name of the sector study remained ‘Oil & Gas’. 
The tertiary sample is composed of 22 corporations distributed over 3 sectors.  
d) Final sample unit: Companies 
The purpose of the final sample unit was to select companies that would be investigated and 
constitute small case studies. In order to finalise the sample of companies the following 
conditions had to be fulfilled:  
- Sectors have been classified according to their ‘sensitivity’ to sustainability-related issues 
(see below what is meant by sensitivity in the variable ‘sector of activity’). Out of the 3 
sectors selected in the tertiary sample, 2 have been classified as ‘sensitive’ and 1 as ‘less 
sensitive’. 
- It was important to have at least one sector of each category, sensitive and less sensitive. All 
companies should be eligible for the sustainability indices and therefore should be listed on 
the FTSE 300 index and on the Dow Jones Stoxx 600. 
- In each sector a pair of companies was selected: one company listed on a sustainable index 
and one not listed. In case of sectors with two or more companies listed on a sustainable 
index then the company the most often listed was selected (case of the food sector). In the 
case where no possible pair could be found in the sector, the whole sector was excluded (case 
of the food retail sector where there was only one company). In cases where two companies 
were listed in the same number of sustainable indices, the criteria used to choose one of them 
was its selection in the Triodos Portfolio. The idea was to find a balance between selected and 
not selected (case of the media sector).  
After the selection process, the study population consisted of 6 companies constituting the 
elements of the sample (see Table 47 below). 
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Primary sample: 631 companies 
Criteria:Triodos Database 
 
Secondary sample: 101 companies 
Criteria: Dutch companies 
 
Tertiary sample: 22 companies 
Criteria: Sector of activity 
 
Final sample: 6 companies 
Criteria; company characteristics 
Figure 28 – Selection of the final sample of companies 
VARIABLES 
• Sector of activity 
The sector of activity is of importance because not all sectors are exposed in the same way to 
social, environmental and political issues. Sectors in direct contact with consumers are more 
exposed/sensitive to pressures exerted by sustainable investment. That is the case for example of 
the food industry. Sectors that are considered as major polluters or are involved in controversial 
activities are more sensitive sectors. That is the case for example with the oil and gas, and 
chemistry sectors. Moreover, the observation and experience at Triodos Research show that some 
firms were more likely than others to change towards sustainability and to cooperate with the 
research department than others. On the other hand some firms have no interest and willingness to 
improve their sustainability performance and to communicate with Triodos Research. Presumably 
institutional pressures are less strong and make the companies less susceptible to change their 
behaviour. For these reasons sectors have been divided into two categories: ‘sensitive’ and ‘less 
sensitive’. Sensitive sectors are also sectors that, because of a certain history or specific perceived 
risks, are very closely watched by the whole society and especially the sustainable investment 
community. 
The following sectors have been selected in the tertiary sample:  
- Food and food retailing, especially because of the GMO issue, are sensitive sectors 
- Oil & Gas, due to a long history in polluting and behaviours in third countries, is a 
sensitive sector 
- Chemistry, due to a long history of polluting, is often on the black list of sustainable 
investment funds, and is a sensitive sector 
- Media, because they have eliminated all the printing activity and only deal with writing 
and editing, is a less-sensitive sector. Moreover no major issues have arisen.  
• Listed on a sustainable index  
There are several so-called sustainable indices. Three of them are the most well-known both by 
companies and investors: the Dow Jones Sustainable Index World, Dow Jones STOXX for 
Europe, and FTSE4Goods. The observation at Triodos Research and interviews with the 
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managers of sustainable funds in the Netherlands showed that they are the most used and the most 
watched by the financial community, as well as the business community. These indices are used 
as one of the references for the selection of companies.  
Other sustainable indices, such as ASPI Eurozone launched in July 2001 by Arese, or Triodos 
Sustainable Investment Index, are less well-known and have never been mentioned by the 
sustainable fund managers. They are therefore not considered in the sampling procedure.  
• listed on the FTSE 300 and/or DJS 600;  
“The FTSE Eurotop 300 is designed to represent the performance of companies resident and 
incorporated in Europe, providing investors with a set of indices that measure the performance of 
the 300 largest capitalised European companies (FTSE, 2001). “The FTSE Eurotop 300 Indices 
consists of the largest 300 European companies by full market value i.e. before the application of 
any investibility weightings, which qualify under Rule 4 as eligible for inclusion in the 
index.”(FTSE, 2001) 
“The Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index (TMI) cover 95% of the free float market 
capitalisation on the investigable stock universe… 
The Dow Jones STOXX 600 size index cover the largest 600 stocks in the Dow Jones STOXX 
TMI in three ranges: Dow Jones STOXX Large 200 index (largest 200 stocks); Dow Jones 
STOXX Mid 200 index (next largest 200 stocks); Dow Jones STOXX Small 200 index (next 200 
stocks). 
The above Dow Jones STOXX size indexes are combined to produce: Dow Jones STOXX 600 
index: Largest stocks in the Dow Jones STOXX TMI by combining the above Large 200, Mid 
200, and Small 200.” (STOXX Limited, 2001)  
Priority is given to companies listed on the FTSE 300 and Dow Jones STOXX 50 for the 
following reasons: 1) in order to have comparable companies in terms of capitalisation and to 
select the biggest capitalisation (consistency in the sample); 2) since the launch of SIRI, Triodos 
Research has been focusing on companies listed on the FTSE 300 for Europe and S&P 500 for 
US; 3) “The majority of the holdings in the Fund -FTSE4Goods- will be from companies within 
the FTSE 350 Index, which comprises the biggest companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.” (Close Fund Management, 2001); “the Dow Jones Sustainable indexes, DJSI World 
and DJ STOXX SI, track the performance of the top 20% of the companies in the Dow Jones 600 
Index that lead the field in terms of sustainability”(DJSI, 2001).  
• Triodos sector study 
Triodos Sector Study means that a sector study has been carried out. There are three types of 
sector study: World, Europe or National. Companies from one sector are compared according to 
their sustainable performance. A European Sector Study selects all European companies from one 
sector – according to the MSCI classification – listed on the FSTE 300. A World Sector Study 
compares companies from one sector according to the MSCI classification that are listed on the 
FTSE 300, S&P 500 and the Japan Nikkei Stock Index 300. World Sector Studies have not yet 
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fully developed due to a lack of research partners in certain countries. Only a few World Sector 
Studies have been conducted (oil & gas, pharmacology).  
• SiRi Profile 
In order to have homogenous screening and information about the companies, corporations 
screened according to the SiRi Group standards were favoured.  
CONSTANTS 
• Listed on the stock market 
The sustainable investment universum solely consists of companies that are listed on the stock 
market. Therefore the sample of companies should only be composed of companies that are stock 
quoted.  
• Dutch companies 
For practical and consistency reasons the sample of companies has been reduced to a specific 
country: the Netherlands. The sample should exclusively be composed of Dutch companies 
located in the Netherlands. The practical reason for this is that the interviews were intended to be 
face to face. With the research project being located in Holland, it made sense to select Dutch 
companies. For the sake of consistency, all the interviewed sustainable fund managers in the 
sample were employed by Dutch funds. Choosing for one single country instead of companies 
from different countries was also a way to avoid national differences, such as cultural and 
regulatory. 
• Available in the Triodos Research database 
Thanks to the involvement in Triodos Research as observer-participant during the whole research, 
access to the Triodos Research database was made possible. It is a very large database gathering 
information on companies across the world. It includes Triodos Research’s own research as well 
as the databases of EIRIS, KLD and SIRI.  
UNITS OF OBSERVATION 
In each of the companies composing the final sample the persons targeted for the interviews were 
the following: 
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Person/function targeted Reasons for the choice 
Chief Executive Officers - Custody values of the companies 
- Strategic level 
- Accountable for the companies’ behaviour 
The corporate 
communication, investor 
relations or issue manager 
- This person is the immediate respondent to external 
demands and questions 
- Corporation reputation 
Environmental Manager - Knowledge and experience the implementation of 
the company’s strategy and values 
- Specific focus on one aspect of ethical screening 
The person who answered 
questionnaires for ethical 
investment 
The person who answered the questionnaires used by rating 
agencies for sustainable indices (SAM and EIRIS) might be 
one of the above persons (often the investor relation or 
corporate communication). Reasons for this choice are the 
following: 
- how the questionnaires are handled 
- perception of sustainable investment 
- reaction to the questions asked 
 
Company Sector 
Study 
Triodos 
MeerWaard
eFonds 
MSCI DJ S 
600 
FTSE 
300 
DJ 
Stoxx 
DJ SI 
World 
FTSE4
Goods 
Sensitive 
sector 
SIRI 
profile
C1 Oil&gas Not Selected x x x x x x Yes  
C2 Oil&gas Not Selected x x x    Yes x 
C3 Food Selected x x x    Yes x 
C4 Food Not Selected  x x x x x Yes x 
C5 Media Selected x x x x   No x 
C6 Media Selected x x x    No x 
Table 47 - Final sample of companies as of December 2001 
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Annex 4- List of the interviews conducted 
Intervie- 
wees  
Organi
-sation 
Date 
(d/m/y) 
Place Length Function (at the time of 
the interview) 
Financial institutions    
P1 F1 31/10/01 Interviewee’s office 1.30 Director general 
P2 F2 26/10/01 Interviewee’s office 1.30 Asset manager 
P3 F3 16/11/01 Interviewee’s office 2.00 Asset manager 
P4 F4 02/22/01 Interviewee’s office 1.30 Assistant Director - 
Sustainable Investments 
P5 F5 14/11/01 Interviewee’s office 1.30 SRI director 
P6 F6 29/11/01 Interviewee’s office 0.45 Chief Investment Officer 
P7 F7 07/11/01 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Corporate Governance & 
Sustainable Investments 
P8 F8 20/11/01 Interviewee’s office 1.15 Senior Portfolio Manager 
P9 F9 28/11/01 Interviewee’s office 2.00 Sustainability Analyst 
P10 F9 31/10/01 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Head of Financial 
Consultancy & SRI  
Corporations     
P11 C1 25/04/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Former CEO 
P12 C1 20/03/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Issue manager 
P13a C2 26/04/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Staff Director Technology 
P13b C2 26/04/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Director Investor relations 
P14 C3 15/03/02 Interviewee’s office 1.15 Corporate 
Communications/Affairs 
P15 C3 30/01/02 Cafe 0.45 Arbo en Milieuzaken 
P16 C4 12/03/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Communication & 
Reputation Director 
P17 C4 13/02/02 Interviewee’s office 1.30 Environmental manager 
P18 C4 13/03/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Vice President Investor 
Relations 
P19 C5 08/02/02 Interviewee’s office 1.20 Deputy Director – 
Corporate 
Communications 
P20 C6 28/03/02 Interviewee’s office 1.00 Director Corporate 
Communications 
Triodos      
Bas Rüter TR/TB 23/08/01 Triodos Bank 1.00 Triodos Research Director 
and deputy managing 
director of Triodos Bank 
Miriam 
Miedeman 
TR 30/03/00 Triodos Bank 1.00 Sustainability analyst 
Thomas 
Thijssens 
TR 06/09/00 Triodos Bank 0.45 Sustainability analyst 
Mariska 
van Dalen 
TR 10/05/00 Triodos Bank 0.45 Sustainability analyst 
Peter Blom  TB 10/07/99 Triodos Bank 1.00 International Director 
Triodos 
Peter Blom  TB 11/04/00 Triodos Bank 1.00 International Director 
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Triodos  
Koert 
Jansen 
TB 11/01/01 Triodos Bank 1.00 Triodos bank employee 
Group 
discussion 
TB 10/05/01 Triodos Bank 1.00 MeerWaarde fund team 
Group 
discussion 
TR 21/05/01 Triodos Bank 1.30 Triodos Research team 
Group 
discussion 
TR 31/05/01 Triodos Bank 1.00 Triodos Research team 
Other      
Piet 
Sprenger 
VBDO 14/05/01 VBDO 1.30 Director 
Steven 
Lydenberg 
KLD 05/04/00 Triodos Bank 2.00 Head of KLD (US) 
Steven 
Lydenberg 
KLD 06/03/01 Triodos Bank 1.30 Head of KLD (US) 
Martin 
Weiss 
Delta 
Lloyd 
30/11/98 Delta Lloyd 1.00 Asset manager 
MeerWaarde Fund 
(TB=Triodos Bank; TR= Triodos Research) 
Annex 5- Description of the five levels of the tree of questions 
Level 0 It consists of one single question which is the general question of the thesis, 
namely: Can ethical investment be a change agent towards sustainable 
development?  
Level 1 It consists of two questions which are the research objectives of the dissertation, 
one related to the institutionalisation of the field of ethical investment, and the 
other one to the responses of firms to the institutional pressures 
Level 2 It consists of 14 issues, 9 related to the institutionalisation and 5 related to 
companies’ responses. They are based on the theoretical framework developed in 
chapter 3. 
Level 3 It consists of 35 issues, 25 related to the institutionalisation research question, and 
10 related to the companies responses research question. These issues are an 
adaptation of the theoretical issues to the specific case of ethical investment. It is a 
first step towards the operationalisation of the theoretical issues. Ethical 
investment has certain specificities that require an adaptation of the theory or to 
emphasise certain aspects. It is the purpose of the level. 
Level 4 This level is composed of blocs of questions. Each issue of the previous level has 
lead to questions that are gathered into blocs. It consists of 35 blocs of questions 
and each bloc contains a various number of questions from one to seven. The 
questions vary a lot according to the theoretical issue and the specificity of the 
field investigated.  
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Annex 6- Comparative analysis of the criteria used by Dutch 
ethical funds 
 
Financial institution ABF/ASN bank ABN AMRO Aegon ASN ING Bank
Kempen 
Capital 
Management
Postbank Robeco Groep SNS Reaal Invest Triodos bank
Fund Het andere beleggingsfonds
ABN AMRO 
Duurzame 
Wereld Fond
Aegon 
Aandelen 
Duurzaam
ASN 
Aandelenfonds
ING Duurzaam 
Rendement 
Fonds
Orange SeNSE 
Fund
Postbank 
Duurzaam 
Aandelen 
Fonds
RG Duurzaam 
aandelen Fund
SNS Duurzaam 
Anndelenfonds
Triodos 
Meerwaarde 
funds
Rating organisation SNS Innovest, KLD, EIRIS
SAM 
Sustainability 
Group
SNS
Triodos 
Research, 
EIRIS
SNS
Triodos 
Research, 
EIRIS
EIRIS, Innovest SNS Triodos Research
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA
Controversial sectors
Arms industry 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Aircraft 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Automobile industry 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Unsustainable mining 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2
Extraction of oil and gas 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Sub-total all 6 2 2 6 3 1 3 2 1 10
Sub-total 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 5
Controversial products/services
Pornography 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Alcohol 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 2
Tobacco 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Gambling 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 2
Nuclear energy 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Production of hazarsous substances 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Fur industry 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Use of endangered species 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Unsustainable timber production 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2
Unsustainable form of tourism 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Sub-total all 15 12 6 15 15 8 14 13 8 20
Sub-total 2 6 5 3 6 6 0 6 6 0 10
Controvercial production processes
Violation of human rights 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Violoation of  ILO and OECD guidelin 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Drugs 1 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 2
Child labour 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
Forced labour 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Discrimination/diversity 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
Corruption 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
Animal testing 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Genetic modification 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
Factory farming 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2
Unsustainable agriculture/fishery 
methods 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 2
Unsustainable and large scale hydroe 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Sub-total all 19 16 0 17 18 10 18 15 10 24
Sub-total 2 7 7 0 6 7 1 7 7 1 12
Total 40 30 8 38 36 19 35 30 19 54
COMPARATIVE CRITERIA
General
Integration of sustainable developme 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Corporate governance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Transparency/social and environmen 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Supply chain 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Marketing, promotion and competitio 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
Code of conduct 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sub-total 5 5 2 5 6 6 6 6 5 6
Environmental aspects
Environmental management system 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Impact on the environment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Environmental innovation 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Take into consideration the environm 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Transport 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-total 5 4 3 5 3 5 3 3 5 5
Social aspects
Social management system 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Working conditions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Health and safety 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Discrimination 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trade unions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Annex 7- Institutional actors 
Code Category Description 
FI Financial 
institutions and 
related 
Organisations offering financial services such as 
commercial banks, private funds, pension funds, etc.  
C Corporations Include all types of companies without sector distinction. 
Note that it does not contain the financial sector. 
RO Rating 
organisations 
Providers of ethical investment research and consulting 
services  
I Investors Include individual and institutional investors. 
CO Consulting 
organisations 
Organisations providing business advisory services or 
business consultancy such as Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu , 
Ernst & Young or KPMG.  
NGO NGOs and trade 
unions 
The World Bank defines NGOs as "private organizations 
that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the 
interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide 
basic social services, or undertake community 
development" (World Bank, 2001). For the purpose of the 
thesis NGOs is used in a wide way including any non-
profit organization which is independent from government 
such as environmental groups and human rights 
organisations. A trade union is an organisation of workers 
created to protect and advance the interests of its members  
CSR CSR organisations Organisations or networks that promote corporate social 
responsibility or/and sustainable development. These 
organisations are often business-driven such as CSR 
Europe.  
EI Ethical Investment 
organisations 
Organisations or networks that promote ethical investment 
such as US SIF or VBDO in the Netherlands 
IP Index providers Organisations that create and manage stock market indices 
such as FSTE in UK or Dow Jones in US.  
J Journalists  
U Universities Academics 
G Governments People from governmental bodies. 
IGO Inter-gornemental 
organisations 
Generally a public or governmental organization created by 
treaty or agreement between states. In the present case it 
mainly consist of representatives of the UNEP or EU.  
O Others It includes all other type of organisations that do not fit in 
any of the above categories. Are also included 
organisations for which no information could be found, 
which may artificially increase the category.  
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Annex 8- Organisation connected to the ethical investment field 
Name Description Category 
Eurosif Eurosif, founded in 2001, is a pan-European stakeholder network for 
promoting and developing sustainable and responsible investment. The 
Eurosif board is represented by the 5 Founding Social Investment 
Forums (French, German, Italian, Dutch (VBDO) and UK SIF). 
Members are mainly investment institutions, rating organisations, 
NGO, and trade unions (Eurosif, 2003).  
EI 
organisation 
UK&/or 
US SIF 
The Social Investment Forum (UKSIF) is a UK's membership network 
for socially responsible investment (SRI). UKSIF’s primary purpose: 
promote and encourage the development and positive impact of SRI 
amongst UK based investors.  
The Forum was launched in 1991. UKSIF’s 250+ members and 
affiliates include retail and institutional fund managers, financial 
advisers, rating organisations, consultants, trade unions, banks, 
building societies, community development finance institutions, NGOs 
and individuals interested in SRI. (UKSIF, 2003) 
EI 
organisation 
ECGS European Corporate Governance Service is an alliance of eight 
independent organisations which have come together to provide expert 
governance assessments and informed proxy voting advice for 
investing institutions on Europe's largest quoted companies. ECGS was 
launched in 2001. (ECGS, 2003) 
EI 
organisation 
CERES CERES; launched in 1988, is a U.S. coalition of environmental, 
investor, and advocacy groups working together for a sustainable 
future. In June 2001, more than 70 companies had endorsed the 
CERES Principles (CERES, 2003). 
CERES’ aim is to encourage corporation to become environmentally 
responsibility via the CERES Principles, working with endorsing 
companies both on meeting their commitment and on environmental 
reporting through the Global Reporting Initiative, mobilising the 
network in activist projects, and holding forums. 
EI 
organisation 
VBDO VBDO, Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development, 
was launched in 1996. The aim of VBDO is “to promote the interests 
of its members (Dutch financial institution), investors both private and 
institutional, within the overarching context of sustainable 
development”. VBDO develops several activities or products related to 
ethical investment. It is the Dutch SIF representative. (VBDO, 2003).  
EI 
organisation 
CSR 
Europe  
CSR Europe, set up in 1995, is a business-driven membership network. 
Its mission is to help companies combine profitability and 
sustainability by making corporate social responsibility a cornerstone 
of the way they operate. It has 57 company members, and 15 national 
partner organisations.  
According the CSR website: “European institutions regard CSR as the 
expert on CSR in Europe”. (CSR Europe, 2003) 
CSR 
organisation 
GRI The Global Reporting Initiative, launched in 1997, is a multi-
stakeholder process and independent institution whose mission is to 
develop and disseminate globally applicable Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines. It was initiated by the CERES and became independent in 
CSR 
organisation 
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2002. GRI is an official collaborating centre of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and works in cooperation with the 
UN Global Compact (GRI, 2003).  
GRI network counts more than 3,800 individuals from 77 countries, 
representing corporations, governments, non-governmental 
organisations, consultancies, accountancy organisations, business 
associations, rating organisations, universities, and research institutes.. 
BSR Business for Social Responsibility is a global non-profit organisation 
that helps member companies to achieve commercial success in ways 
that respect ethical values, people, communities and the environment. 
It started in 1992 as an association of approximately 50 
companies(BSR, 2003). 
CSR 
organisation 
Samenlev
ing & 
Bedrijf 
Samenleving & Bedrijf, formed in 2000; is the Dutch partner 
organisation of CSR Europe. The initiators were waren ABN AMRO, 
Ordina, Rabobank, Randstad en Shell. There are today 15 Dutch 
companies (Samenleving & Bedrijf, 2003). 
CSR 
organisation 
BITC Business in the Community (BITC) is a business led organisation 
consisting of 700 member companies committed to continually 
improving their positive impact on society. Business in the Community 
was set up in 1982 (BITC, 2003) 
CSR 
organisation 
Conferen
ce Board 
The Conference Board (1916), a non-profit organisation counting 2500 
member corporations, creates/disseminates knowledge about 
management and the marketplace to help businesses strengthen their 
performance and better serve society. (The Conference Board, 2003) 
CSR 
organisation 
WBCSD The World Business Council for Sustainable Development is a 
coalition of 160 international companies united by a shared 
commitment to sustainable development via the three pillars of 
economic growth, ecological balance and social progress. Members are 
drawn from more than 30 countries and 20 major industrial sectors. 
The WBCSD was formed in January 1995 through a merger between 
the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) and the 
World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE). (WBCSD, 2003) 
CSR 
organisation 
DuVo In 1995 15 companies active in the food chain in the Netherlands 
initiated the Foundation for a Sustainable Food Chain (Duurzame 
Voedingsmiddelenketen). Its aims at identifying options for 
improvement along the production chain and to the development of 
infrastructures. (DuVo, 2003) 
CSR 
organisation 
UN 
Global 
Compact 
The Global Compact is a network. At its core are the Global Compact 
Office and five UN agencies: the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights; the United Nations Environment Programme; the 
International Labour Organisation; the United Nations Development 
Programme; and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation. Its aim is to advance responsible corporate citizenship. 
 
SNV  Founded in the US in 1987, Social Venture Network (SVN) is an 
association of business leaders, entrepreneurs, corporate change agents 
and NGOs committed to using their organisations as catalysts for 
change towards a more just, humane and sustainable world. SVN 
Europe was founded in 1993. (SNV, 2003) 
CSR 
organisation 
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Annex 11 - Institutional factors 
In this section the factors proposed in Oliver’s framework are adjusted/adapted to the case of 
ethical investment. The objective is to define specific and relevant elements, related to the field 
studied, for each institutional factor. These elements will be used as guideline in the next section 
to investigate corporations’ responses to ethical investment. The elements are not fixed and can 
change from case to case. The specification of the factors is based on empirical data from the 
field of ethical investment and the Triodos Case.  
Cause: Why is the organisation being pressured to conform to institutional rules or 
expectations? 
The ‘cause’ factor refers to the underlying rationale or expectations associated with institutional 
pressures. The choice between acquiescent and more resistant strategies depends on the degree to 
which the organisation agrees with, and values the intentions or objectives that institutional 
constituents are attempting to achieve in pressuring the organisation to be more socially or 
economically accountable (Oliver, 1991).  
Oliver (1991) identifies two main categories of institutional pressures: social and economic 
fitness. Criteria for ethical investment deal with social, environmental and financial aspects, 
therefore pressures concern both social acceptability and economic accountability.  
Acquiescence is more likely if a company perceives that conformity may bring social and/or 
economic gain, or if it enhances the social and/or economic fitness, and it is less likely if the 
company perceives no strategic utility, or if the pressures are against its interests. The choice 
between acquiescence and resistance strategies depends on the degree to which the corporation 
agrees with, and values the requirements of ethical investment.  
Social fitness: Reputation 
Ethical investment deals with issues that can impact on the social legitimacy of corporations (see 
Chapter 3). Ethical investment can either enhance the social fitness of companies – for example a 
company is included in a sustainable index – or on the contrary it can damage its social 
legitimacy – for example a company is excluded from a sustainable index or the ethical screening 
reveals some misbehaviour to the public. A direct impact may be on the reputation/image of 
corporations. 
Ethical investment may also have a strategic utility or serve the company’s interest. For example 
if a company considers ethical investment as an aspect of CSR, and if CSR is part of the 
legitimacy rationality of the company, ethical investment may serve its rationality and reinforce 
its strategic position/reputation.  
Economic fitness: Profitability & Share price 
Although ethical investors take into account social and environmental aspects, they expect the 
company to produce good financial results. Share markets are driven by economic rationalities. 
The extent to which corporations perceive an economic rationality in being socially and 
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environmentally responsible may play an important part in the way they respond to ethical 
investment.  
Two elements can be derived from the economic fitness factor: 
- Profitability: Stock-quoted companies are for-profit organisations and are expected to be 
profitable. Improving the sustainability performance may have a positive impact– resource 
savings – or a negative one – investment costs – on the economic fitness of companies. If the 
perceived costs of being ethical are too high compared to the perceived benefits, companies 
may resist moving towards sustainability.  
- Share price: The price of the share of a company reflects the economical value of the 
company. If social and environmental aspects are perceived by the market as an element of 
the health of corporations, sustainability performance may influence share prices. If the 
amount of money invested under ethical or sustainable considerations reaches a certain level, 
it may affect share prices. 
Constituents: Who is exerting institutional pressure on the organisations? 
‘Constituents’ are the actors who exert institutional pressure on organisations. According to 
Oliver there are two aspects to look at when analysing the constituents: the constituent 
multiplicity and the dependence on constituents. Multiplicity refers to the expectations and 
demands from the constituents exerting pressures on the organisation: are they multiple and 
conflicting, or unitary and coherent? Dependence refers to resource dependency: to what extent is 
the organisation dependent on the constituents exerting pressures?  
There are three aspects that need to be addressed by this factor: firstly, the demands from, and the 
dependency of corporation on, the constituents within the field of ethical investment; Secondly, 
the demands from ethical investment constituents and from CSR, as orporations do not always 
distinguish ethical investment from CSR. It may be therefore interesting to explore whether or not 
demands from these two fields are conflicting or similar; and thirdly, the demands from ethical 
investment/CSR constituents and other stakeholders of the company.  
Multiplicity: Diversity of demands and requirements 
The presence of multiple constituencies may lead to different expectations and conflicting 
objectives. When this happens, the impact of the pressures may be weaker (Powell, 1991) and 
organisational resistance may be easier. Conflicting institutional pressures and multiple 
constituents can create fragmentation within an institutional environment and reduce the degree 
of consensus among institutional actors (Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991). Companies can easily avoid 
conforming to the demands by arguing that they cannot comply with all of them. 
Not all shareholders are ethical investors. Regular and ethical investors may have different 
requirements. This is illustrated by the debate between social and financial performance, or 
environmental versus financial performance. 
The demands placed by ethical investment are most of the time reflected in the criteria used for 
screening companies. This is the case as much for the exclusionary criteria such as animal testing, 
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child labour or arm industry, as for comparative criteria, for which companies are asked whether 
they have sites with ISO 14000 certification, a code of conduct, an environmental policy, etc. The 
companies may perceive conflicting expectations between ethical investment and their other 
stakeholders, either related to CSR or not, which would preclude its ability to conform to ethical 
investment demands. However if expectations and demands are compatible, companies are more 
likely to acquiesce to institutional pressures.  
Dependence: Capital providers & Voting rights 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) assert that the extent of an organisation’s conformity response to 
pressures is a function of its dependence on the constituents exerting pressures. Resistance is 
more likely when the organisation has low dependence on institutional constituents. The greater 
the extent to which institutional constituents control the allocation or availability of critical 
resources for the organisation, the more difficult resistance to the expectations of those 
constituents will be (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Ethical investors, being shareholders, provide capital to corporations. It is a crucial asset for 
stock-quoted companies. An important issue is to what extent corporations have the feeling that a 
significant percentage of the capital is owned by ethical investors, or to what extent this 
percentage is growing and may become significant? 
Another aspect related to dependence is the issue of shareholders’ rights. All shareholders are 
entitled to attend shareholder meetings, at which directors may be elected, dividend payments 
approved, by-laws modified or new capital raised. Shareholders have the right to participate in 
these meetings either to signify their approval or indicate their disagreement. Generally one share 
gives the right to one vote. However, certain companies provide for double voting rights in their 
by-laws for certain types of shares. Although the general meeting of shareholders has very little 
power to interfere with the directors’ and executives’ day-to-day exercise of managerial powers, 
shareholders may use their rights to block certain decisions.  
Content: To which norms or requirements is the organisation being pressured to conform? 
Oliver’s third factor refers to the consistency of the pressures with the organisations’ existing 
goals and expectations and the loss of decision-making discretion that the pressures impose on 
them. In order to explore this factor, it is important to focus on the way corporations perceive the 
requirements of ethical investment: are they compatible with their own goals and objectives? Do 
they constrain certain decisions or limit the freedom of choice of corporations?  
Consistency: Compatibility 
Inconsistency reflects organisational interests at cross purposes with institutional objectives and 
provokes organisational doubts about the validity or legitimacy of institutional expectations. 
When there is low consistency, corporations may easily question the requirements.  
Three aspects need to be taken into account: 
- Ethical investment criteria may be inconsistent with the corporation’s goal and objectives. 
For example a number of ethical investment funds have banned the use of genetically 
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modified organisms (GMO) in food, but some companies have made of GMO one of their 
key research & development areas. In this case the ethical investment requirement is not 
compatible with one of the companies’ objectives. According to Oliver (1991) responsiveness 
is greater when institutional pressure is congruent with an organisation’s existing goals and 
policies.  
- Criteria used for ethical investment have been developed independently by rating 
organisations, sometimes on the basis of common frameworks and conventions such as GRI 
or ILO, and sometimes not. Criteria may be perceived by corporations as disconnected from 
business reality and from the sector or market standards.  
- The requirements of ethical investment, although they may not be incompatible with the 
company’s goal and objectives, may nevertheless not match technical standards. In this case 
the corporation is not capable, although it may be willing, to conform to the requirements.  
Constraint: Screening process & Shareholder activism 
The loss of organisational freedom stemming from conformity to institutional pressures may 
diminish the willingness of corporations to conform. Companies like to feel that to a certain 
degree they control their own organisational decisions (Oliver, 1991). 
Ethical investment may be perceived as a constraint because it imposes criteria that have not been 
discussed with corporations. Although some rating organisations from the ethical investment field 
do seek dialogue with corporations, these may feel that they have little say in the outcome of the 
screening. If they want to be included in the ethical fund or indices they have to conform, 
otherwise they are excluded. There is no choice for the company. Companies might feel 
oppressed, misunderstood or misjudged by sustainable analysts.  
Shareholders may exert pressure on the management board by raising issues during the General 
Annual Meetings (‘shareholder engagement’). Shareholder engagement’ emphasises on 
shareholder dialogue as a core mechanism for bringing company actions into line with the wishes 
of the shareholders. In this way, shareholders may influence the corporation’s management.  
Control: How or by what means are the institutional pressures being exerted? 
Control refers to the mechanisms/method through which rules are enforced, the means by which 
pressures are exerted on organisations. In the literature two distinct processes are identified: legal 
coercion and voluntary diffusion (DiMaggio, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer 1978; Scott, 1987).  
Coercion: Regulatory agencies 
If there is a high level of enforcement, vigilance and sanctions for non-compliance, corporations 
are less likely to resist the pressures.  
Ethical investment does not directly involve law or governmental mandate. However some of the 
issues it deals with such as child labour, human rights, working hours, or marketing practices are 
subject to conventions and agreements. 
Moreover governments and inter-governmental bodies have enacted policies or published 
recommendations related to corporate responsibility. It is the case for example in the Netherlands 
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with the White Paper published in 2001. This document presents the approach of the Dutch 
Government on CSR, which is intented to be translated into policies.  
Diffusion: Imitation/Competitors & Societal support 
Institutional pressures and expectations may occur not only through legal coercion but also by 
means of voluntary diffusion (Oliver, 1991). Oliver states that the extent to which an institutional 
expectation or practice has already diffused or spread voluntarily through an organisational field 
tends to predict the likelihood of conformity to institutional expectations. The more broadly 
diffused an institutional expectation or practice, the higher the likelihood that organisations will 
conform to these expectations. The less widespread a set of values, practices, or expectations, the 
higher the likelihood that organisations will resist them. (Oliver, 1991).  
Two main elements are related to the diffusion of ethical investment criteria: 
- Imitation/Competitors: According to Scott, diffusion can be observed within organisations 
that are similar to the imitating organisation or those in close proximity to it (Scott & 
Christensen, 1995). In every sector there are early adopters and late adopters (Rickards, 1985; 
Rogers, 1995). Early adopters provide an example for other organisations to imitate 
(Galaskiewicz & Wasseman, 1989). Several studies have analysed the diffusion process 
(Fligstein, 1985; Knobe, 1982; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). They confirm DiMaggio and 
Powell’s mimetic view of organisational conformity, meaning that organisations may model 
themselves on other successful organisations (DiMaggio et al., 1983). Ethical investment 
compares corporations and makes clear who is the best sustainable company. It stimulates 
competition among corporations and may stimulate the mechanism of imitation: In order to 
get a good screening, companies may imitate competitors that have been nominated as the 
best of their sector.  
- Societal support: Oliver argues that when institutional rules or norms are broadly diffused and 
supported, organisations are expected to acquiesce to these pressures because their social 
validity is largely unquestioned (Oliver, 1991). These rules and norms also tend to become 
taken-for-granted understandings of what constitutes legitimate or rational behaviour. 
Conformity becomes the strategy because it does not occur to them to do otherwise. On the 
contrary when the diffusion of norms and practices in an institutional environment is low, 
organisations are less likely to conform. Ethical criteria, as part of CSR, may be perceived as 
reflecting societal concerns. Moreover ethical investment involves the consultation of 
corporations’ stakeholders such as trade unions and NGOs. It not only entails spreading or 
sharing some norms/criteria but also getting the support of societal groups. This support 
enhances the legitimacy of ethical investment. 
Moreover, as has just been said above, some of the criteria for ethical investment are based on 
widespread conventions and agreements, such as the ILO conventions, which makes the 
diffusion of ethical investment norms easier.  
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Context: What is the environmental context within which institutional pressures are being 
exerted? 
The environmental context within which institutional pressures are exerted is an influential factor 
in corporations’ responses. Oliver distinguishes two main dimensions of the context: 
environmental uncertainty and interconnectedness. Uncertainty refers to what is unpredictable, 
undecided, variable, and changeable. That means that future states cannot be anticipated and 
predicted. The level of interconnectedness within the environment relates to the density of inter-
organisational relations among occupants of an organisational field (Oliver, 1991). Through these 
connections, organisations are exposed to and socialised to accept institutional norms and 
expectations (Cartwright, 1998).  
Uncertainty: Ethical criteria 
Multiplicity may be a source of uncertainty (Oliver, 1991). Organisational decision-makers have 
a strong preference for certainty, stability, and predictability (Oliver, 1991). In an uncertain and 
unpredictable environment, corporations may be more inclined to follow institutional pressures 
and to imitate one another (DiMaggio et al., 1983; Galaskiewicz et al., 1989). Uncertainty may 
also be a reason for avoiding or defying pressures (Oliver, 1991).  
Ethical investment has evolved in relation to three concepts: ethics, sustainable development and 
CSR. Although CSR may seem to be clearer, all three concepts are sources of uncertainties for 
corporations. Interpretation, understanding and translation of the concepts vary greatly between 
stakeholders and individuals.  
Moreover criteria used for ethical investment are not standardised. They may vary from fund to 
fund and may give rise to divergent interpretations.  
The criteria of ethical investment deal with issues that are evolving and usually very sensitive. 
That is the case for example with GMOs, about which scientific knowledge is developing, but it 
is more generally the case with all issues related to corporate behaviour which involve the 
relationship between consumer/society and the company. 
Interconnectedness: Networks 
Interconnectedness facilitates the voluntary diffusion of norms, values and shared information 
(Cartwright, 1998; Oliver, 1991). Interconnected environments provide channels through which 
institutional norms can be diffused resulting in a higher consensus regarding norms. Such a 
consensus in turn increases the strength of institutional norms and their potential influence on 
organisational responses (DiMaggio et al., 1983; Oliver, 1991). Therefore a high degree of 
interconnectness facilitates acquiescence to institutional pressures (DiMaggio et al., 1983; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). On the contrary environments that are fragmented or purely 
competitive hinder the spread of institutional consensus and conformity (Oliver, 1991) providing 
reasons to corporations to defy or manipulate institutional pressures.  
Ethical investment has created new networks such as ethical investment organisations – EIRIS, 
VBDO, and others – and has brought new actors into the sphere of CSR/sustainable development, 
in particular financial institutions. Is ethical investment perceived by corporations as stimulating 
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contact between organisations? Do corporations have more contact with their stakeholders 
because of ethical investment? 
Cause Why is the company being pressured?  
Social legitimacy - Strategic utility 
- Legitimacy rationality 
- Organisational interest 
Reputation 
Economic fitness - Economic gain 
- Economic accountability 
- Economic rationalisation 
Profitability 
Share price 
Constituents Who is exerting institutional pressure on the 
company? 
 
Multiplicity 
(From constituents) 
- Conflicting pressures, conflicting expectations 
- Incompatible and competing demands 
- Conflicting interest groups 
Diversity of 
demands and 
requirements 
Dependency 
(Organisation’s 
dependence on the 
constituents) 
- Constituent’s in/ability to control the allocation 
or availability of some critical organisation 
resource 
- The organisation’s willingness or ability to find 
alternative resources or resource suppliers.  
Capital 
providers 
Voting rights 
Content To what norms or requirements?  
Consistency 
(Constituents’ 
demands/organisati
on’s goals) 
- Compatibility with internal goals 
- Validity or legitimacy of institutional 
expectations.  
Compatibility 
Constraint - Loss of decision-making discretion that the 
pressures impose on the organisation 
- Constraint on substantive organisational 
decisions 
Screening 
process 
Shareholder 
activism 
Control How or by what?  
Coercion 
(Legal coercion) 
- Law, government mandate 
- Consequences of non compliance: punitive, 
enforcement system 
- Regulatory agencies 
- Mechanisms for enforcing compliance 
Regulatory 
agencies 
Diffusion 
(Voluntary 
diffusion) 
- Spreading values, practices or expectations 
- Imitation and contagion of legitimacy 
- Organisation’s awareness of values and practices 
- Organisation’s scepticism.  
- Competition within the field 
Imitation/Comp
etitors 
Societal support 
Context What is the environmental context?  
Uncertainty - Environmental certainty and predictability 
- Knowledge of the values and norms 
Ethical criteria 
Interconnectedness - Connectedness or fragmentation of the 
environment 
Networks 
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Annex 12- Strategic responses compared to Oliver’s predicted 
strategies 
The table represents the institutional antecedents and predicted strategic responses as 
described in Oliver’s (1991). For each of the cases, before 1999 and after 2000, the 
identified factors have been highlighted in gray and the dominant strategy are circled in a 
black frame, except for C1 & C4 because, there is not a significant difference between the 
strategies however Acquiescence gets one more factor. The strategy identify according to 
the data is indicated with an arrow.  
Strategic responses Before 1999 
Factor Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause      
Legitimacy High Low Low Low Low 
Efficiency High Low Low Low Low 
Constituents      
Multiplicity Low High High High High 
Dependence High High Moderate Low Low 
Content      
Consistency High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Constraint Low Moderate High High High 
Control      
Coercion High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Diffusion High High Moderate Low Low 
Context      
Uncertainty High High High Low Low 
Interconnectedness High High Moderate Low Low 
Uncertainty is High for part of the companies (C2, C3, C5, C6) and Low for others (C1 
and C4); Interconnectedness could not be evaluated; None is considered as Low 
 
Strategic responses After 2000 – C1 & 
C4 
Predictive Factor 
Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause      
Legitimacy High Low Low Low Low 
Efficiency High Low Low Low Low 
Constituents      
Multiplicity Low High High High High 
Dependence High High Moderate Low Low 
Content      
Consistency High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Constraint Low Moderate High High High 
Control      
Coercion High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Diffusion High High Moderate Low Low 
Context      
Uncertainty High High High Low Low 
Interconnectedness High High Moderate Low Low 
Legitimacy: not taken into account because it was considered as Moderate
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Strategic responses After 2000 – 
 C2 & C3 
Predictive Factor 
Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause      
Legitimacy High Low Low Low Low 
Efficiency High Low Low Low Low 
Constituents      
Multiplicity Low High High High High 
Dependence High High Moderate Low Low 
Content      
Consistency High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Constraint Low Moderate High High High 
Control      
Coercion High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Diffusion High High Moderate Low Low 
Context      
Uncertainty High High High Low Low 
Interconnectedness High High Moderate Low Low 
 
Strategic responses After 2000 – C5 & 
C6 
Predictive Factor 
Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause      
Legitimacy High Low Low Low Low 
Efficiency High Low Low Low Low 
Constituents      
Multiplicity Low High High High High 
Dependence High High Moderate Low Low 
Content      
Consistency High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Constraint Low Moderate High High High 
Control      
Coercion High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Diffusion High High Moderate Low Low 
Context      
Uncertainty High High High Low Low 
Interconnectedness High High Moderate Low Low 
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Summary  
The dissertation examines the development of ethical investment in the Netherlands 
during the period 1990-2002. Drawing on institutional theory, it investigates the 
emergence and construction of the ethical investment field, paying particular attention to 
corporations’ responses to this growing phenomenon.  
Ethical investment, also called socially responsible investment, is a form of stock 
investment based on social, environmental and financial screenings. Over the years, the 
activity has gone through a number of changes. Its origins go back to the 18th century in 
the US. For hundreds of years, ethical investment was related to religious groups who 
actively chose to avoid investing in certain kinds of enterprises, the so-called "sin" stocks 
– alcohol, tobacco, weapons and gambling. In the 1970s, a number of social and 
environmental movements showed interest in ethical investment and used it as a political 
tool for lobbying corporations involved, for example, in South Africa or in the Vietnam 
War. In the mid-1980s ethical investment started to develop in Europe; within a decade it 
had shifted from being an activist movement to a mainstream financial product. The 
dissertation focuses on this latest period of transformation and addresses two main 
research questions:  
1) What are the nature and characteristics of the institutionalisation process of the 
field of ethical investment?  
2) How do corporations respond to the pressures exerted by ethical investment?  
The theoretical perspective is based on new institutional theory. This perspective 
emphasises the relationship between organisations and their environments and argues that 
institutionalisation places constraints on organisational rationality. Ethical investment is 
approached in terms of organisational field. Fields do not emerge fully formed; they 
evolve over time through processes and mechanisms of institutionalisation.  
The empirical data are organised into one in-depth case study and six smaller case 
studies. The in-depth case study is based on a five-year participation-observation in a 
Dutch rating organisation, Triodos Research. It is completed by the analysis of nine other 
Dutch ethical investment funds, interviews with other key actors in the field, and the 
screening of various publications related to ethical investment (articles, brochures, 
reports, etc). The in-depth case study provides rich insights into the process of ethical 
investment, the relationships between the actors (network analysis), and the development 
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of the field and activity over time. Corporations’ responses to ethical investment are 
investigated through the analysis of the six smaller case studies. They consist of six 
stock-quoted Dutch companies from three different sectors of activity, namely oil & 
chemicals, food and media. Data on the cases have been gathered through interviews with 
managers, annual reports, websites, and newspaper cuttings.  
These empirical data focus on several aspects. Firstly, how actors of the field perceive 
and describe ethical investment, both the broader historical context and the more 
immediate personal one. Secondly, what stimulated their involvement in the field. 
Thirdly, how do actors see their role within the field. Fourthly, how do they talk about the 
activity of ethical investment. Fifthly, what do they do and with whom do they have 
contacts. And finally, what do they say others do. The data was analysed in a first stage 
by being classified into categories and themes, and then by employing data displays such 
as thematic lists, designed to help organise and interpret the data (Miles & Huberman, 
1984). A theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 guided the process of data 
reduction.  
The results show that ethical investment is a maturing field still under a process of 
institutionalisation. There is a public discourse about it and there are organisations that 
are concerned with activities related to this concept. During the institutionalisation 
process, ethical investment has shifted from being an activist-related activity to a 
commercial project. In the Dutch case, financial institutions and rating organisations have 
played a major role in initiating and professionalising the activity. The data shows that at 
the end of the 1990s ethical investment was captured by mainstream financial institutions. 
In this new activity they perceived some strategic interests: it provided a means to 
reinforce their sustainability approach as well as creating new market opportunities. The 
capture initiated a number of changes within the field and produced a new institutional 
context, which created new types of pressures on corporations. In response, corporations 
adopted new approaches regarding ethical investment and strategically used some 
elements of ethical investment, namely the sustainability indices. The indices have been 
transformed into an external Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) certification in order 
to enhance their own legitimacy towards their stakeholders. Both the capture by 
mainstream financial institutions and the appropriation of the sustainability indices by 
corporations turned ethical investment into a viable commercial project and transformed 
the activity into an element of the broader CSR field.  
The thesis attempts to frame and conceptualise the institutional process of the ethical 
investment field and understand its impact on firms’ behaviour. An important part of the 
research has been to understand the dynamic issues within the field. The major theoretical 
contribution to institutional theory is the expansion of its empirical base. It does so in 
three respects. Firstly it investigates the institutionalisation of a ‘commercial project’, an 
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area that has received little attention from institutional theorists. Secondly it explores an 
institutional field which is ‘in formation’, while studies have mostly focused on mature 
fields. And thirdly it focuses on the structuration process by adopting a ‘mechanism 
approach’ whereas other research studies tend to concentrate on field operations and 
structural determinants. This last element underlined the complexity of field formation, 
which is created through actions of, and interactions between, actors and involve a 
portfolio of mechanisms that take place in combination and interrelation with each other. 
The dissertation also contributes to literature on ethical investment and brings new 
insights into the development of this phenomenon. The study of the Dutch ethical 
investment community raises a number of questions related to the role of ethical 
investment in stimulating sustainable development. Firstly it questions the positive 
impact on shareholders’ awareness regarding social and environmental issues, given the 
process of disengagement of shareholders during the institutionalisation phase. Secondly 
it points to the limited impact of ethical investment as regards the promotion and 
dissemination of the concept of sustainable development within the financial sector. 
Thirdly, it shows how the debate around sustainable development risks being paralysed 
by the standardisation of sustainability criteria. Fourthly it recognises the development 
and improvement of the selection process but notes that screenings are for a significant 
part based on information provided by corporations themselves, which may create a 
dependency problem. It underlines new relationships between actors of the field due to 
the involvement of new actors. And finally, it points at the problem of decoupling. The 
ethical investment community puts pressure on companies to disclose an increasing 
amount of information related to sustainable development. However are these the right 
types of pressure to stimulate change towards sustainable development? One of the risks 
is to encourage companies to adopt buffering strategies by decoupling or detaching its 
technical activities from external scrutiny. 
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Samenvatting  
Het proefschrift onderzoekt de ontwikkeling van ethisch beleggen in Nederland 
gedurende de periode 1990-2002. Vanuit het perspectief van de institutionele theorie 
wordt de opkomst en ontwikkeling van ethisch beleggen bestudeerd. Daarbij wordt in het 
bijzonder aandacht geschonken aan de reacties vanuit het bedrijfsleven op dit groeiende 
terrein. 
Ethisch beleggen, ook wel sociaal verantwoord investeren genoemd, is een vorm van 
beleggen in aandelen gebaseerd op een sociale, milieukundige en financiële screening. In 
de loop der jaren heeft zich op dit terrein een aantal veranderingen voorgedaan. De 
oorsprong ervan ligt in de Verenigde Staten van de 18e eeuw. Gedurende de honderd jaar 
die daarop volgde was het ethisch investeren gerelateerd aan religieuze groepen, die 
bewust hadden gekozen voor het vermijden van beleggen in bepaalde soorten 
ondernemingen; de zo genoemde ‘zondige’ aandelen - alcohol, tabak, wapens en gokken. 
In de jaren zeventig van de 20e eeuw toonde een aantal maatschappelijke organisaties op 
sociaal en milieugebied interesse voor ethisch beleggen en gebruikte het als een politiek 
instrument om het bedrijfsleven dat betrokken was bij het apartheidregiem in Zuid-Afrika 
of de oorlog in Vietnam, onder druk te zetten. 
Midden jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw begon het ethisch beleggen zich in Europa te 
ontwikkelen. Binnen tien jaar veranderde het van een activistische beweging in een 
mainstream financieel product. Dit proefschrift richt zich met name op deze laatste 
periode van verandering en stelt de volgende twee hoofdonderzoeksvragen centraal:  
3) Wat zijn de aard en de kenmerken van het institutionaliseringproces van het gebied 
van ethisch beleggen? 
4) Hoe reageert het bedrijfsleven op de druk die door ethisch beleggen op haar wordt 
uitgeoefend? 
Het theoretisch perspectief van waaruit deze vragen worden belicht, is dat van de nieuwe 
institutionele theorievorming. Dit perspectief benadrukt de relatie tussen organisaties en 
hun omgeving en beargumenteert dat institutionalisering de organisatorische rationaliteit 
beperkt. Ethisch beleggen wordt benaderd als een organisatorisch terrein. Zo’n terrein 
ontstaat niet ineens, maar ontwikkelt zich in de loop der tijd door processen en 
mechanismen van institutionalisering. 
 
Ethical Investment 
 338 
De empirische gegevens zijn verzameld op grond van zeven casestudies, waarvan er één 
diepgaander is. Deze laatste casestudie is gebaseerd op participatieve observatie 
gedurende een periode van vijf jaar binnen een Nederlandse rating organisatie, Triodos 
Research. Saarnaast zijn er een analyse van negen andere Nederlandse ethische 
beleggingsfondsen, interviews met andere sleutelactoren uit het veld, en het doorlichten 
van verschillende publicaties gerelateerd aan ethisch beleggen (artikelen, brochures, 
rapporten, etc.). De diepgaande casestudie geeft talrijke inzichten in het proces van 
ethisch beleggen, de relatie tussen de actoren (netwerk analyse), alsmede de ontwikkeling 
van het veld en de activiteiten door de tijd heen. De reacties van het bedrijfsleven op 
ethisch beleggen zijn onderzocht door het analyseren van zes Nederlandse 
beursgenoteerde bedrijven uit drie verschillende sectoren, namelijk olie & chemie, 
voedsel en media. 
Onderzoeksdata hiervoor is verzameld middels interviews met managers, jaarverslagen, 
websites, krantenberichten.  
Dit empirisch materiaal richt zich op diverse vragen: 
(5) Hoe percipiëren en beschrijven actoren in het veld ethisch beleggen, zowel in 
een bredere historische context als in een meer directe context? 
(6) Wat stimuleerde hun betrokkenheid op dit gebied? 
(7) Hoe zien actoren hun rol op dit terrein? 
(8) Hoe spreekt men over de activiteit van ethisch beleggen? 
(9) Wat doet men en met wie heeft men contact? 
(10) Wat zegt men dat anderen doen? 
In eerste instantie zijn de onderzoeksresultaten geanalyseerd door ze te groeperen in 
categorieën en thema’s. Vervolgens is de data verwerkt met behulp van onder andere 
thematische lijsten, welke dienden als hulpmiddel bij het organiseren en het interpreteren 
van de resultaten (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Een theoretisch raamwerk, ontwikkeld in 
hoofdstuk 3, was behulpzaam bij het proces van data reductie.  
De resultaten tonen aan dat ethische beleggen een zich ontwikkelende sector is die nog 
altijd in een proces van institutionalisering verkeert. Hierover is een publieke discussie 
gaande, waar diverse organisaties bij betrokken zijn. Tijdens het 
institutionaliseringproces is ethisch beleggen verschoven van een activiteit die verbonden 
werd met activisme naar een commercieel product. In het geval van Nederland speelden 
financiële instellingen en ‘rating’ organisaties een belangrijke rol in het initiëren en 
professionaliseren van ethisch beleggen. De data laten zien dat aan het eind van de jaren 
negentig, ethisch beleggen was overgenomen door reguliere financiële instellingen. Zij 
zagen strategische voordelen in deze nieuwe activiteit: het leverde een middel om hun 
duurzaamheidsaanpak te versterken alsook om nieuwe marktkansen te creëren. Deze 
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overname initieerde een aantal veranderingen binnen de sector en bracht een nieuwe 
institutionele context met zich mee, die nieuwe mogelijkheden creëerde om druk uit te 
oefenen op het bedrijfsleven.  
In reactie daarop, implementeerde het bedrijfsleven nieuwe strategieën inzake ethische 
beleggen en maakte het strategisch gebruik van enkele elementen van ethisch beleggen, 
namelijk van de duurzaamheidsindicatoren. De indicatoren zijn vertaald in een systeem 
van externe certificering voor Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen, met als doel 
om hun eigen legitimiteit naar hun stakeholders te vergroten. Zowel de overname door 
mainstream financiële instellingen als de toepassing van duurzaamheidsindicatoren door 
het bedrijfsleven maakten van ethisch beleggen een levensvatbaar commercieel project en 
transformeerde de activiteit tot een belangrijk element van Maatschappelijk Verantwoord 
Ondernemen. 
Dit proefschrift tracht het institutionele proces op het terrein van ethisch beleggen in een 
kader te plaatsen en te conceptualiseren en het effect ervan op het gedrag van bedrijven te 
begrijpen. Een belangrijk deel van het onderzoek was om de dynamische ontwikkeling 
binnen dit terrein te begrijpen. De grootste theoretische bijdrage aan de institutionele 
theorie is de uitbreiding van de empirische basis van de institutionele theorie, en wel in 
drie opzichten: Ten eerste bestudeert het de institutionalisering van een ‘commercieel 
project’, een gebied dat weinig aandacht krijgt van institutionele theoretici. Ten tweede 
onderzoekt het een institutioneel gebied, dat ‘in vorming’ is, terwijl de meeste studies 
zich richten op volgroeide sectoren. En ten derde, richt het zijn aandacht op het proces 
van structuratie door het implementeren van een ‘mechanisme benadering’ terwijl 
onderzoekers geneigd zijn zich te richten op veldwerk en structurele determinanten.  
Dit laatste element vestigt de aandacht op de complexiteit van de formatie van een 
bepaald gebied, dat gecreëerd wordt door acties van en wisselwerking tussen actoren, en 
betrekking heeft op een portfolio van mechanismen die plaatsvinden in combinatie en 
interrelatie met elkaar.  
Het proefschrift draagt evenzo bij aan de literatuur over ethisch beleggen en biedt nieuwe 
inzichten in de ontwikkeling van dit fenomeen. Deze studie van de Nederlandse 
gemeenschap van ethische beleggers roept een aantal vragen op over de rol van ethische 
beleggen in het stimuleren van duurzame ontwikkeling. Ten eerste trekt de studie het 
positieve effect in twijfel op het bewustzijn van aandeelhouders ten aanzien van sociale 
en milieukwesties, omdat zij in het institutionaliseringsproces niet actief betrokken 
waren. Ten tweede betreurt de studie het beperkte effect van ethisch beleggen op het 
stimuleren en verspreiden van het concept van duurzame ontwikkeling binnen de 
financiële sector. Ten derde, brengt de studie het risico naar voren dat discussies rond 
duurzame ontwikkeling worden verlamd door het standaardiseren van 
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duurzaamheidcriteria. Ten vierde erkent de studie de ontwikkeling en verbetering van het 
selectieproces maar constateert dat de screenings voor een belangrijk deel gebaseerd zijn 
op informatie verschaft door de bedrijven zelf. Dit creëert weer een 
afhankelijkheidspositie. De studie onderstreept nieuwe relaties tussen actoren in het veld 
als gevolg van de betrokkenheid van nieuwe actoren. En tenslotte richt de studie zich op 
het probleem van ontkoppeling. De ethische beleggingsgemeenschap zet de bedrijven 
onder druk om een toenemende hoeveelheid informatie over duurzaam ondernemen 
openbaar te maken. De vraag is echter of dit de juiste manier is om verandering in de 
richting van duurzame ontwikkeling te stimuleren. Een van de risico’s is om bedrijven 
aan te moedigen gebruik te maken van buffering-strategieën, door ontkoppeling of 
scheiding van hun technische activiteiten van kritisch onderzoek van derden. 
 
  341
Résumé    
La recherche présentée dans la thèse s’intéresse au développement de l’investissement 
éthique aux Pays-Bas entre 1990 et 2002. Basée sur la théorie institutionnelle, l’étude 
examine l’émergence et la construction du champ institutionnel de l’investissement 
éthique, avec une attention particulière sur les réponses des entreprises à ce phénomène 
croissant. 
L’investissement éthique, ou investissement socialement responsable, est une forme de 
placement sous forme d’actions ou d’obligations sur la base de critères financiers, 
sociaux et environnementaux. Au cours des années, l’activité s’est développée et a subi 
de nombreux changements. Les origines de l’investissement éthique remontent au 18ième 
siècle. Les premiers fonds éthiques sont apparus aux Etats-Unis, sous la pression des 
congrégations religieuses qui refusaient d'investir dans des « actions du péché » (sin 
stocks). Les entreprises actives dans l'alcool, le tabac, le jeu, l'armement et la 
pornographie se voyaient donc exclues. A partir des années 70, le concept 
d'investissement éthique entre dans une nouvelle logique. Un certain nombre de groupes 
sociaux et environnementaux y voient un instrument de boycott pour afficher leur 
opposition. Il devient donc un outil à finalité politique. Au cours des années 80, 
l’investissement éthique commence à se développer en Europe et prend une forme 
nouvelle, celle d’un produit financier courant. La dissertation se concentre sur cette 
dernière période de transformation et aborde deux questions de recherche principales : 
1. Quelle est la nature et quelles sont les caractéristiques du processus 
d’institutionnalisation du champ de l’investissement éthique ?  
2. Comment répondent les entreprises aux pressions exercées par l’investissement 
éthique ? 
Le cadre théorique de la recherche est basé sur la théorie néo-institutionnelle. Cette 
perspective souligne l’importance des relations entre les organisations et leur 
environnement. Elle soutient également que dans une certaine mesure les institutions 
exercent des contraintes sur la rationalité des organisations. Cette recherche aborde 
l’investissement éthique sous l’angle du champ organisationnel, c’est–à-dire un ensemble 
d’organisations opérant dans le même domaine, définies par la similarité de leurs 
services, produits ou fonctions, et ayant pour but de mener à bien un projet commun 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ; Scott, 2001). Les champs organisationnels se forment à 
travers des processus et mécanismes d’institutionnalisation. Avec le temps et par l’action, 
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les règles qui définissent le champ deviennent institutionnalisées et un langage commun 
ainsi qu’une structure sociale se développent (Meyer & Rowan, 1977b).  
Les données empiriques sont organisées autour d’une étude approfondie et de six études 
de cas. L’étude approfondie s’appuie sur une participation-observation de cinq années 
dans une agence néerlandaise de rating sociale et environnementale (Triodos Research). 
L’étude est complétée par l’analyse de neuf autres fonds néerlandais d’investissement 
éthique, des entretiens avec plusieurs acteurs-clé du champ étudié, et de l’analyse de 
diverses publications concernant l’investissement éthique (articles, brochures, rapports, 
etc.). L’étude approfondie donne un riche aperçu du processus d’investissement éthique, 
des relations entre les acteurs (analyse de réseaux), et du développement du champ 
institutionnel et de l’activité au cours des dix dernières années. Afin d’étudier les 
réponses des entreprises à l’investissement éthique, six firmes néerlandaises cotées en 
bourse actives dans trois secteurs d’activité différents --pétrole et chimie, nourriture, 
média-- sont analysées. Une série d’entretiens avec des managers, l’analyse des 
informations fournies par les entreprises de 1996 à 2002 (rapports, brochures, sites 
internet, etc.) et des articles de journaux on permis de recueillir les données empiriques 
pour les six études de cas.  
Les donnés se focalisent sur plusieurs aspects. Premièrement: comment les acteurs du 
champ organisationnel perçoivent et décrivent l’investissement éthique tant dans son 
contexte historique au sens large que dans sa proximité plus immédiate et personnelle. 
Deuxièmement: quelles sont les motifs qui ont stimulé leur engagement dans ce champ 
d’activité. Troisièmement: comment envisagent-ils leur rôle dans le champ 
organisationnel. Quatrièmement: comment parlent-ils de l’investissement éthique 
(analyse du discours). Cinquièmement: quel est leur rôle dans le champ et avec qui ont-ils 
des contacts. Et sixièmement: comment perçoivent-ils les autres acteurs du secteur. Les 
donnés empiriques ont été analysées suivant la méthode de Miles & Huberman (1984). 
Les données ont été, dans un premier temps, organisées en plusieurs catégories puis 
déployées par thème afin de les interpréter. La réduction des données a suivi un cadre 
théorique défini grâce à la perspective institutionnelle.  
Les résultats de la recherche montrent que l’investissement éthique est un champ 
organisationnel en cours d’institutionnalisation, qui n’est pas encore mature. On peut y 
déceler un discours public, ainsi que des organisations et des personnes concernées par 
cette activité. Au cours du processus d’institutionnalisation, l’investissement éthique a 
basculé d’un instrument activiste à un projet commercial. Dans le cas hollandais, les 
institutions financières et les agences de rating ont joué un rôle majeur dans 
l’initialisation et la professionnalisation de l’activité. Les données montrent qu’à la fin 
des années 90, l’investissement éthique a été capturé par les institutions financières 
dominantes, qui y ont vu un intérêt stratégique: renforcer leur image de banque durable et 
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créer de nouvelles opportunités de marché. Cette capture a eu pour conséquences d’initier 
plusieurs changements au sein du champ organisationnel et de produire un nouveau 
contexte institutionnel, créant un autre type de pressions sur les entreprises. En réponse à 
ce changement, les entreprises ont adopté de nouvelles stratégies vis-à-vis de 
l’investissement éthique et ont utilisé stratégiquement certains éléments de cette activité, 
plus exactement les indices boursiers: Dow Jones Sustainability et FTSE4Good. Ces 
indices boursiers ont été transformés en schéma de certification externe de la 
responsabilité sociale des entreprises. Les entreprises listées sur les indices ont ainsi 
consolidé leur légitimité sociale. La capture par les institutions financières et la 
récupération des indices boursiers ont tous deux contribué à la transformation de 
l’investissement éthique en un projet commercial viable et à son assimilation comme 
élément de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises.  
La recherche tente de fournir un cadre théorique et de conceptualiser le processus 
d’institutionnalisation du champ de l’investissement éthique ainsi que de comprendre 
l’effet du développement de ce champ organisationnel sur le comportement social et 
environnemental des entreprises cotées en bourse. Une majeure partie de la recherche 
explore les dynamiques au sein du champ organisationnel. La principale contribution 
théorique concerne l’expansion de la base empirique utilisée dans le cadre de la théorie 
institutionnelle. Ainsi elle examine le processus d’institutionnalisation d’un ‘projet 
commercial’, ce qui a jusqu’à présent reçu très peu d’attention. Elle explore un champ 
institutionnel ‘en cours de formation’, alors que la plupart des recherches se concentrent 
sur des champs matures, c’est–à-dire déjà formés et institutionnalisés. Et finalement la 
recherche s’intéresse aux ‘mécanismes’ du processus de structuration, alors que les 
recherches en théorie institutionnelle ont tendance à se concentrer sur les déterminants 
structuraux et le fonctionnement des champs. 
La recherche contribue également au corps de littérature sur l’investissement éthique et 
apporte un nouveau regard sur le développement de ce phénomène. Elle soulève un 
certain nombre de questions concernant la capacité de l’investissement éthique à 
contribuer au développement durable. Tout d’abord le processus d’institutionnalisation a 
créé un certain désengagement des actionnaires ce qui restreint la capacité de 
l’investissement éthique à sensibiliser les actionnaires aux problèmes sociaux et 
environnementaux. Deuxièmement, le rôle de l’investissement éthique en tant que 
promoteur et diffuseur du concept de développement durable au sein du secteur financier 
est limité. Troisièmement, le processus d’institutionnalisation a entraîné la 
standardisation des critères pour l’investissement éthique. Un des risques de cette 
standardisation est de paralyser le débat sur le développement durable au lieu de le 
stimuler. Quatrièmement, les systèmes de sélection et de rating pour l’investissement 
éthique se sont développés et améliorés au cours de ces dernières années. Cependant la 
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part d’information fournie par les entreprises elles-mêmes pour l’évaluation s’est 
notablement accrue. Les agences de rating et les entreprises ont formé un nouveau type 
de relation qui, dans le futur, peut créer un problème de dépendance et ainsi réduire la 
marge de manœuvre des agences de rating. Et enfin, les résultats de la recherche 
indiquent un risque de découplement. L’une des principales pressions exercées par la 
communauté de l’investissement éthique sur les entreprises concerne la divulgation 
d’informations: une quantité de plus en plus importante d’information est exigée afin 
d’obtenir une notation respectable. Bien qu’en elle-même une telle demande puisse être 
perçue comme positive, car elle conduit à une plus grande transparence, on peut se 
demander si elle contribue positivement au changement vers un développement durable. 
En effet, afin de se protéger de telles pressions les entreprises ont tendance à adopter des 
stratégies dites de ‘buffering’ (tampon), en d’autres termes elles isolent et protègent leurs 
activités techniques de toute surveillance externe.  
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